• By Joseph Herndon —

    Federal Circuit SealZheng Cai DBA Tai Chi Green Tea Inc. appealed an opinion of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) cancelling registration of his mark "WU DANG TAI CHI GREEN TEA" due to a likelihood of confusion with Diamond Hong, Inc.'s registered mark, "TAI CHI," pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).

    The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, and despite the two marks (shown below) looking substantially different in appearance at first glance, other factors weighed in favor of the cancellation.

    Section 1052(d) provides that a trademark may be refused if it consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the USPTO, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive (15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)).

    In Application of E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., the Court articulated thirteen factors to consider when determining likelihood of confusion (DuPont factors).  Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.

    The thirteen factors are as follows:  (1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity and nature of goods described in the marks' registrations; (3) similarity of established trade channels; (4) conditions of purchasing; (5) fame of the prior mark; (6) number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) nature and extent of actual confusion; (8) length of time and conditions of concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) variety of goods on which mark is used; (10) market interface between applicant and owner of a prior mark; (11) extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark; (12) extent of potential confusion; and (13) any other established probative fact on effect of use.

    Between the two marks, in its likelihood of confusion analysis, the TTAB considered the first three DuPont factors, treating the remainder as neutral because neither party submitted evidence related to them.

    Mr. Cai argued that the TTAB improperly weighed these three DuPont factors to arrive at an incorrect conclusion regarding likelihood of confusion. A summary of the analysis of these factors is included below.

    1.  Similarity of the nature of the goods

    With respect to the similarity and nature of the goods, the goods covered by each mark overlap.  Mr. Cai's WU DANG TAI CHI GREEN TEA mark identifies the goods as "Green tea; Tea; Tea bags."

    In turn, among many goods identified in its registration, Diamond Hong's TAI CHI mark identifies "tea."  Given this plain overlap, the TTAB's determination that the parties' goods are identical in part is supported by substantial evidence.

    2.  Similarity of established trade channels

    With respect to similarity of the established trade channels through which the goods reach customers, the TTAB followed case law and presumed that the identical goods move in the same channels of trade and are available to the same classes of customers for such goods—here, general consumers who consume or purchase tea.

    Since the marks cover identical goods (tea), this presumption attaches.  Mr. Cai failed to produce evidence to rebut this presumption.

    3.  Similarity of the marks

    With regard to the similarity of the marks themselves, the TTAB must examine the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.

    The Federal Circuit noted that the proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.

    Where the goods at issue are identical, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.

    Here, the marks were considered similar by the Federal Circuit, when considered as a whole, because they both invoke a large yin-yang symbol and prominently display the term TAI CHI.

    Specifically, the WU DANG TAI CHI GREEN TEA mark to Mr. Cai is described as follows:  the color(s) green and white is/are claimed as a feature of the mark, and the mark consists of a circle outlined in green, that divides to be half green and half white, with a single dot located at each half with the opposite color; on the top of the mark, it has words "Tai Chi Green Tea"; at the bottom of the mark, it has words "Wu Dang."  The mark is reproduced below.

    Image 1Similarly, the TAI CHI mark of Diamond Hong is presented in the following terms:  the mark consists of a man engaged in a tai chi position atop a yin-yang symbol with the term "Tai Chi" below the symbol and a Chinese character on each side of the symbol.  The mark is reproduced below.

    Image 2The Federal Circuit noted that color is not claimed as a feature of Diamond Hong's mark, and this further highlights the likelihood of confusion because, as the TTAB correctly identified, Diamond Hong's mark could be presented in a green-and-white color scheme like Mr. Cai's mark.

    The Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB's findings as to the DuPont factors, and found that the findings were supported by substantial evidence.  Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Opinion of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.

    Despite the two marks looking quite different, the DuPont factors weighed heavily in factor of cancellation of Mr. Cai's mark since the nature of goods described in the marks' registrations were identical and the established trade channels were identical.

    There were other DuPont factors that Mr. Cai could have perhaps argued, however, he encountered errors through submission of evidence, and further briefs by Mr. Cai were not considered.

    Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Wallach and Hughes
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Wallach

  • CalendarSeptember 18, 2018 – "The Continued Influence of PTAB Proceedings on Bio/Pharma Patents" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    September 18, 2018 – "3D Printing: Implications for Patents, Trademarks, Trade Secrets and Copyrights — Challenges With Additive Manufacturing, Policing and Enforcement Strategies to Protect IP" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    September 21, 2018 – "USPTO Post-Grant Patent Trials 2018: Change & Recalibration" (Practising Law Institute) – New York & Groupcasts in Philadelphia, Indianapolis, New Brunswick, NJ, Pittsburgh, and Mechanicsburg, PA

    September 21, 2018 – Supreme Court IP Review (SCIPR) — Patent Edition (Program in Intellectual Property Law, Center for Empirical Studies of Intellectual Property, and Institute on the Supreme Court of the United States at the Chicago-Kent College of Law) – 9:00 am to 5:15 pm (Central), Chicago, IL

    September 23-25, 2018 – Annual Meeting (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – Chicago, IL

    September 24, 2018 – Biotechnology/chemical/pharmaceutical (BCP) customer partnership meeting (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – Alexandria, VA

    September 26, 2018 – "IP Audit Checklist: Best Practices to Identify, Protect, Monetize and Enforce University IP Assets" (Technology Transfer Tactics) – 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm (ET)

    September 26, 2018 – "European and Canadian Patent Practices" (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago Patents-International Committee) – 11:45 am to 1:00 pm (CT), Chicago, IL

    September 27, 2018 – "Using Broadest Reasonable Interpretation to Your Advantage in Patent Prosecution — Establishing Scope of Claims, Avoiding Sect. 112(f), Preserving Enforceability" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    September 27-28, 2018 – "Advanced Patent Prosecution Workshop 2018: Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing" (Practising Law Institute) – Chicago, IL

    September 27-28, 2018 – FDA Boot Camp (American Conference Institute) – Boston, MA

    October 2, 2018 – "Advice of Counsel Defense in Patent Litigation and Protecting Attorney-Client Privilege — Limiting Scope of Discovery, Safeguarding Confidential Communications and Information" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    October 2-3, 2018 – Paragraph IV Disputes master symposium (American Conference Institute) – Chicago, IL

    October 3, 2018 – "2018 Bench & Bar® in Dialogue: Federal Circuit Court Visit!" (Federal Circuit Bar Association) – 2:00 pm to 9:00 pm (CT), Chicago, IL

    October 4, 2018 – "Patent Litigation in Japan and Germany," German Patent and Trade Mark Office, Munich, Germany

  • Chicago-Kent College of LawThe Program in Intellectual Property Law, Center for Empirical Studies of Intellectual Property, and Institute on the Supreme Court of the United States at the Chicago-Kent College of Law will be holding its ninth annual Supreme Court IP Review (SCIPR) — Patent Edition on September 21, 2018 from 9:00 am to 5:15 pm (Central) at the IIT Downtown Campus – Chicago-Kent College of Law in Chicago, IL.  SCIPR is the only annual conference in the country focused exclusively on intellectual property cases before the Supreme Court.  Among the sessions being offered at the conference are:

    • Review of Supreme Court Cases
        – WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical
        
    — Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC
        
    — SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu

    • Analytics and Preview of 2018 Term
        – Supreme Court Analytics on the Past Term
        – Preview of the Upcoming Term: IP cert. grants and cert. petitions to watch
        – Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com
        
    Helsinn Healthcare S.A., v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.

    • Supreme Court IP Review Address – "Huge Numbers of Patent Cases: How One District Judge Manages Them" — presentation by the The Honorable William Alsup, District Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California

    • Staying on Top of Recent Developments at the PTAB

    • PTAB Strategy in a Changing Environment: Claim Construction, Amendments and Section 112(6)

    • Litigating Under the New Trial Practice Guidance

    • PTAB Perspectives from In-House Counsel

    A complete agenda for the conference, including a list of sessions and speakers can be found here.

    Additional information regarding the conference can be found here.  The registration fee for the program is $95 (public guest tickets, including Chicago-Kent alumni), $50 (PTAB Bar Association members), or $45 (outside academics).  There is no fee for Chicago-Kent faculty, current Chicago-Kent students, and current students of other law schools.  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • Federal Circuit Bar AssociationThe Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) will be offering a CLE program and dinner entitled "2018 Bench & Bar® in Dialogue: Federal Circuit Court Visit!" on October 3, 2018 from 2:00 pm to 9:00 pm (CT) at the Langham Hotel in Chicago, IL.  The program will include presentations on the following topics:

    • Supreme Court & Federal Circuit En Banc Round Up
    • Update on Estoppel in District Courts Based on PTAB Proceedings
    • Venue Update: Life after the Supreme Court's Decision in TC Heartland LLC v Kraft Foods Brands Group LLC
    •
    A Conversation with the Federal Circuit Judges

    The registration fee for the program is $700.  Those interested in registering for the program, can do so here.  Additional information regarding the program can be found here.

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Patents-International Committee will be presenting a panel discussion entitled "European and Canadian Patent Practices" on September 26, 2018 from 11:45 am to 1:00 pm (CT) at the DePaul College of Law in Chicago, IL.  Part 1 of the seminar, to be presented by Dr. Mash-Hud Iqbal of Marks & Clerk, will be devoted to tips on drafting patent applications for filing in the European Patent Office.  Part 2 of the seminar, to be presented by Tomas Karger of Marks & Clerk, will cover maximizing patent protection in Canada.

    The registration fee for the presentation is $30 (non-members), $20 (IPLAC members), or free (students).  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Using Broadest Reasonable Interpretation to Your Advantage in Patent Prosecution — Establishing Scope of Claims, Avoiding Sect. 112(f), Preserving Enforceability" on September 27, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Christopher Francis and Daniel Hegner of Bejin Bieneman will guide patent prosecution under the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard. The panel will provide practical lessons for using BRI to your advantage in prosecution by examining recent Federal Circuit and USPTO's Patent Trial and Appeal Board decisions.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What guidance do Federal Circuit and PTAB decisions give patent counsel on the application of BRI?
    • What arguments are useful in overcoming patent examiners’ unreasonable claim interpretations?
    • Why is defining claim terms in the specification and using the definitions critical?
    • How can patent counsel distinguish cases where extrinsic evidence has been used to supplement the specification? If and when should extrinsic evidence be used?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO)A one-day, comparative law symposium on "Patent Litigation in Japan and Germany" will be held on October 4, 2018 at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO) in Munich, Germany.  Experts on patent litigation proceedings from Japan and Germany will be speaking at the event, providing an overview of the current case law in both countries.  Further, this event will offer a practice-oriented comparison of current legal issues such as claim construction and doctrine of equivalence or the protection of confidential information in patent litigation.  The language of the symposium will be English.

    Additional information regarding the symposium can be found here.  While there is no cost to participate in the program, advance registration is required.  Those interested in attending the webinar can register here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Acorda TherapeuticsDetermining obviousness is always a reconstruction, imperfectly done, of a past that never was.  The prior art is consulted and the question asked, would the worker of ordinary skill in the art have been able to achieve the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success?  Of course, this question is posed against a backdrop of the ordinarily skilled worker not having achieved the invention; that accomplishment was attained by the named inventor.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court since Hotchkiss and the Patent Act since 1952 has recognized that sometimes the answer to the question must be no, if only to ensure that the constitutional mandate that Congress only grant patents that will "promote the progress of . . . the useful arts" be satisfied.

    Roxane LaboratoriesIn patent litigation, defendants have the motivation to cast the imperfect past in light most favorable to the claimed invention being obvious, and to balance the rhetorical scales they also bear the burden of establishing obviousness (as in all invalidity pleadings) by clear and convincing evidence.  But what is clear and convincing to some is not to others, and the Federal Circuit's split decision affirming the District Court's obviousness determination in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc. illustrates the point — and at the same time shows that even the "objective" indicia of non-obviousness identified by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere do not always provide a reliable, fact-and historically based shield to a finding of non-obviousness.

    The lawsuit arose when Roxane and co-Defendants Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. each filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for Acorda's multiple sclerosis drug (Ampyra®) and sent Paragraph IV letters to Acorda (and co-Plaintiff Alkermes Pharma Ireland Ltd.) asserting that four Orange Book-listed patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 8,007,826; 8,663,685; 8,354,437; and 8,440,703) were invalid.  As the Federal Circuit panel stated, there was one additional patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,540,938, owned by Elan Corp. plc and exclusively licensed to Acorda.  That patent broadly claimed therapeutic formulations of 4-aminopyridine (4-AP); Acorda's patents were for more narrow formulations having specific characteristics and properties that distinguished (undisputedly, for novelty purposes) these claims from the claims of the '938 patent.

    For the purposes of the appeal all the asserted claims recited methods, dosing regimens, and sustained-release formulations for "methods of administering to a patient with multiple sclerosis a sustained-release 4-AP formulation (1) in a 10 mg dose twice daily, (2) at that stable dose for the entire treatment period of at least two weeks, (3) maintaining 4-AP serum levels of 15–35 ng/ml, (4) with walking improved."  The parties treated the following claims as representative:

    Asserted claim 7 (dependent on claim 6) of the '826 patent:

    6.  A dosing regimen method for providing a 4-aminopyridine at a therapeutically effective con- centration in order to improve walking in a human with multiple sclerosis in need thereof, said method comprising:
        initiating administration of 4-aminopyridine by orally administering to said human a sustained release composition of 10 milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily for a day without a prior period of 4-aminopyridine titration, and then,
        maintaining administration of 4-aminopyridine by orally administering to said human a sustained release composition of 10 milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily; without a subsequent period of 4-aminopyridine titration,
        whereby an in vivo CmaxSS:CminSS ratio of 1.0 to 3.5 and a CavSS of 15 ng/ml to 35 ng/ml are maintained in the human.

    Wherein asserted dependent claim 7 includes the limitation "whereby an increase in walking speed is obtained in said human."

    Asserted claim 22 of the '437 patent (dependent on claim 18, which in turn is dependent on claim 1):

    1.  A method of increasing walking speed in a human multiple sclerosis patient in need thereof comprising orally administering to said patient a sustained release composition of 10 milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily for a time period of at least two weeks, wherein said 10 milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily are the only doses of 4- aminopyridine administered to said patient during said time period.

    Wherein claim 18 recites that the dosage form is a tablet, and claim 22 recites that the tableted formulation of 4-aminopydirine "exhibit[s] a release profile to obtain a release profile of about CavSS of 15 ng/ml to 35 ng/ml."

    In the ensuing ANDA litigation the Defendants stipulated to infringement but recited as counterclaims that all claims at issue were invalid for obviousness.  The District Court found the '826, '685, '437, and '703 (but not the '938 patent) obvious, and entered final judgment and an injunction that precluded final approval by the FDA of Defendants' ANDAs until July 20, 2018 (the expiration date of the '938 patent).  This appeal ensued.

    Federal Circuit SealThe Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Taranto joined by Judge Dyk; Judge Newman dissented (vigorously).  The opinion set forth the extensive prior art asserted against Acorda's claims, as well as evidence that Elan had tried (and failed) to produce a suitable 4-AP formulation, and that Sanofi had also attempted making such a formulation without success.  Distinctions with the prior art included the need to titrate the dose of 4-AP, which (as the opinion concedes) had a "narrow toxic-to-therapeutic range[]"; also noted in the opinion was the variable reports of efficacy and frequent reports of serious side effects (including seizures) and that Acorda's methods, administration regimens, and sustained-release formulations were the only ones the FDA approved to improve walking speed in MS patients.

    Nevertheless, the majority affirmed based on finding the salient limitations (set forth above numbered 1-4) recited in the prior art, and that the skilled worker would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention in view of this extensive prior art.  The majority rejected Acorda's three contentions:  "that the district court erred in finding that a person of skill would have had a motivation to combine the prior art to arrive at the Acorda invention and a reasonable expectation of success in doing so"; "that the claim limitations relating to pharmacokinetics—i.e., achieving 4-AP serum levels of 15–35 ng/ml— are inherent in the claimed invention and therefore obvious"; and "that the court improperly applied a categorical rule that a blocking patent (the Elan patent) negates any findings in favor of Acorda on the objective indicia of commercial success, failure of others, and long felt but unmet need."  While the majority appears to have cherry-picked the prior art and reconstructed the invention using the claims as a roadmap (illustrating why the Supreme Court might have underestimated the pernicious effects of hindsight in obviousness determinations in KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex. Inc.), it is the majority's rejection of Acorda's third argument that makes this decision noteworthy.

    The majority's consideration of the so-called "secondary considerations" (aka objective indicia of non-obviousness) is grounded in the question of whether the '938 patent is a "blocking patent" that provides the basis for the commercial success of Acorda's Ampyra® drug product.  The commercial success objective indication of non-obviousness is burdened with the requirement that there be a nexus between the success and the claimed invention; it is frequently the case that such assertions are rebutted, inter alia, by a patentee's market power or other alternative explanation for the success.  The majority opinion sets forth the Court's precedent based on rebuttal of an assertion of commercial success as a basis for non-obviousness in Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005), Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731 (Fed. Cir. 2013), and Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  In each case, the Court held that the asserted commercial success did not support non-obviousness, due to the existence of another patent, as here not in issue, that explained why others had not marketed a competing product.  Specifically with regard to Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc. ("Merck II"), the majority noted that "a blocking patent did not, all by itself, justify discounting evidence of commercial success," calling it a "fact-specific inquiry."  And:

    Merck II's reasoning reflects a common-sense recognition that, as a theoretical matter, a blocking patent may or may not deter innovation in the blocked space by commercially motivated potential innovators other than the owners or licensees of the blocking patent.  Where the owner of the blocking patent or exclusive licensee is different from the owner of the patent in suit, the granting of a license may be a realistic possibility.  Even where, as here, the owner of the patent in suit and the exclusive licensee of the blocking patent are the same, such a potential innovator might or might not think it could successfully challenge the blocking patent.  And such a potential innovator might or might not be willing to research in the blocked space without a license to a blocking patent—even if the research itself is within the safe harbor provided by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)—and wait until it has already developed and patented its aimed-at improvement to negotiate for a cross-license with the blocking patent's owner to share the profits from the improvement.  Besides the assessment of whether the blocking patent can be successfully challenged, a number of variables appear generally relevant to the calculus, including: the costliness of the project; the risk of research failure; the nature of improvements that might arise from the project, and whether such improvements will be entirely covered by the blocking patent; the size of the market opportunities anticipated for such improvements; the costs of arriving at the improvements and getting them to market; the risk of losing the invention race to a blocking-patent owner or licensee; the risk that the blocking-patent owner (making its own economic calculations, perhaps in light of its own other products or research activities) will altogether refuse to grant a license to the improvement or will demand so large a share of profits that the whole project is not worthwhile for the potential innovator—all evaluated in light of other investment opportunities.

    Taking these factors and the prior art into consideration (including the fact that Acorda been given an exclusive license to Elan's patent), the majority held that the District Court had not erred in its analysis, a conclusion supported by the deference due the District Court on the factual question of commercial success.  The same blocking effect was also fatal (to the panel majority) to the assertion of "long-felt need" and "failure of others" as objective indicia of non-obviousness.

    Not so for Judge Newman, whose dissent (in comparison to the majority) illustrates the pitfalls that exist in any obviousness determination.  Judge Newman considers the exact same prior art and evidence that convinced the majority, and it convinces her of their error.  To Judge Newman, the history of the prior art was one of failure of many others to achieve the claimed invention.  And to Judge Newman the "new legal theory" regarding the almost plenary effect of "blocking patents" on the objective indicia is not just inimical to the patentee but to "the afflicted public," who would have lost the opportunity for Ampyra® to have been developed if, in prescient retrospect Acorda had foreseen the majority's outcome.  Judge Newman cites the prior art as showing "decades of failure" to wrestle this unwieldy drug, with its "narrow toxic-to-therapeutic range[]" associated with unpredictable and severe side-effects, to the reliable therapeutic uses achieved by Acorda:

    The record shows that many scientists in many institutions studied and eventually abandoned 4-AP as a treatment prospect for multiple sclerosis.  These abandoned studies constitute the prior art on which the district court and my colleagues rely for obviousness of the Acorda Patents. However, the experimentation with 4-AP shows just the opposite – it shows that work with 4-AP was abandoned due to the inability to balance the compound's potential effectiveness with its toxicity.

    Over and over, through her litany of the prior art, she shows that the majority used prior art to support obviousness that revealed failure to achieve the therapeutic goals without risking (and incurring) serious side effects.  Judge Newman sets forth instances where the majority apparently ignored or downplayed evidence that prior art upon which their decision relied reported abandonment of research and development efforts on 4-AP due to "toxicity and seizures," encephalopathy, and hepatitis, or "dizziness, hypotension, or nausea" that accompanied the drug's use.  The record shows that even Acorda, like all the other researchers, initially failed to develop a sustained release formulation and administration regimen effective in improving walking speed in MS patients, and that it was only when Acorda achieved an "analytical breakthrough" (i.e., a reevaluation of the clinical data) that its Ampyra® product was successfully developed.

    In addition, with regard to the majority's base determination of obviousness, Judge Newman asserts that "the question is not whether these four elements [as set forth above], if combined, would produce a successful treatment.  The question is whether the prior art contains a suggestion or motivation to select these four elements from the decades of inconclusive prior art, with a reasonable expectation that the selection would eliminate the failures of the prior art," citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  For Judge Newman, "[t]he years of studies and failures weigh heavily against the simplistic post hoc predictability accepted by the court."  Judge Newman finds no basis for the majority's determination that the skilled worker would have had a reasoned basis from the art to make the selections Acorda did nor any reasonable expectation of success if the skilled worker had done so:

    Acorda is correct that there was no suggestion in the prior art that the claimed combination should be tried, and there is no hint of a reasonable expectation of success.  Acorda points to the decades of failure of others to develop a safe and effective treatment for multiple sclerosis using 4-AP, despite its known toxicity.  The district court's selection of separate limitations from separate sources, and retrospectively fitting them into the Acorda template, is achieved only with the hindsight knowledge of Acorda's eventual success.  See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The determination of obviousness is made with respect to the subject matter as a whole, not separate pieces of the claim.").  Here, only the Acorda Patents teach the combination that successfully treats this multiple sclerosis impairment while avoiding toxicity and seizures.

    And with regard to commercial success, Judge Newman's analysis provides a compelling argument that the District Court and the majority made the wrong comparison in deciding that Elan's "blocking patent" was relevant to the question:

    Commercial success is measured against the products available for the same purpose, not against infringing copies of the patented product.  Defendants do not contend that they are precluded from providing or developing other treatments for multiple sclerosis.  The Acorda product met a long-felt need, for which the failure of others, despite decades of experimenting with the neurological properties of 4-AP, is evidence of the unobviousness of the Acorda achievement.  Such evidence is an important aid to a court that is attempting to divine whether the patentee's discovery was obvious in accordance with law [emphasis added].

    For good measure, Judge Newman ends her dissent by noting that "[t]he district court was advised that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board sustained the validity of the Acorda Patents in inter partes review, at Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA), LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 2017 WL 950736 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2017).  Although the majority reports this event, as did the district court, its consequences are not explored, including issues of privity, estoppel, and finality."

    Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Dyk, and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Taranto; dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Newman

  • Claim for Scheduling Packet Data Communication Survives Patent Eligibility Challenge in Motion to Dismiss

    By James Korenchan —

    Last week, in yet another patent case before Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Marshall Division, the Court ruled that Defendants T Mobile USA, Inc. and T-Mobile US, Inc. (collectively, "T-Mobile") failed to show that a claim related to packet scheduling is patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

    T-Mobile had moved to dismiss claim 109 of U.S. Patent. No. RE46,206 (the '206 patent) (a reissue of U.S. Patent No. 7,251,218) as directed to ineligible subject matter.  In addition, T-Mobile, as well as Defendants Ericsson Inc. and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, moved to dismiss all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,359,971 and claim 1 of the '206 patent as barred by issue preclusion.  The Court carried the motion under issue preclusion grounds but denied the motion as to patent eligibility.

    The '206 patent relates generally to packet data communication based on end-user quality of service (QoS) requirements.  As described in the Background of the patent, packet switching — which breaks up network data traffic into "packets" for transmission from one device to another device for reassembly — uses available wireless network bandwidth more efficiently than circuit switching in that it enables many devices to share the available bandwidth.  The invention of claim 109 takes end-user QoS requirements into account when scheduling packet data to be transmitted over a shared bandwidth.  In particular, packets are classified according to such QoS requirements and then scheduled for upstream and downstream communication "according to a scheduling algorithm."

    For reference, claim 109 is provided below:

    109.  A method for scheduling packets comprising:
        classifying a plurality of packets according to end-user quality of service (QoS) requirements of said plurality of packets; and
        scheduling said plurality of packets for communication in at least one of an upstream direction and a downstream direction over a shared wireless bandwidth according to a scheduling algorithm.

    In their motion to dismiss, T-Mobile not only argued that claim 109 is directed to the abstract idea of "classifying information based on an end-user's service requirements and scheduling information," but that the claim is "so abstract" that it can be performed by the human mind or using pen and paper.  T-Mobile even provided a drawing to illustrate this point (complete with a hand holding a pencil, to drive the point home even further):

    FigureIn addition, T-Mobile analogized claim 109 to classifying mail according to customer service requirements and scheduling mail (similar to an analogy made in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., which T-Mobile cited for support).  T-Mobile also cited to Federal Circuit decisions in Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc. and In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., the former of which found an abstract idea in "collecting information in classified form, then separating and transmitting that information in classified form," and the latter of which found an abstract idea in "classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner."  Emphasizing In re TLI, T-Mobile asserted that the concept of storing digital images could be substituted for scheduling information.

    In response, Intellectual Ventures argued that T-Mobile trivialized the invention and described the claims at too high a level.  Intellectual Ventures also argued that the invention makes little sense outside of the context of telecommunications, and overcomes a problem specifically arising in that realm — namely, that "different types of data packets have different ideal quality of service ("QoS") settings, which results in suboptimal data flow when, for example, voice packets and data packets are transferred over the same connection."  According to Intellectual Ventures, claim 109 specifically addresses this problem by requiring wireless networks to classify packets according to QoS requirements before scheduling the packets for communication.

    The Court agreed that "[the] '206 patent is directed to a technical solution to a technical problem" and was persuaded that the patent sufficiently describes the invention as such.  In particular, the Court cited to portions of the patent that discuss existing challenges that wireless networks face in delivering QoS to end-users, including network congestion.  The Court then elaborated:

    The '206 Patent is explicit in its solution to these problems.  Indeed, the first sentence, covering the field of the invention, states "The present invention relates generally to telecommunications and, more particularly, to a system and method for implementing a QoS aware wireless point-to-multi-point transmission system."  (emphasis added).  The "Summary of the Invention" states that "[t]he present invention is directed to an IP flow classification system used in a wireless telecommunications system.  More specifically, the IP flow classification system groups IP flows in a packet-centric wireless point to multi-point telecommunications system."  Accordingly, the '206 Patent makes clear that the patented invention is directed towards a technological solution to these stated problems.  Such solution is achieved by classifying, on a packet level, what the ideal quality of services characteristics are for each type of data in order to optimize data flow.  Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to take these affirmative statements as true.

    (citations omitted).

    The Court thus found that the '206 patent is directed to patent eligible subject matter and that the Defendants failed to show otherwise.

    Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T Mobile USA, Inc. (E.D. Tex. 2018)
    Order Carrying-in-part and Denying-in-part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by District Judge Gilstrap

  • Federal Circuit Affirms PTAB in Appeal of CRISPR Interference

    By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealBarring the unlikely event that the Federal Circuit rehears en banc today's decision in Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc. (or, even more unlikely, that the Supreme Court grants certiorari), the interference between the Broad Institute and the University of California/Berkeley is now concluded.  The Court affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's decision (see "PTAB Decides CRISPR Interference — No interference-in-fact"; "PTAB Decides CRISPR Interference in Favor of Broad Institute — Their Reasoning") that there is no interference-in-fact between the Broad's twelve patents (the Federal Circuit citing U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 as being representative) and one application-in-interference and the University of California/Berkeley's pending application (Application No. 13/842,859).

    To recap, the Board found that there was no interference-in-fact based on these requirements:

    In this proceeding, to prevail on its argument that there is no interference, Broad must show that the parties' claims do not meet at least one of the following two conditions:

    1) that, if considered to be prior art to UC's claims, Broad's involved claims would not anticipate or render obvious UC's involved claims, or

    2) that, if considered to be prior art to Broad's claims, UC's involved claims would not anticipate or render obvious Broad's claims.

    Broad will prevail and a determination of no interference-in-fact will be made if a preponderance of the evidence indicates one of these conditions is not met.

    In considering the evidence before it, the PTAB gave great weight to contemporaneous, cautious statements in the art in view of Professor Doudna's disclosure of in vitro CRISPR activity regarding whether the system would work in eukaryotic cells.  Specifically, these statements convinced the Board that while the results "suggested the 'exciting possibility'" that CRISPR-Cas9 could be operative in eukaryotic cells, "it was not known whether such a bacterial system would function in eukaryotic cells."  And "[i]n another report, Doudna was quoted as stating that she had experienced 'many frustrations' getting CRISPR to work in human cells and that she knew that if she succeeded, CRISPR would be 'a profound discovery.'"  UC's assertion of other statements by their inventors that could be interpreted more positively did not convince the Board that there was a reasonable expectation of success in the art for getting the CRISPR-Cas9 system to work in eukaryotic cells, the Board stating that:

    Although the statements express an eagerness to learn the results of experiments in eukaryotic cells and the importance of such results, none of them express an expectation that such results would be successful.

    The Board swept aside Berkeley's arguments that this reasoning was flawed because the standard is not the inventor's expectations but those of the worker of ordinary skill by stating that "if the inventors themselves were uncertain, it seems that ordinarily skilled artisans would have been even more uncertain."  The Board also quoted Berkeley's expert as having said (contemporaneously with Professor Doudna's report of in vitro CRISPR activity):

    There is no guarantee that Cas9 will work effectively on a chromatin target or that the required DNA-RNA hybrid can be stabilized in that context.

    The Board concluded that "[w]e fail to see how 'no guarantee' indicates an expectation of success."

    Nor was the Board convinced based on the history of the development of CRISPR technology, which showed that many laboratories independent of the Doudna group quickly applied the new technology to manipulate eukaryotic cell genomic DNA:

    Regardless of how many groups achieved success in eukaryotic cells, we are not persuaded that such success indicates there was an expectation of success before the results from these experiments were known.  The unpublished results of research groups are not necessarily an indication of whether ordinarily skilled artisans would have expected the results achieved.  Instead of viewing such work as evidence of an expectation of success, we consider the number of groups who attempted to use CRISPR-Cas9 in eukaryotic cells to be evidence of the motivation to do so, an issue that is not in dispute.  We agree with Broad's argument that a large reward might motivate persons to try an experiment even if the likelihood of success is very low.

    On balance, the Board found that this evidence further supported their decision that there was insufficient evidence of a reasonable expectation of success to support Berkeley's allegation that their earlier work and publications would have rendered Broad's invention obvious.  This evidence was that "differences in gene expression, protein folding, cellular compartmentalization, chromatin structure, cellular nucleases, intracellular temperature, intracellular ion concentrations, intracellular pH, and the types of molecules in prokaryotic versus eukaryotic cells, would contribute to this unpredictability [regarding whether the CRISPR-Cas9 system would be operative in eukaryotic cells]."  In response to Berkeley's allegations that these considerations turned out not to be an impediment to CRISPR's activity in eukaryotic cells, the Board said "[t]he relevant question before us is whether those of skill in the art would have expected there to be problems before the experiments were done," not whether it turned out that the experiments were successful once they were tried.

    Finally, the Board rejected Berkeley's citation of other prokaryotic genetic modification systems found to work in eukaryotes, generally on the grounds that there was no "commonality" in these methods that would have refuted Broad's evidence that the skilled worker would not have had any reasonable expectation of success.

    The University appealed, and today the Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Moore joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Schall.  After a recitation of a description of CRISPR (see "CRISPR Interference Declared" for a description of this technology) and the substantive and procedural posture before the PTAB, the Court addressed the legal arguments proffered by California in support of its argument against the PTAB's decision of no interference-in-fact.  As stated in the opinion,

    The case turns in its entirety on the substantial evidence standard.  The Board found a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in applying the CRISPR-Cas9 system in eukaryotic cells.  . . .  Given the mixture of evidence in the record, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that there was not a reasonable expectation of success, and we affirm.

    The opinion then addressed California's two arguments contrary to the PTAB's decision:  "that the Board: (1) improperly adopted a rigid test for obviousness that required the prior art contain specific instructions, and (2) erred in dismissing evidence of simultaneous invention as irrelevant."  The Court based its opinion on the evidence presented by one of the Broad's experts with regard to the difference between prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells (which it recited extensively) "that rendered the application of the CRISPR-Cas9 system in eukaryotic cells unpredictable."  The issues these differences raised relevant to whether the skilled worker would have had a reasonable expectation of success in applying CRISPR to eukaryotic cells were also, according to the opinion, recognized by California's expert, including inter alia statements like "[t]here is no guarantee that Cas9 will work effectively on a chromatin target or that the required DNA-RNA hybrid can be stabilized in that context" and "whether the CRISPR-Cas9 system will work in eukaryotes 'remains to be seen' and '[o]nly attempts to apply the system in eukaryotes will address these concerns.'"  This evidence was supported, in the panels' opinion, from California's own inventors (including Jennifer Doudna) "acknowledging doubts and frustrations about engineering CRISPR-Cas9 systems to function in eukaryotic cells and noting the significance of Broad's success."  In addition, the Court noted evidence that other prokaryotic systems adapted to eukaryotic cells ("riboswitches, ribozyme systems, and group II introns") "either [had] limited efficacy or the technology required a specific strategy to adapt it for use in eukaryotic cells."  This evidence amounted to substantial evidence that the skilled worker would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving CRISPR in eukaryotic cells.

    (The opinion recognizes that California had presented evidence in support of its position, but noted "[w]e are, however, an appellate body.  We do not reweigh the evidence.  It is not our role to ask whether substantial evidence supports fact-findings not made by the Board, but instead whether such evidence supports the findings that were in fact made.")

    The opinion also rejected California's arguments that the Board had used a rigid test that required specific instructions in the prior art and ignored the "inferences and creative steps" recognized as being relevant to an obviousness determination under the Supreme Court's decision in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 420 (2007).  And with regard to "simultaneous invention" evidence (which California argues the Board ignored), the opinion states that while "[s]imultaneous invention may serve as evidence of obviousness when considered in light of all of the circumstances," citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the existence of interferences means that simultaneous invention cannot, by itself, be evidence of obviousness.  The Federal Circuit rejected California's argument that evidence that six independent research groups applied CRISPR to eukaryotic cells "within a short period of time" after publication of Its discovery on prokaryotes rendered the Broad's claims obvious, and approved the legal rationale used by the PTAB:

    The Board explained that "[e]ach case must be decided in its particular context, including the characteristics of the science or technology, its state of advance, the nature of the known choices, the specificity or generality of the prior art, and the predictability of results in the area of interest."  . . . (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  We do not see any error in this analysis.

    The consequence of this decision (assuming it is the final word) is that the status quo will remain:  the Broad will maintain its extensive CRISPR patent portfolio and the University's patent application (reciting claims broader than the Broad's and encompassing CRISPR without regard to the cells in which it is practiced) should grant as a patent in due course.  Under these circumstances, a third party wishing to practice the technology in eukaryotic cells (encompassing everything from yeast to man) would need a license from both the University and the Broad (absent the parties coming to an agreement on how their overlapping technologies will be licensed).  This circumstance cannot fail to retard commercial adoption of the techniques, providing further impetus for some sort of co-licensing agreement between the parties to be forged.

    Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Schall and Moore
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Moore