• By Donald Zuhn —

    USPTO SealIn a decision issued in May, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office reversed the final rejection of claims 35-48 in U.S. Application No. 13/512,585.  The claims at issue had been rejected by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 7,056,690 ("Laskey") in view of Pajor et al., International Society for Analytical, Cytometry Part A. (2008) ("Pajor"), and Stoeber et al., J. Nat. Cancer Inst. 94(14): 1071-79 (2002) ("Stoeber"), and under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.

    The '585 application relates to a screening method for bladder cancer.  Representative claim 35 recites:

    35.  A method of diagnosing a subject with bladder cancer or at risk of developing bladder cancer comprising:
        a) providing a urine sample isolated from said subject;
        b) isolating cells from said sample and dispersing them on a slide, wherein said slide contains at least 5000 total cells;
        c) contacting said cells with a labelled specific binding member capable of binding to a minichromosome maintenance 2 (MCM2) polypeptide to stain cells with that express MCM2; and
        d) counting said stained cells to provide a cell count;
        wherein if said cell count is at least 50 cells of said 5000 total cells said subject has bladder cancer or is at risk of developing bladder cancer.

    In reversing the Examiner's § 103 rejection, the Board began by citing CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Intern. Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003), for the proposition that "[o]bviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim."  The Board noted that the Examiner had determined that Laskey teaches all of the claimed elements except for dispersing 5000 total cells on a slide and then counting MCM2 positive cells, and that Pajor and Stoeber teach those elements.  In particular, the Examiner had determined that:

    One of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made would have been motivated to . . . count dispersed cells expressing MCM2 by performing the method of Pajor et al using the labeled anti-MCM2 antibodies of Laskey et al wherein the presence of (including 50 or more) MCM2-expressing cells is indicative of bladder cancer.

    The Board determined, however, that the Examiner failed to establish that either Stoeber or Pajor teaches the claimed step of counting cells.  With respect to Stoeber, the Board noted that this reference teaches the calculation of the fluorescence of batch cell lysate samples labeled with Mcm5 antibody by Dissociation-Enhanced Lanthanide Fluorometric Immunoassay (DELFIA).  The Board concluded that "[t]he Examiner points to no evidence or disclosure in Stoeber that individual cells were counted, and makes no supported finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand a correlation between a batch fluorescence value of cells and individual cell counts."

    As for Pajor, the Board noted that this reference discloses the scanning of CK-7 and hematoxylin stained cell samples on slides from voided urine by examining predefined areas of the slides using immunostain microscopy.  The Board concluded that "[t]he Examiner points to no evidence or disclosure in Pajor that individual cells were counted, and makes no supported finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood there to be a correlation between a fluorescent intensity of cells obtaining by immunostain microscopy and individual cell counts."

    The Board therefore reversed the Examiner's obviousness rejection, finding that "the Examiner has not provided evidence of each and every method step claimed, in particular the claimed cell counting step."

    In reversing the Examiner's § 101 rejection, the Board noted that the Examiner had determined that the judicial exception to which the claims were directed was the natural phenomenon of "elevated numbers of MCM2 expressing cells in urine [that] are indicative of bladder cancer or risk of developing bladder cancer."  The Examiner had also determined that "in the instant case, the claims only recite well-understood, routine and conventional limitations in addition to the judicial exception(s)."  In particular, the Examiner had determined that:

    [D]etection methods encompassed by the instant claims are well[-]known, routine, and conventional.  The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional elements (common methods of detecting expression and common therapeutic methods) are routinely performed in the art to obtain data regarding expression and treat subjects.

    Appellants, however, argued that the Examiner's assertion that the additional claim elements consisted of well-understood, routine, and conventional methods of detecting a known bladder cancer urine biomarker (MCM2 of Laskey) by modifying the generic method of Pajor was "conclusory and fails to consider the claims as a whole."  Appellants also argued that "the combination of Laskey and Pajor does not even provide all limitations of the claim and are conflicting technologies, not providing a routine path to practice the claims."

    The Board concluded that the Examiner failed to provide evidence to support a prima facie case of patent ineligible subject matter, citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018), for the proposition that "[w]hether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination."  In particular, the Board noted that "the Examiner did not establish with factual evidence, that the cell counting step, as claimed, is conventional or known in the art."  The Board therefore reversed the Examiner's rejection of the claims at issue under § 101.

    Ex parte Galloway (PTAB 2018)
    Panel: Administrative Patent Judges Adams, Mills, and Jenks
    Decision on Appeal by Administrative Patent Judge Mills

    Hat tip to Warren Woessner of Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner and Patents4Life for bringing the above decision to our attention.

  • By Michael Borella —

    USPTO SealEarlier this month, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) changed a number of decisions to "informative" status.  An informative decision reflects "the Board's general consensus on recurring issues and guidance to examiners, appellants, patent owners, or petitioners in areas where parties routinely misapply the law" (see PTAB's Designations for Opinions)

    One of these opinions is Ex Parte Jung, initially published in March of last year.  In it, the PTAB clarifies how a certain commonly-used claiming technique could be construed as either in the conjunctive or disjunctive depending on the disclosure of the specification.  While this interpretation is not new and dates back to a 2004 Federal Circuit opinion, many practitioners still use similar language in claims with the intent for these claims to be interpreted in the disjunctive only.  Therefore, it is worth revisiting this case.

    The relevant sections of a representative claim recite (formatted for clarity and with emphasis added):

        receiving, by the control point, one or more scene objects comprising the scene to be played back from the media server in response to the request, each scene object including metadata representing at least one of
            
    a precedence relation indicating the scene object's location in a sequence of scene objects and
            a connection relation indicating one or more scene objects capable of replacing the scene object, the connection relation including at least one of
                
    a connection branch and
                a contents connection list having a first group identification…

    This claim was rejected as obvious over a combination of two references.  The Applicant took the position that the first reference failed to teach what the Examiner relied upon it for, a "connection relation including at least one of a connection branch and a contents connection list."  The Applicant further took the position that the second reference also failed to teach that feature, as well as "at least one of a precedence relation indicating the scene object's location in a sequence of scene objects and a connection relation indicating one or more scene objects."

    Getting straight to the point, the PTAB stated that the plain meaning of claim language in the form of "at least one of A and B" is conjunctive and such language should be interpreted as "at least one of A and at least one of B."  This interpretation was set forth by the Federal Circuit in SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., and is based on the principle (from Strunk and White's Elements of Style) that "an article of a preposition applying to all the members of the series must either be used only before the first term or else be repeated before each term."

    Such a construction, however, does not apply when "the patent's claims, specification, or prosecution history necessitate a broader meaning."  Thus, in some situations, "at least one of A and B" is properly construed in the disjunctive as "at least one of A or B."  For example, if the specification suggests that only one of A or B is to be selected, then the disjunctive interpretation should be applied.

    In the case at hand, the Examiner interpreted the first instance of "at least one" in the claim as referring to either a precedence relation or a connection relation.  But the Examiner did not support this interpretation with any reasoning.  Thus, the PTAB instead applied plain and ordinary meaning per SuperGuide to find that this term should have been interpreted as conjunctive.  The PTAB wrote: "like any claim construction straying from the ordinary meaning, the Examiner should set forth the reasoning for such an interpretation, including citations and explanations of relevant portions of the claims, specification, or prosecution history."  Furthermore, the PTAB's analysis of the specification resulted in a conclusion that while both a conjunctive and disjunctive interpretation was supported therein, there was no "clear definition or disavowal which would compel a disjunctive construction."

    Regarding the second instance of "at least one" in the claim, the PTAB found support for a disjunctive interpretation.  But, it stated that "neither the claims nor the remainder of the Specification ever suggest that a connection branch and a contents connection list must be mutually exclusive . . . [t]hus, nothing compels interpreting 'and' to mean 'or' contrary to its ordinary meaning."

    Therefore, both instances of "at least one" were properly construed as conjunctive.  As a result, the PTAB reversed the Examiner's obviousness rejections, as the PTAB's claim construction was sufficiently narrower than that of the Examiner to avoid reading on the cited references.  The irony here, however, is that the narrower construction of "at least one of a connection branch and a contents connection list" was not adequately supported by the specification.  Consequently, the claims were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph for lack of written description.

    The practice tip here is that a claim term in the form of "at least one of A and B" will be interpreted in the conjunctive unless the Applicant clearly requires a disjunctive interpretation.  Nonetheless, numerous practitioners are unaware of SuperGuide and still expect such a term to mean "A or B."  A safe bet for those who wish to claim in the conjunctive or disjunctive is to use "A and B" or "A or B", respectively.  With appropriate support in the specification, of course.

    Ex parte Jung (PTAB 2018)
    Panel: Administrative Patent Judges MacDonald, Horner, and Engle
    Decision on Appeal by Administrative Patent Judge MacDonald

  • By Michael Borella —

    Federal Circuit SealInterval Licensing brought an action against AOL and several other defendants in the Western District of Washington, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,034,652.  In a previous ruling, all asserted claims of this patent were invalidated as being indefinite.  At issue in this decision are claims 15-18, which were subsequently ruled invalid for failing to recite patent-eligibile subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

    As an example, claim 18 recites:

    A computer readable medium, for use by a content display system, encoded with one or more computer programs for enabling acquisition of a set of content data and display of an image or images generated from the set of content data on a display device during operation of an attention manager, comprising:
        acquisition instructions for enabling acquisition of a set of content data from a specified information source;
        user interface installation instructions for enabling provision of a user interface that allows a person to request the set of content data from the specified information source;
        content data scheduling instructions for providing temporal constraints on the display of the image or images generated from the set of content data;
        display instructions for enabling display of the image or images generated from the set of content data;
        content data update instructions for enabling acquisition of an updated set of content data from an information source that corresponds to a previously acquired set of content data;
        operating instructions for beginning, managing and terminating the display on the display device of an image generated from a set of content data;
        content display system scheduling instructions for scheduling the display of the image or images on the display device;
        installation instructions for installing the operating instructions and content display system scheduling instructions on the content display system; and
        audit instructions for monitoring usage of the content display system to selectively display an image or images generated from a set of content data.

    According to the Court, the invention involves a software application referred to as an "attention manager."  This application "makes use of 'unused capacity' of a display device, by displaying content in that unused capacity."  Thus it can display "content when the display device is turned on but the user is not actively engaged with the display device" as well as displaying "content in an area of the display screen not used by already-displayed content with which the user is actively engaged."

    In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But generic computer implementation of an otherwise abstract process does not qualify as "significantly more," nor will elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.

    Applying step one of Alice, the Court quickly concluded that the claimed invention was directed to "providing information to a person without interfering with the person's primary activity."  This, in and of itself, is an abstract idea according to the Court due to it being analogous to news tickers on television programs, for example.  The Court also frowned upon the claim's "broad, result-oriented" structure that "demands the production of a desired result (non-interfering display of two information sets) without any limitation on how to produce that result."

    Regarding step 2, the Court again criticized the claim's lack of detail, stating that it "do[es] not recite any arguably inventive method of how the secondary information is displayed, such as what portion of the screen is utilized or how the primary activity on the screen is monitored."  Interval Licensing argued that the claim "improve[s] computer display devices by combining the acquired information with the user's primary display interaction."  But the Court did not view this ability as an improvement, largely because the claim is broad enough to encompass any mechanism to achieve this goal.  Arguably, this would include prior known mechanisms.

    Consequently, claims 15-18 were ruled invalid as directed to non-eligible subject matter.

    This opinion would just be another ho-hum, run-of-the-mill § 101 decision if not for Judge Plager filing a concurrence-in-part and dissent-in-part.  While not binding law, he has provided the most pointed (and sarcastic) criticism of the Alice test and how § 101 is currently applied that we have yet to hear from a sitting Federal Circuit judge.  Even a casual read of his concurring / dissenting remarks indicate that he has chosen his language carefully.  Thus, we will block quote much of what he wrote.

    He begins with an indication of what is to come:

    Given the current state of the law regarding what inventions are patent eligible, and in light of our governing precedents, I concur in the carefully reasoned opinion by my colleagues in the majority, even though the state of the law is such as to give little confidence that the outcome is necessarily correct.  The law, as I shall explain, renders it near impossible to know with any certainty whether the invention is or is not patent eligible.

    He then indicates that the term "abstract idea" as used by the courts is far removed from its plain meaning:

    An idea itself by definition is "[s]omething, such as a thought or conception, that is the product of mental activity."  The definitions of "abstract" include "[c]onsidered apart from concrete existence," "[d]ifficult to understand; abstruse," and "[n]ot applied or practical; theoretical."  An idea, whether abstract or not, is something that lives in the interstices of someone's brain, a psychophysiological area not fully understood to this day.

    Thus, by the very nature of the term, it is difficult if not impossible to apply the test to claimed inventions, and that focusing on whether a claim is to an outcome or a process to achieve that outcome does little to clarify the situation:

    And ideas can have an infinite range of abstractness, if by that we imply concreteness—for example, compare "I have an idea—let's have hamburgers for dinner," with "I have an idea—I am going to invent how to make time go backwards."  How much of abstractness is a function of concreteness?  How do we pick the line where the articulation and explication of an idea is sufficiently concrete to be 'non-abstract,' but not so much as to be 'generic and conventional'?  Does it help to phrase the notion as the difference between claiming a desired result and claiming how to produce that same result?  Or are we just substituting one set of vague notions for the other, with the same line-drawing problem?

    He backs this up by noting that "a search for a definition of 'abstract ideas' in the cases on § 101 from the Supreme Court, as well as from this court, reveals that there is no single, succinct, usable definition anywhere available."  Further, "[t]he problem with trying to define 'abstract ideas,' and why no court has succeeded in defining it, is that, as applied to as-yet-unknown cases with as-yet-unknown inventions, it cannot be done except through the use of equally abstract terms."

    Judge Plager then fires a shot:  "[t]he 'abstract ideas' idea, when used for denying a claimed invention's patent eligibility either before or after a patent is issued, cannot thus function as a valid rule of law."  Making an analogy to the I-know-it-when-I-see-it notion of obscenity, he writes:  "the 'abstract ideas' idea falls short in the sense of providing a trial judge with confidence that the judgment will be understood by the judges who come after."

    He goes on to question whether step two of Alice, the search for an "inventive concept" in an abstract claim, makes any sense at all:

    A small puzzle—if a court, after reviewing challenged claims in light of their terminology and written description, determines the claims to be 'abstract' in Step 1, how can the same court be expected to determine on a second reading that the same claims have become 'un-abstract' via Step 2?  Could it be that an 'inventive concept' cannot exist until the court reads the patent at least one more time?  Perhaps courts cannot be expected to read the claims carefully enough the first time?

    Judge Plager then makes an analogy between the notion of an inventive concept and similar "inventive requirements" that were eliminated from the § 103 obviousness inquiry by the 1952 Patent Act:

    As a decisional construct for validation of a property right—a patent—the idea of a necessarily underlying 'inventive concept' proved unworkable.  The concept provided no discernable boundaries for decision-making in specific cases, resulting in an incoherent legal rule that led to arbitrary outcomes.  Judge Rich, who devoted his life to patent law, saw this clearly, and gave the Congress a workable alternative—nonobvious subject matter—which they adopted.

    Finally, Judge Plager focuses on recent criticism of Alice from his colleagues, Judges Linn and Lourie, as well as academics, commentators, and the former head of the USPTO.  He also points to the bases of this criticism:

    There is little consensus among trial judges (or appellate judges for that matter) regarding whether a particular case will prove to have a patent with claims directed to an abstract idea, and if so whether there is an 'inventive concept' in the patent to save it.  In such an environment, from the viewpoint of counsel for the defense, there is little to be lost in trying the § 101 defense.  We are left with a process for finding abstract ideas that involves two redundant steps and culminates with a search for a  concept—inventiveness—that some 65 years or so ago was determined by Congress to be too elusive to be fruitful.  Is it any wonder that the results of this process are less than satisfactory?

    Turning to those who view modern, information-age inventions with disfavor, he adds:

    With the rise of software and business method patents, the 'abstract idea' became a weapon of choice for summary execution of what many decried as 'bad' patents.  The problem is that it does not distinguish good from ill in any coherent sense, and thus does not serve well either patent law or the public.

    Judge Plager then encourages district courts to defer § 101 determinations until after challenges under §§ 102, 103, and 112 have been decided, and suggests that many of the so-called "bad" patents killed off under § 101 would fail to meet these other statutory requirements.  Thus, in his view, there is no need to address § 101 on the pleadings for example.

    Judge Plager finishes with another strong statement:

    This emperor clearly has no clothes; we need not wait for our children to tell us this.  The legitimate expectations of the innovation community, as well as basic notions of fairness and due process, compel us to address this § 101 conundrum.

    There is little that Judge Plager writes in this concurrence / dissent that has not already been said many times by many individuals.  But his position as an active appellate jurist and the power of his choice of words lend additional weight to the growing sense of institutional disapproval over current patent-eligibility practice.  There still might not be enough momentum for the Supreme Court or Congress to rectify the situation, but a strong voice that cannot be ignored has joined the fray.

    Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel:  Circuit Judges Taranto, Plager, and Chen
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Chen; opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part by Circuit Judge Plager

  • By Andrew Williams —

    IPO #2In a document entitled the "Push Forward Report," the Intellectual Property Owners Association ("IPO") Women in IP Committee pointed out that "[w]omen are under-represented in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields, including in the ranks of patent and licensing attorneys."  In response to this concern, this IPO committee has prepared and shared tools that are designed to help build and expand on current practices to benefit women and diversity.  These resources, found here, address concerns of implicit bias, provide recommendations for what both companies and law firms can do to support women in speaking with influence, analyze how work-life balance considerations may impact talent review and attorney development, and provide suggestions for counteracting the problem of "vague feedback" that women tend to receive in contrast to the granular detail generally received by men.

    Implicit bias is "the unconscious attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decision," according to a White Paper produced by the Women in IP committee's Push Forward subcommittee ("Implicit Bias in the Legal Profession").  This report explains that there are different types of implicit bias.  For example, there is confirmation bias, which causes people to pay more attention to information that confirms existing beliefs and disregard information that is contradictory.  In addition, there is attribution bias that causes people to find more favorable behaviors and circumstances of their "in groups," and judge as less favorable those from their "our groups."  Availability bias causes people to default to "top of mind" information, such as picturing a man when asked to think of a "leader."  Finally, the report identified affinity bias as a form of implicit bias caused by the tendency of people to gravitate towards and develop relationships with people that share similar interests and backgrounds.  This can result in a "'mirrortocracy' – not a meritocracy."  Implicit bias not only impacts the career paths or women, but of "LGBTQ, racially/ethnically diverse, and disabled lawyers."

    The IPO resources include a toolkit on identifying and addressing implicit bias, which consists of a comprehensive PowerPoint, entitled "Implicit Bias & Ethical Duties of Lawyers," which was presented at the IPO Annual Meeting last September in San Francisco, CA.  First, the presentation explains what implicit bias is and how to identify it.  Also included is an identification of laws and ethical rules that are impacted by implicit bias.  But in addition to the help in recognizing implicit bias, this presentation provides suggestions for overcoming such bias, referred to as "de-biasing tips."  These include instituting procedures during the hiring process to remove any reference to gender and/or race, or using a voice modulator to mask gender in early rounds of interviews; and increasing retention or women and minorities by encouraging matching with sponsors, offering clear and constructive feedback, and adoption of succession plans that are inclusive.

    The IPO resources also include a toolkit to address "speaking with influence."  The Push Forward report identified two significant issues that have prevented women from fully contributing in the workplace.  First, upper management can end up discounting the contributions of women, even if unintentionally.  Second, women can end up being reluctant to share their opinions due to concerns of being ignored or drowned out.  Organizations need to support women to "speak with influence," because women are being prevented from fully contributing to their workplace, and in addition to impacting these women, it is also depriving the organization of valuable ideas.  The provided toolkit includes a video and the accompanying PowerPoint slides that conclude with recommendations for what employers and employees can do to support women speaking with influence.  These include facilitating informal interactions, instituting no-interruptions rules, and adopting practices that focus on ideas not speakers.

    Another issue addressed by the IPO resources is the impact of work-life balance on talent review and attorney development.  The toolkit also includes a video and accompanying PowerPoint slides on this topic.  However, the material points out that this is not just a women's issue, because everyone should be included in the dialogue regardless of whether they have children, and everyone at a firm or company can benefit from work-life balance.  The Push Forward report and toolkit focused on the problem that, during performance reviews and development discussions, work-life balance considerations can influence rating and development opportunities, even when firms and companies may have written policies relating to leave, flex time, and working from home.  Suggestions for addressing the problem include ensuring that alternative work schedule policies are formalized, seeking to eliminate bias in evaluations by outlining the specific criteria being relied upon before beginning an evaluation, and ensuring equal opportunities related to development by assigning a staff member to work closely with employees on alternative schedules.

    Finally, the IPO Women in IP committee sought to identify and address the problem of vague feedback that can disproportionately impact women.  Too often, feedback for women is not tied to outcomes but rather includes general statements, such as "you are too aggressive," or "you had a great year."  To overcome this problem, the Push Forward report and accompanying toolkit suggested that evaluators outline specific criteria being relied upon before starting evaluations, discuss three to five specific outcomes for all employees, and systematically tie feedback to business and goal outcomes (whether positive or negative).  Moreover, evaluators are encouraged to treat people in similar roles the same, including equalizing references to technical accomplishments and capabilities, and writing similar length reviews for all employees.  In addition, to overcome a tendency of some women to assume that their good work will always be noticed and rewarded, employees should all complete a self-review of performance so that they can highlight accomplishments that may or may not have been overlooked.  For employees being evaluated, the toolkit suggests that they be specific in their own self-evaluation, that they be proactive in obtaining feedback from supervisors, that they clarify expectations and get them in writing, and that they maintain records.

    On a related note, the American Conference Institute's 5th annual Women Leaders in Life Sciences Law begins this week on July 25-27, 2018 in Boston, MA, during which similar issues will be discussed.  As a reminder, MBHB attorneys Alison Baldwin, Paula Fritsch, Ph.D., Lisa Hillman, Ph.D., Sarah Fendrick, Ph.D., and Jelena Janjic Libby, Ph.D. will be attending this conference.  Also, Patent Docs readers are entitled to a 10% discount off of registration using discount code P10-999-PTD18 –– but hurry because registration is closing soon.

  • Federal Circuit Rejects Use of Tribal Immunity to Shield Patents in IPR Proceedings

    By Kevin E. Noonan –

    Federal Circuit SealThe Federal Circuit issued its opinion on Friday in St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, affirming the decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that denied the Tribe's motion to terminate Mylan's inter partes review (IPR) proceedings as being barred by tribal sovereign immunity.

    The issue arose over IPR Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, and IPR2016-01132 (and parallel IPRs filed by Petitioners Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Akorn, Inc., which had been joined with Mylan's IPRs) instituted against U.S. Patent Nos. 8,685,930, 8,629,111, 8,642,556, 8,633,162, 8,648,048, and 9,248,191 respectively.  After the PTAB instituted IPRs against these six patents owned by Allergan and directed to its Restasis® product, Allergan assigned its rights in the patents to the Tribe in return for a license (see "Allergan Avails Itself of Sovereign Immunity").  The Tribe argued unsuccessfully before the Board that as rightful owner of the patents the Board lost jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign immunity (see "Mohawk Nation Exercises Sovereign Immunity in Inter Partes Review").  The Board held that, as an issue of first impression, the Tribe had not borne its burden of showing it was entitled to the requested relief, and that the nature of the license left all substantive patent rights with Allergan, and thus that the company could amply represent the Tribe's rights even in its absence (see "PTAB Denies St. Regis Mohawk Tribe's Motion to Terminate IPRs based on Sovereign Immunity").

    The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Moore joined by Judges Dyk and Reyna.  The opinion acknowledges the existence of tribal sovereign immunity affirmed by the Supreme Court, including Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978), and Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991), but that the immunity "does not extend to actions brought by the federal government," citing E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1987).  In particular, tribal sovereign immunity "does not apply where the federal government acting through an agency engages in an investigative action or pursues an adjudicatory agency action" according to the opinion, citing Pauma v. NLRB, 888 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2018), and Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 122 (1960), as well as Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth.  But this exception to tribal sovereign immunity does not constitute a "blanket rule" regarding the application of tribal sovereign immunity as illustrated by Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754–56 (2002).

    The FMC case formed the basis of the panel's opinion, appropriate seeing as the Tribe had used this case to support its sovereign immunity assertion (albeit that case involved state sovereign immunity).  The panel drew its distinction on the quality of IPRs as being more akin to federal administrative proceedings (in which the Federal government is the "superior sovereign" and tribal immunity does not apply) than these proceedings are to a dispute between private parties, in which a government agency plays an adjudicatory role (as in the FMC precedent).  The opinion distinguishes IPRs from the circumstances in FMC based on the "hybrid" nature of IPRs, as the Supreme Court characterized these proceedings in Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016).  The Supreme Court continued its explication of the nature of IPRs in its two recent decisions on these proceedings, Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018), and SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).  Under these precedents, the panel concluded that there were sufficient similarities between IPRs and administrative agency proceedings (here, wherein the USPTO reconsiders the propriety of granting the challenged patents) and sufficient differences from more adjudicatory proceedings (including the "broad" and "complete discretion" vested in the Director on whether to institute an IPR, the absence of any requirement that either party continue to participate once an IPR has been instituted, and procedural differences relating to, inter alia, evidentiary and discovery rules) for tribal sovereign immunity not to apply.  The "government's central role" in IPRs and the Director's unreviewable discretion (rather than the insistence of a private party) in deciding whether to institute IPR proceedings were considerations leading to the panel's conclusion that "IPR is more like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party" and tribal sovereign immunity could not shield the Tribe from the IPRs.  (And the opinion notes that the Director is "politically accountable," sub silentio acknowledging the public policy aspects of the question, both in controlling increased drug prices and the ability of Native American tribes to participate in facets of the economy outside casinos and tourism.)

    Also relevant to the panel's opinion is the capacity of the PTAB to continue IPRs after institution even if the petitioner (Cuozzo) or patent holder (Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., IPR2017-00572, Paper 32 (PTAB July 13, 2017)) declines to participate.  Finally, "substantial" differences in procedure between IPRs and district court litigation (wherein similarities between administrative agency action and district court litigation was used to support tribal sovereign immunity in FMC) was another basis for the Federal Circuit's opinion ("An IPR hearing is nothing like a district court patent trial.").

    The opinion avoided Mylan's other arguments, including that the assignment and re-licensing of these patents was a sham intended by the parties to avoid reexamination of these patents to thwart Congressional goals of improving patent quality by providing a means to invalidate improvidently granted patents.  The opinion also pointedly states that its decision was limited to tribal sovereign immunity and that the Court "leave[s] for another day" the question of whether States can assert their Eleventh Amendment immunity against IPR proceedings (which the Court is slated to hear in the upcoming Ericsson v. University of Minnesota appeal).

    Judge Dyk wrote a concurring opinion, expressing his views on the history of reexamination proceedings before the USPTO as being consistent with the panel's decision to uphold the Board's refusal to recognize tribal sovereign immunity in this case.

    It is very likely that the Tribe will file a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  In view of the importance of the issue of the proper scope of tribal sovereign immunity (and the Court's recent penchant for patent law cases), there is a good chance that the final decision on this matter has not been rendered.

    Meanwhile, it can be expected that the Federal Circuit will lift the stay on the PTAB IPR proceedings that it entered while this appeal was pending (see "Federal Circuit Issues Stay in St. Regis Mohawk Tribe Sovereign Immunity Appeal").  And in due course the PTAB will hold oral hearings and issue its Final Written Decision, no doubt invalidating the claims and patents at issue.

    Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Dyk, Moore, and Reyna
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Moore; concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Dyk

  • CalendarJuly 24, 2018 – "Proving and Avoiding Inequitable Conduct and Unclean Hands in Patent Prosecution and Litigation" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    July 24, 2018 – "WesternGeco and Lost Profits: Fair Compensation for Domestic Infringement or Extraterritorial Extension of Patent Rights?" (Practising Law Institute) – 1:00 – 2:00 pm (Eastern)

    July 25, 2018 – "Protecting and Licensing University Patents in a Post-Oil States and SAS World" (Technology Transfer Tactics) – 1:00 to 2:00 pm (ET)

    July 25-27, 2018 – Women Leaders in Life Sciences Law conference (American Conference Institute) – Boston, MA

    July 26, 2018 – Semiconductor Customer Partnership Meeting (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 8:30 am to 3:00 pm (ET)

    July 27, 2018 – "Is Your Patent Portfolio SPC Ready?" (J A Kemp) – 3:30 to 4:30 pm (Greenwich Mean Time)

    July 31, 2018 – "Structuring Freedom to Operate Opinions: Reducing Risk of Patent Infringement — Combating Troubling FTO Results, Overcoming Potential Roadblocks, Addressing Impact of Post-Grant Process on FTO Opinions" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 9, 2018 – "Hatch-Waxman Litigation and 30-Month Stays: Multiple Stays, Late-Listed Patents, and More" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 16-17, 2018 – "Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2018: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing" (Practising Law Institute) – San Francisco, CA

    September 21, 2018 – "USPTO Post-Grant Patent Trials 2018: Change & Recalibration" (Practising Law Institute) – New York & Groupcasts in Philadelphia, Indianapolis, New Brunswick, NJ, Pittsburgh, and Mechanicsburg, PA

    September 27-28, 2018 – "Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2018: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing" (Practising Law Institute) – Chicago, IL

  • J A KempJ A Kemp will be offering a webinar entitled "Is Your Patent Portfolio SPC Ready?" on July 27, 2018 from 3:30 to 4:30 pm (Greenwich Mean Time).  Graham Lewis and Chris Milton of J A Kemp will use case studies to illustrate their tips for preparing your patent portfolio to take maximum advantage of the Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) system.  The webinar will also address the following topics:

    • Optimising patent claims for SPC purposes
    • Choosing the right patent for your SPC application
    • Planning ownership for multiple SPCs
    • Strategic use of divisional applications to maximise SPC term
    • Third party considerations

    Those wishing to register can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Structuring Freedom to Operate Opinions: Reducing Risk of Patent Infringement — Combating Troubling FTO Results, Overcoming Potential Roadblocks, Addressing Impact of Post-Grant Process on FTO Opinions" on July 31, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Doris Johnson Hines of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner and Laura A. Labeots of Husch Blackwell will guide patent counsel preparing freedom to operate (FTO) opinions for companies developing new products, and outline best practices for drafting FTO opinions to reduce infringement risks.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What are best practices for patent counsel when analyzing FTO issues and structuring FTO opinions?
    • What is the impact of the post-grant process on FTO opinions?
    • When should counsel seek FTO opinions to protect new research and products from infringement claims?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • USPTO Building FacadeThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be holding a Semiconductor Customer Partnership Meeting from 8:30 am to 3:00 pm (ET) on July 26, 2018 at the USPTO headquarters in Alexandria, VA.  The semiconductor workgroup examines solid-state devices and manufacturing processes, memory storage and retrieval, and lasers technologies.  The Customer Partnership Meeting will address the following topics:

    • Appeal and pre-appeal processes — SPE Alex Sofocleous and TQAS Darren Schuberg
    • Certainty in search and CPC — SPE Brett Feeney
    • Interview tools and process — SPE William Kraig
    • TC2800 quality with MQAS Brian Sircus and Supervisory RQAS and TC2800 Quality Lead Cassandra Spyrou
    • Panel discussion of topics
    • Patent prosecution topic from an external stakeholder (TBD)

    The event is free, open to the public, and will be webcast.  Those wishing to attend the meeting can register here.  Additional information regarding the customer partnership meeting can be found here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Hatch-Waxman Litigation and 30-Month Stays: Multiple Stays, Late-Listed Patents, and More" on August 9, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Shana K. Cyr and Barbara R. Rudolph of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner will guide patent counsel on the 30-month stay in Hatch-Waxman Act litigation, discuss the circumstances where the FDA will grant a stay — and those where it will not, and the panel will discuss when a stay may extend beyond 30 months and when it may be shortened.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • Can a "defective" complaint trigger the stay?
    • Can a late-listed patent give rise to a stay?
    • Is a generic drug applicant subject to a second 30-month stay if it converts a Paragraph III certification to a second Paragraph IV?
    • What is the impact of the stay expiring while the litigation is pending?
    • What is the impact of the litigation ending while the stay is in place?
    • What impact does a USPTO decision or pending USPTO proceedings have on a stay?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.