• CalendarAugust 9, 2018 – "Hatch-Waxman Litigation and 30-Month Stays: Multiple Stays, Late-Listed Patents, and More" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 9, 2018 – "Strategies and Pitfalls of CIP and Provisional Practice" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    August 14, 2018 – Patent Quality Chat webinar (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 12:00 to 1:00 pm (ET) on 

    August 16, 2018 – "Patent Drafting for Machine Learning: Structural Claim Limitations, Avoiding 101 or 112 Rejections" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 16-17, 2018 – "Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2018: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing" (Practising Law Institute) – San Francisco, CA

    August 21, 2018 – "Navigating the Patent Prosecution Highway and Other Accelerated Filing Options — Evaluating the Different Options, Weighing the Benefits and Risks, Obtaining Patent Protection" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    September 21, 2018 – "USPTO Post-Grant Patent Trials 2018: Change & Recalibration" (Practising Law Institute) – New York & Groupcasts in Philadelphia, Indianapolis, New Brunswick, NJ, Pittsburgh, and Mechanicsburg, PA

    September 27-28, 2018 – "Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2018: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing" (Practising Law Institute) – Chicago, IL

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be offering the next webinar in its Patent Quality Chat webinar series from 12:00 to 1:00 pm (ET) on August 14, 2018.  In the latest webinar, entitled "AIA Trial Statistics from PTAB and Using AIA Trials to Enhance Patent Examination," Janet Gongola, Vice Chief Judge for Engagement, Patent Trial and Appeal Board; and Jack Harvey, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Patent Operations, will discuss performance benchmarks of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for America Invents Act (AIA) trials highlighting inter partes reviews (IPRs), and present how programs such as the Post Grant Outcomes program work together to improve patent quality.

    Additional information regarding this webinar, including instructions for viewing the webinar, can be found here.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Strategies and Pitfalls of CIP and Provisional Practice" on August 9, 2018 from 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET).  Courtenay Brinckerhoff of Foley & Lardner LLP, Charles Chesney of Qualcomm Inc., and Roland McAndrews of Bookoff McAndrews PLLC will discuss potential pitfalls associated with U.S. provisional or CIP patent applications.  Problems may arise not only when there is failure to fully claim the invention, but if there is a failure to: (1) list all of the inventors in a provisional application, (2) timely assign the provisional application, or (3) properly list the applicant(s).  Similarly, if the timing is not right, CIP applications are often dead on arrival and, even if done correctly, may needlessly sacrifice patent term.  The panel will address PCT traps, as well as the circumstances when filing a provisional or CIP application instead of a standalone utility application can be a sound strategy.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • By James Korenchan —

    USPTO SealNavigating the post-Alice patent-eligibility landscape with graphical user interface (GUI) claims can be trying, particularly when fighting to maintain desirable breadth.  As with all software-related claims, limitations must raise GUI claims (and other types of UI claims, for that matter) beyond fundamental designs and implementations, root the invention in computer technology, and provide a specific, innovative solution to a technological problem.  In the past four years, the Federal Circuit has provided some guidance for GUI claims, perhaps most notable being the recent Core Wireless decision.  In Core Wireless, the Court essentially stated that, to overcome the scrutiny of 35 U.S.C. § 101, a GUI claim should describe the specific functionality and/or layout of the GUI, and in addition, the patent's specification should describe in detail the advantages of the GUI functionality and/or layout over existing methods and designs.

    Still, despite efforts to meet these requirements, practitioners can find themselves faced with rejections citing various cases such as Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., and Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), in which higher-level GUI claims were deemed patent-ineligible.  Even more dreaded is the oft-cited Electric Power Group Federal Circuit decision, used in § 101 rejections to characterize GUI claims to "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis."

    Federal Circuit decisions are certainly helpful to consider in prosecuting GUI claims.  The goal of this post, however, is to highlight a small handful of Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) appeal decisions from the past three months as examples of how the Board has been addressing GUI claims of late.

    In May, for instance, the PTAB affirmed the patent-ineligibility of claims directed to a GUI display for use in locating buried or otherwise inaccessible "utility lines," such as pipes and other conduits, cables, transmitters, etc. by using sensors to detect electromagnetic signal emissions from buried or hidden objects.  The patent application (U.S. Patent App. No. 13/189,844) noted that advances in inexpensive processing power and complex software systems have made it possible to improve locator performance using a GUI to present data obtained from such sensors, such as a direction of current flow.  The application went on to note that there still exist unresolved problems in the field, and the claimed GUI was one of a handful of proposed solutions.  For example, the application described the claimed GUI as incorporating "intuitive" displays that more accurately display representations of signal quality to a user so that no confusion exists as to whether sensor data indicates that a utility line has been found.  However, claim 1, shown as follows, did not appear to sufficiently convey any alleged improvement to GUI display or to the determination of the displayed information.

    1.  A graphical user interface (GUI) display method in a portable locator system for locating a utility line coupled to a phase-encoded modulated electromagnetic (EM) reference signal, the method comprising the steps of:
        measuring, at the locator system, a three dimensional magnetic field generated at least in part based on the phase-encoded modulated EM reference signal;
        determining a current flow based on the measured magnetic field;
        determining a direction of the current flow based on the phase-encoding of the modulated EM reference signal; and
        displaying, on the GUI, a representation of the direction of the current flow.

    In rejecting this claim, the Examiner deemed the claim to be directed to an abstract idea of an algorithm for measuring and determining a direction of current flow, and cited both Diamond v. Diehr and Electric Power Group.  And with regard to Electric Power Group, the Board equated the "measuring" step to data gathering, equated the middle two steps as processing gathered data, and deemed the display of current flow direction to be an insufficient post-solution activity.  The Appellants' attempt at distinguishing over Electric Power Group stated that the claims "have nothing to do with" measuring current direction and instead provide an improved process for using current direction to help find information about buried utilities and for processing signals emitted from the utility.  The Appellants further asserted that the claims use this alleged improved process to in turn improve the technology of providing a visual representation of detected buried utilities.  Still, the Examiner and the Board did not waver on step one of Alice.  In addition, the Board found no additional features sufficient for elevating the claim to the realm of patent-eligibility.  (The Board also sustained a § 102 rejection of claim 1.)

    In June, the PTAB also affirmed the patent-ineligibility of claims directed to a GUI that allows medical personnel to document medical procedures and automatically generate billing information for the procedures.  The patent application (U.S. Patent App. No. 13/103,129) aimed to reduce time spent summarizing procedure details and generating bills, as well as to reduce errors found in procedure summaries and resulting bills, such as errors that occur when doctors forget or insufficiently document acts performed during procedures.  Claim 1 is provided as a representative example.

    1.  A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon sequences of instructions which, when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
        output a graphical user interface (GUI), the GUI including a visual representation of at least a portion of a human body and a text input area;
        receive input from a user via the GUI, the input selecting portions of the visual representation and identifying a sequence of medical procedures that were performed on a patient with respect to the selected portions;
        highlight the selected portions on the visual representation, the highlighted portions providing a graphical representation of the sequence of medical procedures that were performed on the patient;
        automatically generate billing codes corresponding to the medical procedures that were performed based on the input received via the GUI;
        automatically generate text, based on input received via the GUI, identifying at least some of the medical procedures that were performed;
        display the billing codes and the generated text on the GUI;
        provide, via the GUI, a pop-up or dialog window in response to input corresponding to at least some of the medical procedures that were performed;
        receive, from the user, information via the pop-up or dialog window; and
        display at least some of the information provided via the pop-up or dialog window in the text input area of the GUI,
        wherein the sequence of medical procedures corresponds to surgery performed on the patient and the visual representation displays a portion of a vascular system of the human body, and
        wherein when highlighting the selected portions, the instructions cause the at least one processor to highlight a path in the displayed portion of the vascular system corresponding to portions of the vascular system in which the surgery was performed.

    In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner stated that the claimed invention "merely encompasses the abstract ideas of comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options; and/or using categories to organize, store and transmit information."  The Appellants then argued that the claims were mischaracterized and that not all of the claim features were considered.  In particular, that Appellants stated in their reply brief that:

    Claim 1, however, recites a much more detailed set of features that provide a comprehensive solution to documenting medical procedures in a visual manner (e.g., by highlighting selected portions of the visual representation), while ensuring that needed information and text are provided (e.g., via input from the GUI and pop-up or dialog window), that text and billing codes are automatically generated for billing purposes, and that a highlighted path is displayed that corresponds to the portions of the vascular system in which the surgery was performed.  Such features provide medical personnel with a comprehensive visual representation, along with text and billing codes.

    But the Board concluded that the Examiner's characterization was proper because "different levels of abstraction" can be applied in an Alice step-one analysis.  Unfortunately, the Appellants' arguments with regard to step two were relatively lacking, and the Board concluded that the Appellants did not identify or provide supporting explanation for additional elements that amount to significantly more than an abstract idea.  Instead, the Appellants restated the above-noted improvements to the field of documenting and billing medical procedures, and then proceeded to unsuccessfully argue that the claimed features are not well understood, routine, and conventional because there was no prior art rejection of claim 1.  The Board very quickly dismissed these arguments.  Had the Appellants cited to the specification in step two and tied described advantages to particular claim limitations, they might have set themselves off on a better foot with the Board (and possibly with the Examiner), though it is difficult to say whether this would have been persuasive.

    As an interesting point of comparison to the medical documenting/billing claim in the previous case, the Board also recently reversed a § 101 rejection of claims in the medical field (albeit arguably claims with more-detailed functionality).  In particular, in U.S. Patent App. No. 14/271,719, the claims relate to a "GUI wizard" used to help human personnel audit and score medical documents that have undergone a process in which clinical contents of the documents, such as medical findings, diagnoses, and procedures, are "coded" (i.e., mapped to standardized alphanumeric nomenclature codes).  The application describes that coding has traditionally been done manually, and that the auditing of coding results is heavily dependent on human skills and prone to human error.  The claimed GUI method thus aims to make the auditing and scoring process less complex and reduce errors.  Representative claim 37 is provided as follows:

    37.  A method of evaluating coded medical documents performed by a computer, the method comprising:
        [1] providing, by a computer, a graphical user interface (GUI) wizard;
        [2] receiving, by the computer via the GUI wizard, audit parameters for selecting a document universe and for calculating a sample size;
        [3] calculating, by the computer, a sample size using the received audit parameters;
        [4] selecting, by the computer, a document universe based on the received audit parameters;
        [5] providing, by the computer via the GUI wizard, a plurality of medical documents coded by a coder and selected using the selected document universe and the calculated sample size;
        [6] receiving, by the computer via the GUI wizard, a plurality of corrections by an auditor to the plurality of medical documents;
        [7] recording, by the computer, the plurality of corrections to the coded medical documents to form a plurality of audited medical documents;
        [8] determining, by the computer, a document score for each of the plurality of audited medical documents, each document score based on one or more document corrections provided by the auditor and weighted factors, wherein the weighted factors comprise predefined weights assigned to diagnosis codes and finding codes of each of the plurality of audited medical documents;
        [9] determining, by the computer, a sample score for the plurality of audited medical documents based on the determined document scores;
        [10] determining, by the computer, the acceptability of the sample score by periodically performing an empirical test to compare the sample score to system control limits; and
        [11] displaying, by the computer via the GUI, an X-bar chart analysis comprising the sample score, an upper control limit, a lower control limit, and a previously determined sample score of audited medical documents coded by the coder.

    In rejecting this claim, the Examiner argued that the claims were directed to an abstract idea of "determining the acceptability of a determined sample score that is based on determined document scores of audited medical documents."  In response, the Appellants contended that the claims recite specific UI elements (e.g., a GUI wizard and an X-bar chart analysis) that define a specific user experience.  Analogizing to the claims in Core Wireless, the Board sided with the Appellants, finding the claim to be directed to an improved GUI wizard and specifically identifying steps [2], [5], [6], and [11] of the claim as sufficiently inventive features.  Notably, the Board emphasized how these and other claimed steps are described in detail in the specification along with details as to how the steps, as well as the GUI layout, help a user audit coded medical documents.  The Board stopped its analysis after step one, concluded that the claims are patent eligible, and reversed the Examiner's rejection.

    Ex parte Ahn (PTAB 2018)
    Panel: Administrative Patent Judges Astorino, Meyers, and Silverman
    Decision on Appeal by Administrative Patent Judge Silverman

    Ex parte Olsson (PTAB 2018)
    Panel: Administrative Patent Judges Colaianni, Housel, and McManus
    Decision on Appeal by Administrative Patent Judge Housel

    Ex parte Heinze (PTAB 2018)
    Panel: Administrative Patent Judges Lorin, Medlock, and Bayat
    Decision on Appeal by Administrative Patent Judge Lorin

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    FDAEarlier this month, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration announced a new initiative, the Biosimilars Action Plan: Balancing Innovation and Competition in furtherance of its efforts "to ensure that this balance between innovation and competition exists across the spectrum of pharmaceutical products."  The hoped-for outcome of the BAP:  that "[a]fter patents or other exclusivities expire on these novel products, prices can fall dramatically once follow-on products are available, potentially lowering costs for patients and payors and expanding access to these innovations."

    The Introduction states that:

    The agency is taking steps to more efficiently manage our review and licensure pathways to facilitate biosimilar competition.  We are modernizing our policies that govern the development of biosimilar to make it more efficient.  We are also educating clinicians, payors and patients about biosimilar products and the rigorous evaluation they must go through.  And, we are modernizing regulatory policies to accommodate new scientific tools that can better enable comparison between biosimilars and reference products that may reduce the need for clinical studies.

    Some of the bureaucratic measures the agency intends to implement in furtherance of these efforts include:

    1.  Introducing new FDA tools to improve efficiency of FDA review (e.g., templates "tailored to marketing applications for biosimilar and interchangeable products")
    2.  Creating information resources and development tools for biosimilar applicants (in silico models and simulations for correlating PK/PD responses to clinical outcomes)
    3.  Enhancing the Purple Book
    4.  Looking into data sharing agreements with foreign regulators
    5.  Establishing a new Office of Therapeutic Biologics and Biosimilars to improve coordination under the BsURA program
    6.  Providing critical education to health care professionals
    7.  Finalizing Guidance on labeling
    8.  Providing finalized Guidance on interchangeable biosimilars
    9.  Improving analytical approaches for structure/function for demonstrating biosimilarity including statistical methods
    10.  Implementing standards for manufacturing quality control
    11.  Improving public dialog with hearings and requests for public input on FDA actions to evaluate and promote biosimilars

    Why now?  The FDA contends that "[t]his is a crucial time in the emergence of the marketplace of biosimilar and interchangeable products."  The agency expects continued expansion in the number of approved biosimilar and interchangeable products in the coming years.  The announcement of this new initiative recognizes "barriers to marketing a biosimilar or interchangeable product that are outside of the FDA's purview," but assert that it is part of the agency's mandate to "advance[e] policies to facilitate the efficient development and approval of these products."  Hence, the enunciation of the BAP.

    There are four "key elements" of the BAP:

    1.  Improving the efficiency of the biosimilar and interchangeable product development and approval process

    How?

    • Providing application review templates, formatted for 351(k) BLA requirements
    • Transitioning to a Therapeutic Biologics and Biosimilars Staff (TBBS) from the Office of New Drugs under Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) to the Office of Therapeutic Biologics and Biosimilars (OTBB), intended to "improve coordination and support" of activities under the Biosimilar User Fee Act (BsUFA), increase agency response times, and improve efficiencies in policy development and response to applicants
    • Improve coordination with CDER
    • Develop information resources for biosimilar applicants, such as an "index of critical quality attributes" for comparing reference products to biosimilars, and comparison metrics that will reduce the size of clinical studies

    2.  Maximizing scientific and regulatory clarity for the biosimilar product development community

    How?

    The FDA has issued six final (see "Nonproprietary Naming of Biological Products"; "Considerations in Demonstrating Interchangeability with a Reference Product"; "Clinical Pharmacology Data to Support a Demonstration of Biosimilarity to a Reference Product"; "Scientific Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product"; "Quality Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity of a Therapeutic Protein Product to a Reference Product"; and "Biosimilars: Questions and Answers Regarding Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009") and four draft (see "Scientific Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product"; "Quality Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Protein Product"; "Biosimilars: Questions and Answers Regarding Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009," as discussed in "FDA Publishes Draft Guidelines for Biosimilar Product Development" and "More on FDA Draft Guidelines for "Follow-on" Biologic Drug Approval Pathway") Guidance documents relating to biosimilars.  The FDA expects additional Guidances to be forthcoming that will involve public hearings, prioritizing the following issues:

    • Final or Revised Draft Guidance: Reference Product Exclusivity for Biological Products Filed Under Section 351(a) of the PHS Act
    •
    Final or Revised Draft Guidance: Implementation of the "Deemed to be a License" Provision of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
    •
    Final or Revised Draft Guidance: Considerations in Demonstrating Interchangeability with a Reference Product
    •
    Final or Revised Draft Guidance: Statistical Approaches to Evaluate Analytical Similarity
    •
    Draft Guidance: Processes and further considerations related to post-approval manufacturing changes for biosimilar biological products

    The agency is also developing guidance for biosimilar applicants who will seek approval for fewer than all conditions for which the reference product is licensed, and developing a formal rule for interpreting the definition of "biological product" under the BPCIA, to provide additional "clarity."  FDA is evaluating regulations regarding aBLA submission, and working on an enhanced Purple Book (which will contain "information about newly approved or withdrawn BLAs and about reference product exclusivity determination").

    Finally, under this part of the BAP, the agency will be "[s]trengthening its partnerships with regulatory authorities in Europe, Japan and Canada" by "harmonizing requirements for their development as well as sharing regulatory experience across national boundaries," including data sharing agreements to increase the use of non-U.S.-licensed comparator products to support biosimilar application.

    3.  Developing effective communications to improve understanding of biosimilars among patients, clinicians, and payors

    How?

    This portion of the Plan is aimed at increased educational efforts according to the Biosimilar Education and Outreach Campaign released in October 2017; continuing efforts including videos, webinars, information on the webpage, and providing educational materials for patients, pharmacists, and other stakeholders.

    4.  Supporting market competition by reducing gaming of FDA requirements or other attempts to unfairly delay competition

    How?

    In many ways the most provocative part of the Plan, the announcement states that:

    The FDA will clarify our position on issues affecting reference product exclusivity to better effectuate balance between innovation and competition.  We will also take action, whenever necessary, to reduce gaming of current FDA requirements, and coordinate with the Federal Trade Commission to address anti-competitive behavior.  Additionally, we will work with legislators, as needed to close any loopholes that may effectively delay biosimilar competition beyond the exclusivity periods envisioned by Congress.

    The FDA intends to take steps for biosimilars analogous to the Drug Competition Action Plan (DCAP) the agency has implemented for generic drugs, where it was "a priority to address practices that delay or block competition from entering the market."  For generic drugs, these efforts were aimed at preventing branded drug makers from activities such as "refusal to sell the samples necessary for developing generic drugs [a practice we've seen with products under limited distribution, whether the drug maker limits distribution voluntarily or does so in connection with a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) program]."  Insofar as such practices are being used by reference product sponsors (and the announcement does not provide any examples of such behavior, the agency states that "[w]e will apply the same principles used in DCAP to our BAP to address circumstances in which drug makers refuse to sell samples, or use any other anticompetitive strategies, to delay the entry of biosimilar or interchangeable development and competition."

    In conclusion, the FDA says it expects development of biosimilar and interchangeable drugs to "continue to evolve" and thus implementation of the BAP to be "dynamic."  And:

    The FDA is committed to transparent, science-based regulation of biosimilar and interchangeable products that maintains the dynamic balance between innovation and timely access, as Congress intended.  Appropriate market exclusivities allow innovators to recoup their investments, and compensate them for the time, risk and uncertainty that make the cost of capital to undertake these endeavors high.  These rewards provide incentives for research and development of new treatment options, as well as help advance medical innovation and improve outcomes.

    While a good deal of this announcement is conventional bureaucratic promotion, there are a few nuggets that suggest that the FDA under this Administration may be more confrontational and aggressive towards perceived "bad behavior" by certain of its shareholders.  It is certainly the case that the price of drugs, particularly biologic drugs, is high and poses a significant cost burden on the health care system as a whole (both public and private).  The BAP appropriately addresses these concerns and recognizes that they must be addressed.  But it is also good to try to understand the economic realities that have created the situation (without excessive and unproductive finger-pointing).  It is a truism that everything has increased in price (and many things even adjusted for inflation); after all, it isn't just the elderly that are confronted with prices that seem ridiculously excessive.  But for drugs it also must be recognized, by policy makers as well as the public, that the low-hanging fruit of small molecule drugs and those with (relatively) simple etiologies have been discovered in the first flowering of the modern pharmaceutical intervention in human disease (see, e.g., Epstein, 2006, Overdose: How Excessive Government Regulation Stifles Pharmaceutical Innovation; and Rosen, 2017, Miracle Cure: The Creation of Antibiotics and the Birth of Modern Medicine).  And federal regulation, particularly by the FDA, is more extensive and costly than it was prior to the thalidomide tragedy in 1962.  While it is convenient and politically expedient to castigate the pharmaceutical industry for high prices, it is foolhardy not to recognize these and other factors in producing the current price situation.

    The context of the comments in the FDA's BAP also comprises statements by Commissioner Gottleib regarding the possibility of changing U.S. drug importation regulations (but with disclaimers regarding exclusivities and prompted by "supply chain disruptions" to soften the political effects of implied threat) to permit "temporarily" importation of drugs from foreign sources.  The FDA has also created a task force to address drug shortages, either due to supply chain difficulties or source monopolization of unpatented drugs without remaining regulatory exclusivity due to sole sourcing.

    But there is another aspect that is typically overlooked.  For many biologic drugs, the diseases they address are ones that a generation ago resulted in significant morbidity and mortality; indeed, some diseases were invariably fatal (many cancers, HIV) or severely debilitating (kidney disease, hepatitis).  Some of these were diseases of the elderly, and the wisdom of expending vast sums to extend few lives for short times is a topic for another day.  But for the overwhelming number of cases where individuals in the prime of life are cured or their diseases managed, these drugs provide significant advantages, both for the afflicted individuals and society as a whole.  In the most hard-hearted, dollars-and-cents analysis, what pundits who bemoan high drug costs appear to forget is that these individuals are returned to the workforce as productive participants, who hold down jobs and pay taxes and participate in the U.S. consumer economy.  Society, whether in the form of local or nationwide businesses or federal, state, and local tax collectors, reaps the benefit of those who have returned to the workforce due to the effects of biologic drugs that did not exist twenty, ten, five, or even one year ago.

    And that doesn't take into account the human benefits, which now routinely permit individuals (and their spouses, sons, daughters and grandchildren) to enjoy the benefits of longer life and participation in weddings, births, and other lifetime milestones.  Undue focus on the goal — obtaining biologic drugs at reduced prices — raises a risk of not having these drugs, or their benefits, because private investment is frustrated and the government is a generally a poor source of innovation.  It would be well for policymakers, particularly at FDA, to keep such considerations in mind to temper their fiscal zeal.

  • Catalog Distributed at Conference (Not "Open to the Public") Is Publicly Accessible

    By Joseph Herndon —

    Federal Circuit SealGoPro, Inc. appealed from final written decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings.  In the proceedings, the Board found that the petitioner, GoPro, did not demonstrate that the challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious, and based this decision on its finding that a certain GoPro catalog was not a prior art printed publication.  The sole issue on appeal is whether the GoPro catalog is prior art.

    Contour IP Holding LLC owns U.S. Patent Nos. 8,890,954 and 8,896,694.  The patents share a common specification that generally relates to and describes action sport video cameras or camcorders that are configured for remote image acquisition control and viewing.  According to the patents, the claimed device uses global positioning system (GPS) technology to track its location during recording and a wireless connection protocol, such as Bluetooth, to provide control signals or stream data to the wearable video camera and to access image content stored on or streaming from the wearable video camera.

    The patents further describe that when recording video or taking photographs in a sports application, a digital video camera is often mounted in a location that does not permit the user to easily see the camera.  The digital camera includes wireless communication capability to allow another device, such as a smartphone or tablet, to control camera settings in real time, access video stored on the camera, and act as a "viewfinder" to preview what the camera sees.

    Both the '954 and '694 patents claim priority to a provisional application filed on September 13, 2010.  Thus, the one-year critical date is September 13, 2009.

    GoPro petitioned for inter partes review of the '954 and '694 patents and challenged the patentability of the claims on obviousness grounds, relying on a 2009 GoPro sales catalog as prior art in each petition.  The GoPro Catalog discloses a digital camera linked to a wireless viewfinder/controller that allows for a user to preview before recording.

    The Board instituted both IPRs, and in its decisions to institute, the Board found that GoPro made a threshold showing that the GoPro Catalog is prior art.  After the hearing, however, the Board found that the GoPro Catalog did not qualify as a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and because all the instituted grounds were based on the GoPro Catalog, the Board found that GoPro had not demonstrated that the challenged claims of the '954 and '694 patents were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.  GoPro appealed from these final written decisions to the Federal Circuit.

    On appeal, neither the claim terms nor the claimed inventions are at issue in this appeal.  The only issue is whether the GoPro Catalog is prior art.  The '954 and '694 patents each have an effective filing date before the effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act ("AIA").  Thus, the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 102 was applied.

    Section 102(b) provides that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention was described in a printed publication more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.  The printed publication rule is based on the principle that once an invention is in the public domain, it can no longer be patented by anyone.  Even relatively obscure documents qualify as prior art so long as the relevant public has a means of accessing them.

    The most commonly referenced example is that even a single cataloged thesis in a university library was found to be sufficiently accessible to those interested in the art exercising reasonable diligence.  Accessibility goes to the issue of whether interested members of the relevant public could obtain the information if they wanted to and if accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to show that particular members of the public actually received the information.  Accordingly, a reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.

    Critical to its decision, the Board credited a declaration from GoPro employee, Damon Jones, relating to the distribution of the GoPro Catalog.  Mr. Jones worked at GoPro from 2008 to 2016 and participated in various trade organizations relevant to GoPro's business.  This included Tucker Rocky Distributing ("Tucker Rocky"), a trade organization focused on action sports.  In his declaration, Mr. Jones testified that Tucker Rocky holds an annual dealer trade show, which he attended in Fort Worth, Texas, from July 23 through July 27, 2009, on GoPro's behalf.  Mr. Jones also testified that at the 2009 show, there were approximately 150 vendors and more than 1,000 attendees, including actual and potential dealers, retailers, and customers of portable POV video cameras.  Mr. Jones stated that he manned the GoPro booth at the show, where the GoPro Catalog was displayed, and that he personally distributed the GoPro Catalog to attendees.  Attached to Mr. Jones's declaration, GoPro provided the catalog, a vendor list and map of the Tucker Rocky 2009 show, and email records supporting Mr. Jones's statements.  The declaration from Mr. Jones also included testimony that GoPro continued to make the GoPro Catalog available to GoPro's actual and potential customers, dealers, and retailers through its website, direct mail, and other means of distribution.

    In its Patent Owner Responses, Contour argued that GoPro had not demonstrated that the GoPro Catalog was a prior art printed publication.  To support its argument, Contour submitted two pieces of evidence—a screenshot from Tucker Rocky's website from 2009 and a Facebook webpage for the 2013 Tucker Rocky Dealer Show.  The 2009 website screenshot explained that Tucker Rocky is a wholesale distributor that does not sell to the public.  The 2013 Facebook page stated that the 2013 Tucker Rocky Dealer Show was open to dealers but not the public.  In its final written decisions, the Board concluded that GoPro had not met its burden to show that the GoPro Catalog was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art and exercising reasonable diligence could have located it.

    On Appeal, the parties did not dispute any of the facts or evidence presented by GoPro regarding the distribution of its catalog.  In addition, there is no dispute that the Tucker Rocky Dealer Show occurred before the critical date of the '954 and '694 patents.  The only issue on appeal is whether the GoPro Catalog was sufficiently accessible as contemplated under § 102(b).

    The Federal Circuit reversed the Board's decision, and agreed with GoPro in that Mr. Jones's declarations and corroborating evidence were sufficient to meet its burden of establishing that the GoPro Catalog was publicly accessible.  The Federal Circuit noted that the case law regarding accessibility is not as narrow as the Board interpreted it.  The Board focused on only one of several factors that are relevant to determining public accessibility in the context of materials distributed at conferences or meetings—i.e., that the conference was open to the public.

    However, the nature of the conference or meeting must be considered.  The Federal Circuit found that if one desires to examine certain new products on the market, attending a trade show involving identical or similar products is a good option.  Mr. Jones testified that Tucker Rocky holds an annual trade show that draws thousands of attendees.  In 2009, GoPro participated in the Tucker Rocky Dealer Show as a vendor and had a demonstration booth at the show.  Mr. Jones testified that there were over 150 vendors, 1,000 attendees, and that GoPro displayed and distributed hundreds of copies of the GoPro Catalog to attendees at the show without restriction.

    The Patent Owner did not cross-examine Mr. Jones, and does not point to any reason to doubt the veracity of his testimony.

    Although the trade show was only open to dealers, there is no evidence or indication that any of the material disseminated or the products at the show excluded POV action cameras, or information related to such cameras.  Contrary to the Board's conclusion, the attendees attracted to the show were likely more sophisticated and involved in the extreme action vehicle space than an average consumer.  Thus, it is more likely than not that persons ordinarily skilled and interested in POV action cameras were in attendance or at least knew about the trade show and expected to find action sports cameras at the show.

    The Board concluded that the GoPro Catalog was not a printed publication because the Tucker Rocky Dealer Show was not open to the general public and GoPro failed to provide evidence that someone ordinarily skilled in the art actually attended the dealer show.  But the Federal Circuit found that the standard for public accessibility is one of reasonable diligence to locate the information by interested members of the relevant public.  A dealer show focused on extreme sports vehicles is an obvious forum for POV action sports cameras.  And although the general public at large may not have been aware of the trade show, dealers of POV cameras would encompass the relevant audience such that a person ordinarily skilled and interested in POV action cameras, exercising reasonable diligence, should have been aware of the show.

    Additionally, the GoPro Catalog was disseminated with no restrictions and was intended to reach the general public.  Because the Board refused to accept the GoPro Catalog as a printed publication, it did not consider the merits of GoPro's obviousness claims.  The Federal Circuit thus remanded the case for consideration of the catalog as prior art.

    GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel:  Circuit Judges Reyna, Wallach, and Hughes
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Reyna

  • En Banc Federal Circuit Finds § 145 Appellants Generally Will Not Be Liable for Patent Office's Attorneys' Fee

    By Kevin E. Noonan & Josh Rich —

    Federal Circuit SealThe Federal Circuit handed down its en banc decision on Friday regarding the question of whether under 35 U.S.C. § 145 an applicant must pay attorneys' fees as part of the "expenses" the statute mandates, in NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).  Generally, under the "American Rule," parties in U.S. litigation are responsible for their own fees regardless of the outcome of the case.  In NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu, the U.S. Patent Office sought to turn that rule on its head for appeal from adverse patent decisions, wherein the Patent Office would recover its attorneys' fees — along with all other expenses — regardless of whether the applicant won or lost the case.  The District Court rejected the Patent Office's argument, and a divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and ordered payment of the Patent Office's fees.  The Federal Circuit chose to review the panel's decision sua sponte.  The en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, over a spirited dissent, holding that the Office was not entitled to its attorneys' fees in appeals under § 145.

    There are two ways to appeal an adverse Patent Trial and Appeal Board decision arising out of patent prosecution (§ 145 appeals are not available for reexamination, post-grant and inter partes review, or derivation proceedings).  First, under 35 U.S.C. § 141(a), a dissatisfied applicant can pursue an appeal to the Federal Circuit as a routine appeal of an agency decision under the Administrative Procedure Act.  In such an appeal, the review is confined to the record before the Patent Office.  Second, under 35 U.S.C. § 145, the applicant can bring a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.  In such an action, the parties can conduct full discovery and introduce new evidence, including oral evidence, that was not presented to the Patent Office in prosecution.  The § 145 action is resolved by the same methods generally used in other district court cases, including motion practice and trial on the merits.

    One downside of appealing under § 145 has always been financial:  the statute provides that "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant."  Ever since the predecessor to the current statute was enacted in 1839, the Patent Office had required a § 145 appellant to pay expenses including travel expenses, expert fees, and document reproduction costs, but not attorneys' fees.  That changed with the NantKwest case, where the Patent Office — for the first time in over 170 years — demanded that NantKwest pay the Patent Office's attorneys' fees incurred in the § 145 action, win or lose.

    The majority and dissent reached opposite conclusions based on two major distinctions.  First, the majority placed the emphasis on the statutory language "expenses," not "all"; the dissent focused on "all" rather than "expenses."  The majority also considered the language somewhat vague, not "specific and explicit," whereas the dissent considered it so clear as to not need further consideration as to clarity.  Surprisingly, however, neither the majority nor the dissent placed much emphasis on the Patent Office's 170 years of conduct under the statute, which would seem to be the clearest indication of what it believed the statute to mean at the time of enactment and many years thereafter.

    The en banc majority started its attorneys' fees analysis with the American Rule as a "bedrock principle" of American jurisprudence:  that each party pays its own attorneys' fees, win or lose.  The American Rule is rooted in fair access to the legal system for the poor, as well as the difficulty of litigating the reasonableness of fees.  That is, the American Rule — unlike the presumption in England — chooses to value allowing less wealthy litigants to contest a case over demanding that a prevailing party avoid any loss whatsoever from litigation.

    The American Rule does not apply in all cases, however; Congress has, from time to time, chosen to establish a presumption in certain cases that a prevailing litigant will recover attorneys' fees.  No magic words are required for fee-shifting, but for a law to do so, according to the Supreme Court, Congress's intent must be "specific and explicit"; see, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976).

    The majority first considered whether the presumption of the American Rule applied under § 145.  The Patent Office argued that it should not, because it relates only to cases in which fees are shifted from a losing party to a prevailing party.  The Patent Office relied heavily on a Fourth Circuit case, Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015), in which language from the Lanham Act nearly identical to § 145 was held not to require consideration of the American Rule in compelling an appellant's payment of the Patent and Trademark Office's attorneys' fees in trademark cases.  The majority chose to reject the Shammas holding, finding that it "cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's line of non-prevailing party precedent applying the American Rule."  The Patent Office also relied on Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (2013), which interpreted a statute that allows prevailing "Vaccine Court" petitioners to recover reasonable attorneys' fees, but also permits a discretionary award of fees for unsuccessful petitions "brought in good faith [with] a reasonable basis for the claim."  The majority did not dispute or reject the Supreme Court's Sebelius holding, but found that the underlying statute was a straightforward instance of a specific and explicit intent by Congress to overcome the presumptive American Rule.  As a result, the majority found no reason to avoid the presumption of the American Rule in determining whether § 145 required an applicant to pay the Patent Office's attorneys' fees.

    The majority thus started with the presumption of the American Rule and considered whether § 145's requirement that the applicant pay "all of the expenses of the proceedings" showed a specific and explicit intent to overcome the American Rule.  In doing so, it viewed the key question as whether attorneys' fees would be considered "expenses" in the context of § 145, which meant an investigation of the meaning of the term in 1839.  While one dictionary definition would support a meaning that would include attorneys' fees, the majority found that most contemporaneous dictionary definitions would not.  Similarly, other statutes' use of "expenses" generally did not include attorneys' fees.  In some cases, the statutes identified expenses and attorneys' fees as different categories, some others explicitly included attorneys' fees in expenses.  And where the Patent Act discusses fee awards (specifically, § 285), it does so explicitly, with language quite different from the more general term "expenses" used in § 145.  Furthermore, judicial decisions (both from the mid-1800s and more recently) in relation to expenses and attorneys' fees have viewed the two as separate categories.  Finally, the majority considered that the Patent Office's interpretation would require a prevailing appellant to pay the losing Patent Office's attorneys' fees.  Such an anomalous departure from the presumption of the American Rule would require extraordinary clarity in the statute; the majority did not find it.  Thus, the majority did not find the specific and explicit intent to overcome the American Rule and refused to award the Patent Office its attorneys' fees as part of "all of the expenses of the proceedings" in a § 145 case.

    Having reached a conclusion based on its analysis of the statutory language, judicial decisions, and contemporaneous interpretation, the majority dealt with additional policy and legal arguments raised by the Patent Office and dissent.  It discussed the Patent Office's citations to Supreme Court cases, finding the language did not support the Patent Office's arguments when read in context.  It then dealt with the dissent's citation of the legislative history of the 1870 amendment to § 145's predecessor.  First, honoring the legacy of Justice Scalia, the majority questioned whether legislative history should even be considered.  But even so, it found that the legislative history was opaque in changing the statutory language from "costs" capped at $25 to uncapped "expenses."  Certainly, the majority agreed, that was intended to broaden the recoverable amounts, but it provided no guidance as to whether attorneys' fees was intended to be one of the recoverable categories.  The majority also rejected the dissent's reliance on the Patent Office's 1836 budgetary provisions (which included salaries of employees as one of the "expenses of the Patent Office") as being such a different context as to be uninformative.  Finally, it rejected the dissent's suggestion that § 145 actions would be scourge on the patent system as a whole if the Patent Office were required to pay its own attorneys' fees.  There are only a handful of § 145 actions per year — if that many — and the Patent Office's attorneys' fees can be spread over hundreds of thousands of applications.  As the majority calculated it, the attorneys' fees from § 145 actions adds up to less than $2 per application, scarcely a disabling imposition.

    Thus, having rejected the Patent Office's arguments, the majority found that the general American Rule should apply and parties to § 145 actions should pay their own attorneys' fees.  It demanded specific and explicit evidence of a Congressional intent to deviate from the American Rule and found none, either in the statutory language or other evidence.  While the Fourth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in the Shammas case (in the trademark context), the Federal Circuit concluded that Shammas's interpretation of the governing law (both statutory language and case law) was wrong.  There was insufficient evidence to overcome the American Rule and a dissatisfied applicant's payment of "all of the expenses of the proceedings" in a § 145 action does not require it to pay the Patent Office's attorneys' fees.

    The dissent

    Chief Judge Prost's dissent (joined by Judges Dyk, Reyna, and Hughes) makes the more straightforward (if not better) argument.  Its straightforwardness comes from the plain language of the statute, that an applicant who avails herself of the provisions of § 145 must pay "all expenses of the proceedings."  Expenses according to the dissent would include attorneys' fees (despite the long history to the contrary), and use of the word "all" further supports this construction of the statute.  The Fourth Circuit employed a similar construction to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (having language regarding expenses "almost identical" to the language of § 145) in Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015), and another reason put forth in the dissent was the perceived (unnecessary) circuit split that the majority's decision raises.

    The dissenting opinion notes that a disappointed applicant has two options for appeal:  direct appeal to the Federal Circuit and recourse to the district court at issue in this appeal.  "Litigation in district court is expensive and time-consuming, much more so than direct appeals to this court limited to the administrative record," the opinion reminds us (although in view of the difference between the resources of the Federal government and most applicants this seems not particularly relevant to the statutory construction issue before the Court).  Citing Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), aff'd and remanded, 566 U.S. 431 (2012), the opinion emphasizes that an applicant must pay "all expenses of the proceedings" and this responsibility attaches "regardless of the outcome," i.e., whether the district court rules for or against the applicant.  The dissent then points out PTO outlays in this case, for expert witnesses (which payments are not at issue) and agency attorneys (which are) and that the Office did not employ outside counsel.  The significance (insofar as there is any) of this arrangement was that the "expenses" for using these lawyers stemmed from "the time they devoted to this case was not available for other work," citing Wis. v. Hotline Indus., Inc., 236 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 2000), as precedent for these considerations.  As evidence of the PTO's frugality and absence of overreach, the dissent noted that "the PTO is not seeking reimbursement for its lawyers' time at market rate" but rather for "personnel expenses it actually incurred in these proceedings."

    Regarding how the term "expenses" should be construed, the dissent looks at the meaning of the term when the Patent Act of 1836 was enacted (and the district court option first became available to applicants), specifically:

    [T]he applicant shall pay into the Treasury of the United States, or into the Patent Office, or into any of the deposit banks to the credit of the Treasury . . . the sum of thirty dollars . . . .  And the moneys received into the Treasury under this act shall constitute a fund for the payment of the salaries of the officers and clerks herein provided for, and all other expenses of the Patent Office, and to be called the patent fund.  Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121 (emphasis added).

    While acknowledging that "expenses of the Patent Office" and "expenses of the proceedings" is not exactly the same language, the dissent relied upon this language to establish that Congress (perhaps) in 1836 'understood salaries to be within the scope of 'expenses.'"  But the dissent relies less on this citation and more on the "plain meaning" of the term, citing Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012), for the rubric that plain meaning should be used when Congress has not defined a term with particularity.  Again harkening back to the 1830's, the dissent quotes Webster's original American Dictionary of the English Language as including "employment and compensation" to fall with the scope of "expense" and states that the dictionary definitions cited by the majority actually support its definition of "expenses" to include personnel expenditures and out-of-pocket attorneys' fees.  In addition, the dissent cites Taniguchi (albeit not a Section 145 case or even a patent case) for including attorneys' fees as "expenses."  And the dissent criticizes the majority's reliance on other statutes on the grounds that these statutes were enacted after (and in most cases significantly after) the 1836 Patent Act and the Supreme Court's practice of using contemporaneous statutes in these instances, citing W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991).

    Next, the dissent distinguishes the majority's argument that other sections of the Patent Act (specifically, § 285) expressly recite attorneys' fees as meaning that failure to do so in § 145 is meaningful for statutory construction here.  The dissent notes its opinion that "Congress intended a broader compensation scheme under § 145 than under § 285" by comparing "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings" with "reasonable attorneys' fees," saying that "Congress can certainly employ a broad word over other narrower alternatives if it so chooses."  Additionally, the "overhead" aspect of agency attorneys' compensation from which the fees at issue here were calculated is persuasive to the dissenting judges that such fees should be considered expenses.  The difference in the "setting" of the two sections (district court litigation versus agency proceedings) are significant to the dissent because "§ 145 proceedings are, 'in fact and necessarily, a part of the application for the patent'" for the dissenters, citing Gandy v. Marble, 122 U.S. 432, 439 (1887).  In this reading of the statute, expenses under §145 "are a direct counterpart to the application fees that are designed to reimburse the PTO's examination expense[s]," for which there is little argument that they are the responsibility of an applicant.

    Once having established that for Chief Judge Prost and her brethren the term "expense" should include agency attorneys' fees, the dissent then considers the use of "all" as emphasizing that the term should be construed broadly (see similar arguments by Chief Justice Burger in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Justice Scalia in Merck v. Integra).  In Chief Judge Prost's view, the majority's construction would "leave[] little work for 'all' to do" because "simply saying 'the expenses' would seem to do just as well."  According to Chief Judge Prost, "Congress used the word 'all' to broadly and comprehensively capture anything fairly regarded as an 'expense,' resolving any lingering doubt in favor of inclusion [of the PTO's attorneys; fees as part of the Office's "expenses"]."

    Finally, the dissenting opinion sites the legislative history (from the 1836, 1839, and 1870 Patent Acts), justifying this analysis by Supreme Court practice in assessing fee shifting in the context of the American Rule; see Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686–91 (1983), and Summit Valley Indus., Inc. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 456 U.S. 717, 723–24 (1982).  According to the dissent, review of this record shows that "Congress intended all of the expenses associated with § 145 proceedings to be borne by the applicants who elect them—not by taxpayers or other PTO users whose fees fund the agency's operations.  Section 145 proceedings are an optional extension of the application process."  Further:

    An applicant's choice to proceed under § 145 diverts the agency's resources from the PTO's principal mission of examining patent and trademark applications at the agency.  The purpose of § 145's expense-reimbursement provision is to ensure that these expenses fall on the applicants who elect the more expensive district court proceedings over the standard appeal route [emphasis added].

    Regarding the role of the American Rule in the dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Prost reviewed the Fourth Circuit's Shammas decision contrary to the majority here.  The American Rule does not apply, either under Shammas or, in the dissent's view, here because expenses are assessed against an applicant regardless of whether the application prevails or does not.  And the dissent states that these judges disagree with the majority even if the American Rule was held to apply.

    The dissent concludes with a discussion of various policy considerations, including applicant "choice" between appeal to the Federal Circuit and district court (neglecting to consider the procedural necessities that may influence an applicant's choice); that any "special solicitude" extended by the majority over the financial burden on "small businesses and individual inventors" is "entirely speculative," citing Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015) (quoting Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004)), for the principle that "'[the Supreme Court's] unwillingness to soften the import of Congress'[s] chosen words even if [the Court] believe[s] the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding.'"  Concern over such costs is also lessened by the cost of experts and other expenses not at issue here that can themselves be considerable, according to the dissent.  Acknowledging these costs implicates who should pay them, which is an easy choice for the dissent:

    [W]hile it may be true that the PTO's personnel expenses in some cases might amount to a significant sum for applicants who choose to proceed down the optional § 145 route, those expenses have to be paid by someone.  As the PTO observes, at Congress's direction, the PTO now must operate entirely as a user-funded agency.  All applicants pay a number of fees throughout the patent-examination process to cover the PTO's expenses of operation.  Thus, in asking this court to exclude personnel expenses from "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings," NantKwest asks this court to require other PTO applicants to pay the PTO's personnel expenses incurred in response to its §145 complaint, rather than NantKwest itself.  This contravenes Congress's intent [references to PTO brief omitted].

    That the Office has never demanded applicants to pay attorneys' fees is another aspect of this case having no weight to the dissenting judges.  "Given how dramatically the patent and litigation landscapes have changed since the provision was first enacted, it is hardly surprising that the PTO would have felt compelled in recent years to change its strategy," based in part on applicants purportedly using §145 proceedings more frequently and their costs becoming greater in recent years.

    These questions of policy, while outside the scope of the question before the Court or the Court's purview in making these judgments, are in the dissent's view relevant as evincing Congress's choices in enacting § 145 to require an applicant to pay "all expenses of the proceedings" including the PTO's attorneys' fees.

    NantKwest, Inc. v. Iancu (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc)
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Newman, Lourie, Dyk, Moore, O'Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Taranto, Hughes, and Stoll; Circuit Judge Chen did not participate.
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Stoll, joined by Circuit Judges Newman, Lourie, Moore, O'Malley, Wallach, and Taranto; dissenting opinion by Chief Judge Prost, joined by Circuit Judges Dyk, Reyna, and Hughes

  • CalendarJuly 31, 2018 – "Structuring Freedom to Operate Opinions: Reducing Risk of Patent Infringement — Combating Troubling FTO Results, Overcoming Potential Roadblocks, Addressing Impact of Post-Grant Process on FTO Opinions" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 9, 2018 – "Hatch-Waxman Litigation and 30-Month Stays: Multiple Stays, Late-Listed Patents, and More" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 16, 2018 – "Patent Drafting for Machine Learning: Structural Claim Limitations, Avoiding 101 or 112 Rejections" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 16-17, 2018 – "Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2018: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing" (Practising Law Institute) – San Francisco, CA

    August 21, 2018 – "Navigating the Patent Prosecution Highway and Other Accelerated Filing Options — Evaluating the Different Options, Weighing the Benefits and Risks, Obtaining Patent Protection" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    September 21, 2018 – "USPTO Post-Grant Patent Trials 2018: Change & Recalibration" (Practising Law Institute) – New York & Groupcasts in Philadelphia, Indianapolis, New Brunswick, NJ, Pittsburgh, and Mechanicsburg, PA

    September 27-28, 2018 – "Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2018: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing" (Practising Law Institute) – Chicago, IL

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Navigating the Patent Prosecution Highway and Other Accelerated Filing Options — Evaluating the Different Options, Weighing the Benefits and Risks, Obtaining Patent Protection" on August 21, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Ralph G. Fischer and Duane A. Stewart, III of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney will provide guidance to patent counsel on the use of the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) and other ways to fast track examination, examine the pros and cons of options and discuss factors to consider when determining whether to pursue accelerated prosecution and which avenue to take, and offer best practices for avoiding common mistakes and obtaining patent protection.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What options are available to accelerate a patent prosecution, and what are the pros and cons of each?
    • What factors should patent counsel consider when determining whether seeking accelerated patent protection is the best avenue for prosecution?
    • What are the key considerations for patent counsel drafting applications when accelerated patent protection is anticipated?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Patent Drafting for Machine Learning: Structural Claim Limitations, Avoiding 101 or 112 Rejections" on August 16, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Gregory Rabin of Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner and Michael D. Stein of Baker & Hostetler will guide patent practitioners in overcoming the challenges when seeking patent protection for machine learning inventions, and also discuss what can be done to anticipate and minimize the risks of § 101 or § 112 rejections.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What are the hurdles for patent counsel to demonstrate inventorship?
    • How can patent counsel meet the requirements under §101 and §112 in machine learning patent applications?
    • What steps should patent counsel take to minimize the likelihood of §101 or §112 rejections?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.