• By Michael Borella —

    This article is Part II of a study on the patent eligibility of graphical user interfaces.  Part I was published yesterday.  We continue from where we left off, with overviews of a handful of Federal Circuit § 101 decisions addressing claims to graphical user interfaces and a discussion of how the three properties of specificity, technical character, and an advance over the prior art can be used to predict whether a claim meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101.

    D.  Mobile User Interfaces

    In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Company, claim 40 of U.S. Patent No. 6,546,002 was under dispute.  Particularly, this claim recites:

    A system for storing and accessing user specific resources and information, the system comprising:    
        a network for accessing the user specific resources and information stored in a network server;
        
    and a local device communicating with the network and having a local memory and a mobile interface, wherein the local memory also includes user specific resources and information, and the mobile interface includes pointers corresponding to the user specific resources and information that are stored either on the local device or the network server, wherein the pointers provide links to access the corresponding user specific resources and information.

    At issue was the mobile interface's use of pointers.  The plaintiff argued that the claim involved "a particular software-driven machine that performs specific operations to solve a problem unique to the field of computer networks."  But the Court did not concur, writing:

    Yet the claimed invention does not recite any particular unique delivery of information through this mobile interface. Rather, it merely recites retrieving the information through the mobile interface. Nor do the claims describe how the mobile interface communicates with other devices or any attributes of the mobile interface, aside from its broadly recited function. Thus, the mobile interface here does little more than provide a generic technological environment to allow users to access information.

    Finding the claims directed to an abstract idea, the Court moved on to part two of Alice.  Here, the plaintiff again focused its arguments on the mobile interface, contending that "the claims are limited to a specific use of multiple pointers to retrieve the user-specific data via a mobile interface in a network with a server and local device," thus providing users "with access to their files and data from any location irrespective of the device used."

    Again, the Court disagreed, finding that "[t]he claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component . . . that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources," and "this interface provides no more than similar user interfaces recited in claims that we have previously held ineligible."  Moreover, the Court deemed the use of pointers to retrieve information over a network as conventional activity, claimed too functionally to provide an inventive concept.

    A different story played out in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc.  At issue was claim 1 of U.S. Patent. No. 8,434,020, which recites:

    A computing device comprising a display screen,
        the computing device being configured to display on the screen a menu listing one or more applications,
        
    and additionally being configured to display on the screen an application summary that can be reached directly from the menu,
        
    wherein the application summary displays a limited list of data offered within the one or more applications, each of the data in the list being selectable to launch the respective application and enable the selected data to be seen within the respective application, and
        
    wherein the application summary is displayed while the one or more applications are in an un-launched state.

    The defendant contended that the invention as claimed was directed to the abstract idea of an index.  This point did not gain any traction with the Court, which found the claims "directed to a particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices."  The Court continued:

    The claim further requires the application summary window list a limited set of data, "each of the data in the list being selectable to launch the respective application and enable the selected data to be seen within the respective application."  This claim limitation restrains the type of data that can be displayed in the summary window.  Finally, the claim recites that the summary window "is displayed while the one or more applications are in an un-launched state," a requirement that the device applications exist in a particular state.  These limitations disclose a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather than using conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on a computer.

    To back up its position, the Court looked to the patent's specification, observing that it discusses the problems associated with prior art interfaces, especially with respect to displaying information on devices with small screens.  Particularly, users had to "drill down through many layers to get to desired data or functionality [which] could seem slow, complex and difficult to learn, particularly to novice users."  In contrast, the claimed invention involves "[d]isplaying selected data or functions of interest in the summary window allows the user to see the most relevant data or functions without actually opening the application up."  Doing so "saves the user from navigating to the required application, opening it up, and then navigating within that application to enable the data of interest to be seen or a function of interest to be activated."

    Based on this understanding, the Court concluded that the claim was not abstract, and that part two of the Alice test need not be carried out because the invention was eligible.

    E.  Support for Tabs and Change Tracking in Spreadsheets

    Examples of claims directed to spreadsheets that fell on both sides of § 101 can be found in Data Engine Technologies LLC v. Google LLC.  Under dispute were U.S. Patent Nos. 5,590,259, 5,784,545, 6,282,551, and 5,303,146.  For purposes of the Alice analysis, the Federal Circuit divided the patents into two groups:  the '259, '545, and '551 patents in one and the '146 patent in the other.

    The patents of the first group are directed to tabbed interfaces in spreadsheets.  With priority dates going back to 1992, these patents allege improvements over spreadsheets (at the time) that did not use tabbed interfaces.  In the words of the Court:

    In contrast to conventional electronic spreadsheets, the method claimed in the Tab Patents includes user-familiar objects, i.e., paradigms of real-world objects which the user already knows how to use such as notebook tabs.  In this manner, complexities of the system are hidden under ordinary, everyday object metaphors, providing a highly intuitive interface—one in which advanced features (e.g., three-dimensionality) are easily learned.

    In essence, the invention involves tabs familiar to anyone who has used a modern spreadsheet such as Microsoft Excel.  According to the patents, this interface has several advantages.  Notably, "instead of finding information by scrolling different parts of a large spreadsheet, or by invoking multiple windows of a conventional three-dimensional spreadsheet, the present invention allows the user to simply and conveniently 'flip through' several pages of the notebook to rapidly locate information of interest."

    In what may have been a determinative move, the plaintiff submitted several articles from popular magazines (e.g., PC World and InfoWorld) at the time of the invention lauding the advantages of new spreadsheet software packages that used tabs.  The articles noted that managing the complexity of large spreadsheets had long been a problem for users, and existing, non-tabbed spreadsheets would have data and results distributed in an unorganized fashion.  The introduction of tabbing elegantly solved this problem.

    Claim 12 of the '259 patent, which was representative of that patent and claims of the '545 patent, recites:

    In an electronic spreadsheet system for storing and manipulating information, a computer-implemented method of representing a three-dimensional spreadsheet on a screen display, the method comprising:    
        displaying on said screen display a first spreadsheet page from a plurality of spreadsheet pages, each of said spreadsheet pages comprising an array of information cells arranged in row and column format, at least some of said information cells storing user-supplied information and formulas operative on said user-supplied information, each of said information cells being uniquely identified by a spreadsheet page identifier, a column identifier, and a row identifier;
        
    while displaying said first spreadsheet page, displaying a row of spreadsheet page identifiers along one side of said first spreadsheet page, each said spreadsheet page identifier being displayed as an image of a notebook tab on said screen display and indicating a single respective spreadsheet page, wherein at least one spreadsheet page identifier of said displayed row of spreadsheet page identifiers comprises at least one user-settable identifying character;
        
    receiving user input for requesting display of a second spreadsheet page in response to selection with an input device of a spreadsheet page identifier for said second spreadsheet page;
        
    in response to said receiving user input step, displaying said second spreadsheet page on said screen display in a manner so as to obscure said first spreadsheet page from display while continuing to display at least a portion of said row of spreadsheet page identifiers; and
        
    receiving user input for entering a formula in a cell on said second spreadsheet page, said formula including a cell reference to a particular cell on another of said spreadsheet pages having a particular spreadsheet page identifier comprising at least one user-supplied identifying character, said cell reference comprising said at least one user-supplied identifying character for said particular spreadsheet page identifier together with said column identifier and said row identifier for said particular cell.

    The Court quickly concluded that the invention as claimed was "directed to a specific method for navigating through three-dimensional electronic spreadsheets" rather than an abstract idea.  Relying on the teachings of the specification that prior art spreadsheet technology was not user-friendly, the Court found that the claimed method "provides a specific solution to then-existing technological problems" that were unique to computers.  Particularly, the tabbed interface offers "a highly intuitive, user-friendly interface with familiar notebook tabs for navigating the three-dimensional worksheet environment."  The Court also seemed persuaded by the contemporaneous articles lauding the benefits of the tabbed interface.  As a consequence, both the '259 and '545 patents were found to be eligible.

    In contrast, claim 1 of the '551 patent was struck down under § 101.  This claim recites:

    In an electronic spreadsheet for processing alphanumeric information, said . . . electronic spreadsheet comprising a three-dimensional spreadsheet operative in a digital computer and including a plurality of cells for entering data and formulas, a method for organizing the three-dimensional spreadsheet comprising:
        partitioning said plurality of cells into a plurality of two-dimensional cell matrices so that each of the two-dimensional cell matrices can be presented to a user as a spreadsheet page;
        
    associating each of the cell matrices with a user-settable page identifier which serves as a unique identifier for said each cell matrix;
        
    creating in a first cell of a first page at least one formula referencing a second cell of a second page said formula including the user-settable page identifier for the second page; and
        
    storing said first and second pages of the plurality of cell matrices such that they appear to the user as being stored within a single file.

    When compared to claim 12, this claim "generically recites associating each of the cell matrices with a user-settable page identifier and does not recite the specific implementation of a notebook tab interface."  Therefore, claim 1 is "not limited to the specific technical solution and improvement in electronic spreadsheet functionality that rendered representative claim 12 of the '259 patent eligible . . . [i]nstead, claim 1 . . . covers any means for identifying electronic spreadsheet pages."  Thus, the claim was deemed abstract.  Under part two of Alice, the Court found that the elements of "partitioning cells to be presented as a spreadsheet, referencing in one cell of a page a formula referencing a second page, and saving the pages such that they appear as being stored as one file . . . merely recite the method of implementing the abstract idea itself."

    Unlike those of the first group, the '146 patent is "directed to methods that allow electronic spreadsheet users to track their changes."  In the prior art, spreadsheets "provided little or no tools for creating and managing such a multitude of [what-if] scenarios."  This resulted in users having to "resort to manually creating separate copies of the underlying model, with the user responsible for tracking any modifications made in the various copies."

    The solution provided by the '146 patent is "an electronic spreadsheet system having a preferred interface and methods for creating and tracking various versions or scenarios of a data model."  The invention "includes tools for specifying a capture area, that is, a specific set of information cells to be tracked and an Identify Scenario tool for automatically determining changes between a captured parent or baseline model and a new scenario."

    Claim 1 of the '146 patent recites:

    In an electronic spreadsheet system for modeling user-specified information in a data model comprising a plurality of information cells, a method for automatically tracking different versions of the data model, the method comprising:
        (a) specifying a base set of information cells for the system to track changes;
        
    (b) creating a new version of the data model by modifying at least one information cell from the specified base set; and
        
    (c) automatically determining cells of the data model which have changed by comparing cells in the new version against corresponding ones in the base set.

    The Court rapidly concluded that the claim was directed to the abstract idea of "collecting spreadsheet data, recognizing changes to spreadsheet data, and storing information about the changes" because "[t]he concept of manually tracking modifications across multiple sheets is an abstract idea."  Further, the Court found that the claimed invention does not improve spreadsheet technology in a specific, non-abstract fashion.  Moving on to step two of Alice, the Court stated that there was nothing more in the claims aside from "simply stating the abstract idea while adding the words 'apply it.'"

    Again this case demonstrates how fine a line exists between eligible and ineligible claims to a graphical user interface.  Here, the valid claims explicitly recited navigation of a tabbed spreadsheet interface, were specific in doing so, and were supported by statements in their specification regarding the technological problems solved thereby.  This latter point was bolstered by extrinsic evidence from contemporaneous publications.  On the other hand, the invalid claims were broader and not specific to navigating a tabbed interface.  Despite evidence that all claims under review were directed to an improvement in spreadsheet technology, the claims ultimately found invalid were viewed by the Court as conceptual rather than concrete, most likely due to their relative lack of specificity.

    IV.  Conclusion

    Based on the detailed case law analyses provided above, a few recommendations regarding the eligibility of graphical user interfaces can be made.  First, like all inventions, claims to graphical user interfaces are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  There is no categorical inclusion or exclusion of these types of claims.  Second, to be eligible, at least some aspect of the claim must be specifically recited to address a technical improvement over the prior art.  Each of the claims discussed above that failed the Alice test lacked at least one of these three factors.  In order to establish that an invention is such an improvement, it can be helpful to disclose in the specification or perhaps in a later declaration, the problems with the prior art and how the claimed invention overcomes these problems using a technical solution.

    Even with this framework, not all marketable inventions are going to be found eligible under § 101.  But focusing on the innovative displaying of data — whether a particular layout, workflow, real-time updating, or involving adaptation to screen size — with claims drawn to specific embodiments is almost certain to help improve your odds of a favorable outcome.

  • By Michael Borella —

    I.  Introduction

    The evolution of graphical user interfaces parallels the evolution of computing technology itself.  As computers grow more powerful and sophisticated, so does their ability to display cutting-edge representations of information to users.  Indeed, an entire field of academia, Human-Computer Interaction, has been established to address how to best allow humans to interface with computers, and graphical user interfaces are one of several modalities that are frequently studied.

    The importance of providing a suitable experience for users of software applications cannot be overstated.  One of the most visible aspects of any application is its user interface, which is often graphical.  Good graphical user interfaces can help applications become successful, while poor graphical user interfaces have the opposite effect and are regularly the subject of frustration and criticism.

    It would be sensible to assume that, as a field ripe with innovation, graphical user interfaces would be commensurately well-disposed for patenting.  But this is not the case.  Due to a series of Supreme Court decisions, as well as restrictive interpretations thereof by the Federal Circuit, patenting a graphical user interface can be fraught with peril.

    This article applies current state of patent eligibility to inventions involving graphical user interfaces.  In doing so, we develop a framework for assessing the patentability of such inventions and provide examples of claims that have both succeeded and failed to meet the eligibility standard.

    Today we post Part I of this study and tomorrow we will port Part II

    II.  Subject Matter Eligibility Overview

    A series of decisions by the Supreme Court from 2010 to 2014 significantly narrowed the scope of what is patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  This culminated in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, which held that claims of all statutory categories must have their eligibility determined by a two part test.

    In a nutshell, the first part was described as "determin[ing] whether the claims at issue are directed to one of [the] patent-ineligible concepts" of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.  If this is the case, then for the second part one must "consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application."  The Court described the second part as "a search for an 'inventive concept'—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.'"

    While finding the claims in Alice directed to an abstract idea, the Court declined to actually define the term "abstract idea" in any meaningful fashion, noting that "we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the abstract ideas category in this case."  The Court's treatment of the "search for an inventive concept" was similarly elusive.  Consistent with the prior holding of Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., so-called "well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry" would not clear this hurdle.

    Recently, the Federal Circuit provided a major clue as to how to think about patent eligibility in practice.  In Dropbox Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs. Inc. the Court wrote that "an inventive concept exists when a claim recites a specific, discrete implementation of the abstract idea where the particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over the prior art."  This suggests that in order for a claim to be successful under § 101, it should have three qualities: specificity, a technical solution that it provides, and some degree of novelty.  More particularly, there should be a nexus between these three factors — specificity, technical character, and an advance over the prior art should appear in the same claim element or at least be explicitly linked in some fashion in the recitation of the claim.

    Support for the three factors being a more suitable proxy for eligibility than the Alice test can be found in case law.  This point was argued at length with empirical support in a pair of previous articles: What is an Abstract Idea, Anyway? and The Three Properties of Patent-Eligibility: An Empirical Study.

    Claim specificity is not the same thing as claim breadth, although in practice the two are correlated.  Specificity, though, refers to whether and how much the claim recites a series of steps or set of elements that can be used to achieve a goal, rather than the goal itself.  The latter style has been referred to as "result-oriented," "outcome-oriented," and "black box" claiming, where the claim recites what the inventor hopes to achieve without reciting how the inventor purports to have achieved that goal.  The Federal Circuit often lauds the specificity of claims that it eventually finds eligible, while disparaging claims that lack this property.

    Technical character is a bit trickier to explain.  Notably, § 101 lacks any requirement that inventions be technical, and even Alice only hinted that such a requirement might be the case.  But the Federal Circuit has run with these sub-dicta suggestions, using terms similar to "technical solution to a technical problem" among others to describe what it is looking for in eligible claims.  To understand this property, it helps to imagine all inventions on a spectrum of technical character.  Those at one extreme are clearly technical because they improve the operation of machines (e.g., engine control, error correction coding, image sharpening, memory management in a computer).  Those at the other extreme are clearly more business-oriented than technical (e.g., derivative trading, annuity calculations, retail schemes).  Put another way, the former improves how a machine works, while the latter improves how a business works.  The fact that business-oriented inventions can be run on computers (and may even require computers to obtain meaningful results) is largely irrelevant to this analysis — such claims are still "non-technical."  Finally, in the middle of the spectrum we have inventions that improve how a person works (e.g., video game animations, livestock management, and in particular relevance to this discussion, graphical user interfaces).  These could be viewed as either technical or non-technical depending on the actual claim language at play.

    Novelty is a simple enough concept, and is well-understood in patent law, though the exact nature of the de facto prior art analysis under § 101 is unclear.  Nonetheless, comparisons between claimed inventions and prior art are found in a vast number of § 101 decisions including the aforementioned Enfish and McRO cases, as well as Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., and Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., just to name a few.  Claims reciting features that are not in the universe of prior art being considered by the Court tend to fare much better than those that fall squarely within the prior art's confines.

    To sum up, the three properties appear not only to be a reasonably useful way of thinking about patent-eligibility in a world where the two-part test is bewildering and obtuse, it is also highly predictive of patent-eligibility outcomes.  Of course, when you are before the USPTO or a court, you need to argue the two parts of Alice.  But keeping the three properties in mind can help you hone those arguments.

    III.  Graphical User Interfaces

    With Alice and the three factors in mind, let's discuss how to successfully claim an invention based around a graphical user interface in such a way that the claims are unlikely to run afoul of § 101.  But first let's define what we are talking about.

    Graphical user interfaces facilitate user interaction with computing devices by way of graphical elements (and in some cases display links to audio elements as well), instead of through use of a pure text-based interface.  These graphical elements may include windows, icons, widgets, sliders, text boxes, buttons, and menus that can be selected, highlighted, moved, and so on through use of a pointing device (e.g., a mouse).  Modern smartphones expand these features to support touch and multi-touch manipulation.  Often, two or more screens of a graphical user interface are linked together into a workflow.  Navigation between these screens may be possible in particular orderings.  Graphical user interfaces may be web-based, for example, with parts of each page being loaded from a server and/or a database, or natively-compiled to execute on a client device even when no network is available.

    An ongoing challenge in graphical user interface design is to maximize the user experience by providing sought-after information in a consistent, logical, and low-effort fashion.  This has, in turn, been an area that is ripe for innovation and in which many patents have been filed over the years.  But not all of these patents have survived § 101 scrutiny.

    In the following sub-sections, we explore a handful of Federal Circuit § 101 decisions addressing claims to graphical user interfaces.  An understanding of these examples, as well as application of the three factors discussed above, can better guide claiming efforts in directions that are more likely to avoid § 101 pitfalls.

    A.  Simple Generation and Display of Information

    As a first point of order, the generation and display of generic, mathematical, or financial information at a high level is almost certainly going to be viewed as ineligible.  For an example, one need not look further than SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC.  Claim 1 of InvestPic's U.S. Patent No. 6,349,291 recites:

    A method for calculating, analyzing and displaying investment data comprising the steps of:
        (a) selecting a sample space, wherein the sample space includes at least one investment data sample;
        (b) generating a distribution function using a re-sampled statistical method and a bias parameter, wherein the bias parameter determines a degree of randomness in a resampling process; and,
        (c) generating a plot of the distribution function.

    It is relatively easy to glance at this claim, observe how non-specific it is (strike one) and how it appears to be focused on plotting a mathematical function (strike two) related to financial services (strike three), and then conclude that it is directed to an abstract idea.  Indeed, that is more or less what the Federal Circuit did, as it wrote that "[t]he focus of the claims . . . is on selecting certain information, analyzing it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of the analysis."  All of these aspects had been previously found to be abstract.

    There was some evidence in the specification that the invention entailed an improvement over the prior art.  Notably, it states that "conventional financial information sites on the World Wide Web perform rudimentary statistical functions that are not useful to investors in forecasting the behavior of financial markets because they rely upon assumptions that the underlying probability distribution function ('PDF') for the financial data follows a normal or Gaussian distribution."  The Court observed that "[such an] assumption, the patent says, is generally false: the PDF for financial market data is heavy tailed . . . rather than symmetric like a normal distribution."  As a consequence, traditional "analyses understate the true risk and overstate the potential rewards for an investment or trading strategy."  In other words, real-world financial data does not fit a so-called bell curve, and any statistics based on the incorrect assumption that it does will be flawed.

    But this was insufficient to establish eligibility.  The Court ultimately concluded that:

    There is, in short, nothing inventive about any claim details, individually or in combination, that are not themselves in the realm of abstract ideas.  In the absence of the required "inventive concept" in application, the claims here are legally equivalent to claims simply to the asserted advance in the realm of abstract ideas—an advance in mathematical techniques in finance.  Under the principles developed in interpreting § 101, patent law does not protect such claims, without more, no matter how groundbreaking the advance.

    Or, specific, technical advances are necessary to establish patent eligibly, and the claimed invention here was neither.

    B.  Web Navigation

    Internet Patents Corporation (IPC) filed infringement suits against Active Network, Inc. and several other parties alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,707,505.  Of dispute was claim 1 of the '505 patent, which recites:

    A method of providing an intelligent user interface to an online application comprising the steps of:
        furnishing a plurality of icons on a web page displayed to a user of a web browser, wherein each of said icons is a hyperlink to a dynamically generated online application form set, and wherein said web browser comprises Back and Forward navigation functionalities;
        displaying said dynamically generated online application form set in response to the activation of said hyperlink, wherein said dynamically generated online application form set comprises a state determined by at least one user input; and
        maintaining said state upon the activation of another of said icons, wherein said maintaining allows use of said Back and Forward navigation functionalities without loss of said state.

    In a nutshell, the claimed invention is directed to a web browser that stores state representing what a user has typed into a web-based form, even if that information has not yet been submitted.  Then, if the user navigates away from and back to the web-based form, the stored state is usable in the form.  In this way, the user does not have to retype the information.

    The Court focused on what the specification of the '505 patent discloses regarding claim elements that were new and those encompassed by the prior art.  Particularly, the '505 patent asserts that "the end result of 'maintaining the state' is described as the innovation over the prior art, and the essential, 'most important aspect'" thereof.  On the other hand, the '505 patent describes the "browser Back and Forward button functionality" as "conventional," "well-known," and "common."

    Ultimately, the Court was influenced by the claim's lack of specificity, writing that "claim 1 contains no restriction on how the result is accomplished," and "[t]he mechanism for maintaining the state is not described, although this is stated to be the essential innovation."  Thus, "IPC's proposed interpretation of 'maintaining state' describes the effect or result dissociated from any method by which maintaining the state is accomplished upon the activation of an icon."  As a result of this outcome-oriented claiming, the Court ruled that the claim was patent-ineligible.

    C.  Securities Trading

    In Trading Technologies Int'l v. CQG, Inc., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,772,132 and 6,766,304 were found eligible in district court, and defendant CQG appealed.  Claim 1 of the '304 patent was found to be representative for purposes of the § 101 analysis:

    A method for displaying market information relating to and facilitating trading of a commodity being traded in an electronic exchange having an inside market with a highest bid price and a lowest ask price on a graphical user interface, the method comprising;
        dynamically displaying a first indicator in one of a plurality of locations in a bid display region, each location in the bid display region corresponding to a price level along a common static price axis, the first indicator representing quantity associated with at least one order to buy the commodity at the highest bid price currently available in the market;
        dynamically displaying a second indicator in one of a plurality of locations in an ask display region, each location in the ask display region corresponding to a price level along the common static price axis, the second indicator representing quantity associated with at least one order to sell the commodity at the lowest ask price currently available in the market;
        displaying the bid and ask display regions in relation to fixed price levels positioned along the common static price axis such that when the inside market changes, the price levels along the common static price axis do not move and at least one of the first and second indicators moves in the bid or ask display regions relative to the common static price axis;
        displaying an order entry region comprising a plurality of locations for receiving commands to send trade orders, each location corresponding to a price level along the common static price axis; and
        in response to a selection of a particular location of the order entry region by a single action of a user input device, setting a plurality of parameters for a trade order relating to the commodity and sending the trade order to the electronic exchange.

    In the words of the Federal Circuit, the patents "describe and claim a method and system for the electronic trading of stocks, bonds, futures, options and similar products," and "explain problems that arise when a trader attempts to enter an order at a particular price, but misses the price because the market moved before the order was entered and executed."  The claimed graphical user interface involves "bid and asked prices [that] are displayed dynamically along the static display, and the system pairs orders with the static display of prices and prevents order entry at a changed price."

    This dynamic display appears to be the nugget of eligibility in the claim, providing a specific technical advance over the prior art.  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the claims "solve problems of prior graphical user interface devices . . . in the context of computerized trading relating to speed, accuracy and usability," and that these improvements have "no pre-electronic trading analog."  Furthermore, rather than merely claiming the displaying of information on a graphical user interface, the claims "require a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user interface's structure that is addressed to and resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art."  Thus, the claims were not abstract under part one of Alice.  Further, the static price index was an "inventive concept" under step two of Alice, because it "allows traders to more efficiently and accurately place trades using this electronic trading system."

    The same plaintiff did not fare so well in Trading Technologies Int'l v. IBG LLC.  At issue was claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,783,556, which had been held ineligible in a Covered Business Method Review procedure at USPTO's Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).  The claim recites:

    A method for displaying market information on a graphical user interface, the method comprising:
        receiving by a computing device a current highest bid price and a current lowest ask price for a tradeable object from an electronic exchange;
        identifying by the computing device a long or short position taken by a user with respect to the tradeable object, wherein the long position is associated with a quantity of the tradeable object that has been bought by the user at a price, and wherein the short position is associated with a quantity of the tradeable object that has been sold by the user at a price;
        computing by the computing device a plurality of values based on the long or short position, wherein each of the plurality of values represents a profit or loss if the long or short position is closed at a price level among a range of price levels for the tradeable object;
        displaying via the computing device the plurality of values along a value axis;
        displaying via the computing device a first indicator at a first location corresponding to a first value along the value axis, wherein the first indicator represents a particular price based on any of the following prices: current best bid, current best ask, and a last traded price, and wherein the first value represents a profit or loss incurred by the user if the long or short position is closed at the particular price; and
        moving the first indicator relative to the value axis to a second location corresponding to a second value along the value axis responsive to receipt of an update to the particular price, wherein the second value represents a profit or loss incurred by the user if the position is closed at the update to the particular price.

    The Court rapidly found the claims abstract, noting that "[t]he only difference between the trading screen of [the prior art] and the one claimed is that the axis in [the prior art] displays price values, and the claimed axis displays P&L values."  Further, the Court concluded that the identifying and computing steps were "nothing more than mere automation of manual processes using generic computers, which does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology."

    Despite the plaintiff arguing that the displaying and moving steps "provide a particular graphical user interface that improves usability, visualization, and efficiency," the Court disagreed.  Instead, it found that the claims focus on "providing information to traders in a way that helps them process information more quickly, not on improving computers or technology" and they fail to be non-abstract "because arranging information along an axis does not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently, or solve any technological problem."  The Court also found no inventive concept in the combination of claim elements.

    Thus, unlike the static price index of the '304 patent, there apparently was not enough daylight between the prior art and the displaying and moving of first indicator in the '556 patent.  This goes to show how some graphical user interface decisions could easily go one way or another not just based on the claim language under review, but also the context of the invention with respect to the prior art.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    SARS-CoV-2Svante Pääbo created the science of detecting Neanderthal DNA in archeological samples (and living humans) almost single-handedly (see Neanderthal Man: In Search of Lost Genomes).  So it will come as little surprise to many that he published a paper in September describing his discovery of a gene derived from our Neanderthal ancestors (and inherited by modern humans) that encodes a risk factor for infection with the etiological agent for COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2.

    The paper, entitled "The major genetic risk factor for severe COVID-19 is inherited from Neanderthals" and published in Nature, builds on genetic association studies that disclosed a gene cluster located on human chromosome 3 that relates to respiratory failure in response to COVID infection.  Separately, other researchers had shown that this cluster was a "major risk factor" for severe COVID symptoms in 3,200 infected, hospitalized patients.  In this paper, Dr. Pääbo and his collaborator show that the genetic element responsible for this phenotype resides in a 50 kilobase (kb) genomic segment inherited from our Neanderthal ancestors and is disproportionately found in humans from South Asia (50%) as compared with Europeans (16%).

    The portion of the human genome on chromosome 3 showed high linkage disequilibrium in non-African populations (meaning that the genes in this region tend to be co-inherited at higher frequencies than expected for random parts of the chromosome), indicating the action of some selective pressure in favor of co-inheritance.  The "risk" alleles in this segment are associated with the genome of a ~50,000 year-old Neanderthal specimen from Croatia reported by Dr. Pääbo and his collaborators in 2017 in Science, as reflected in the presence of 11 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in common between Neanderthal and modern human DNA from this segment.  None of these diagnostic SNPs are found in Denisovan specimens, whereas some (3) of them are found in older Neanderthal specimens (60000 – 120,000 years old) from Siberia.  The paper thus hypothesizes that the presence of these genes in modern human DNA was the result of Neanderthal-human crossbreeding.

    The paper also reports that the alternative hypothesis — that this segment in inherited from the common ancestor between Neanderthals and modern humans — was not supported (albeit a conclusion reliant on a number of reasonable yet hypothetical conditions).  In addition, the conclusion that this segment was the result of Neanderthal-human crossbreeding is consistent with other studies regarding "gene flow" from Neanderthal ancestors in this region of the chromosome.

    From a population genetic perspective, the Neanderthal-derived risk segment (or "haplotype) is almost completely absent from Africa, which is consistent with most human-Neanderthal interbreeding occurring in populations that had migrated from Africa (see Who We Are and How We Got Here: Ancient DNA and the New Science of the Human Past).  The paper reports that the "core" Neanderthal risk haplotype occurs "in south Asia at an allele frequency of 30%, in Europe at an allele frequency of 8%, among admixed Americans with an allele frequency of 4% and at lower allele frequencies in east Asia," resulting in their finding that "50% of people in South Asia carry at least one copy of the risk haplotype, whereas 16% of people in Europe and 9% of admixed American individuals carry at least one copy of the risk haplotype."  Perhaps surprisingly, the highest frequency of modern carriers was found in Bangladesh where 63% of the population carries at least one copy of the risk factor DNA and 13% of the population is homozygous for this haplotype.  This result its consistent with the experience in the UK of individuals from Bangladesh, who have about twice the risk of dying from COVID than members of the general population.  There is also some evidence that these population differences reflect initial positive selection in South Asia in ancestral populations (although the only speculative basis for positive selection the authors provide would be against another unknown pathogen).

    Unfortunately, the paper does not report what is encoded in this segment inherited from Neanderthals. When elucidated, such results may be beneficial, providing for example a genetic screen for individuals at particular risk (and hence motivated to take particular cautions) of SRAS-CoV-2 infection.  Nevertheless, the paper provides a fascinating (albeit tragic) insight into the consequences of the persistent presence of Neanderthal-derived DNA in modern humans, particularly as they relate to resistance and susceptibility to even the most novel of diseases.

  • By Michael Borella —

    With apologies to David Letterman.

    If we have learned anything from the last six-and-a-half years of patent eligibility jurisprudence, it is that nobody knows what's going on.

    Subject matter eligibility is a fundamental requirement for an invention to be patentable.  According to 35 U.S.C. § 101, "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."  This definition is quite broad, covering virtually any physical thing (machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter) and any series of steps used to achieve a goal (processes).  Indeed, 40 years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had intended the statute to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."

    But a series of decisions by the Court from 2010 to 2014 significantly narrowed the scope of what is patentable.  This culminated in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, which held that claims of all statutory categories must have their eligibility determined by a two part test.

    In a nutshell, the first part was described as "determin[ing] whether the claims at issue are directed to one of [the] patent-ineligible concepts" of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.  If this is the case, then for the second part one must "consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application."  The Court described the second part as "a search for an 'inventive concept'—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.'"

    While finding the claims in Alice directed to an abstract idea, the Court declined to actually define the term "abstract idea" in any meaningful fashion, noting that "we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the abstract ideas category in this case."  The Court's treatment of the "search for an inventive concept" was similarly elusive.  Consistent with the prior holding of Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., so-called "well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry" would not clear this hurdle.  Regarding the computer-implemented claims of Alice, the Court wrote that:

    [M]ere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.  Stating an abstract idea while adding the words 'apply it' is not enough for patent eligibility.  Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment.  Stating an abstract idea while adding the words 'apply it with a computer' simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result.  Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on . . . a computer, that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.

    In practice, the introduction of this test effectively made it more difficult to patent certain types of inventions — particularly, diagnostic methods, software, and business methods.  As a result, there has been consternation over the Court's opinions not only in how they have reduced the ability to protect critical innovations that drive the U.S. economy, but also how vague the Justices left the line between inventions that are eligible for patent and those that are not.

    Indeed, a number of federal judges have strongly criticized Alice and its progeny.  Judge Wu of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California panned Alice for setting forth an "I know it when I see it" test.  Judge Pfaelzer, a colleague of Judge Wu, wrote that the Supreme Court's patent eligibility cases "often confuse more than they clarify [and] appear to contradict each other on important issues."  More recently, Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit wrote that the post-Alice § 101 inquiry "renders it near impossible to know with any certainty whether the invention is or is not patent eligible."  Former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Paul Michel stated that Alice "create[d] a standard that is too vague, too subjective, too unpredictable and impossible to administer in a coherent consistent way in the patent office or in the district courts or even in the federal circuit."  And these are just a few examples of judicial confusion.  There are more.

    Having said that, there are a few lines of attack that have been used by judges and patent examiners over the few last years that are particularly egregious.  Using these patterns allows a quick kill — rejection of pending claims or invalidation of granted claims on grounds of ineligibly without the legal or factual reasoning that one would expect from the USPTO and the federal courts.  We'll call these "Stupid § 101 Tricks" for lack of a better term.

    Trick 1: Abstract Is As Abstract Does

    What does it mean to be "directed to" an abstract idea?  There is no clear answer, but all too often it involves a process that resembles a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Particularly, one takes a claim, removes most or all of the technical detail, views what is left at a 10,000 foot level, and then declares that this drastically summarized version of the claim language is abstract.  The logical fallacy comes in the next step, where one then declares that because the summarized version is abstract, the whole claim is directed to an abstract idea.  Or, in other words, you remove everything that is concrete in a claim and then assert that the claim is abstract based on what little is left.

    The Supreme Court specifically warned against doing this, noting in Alice that "at some level, all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas," and that one must "tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law."  And yet, the Federal Circuit is guilty of this summarizing-to-abstraction.  In Recognicorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., it took a 154-word claim directed to a particular type of data compression technology, and declared it to be directed to the abstract idea of "encoding and decoding image data."  For those of you doing not doing the math at home, the Court compressed 154 words into 5 words without the benefit of any algorithm like that of Recognicorp.

    And Recognicorp was not the only victim of this trick.  The Federal Circuit effectively rubber-stamped a district court's oversimplifying of claims essentially down to their preambles in Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, and also summarized a 155-word claim in Intellectual Ventures I v. Symantec Corp. down to the abstract idea of "backing up data."

    There are numerous further examples in the courts as well as in USPTO examination.

    Trick 2: Prima Facie Case?  What Prima Facie Case?

    Speaking of the USPTO examination, let's pick on that for a while.  According to the USPTO's guidance entitled October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, "the initial burden is on the examiner to explain why a claim or claims are ineligible for patenting clearly and specifically, so that the applicant has sufficient notice and is able to effectively respond."  Further, "[o]nce the examiner has satisfied the initial burden, the burden of coming forward with evidence or argument shifts to the applicant."  Sounds good, right?  But what can happen in practice is quite different.

    Examiners often avoid truly establishing a prima facie case of ineligibility by instead following a three step process: (i) quote claim language, (ii) quote boilerplate rejection language, and (iii) conclude that the claim is ineligible.  Here's a generic example modeled after actual USPTO rejections:

    Claim is directed to [quote claim 1 in its entirety].  This claim recites a [mathematical concept / mental process / method of organizing human activity] and is not meaningfully different from concepts found to be abstract ideas by the courts.  The claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional elements when considered both individually and as an ordered combination do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.  Therefore, the claim does not meet the requirements of § 101.

    You'll note that rejections of this style can be quite long but they do not say much.  Particularly, there is no actual reasoning pertaining to why the claim is abstract.  There is no identification of particular claim elements that are abstract or that are analogous to other claims previously found abstract by the courts.

    But when interviewed, examiners who issue these types of rejections often believe that they did meet their prima facie burden even though they did not.[1]  Such examiners frequently contend that if the claim is not abstract, it is the applicant's job to explain why.  When challenged, examiners that issue these conclusory rejections often write more words defending their non-analysis than explaining why the claim was rejected.  The result is improper burden shifting from the USPTO to the applicant, an increased cost to the applicant, and an uphill battle for the applicant to be able to be provided with "sufficient notice and [to] able to effectively respond."

    Trick 3: Wither the Dependent Claim?

    On a related note, pity the dependent claim rejected under § 101.  Often, all dependent claims are rejected summarily with vacuous reasoning such as "the dependent claims merely further define the abstract idea or recite mechanisms of a generic computer, and therefore also lack eligibility."  Doing so also goes against the grain of MPEP § 2106.07, which states that the § 101 evaluation "should be made on a claim-by-claim basis, because claims do not automatically rise or fall with similar claims in an application," "even if an independent claim is determined to be ineligible, the dependent claims may be eligible because they add limitations amounting to significantly more than the judicial exception recited in the independent claim," and "each claim in an application should be considered separately based on the particular elements recited therein."

    And yet, pointing this out to examiners rarely makes a difference.  Examiners challenged on this point again apply improper burden-shifting, stating that if the applicant does not argue for the eligibility of the dependent claims separately (even though these were rejected en masse), the rejections will stand.  If you think that appealing this point to the PTAB would set the record straight, think again.

    It is now well-established that, during litigation, the parties can agree upon a representative claim to analyze in lieu of a separate § 101 analysis for each.  But doing so during examination without the applicant's consent essentially provides the examiner with a short-cut to ignore the dependent claims.  The USPTO either needs to clarify its guidance or enforce it.

    Trick 4: Ghosting the Technical Improvement

    One way to overcome an Alice rejection in the USPTO or an Alice challenge in court is to establish that the claimed invention provides a technical improvement over the state of the art.  In many cases, this can be done by pointing to such an improvement (when it exists) in the claim language or the specification, as was done in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., for example.

    Similar arguments can be successful in the USPTO.  Moreover, according to the October 2019 Update, "[t]he claim itself does not need to explicitly recite the improvement described in the specification," and "[t]he specification need not explicitly set forth the improvement, but it must describe the invention such that the improvement would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art."  Thus, when the claims and specification do not overtly describe the technical improvement provided, one can still argue that it is inherent.

    Nonetheless, both courts and the USPTO have been known to summarily dismiss, downplay, or outright ignore purported technical improvements in claimed inventions.  In the courts, this can happen when the claims are analogous — even at a high level — to those of a case in which a § 101 ruling went against the patentee.  One need look no further than Recognicorp for an example, where the patentee argued that the invention provided a technical improvement.  The Federal Circuit concluded — after a non-substantive dismissal of this argument — that claims "directed to encoding and decoding image data [are not] a software method that improves the functioning of a computer."  Such a statement is hard to square with the image processing claims of McRO that were found eligible by the same court just a few months earlier.  An even more glaring example was in American Axle & Mfg. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, where Judge Moore of the Federal Circuit dissented from the majority view that a claim was invalid under § 101 and pointed out that there were numerous disclosures of the invention's technical improvements in the specification and that were made during oral argument.

    In the USPTO, it is commonplace for an initial Office action to completely ignore any technical improvement disclosed in the claims or specification.  Boilerplate that we see in these rejections goes like this:  "The combination of these [claimed] elements offers nothing more than generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use because the claimed machine is not particular, and the claim as a whole monopolizes the abstract idea."  This standard rejection language shows up even when a specification has several paragraphs describing the improvements in detail.

    If the examiner disagrees with the applicant as to whether these stated technical improvements are indeed enough to meet the § 101 requirements, that is fine.  But the examiner should make that case.  Without any substantive reasoning, the applicant is provided with a rejection and nothing to rebut.

    Even worse, after an applicant files a response describing the technical improvements (and perhaps pointing to relevant sections of the specification when doing so), a subsequent Office action arrives with the exact same rejection and no discussion (or minimal, conclusory discussion) of the applicant's arguments.  Again, if the examiner disagrees, the grounds for that disagreement should be made of record.

    Trick 5: Forgetting That If You Can Drop the Invention on Your Foot, It Probably Is Not Abstract

    Much hay has been made about the Federal Circuit's recent expansion of the judicial exceptions to patent eligibility beyond pure math, software, and business methods, and into inarguably tangible inventions.  In addition to American Axle (involving the manufacture of driveline system shaft assemblies), judicial exceptions have metastasized in The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co. (involving a garage door opener) and ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc. (involving a charging station for electric vehicles).  Admittedly, the judicial exception in American Axle was a law of nature, but the Court's reasoning was so similar to that used in its abstract idea analyses that any differentiation on these grounds is largely academic.

    A legal definition of abstract idea remains difficult — if not impossible — to pin down.  The Google-provided dictionary definition of "abstract" is "existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence."  But one cannot square such a definition with the case law.  Some of the claims in Alice were found abstract despite reciting physical, tangible computer hardware.  To be sure, pure software written in code is stored on a physical tangible medium, such as a disk drive, flash memory, CDROM, etc.  While thinking about software is abstract, the code and equipment that makes your computer display or print this article — or do anything else for that matter — is not.  The dictionary definition does not help us decode how the courts are applying § 101.

    Instead, the abstract idea is an elaborate legal fiction that has little to do with the layperson's understanding of what might or might not be abstract.  Without being grounded in statute or plain meaning, it is not hard to see why patentees, patent attorneys, the USPTO, and federal judges remain unable to agree on whether certain types of inventions are eligible for patenting.  And this gray area covers many types of inventions that are not only at the bleeding edge of research, but also crucial to the U.S. economy and competitiveness.  Artificial intelligence, machine learning, data science, and quantum computing innovations are more difficult to patent due to the current interpretation of § 101.

    Which brings us back to a point made earlier.  If a goal of the § 101 analysis is to avoid letting the exclusions swallow all of patent law, then we need to draw the line somewhere.  Reasonable minds can differs on the exact contours of this line, but we have to ensure that it does not rule out what the law is intended to protect — innovative new technologies.

    [1] To be fair, only a minority of examiners engage in this behavior and this minority has gotten smaller since the USPTO revised its § 101 examination procedures in 2019.  But it still happens and it is still wrong.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    USPTO SealSince the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) rendered its decisions on Motions in Interference No. 106,115, Senior Party The Broad Institute, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (collectively, "Broad") and Junior Party the University of California/Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, "CVC") have filed a number of miscellaneous motions, and the Board has issued several Orders in response.

    The most significant of these was a joint stipulation to extend Time Periods 11-13, each by a week.  The Board granted this request under 37 C.F.R. § 41.104(c), and thus the deadlines for filing the Junior Party priority motion, the Senior Party priority motion (should Broad deign to file one) and Oppositions to those motions are now:

    TIME PERIOD 11 ………………………………………………..23 October 2020
    JUNIOR PARTY ONLY file priority motion                                  30 October 2020

    TIME PERIOD 12 ……………………………………………….4 December 2020
    SENIOR PARTY ONLY file priority motion                               11 December 2020

    TIME PERIOD 13 …………………………………………………29 January 2021
    File oppositions to all motions                                                   5 February 2021

    TIME PERIOD 14 ………………………………………………..26 February 2021
    File all replies

    TIME PERIOD 15 ……………………………………………………..2 April 2021
    File request for oral argument
    File list of issues to be considered
    File motions to exclude
    File observations

    TIME PERIOD 16 …………………………………………………….23 April 2021
    File oppositions to motions to exclude
    File response to observations

    TIME PERIOD 17 ……………………………………………………….7 May 2021
    File replies to oppositions to motions to exclude

    ORAL ARGUMENT DATE (if ordered) …………………………………………TBD

    The remaining time periods are unaffected by this change.

    CVC also requested that the Board waive the requirement for the parties to file a separate statement of material facts and that any such statement not count towards the page limit (50 pages) for each party's priority briefs.  The Board denied the request to waive the requirement that the parties each include a statement of material facts by ordering that each priority brief have such a statement, limited to 20 pages, submitted as an appendix to the parties' priority brief.  These pages will not be counted as part of the 50 page limit.  In addition, the Board modified the Standing Order ¶ 121.5.2 to the effect that the material facts enumerated in each parties' statement "need not reiterate each and every fact asserted in the Motion" but "[r]ather, the enumerated facts should support the central issues argued by the parties."

    Finally, CVC requested that the Board permit CVC to subpoena discovery from Luciano Marraffini and Shuailiang Lin, neither of whom is a party to this interference.  (Readers may remember that Dr. Marraffini, faculty at The Rockefeller University, was involved in a dispute over inventorship of certain of the Broad's patents that resulted ultimately in some of the European counterparts of these patents to be revoked by the European Patent Office; see "The CRISPR Chronicles — Broad Institute Wins One and Loses One").  CVC proposes to pursue such subpoenas through application to U.S. District Court under 35 U.S.C. § 24.

    Although opposed by Broad, the Board consented to CVC's request that it file a miscellaneous motion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.156(a) for Board authorization, limited to 5 pages by November 6, 2020.  The Board further ordered that CVC's motion must:

    • describe the general relevance of testimony by Dr. Marraffini and Dr. Lin;
    • present the basis on which CVC reasonably believes that Dr. Marraffini and Dr. Lin have knowledge of Broad's priority proofs and can refute them;
    • outline the scope of the testimony they will be seeking; and
    • explain why subpoena is necessary to obtain the testimony of Dr. Marraffini and Dr. Lin and why an attempt to obtain a subpoena will be successful.

    As it has done for other Party motions, no opposition is authorized yet (but should CVC make a convincing argument the Board will undoubtedly permit Broad to respond in opposition).

    CVC's Priority Motion is due tomorrow, October 30th.

  • By Aaron Gin —

    USPTO SealToday, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office released a study entitled "Inventing AI", which highlights the increasing prevalence of artificial intelligence (AI)-based patent applications in the U.S. over the past few decades.  The study, released by the Office of the Chief Economist of the USPTO, surveyed publicaly available granted U.S. patents and U.S. patent application pre-grant publications (PGPub) published from 1976 through 2018.

    In a very "meta" analysis method, the study authors utilized a machine learning neural network classification model to identify patent documents relevant to AI.  The author's neural network classifier identified patent documents that fit into one or more of eight "AI component technologies":  Knowledge processing, Speech, AI hardware, Evolutionary computation, Natural language processing, Machine learning, Vision, and Planning and control.  Once the relevant patent landscape was identified, the study examined various patent trends and diffusion across technologies, inventor-patentees, organizations, and geography.

    2020-10-27 Image 1

    Source: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-ai-supplementary-materials.pdf

    Interestingly, the study utilized text from patent document abstracts as well as from the corresponding claims to train its classifier system while previous research in this area had focused on the abstract text only.  In describing its methodology, the authors claim that their machine learning model classifier achieved results comparable to that of a manual evaluator and more than 92% accurate in properly classifying patent documents into AI component technologies.

    One of the main themes of the study is that AI-based patents are diffusing throughout the U.S. patent system.  For example, while it may be perhaps unsurprising that the number of AI patent applications has increased by more than 100% between 2002 and 2018, the study found that the share of applications relating to AI grew from 9% to nearly 16% of all patent applications over that time period.  That is, as of 2018, the study suggests that almost one out of every six patent applications relates to at least one AI component technology.  Furthermore, the authors indicate that AI-related patent documents appeared in about 9% of all technology subclasses in 1976 while such documents spread to over 42% of all technology subclasses by 2018.

    2020-10-27 Image 2
    Source: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-DH-AI.pdf

    Infographics from the USPTO study indicated that AI-based technologies are also diffusing geographically throughout the U.S.  For example, the study compared the location of inventor-patentees between two periods:  1976-2000 and 2001-2018, which indicates substantial growth of AI-based patenting in the Midwest and other "non-traditional" technology hubs.

    Furthermore, the USPTO study found that a greater variety of companies seek to patent AI-based technologies.  For example, while most of the group of the top 30 AI-based patent owners are in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, AI technologies are now being increasingly adopted and patented by companies in other technology sectors, including multi-sector conglomerates (General Electric), aerospace (Boeing), and financial (Bank of America).

    In its role to advise Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO Andrei Iancu on the economic implications of policies and programs affecting the U.S. intellectual property system, the Office of the Chief Economist apparently believes that AI-based patents are poised to continue their dramatic expansion.  In closing, the study authors state that:

    Whether AI turns out to be as revolutionary as electricity or the semiconductor depends, in part, on the ability of innovators and firm to successfully incorporate AI inventions into existing and new products, processes, and services.  Our results suggest that AI has this potential.

    Regardless of whether AI will become as revolutionary as electricity, however, it is clear that AI-based patents will remain an important part of the U.S. patent landscape going forward.

    For additional information, please see:

    • United States Patent and Trademark Office, Office of the Chief Economist, "Inventing AI; Tracing the diffusion of artificial intelligence with U.S. patents" Number 5, October 2020. https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-DH-AI.pdf
    • United States Patent and Trademark Office, Office of the Chief Economist, "Supplementary Material; Inventing AI: Tracing the diffusion of artificial intelligence with U.S. patents" Number 5, October 2020. https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-ai-supplementary-materials.pdf
    • Aaron Abood and Dave Feltenberger, "Automated patent landscaping" Artificial Intelligence and Law, June 2018. https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1007/s10506-018-9222-4

  • By Michael Borella —

    Federal Circuit SealOne of the more frustrating aspects of current patent-eligibility law is that it lends itself all too easily to mischief.  In particular, given that the eligibility test under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by the courts is poorly-defined, conclusory reasoning frequently rears its ugly head.  Such reasoning is sometimes found in § 101 rejections of claims by examiners of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  The more egregious of these rejections involve little actual analysis, no actual analysis, the ignoring of claim elements, the ignoring of stated improvements of the claimed invention, and attempts to minimize case law favorable to patentees by limiting the scope of those decisions to their facts.  But district courts are not immune to jumping to conclusions either.

    Realtime LLC brought an action in the District of Delaware alleging that multiple parties infringed claims of U.S. Patents 7,415,530, 8,717,203, 9,054,728, 9,116,908, and 9,667,751.  The defendants moved the District Court to dismiss, contending that the patents are ineligible (among other grounds).  Immediately after oral argument, the District Court declared all 159 claims of the five patents ineligible without a formal written opinion.  The only memorialization of the judge's reasoning is a five-page transcript.  Realtime asked the District Court for leave to amend its complaint, but the judge refused.  He admitted that "reasonable people can disagree" on the eligibility of the asserted claims, but nonetheless stated "I think you can take your issues up with the Federal Circuit, and if I'm wrong, I'm wrong."  Realtime appealed.

    In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand involves a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But elements or combinations of elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional will not lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.  While this inquiry is generally carried out as a matter of law, factual issues can come into play when determining whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional.

    As characterized by the Federal Circuit, the claimed inventions relate to "improving data storage and retrieval bandwidth utilizing lossless data compression and decompression."  The patents describe "certain drawbacks found in prior art systems, including that they did not adequately account for hardware limitations."  The inventions "overcome these limitations by, for example, selecting encoding techniques based upon their ability to effectively encode different types of input data."  As an example, claim 25 of the '751 patent recites:

    A system for compressing data comprising:
        a data server implemented on one or more processors and one or more memory systems and configured to:
            analyze content of a data block to identify a parameter, attribute, or value of the data block that excludes analysis based solely on reading a descriptor;
            select an encoder associated with the identified parameter, attribute, or value;
    compress data in the data block with the selected encoder to produce a compressed data block,     wherein the compression utilizes a state machine; and
    store the compressed data block;
        wherein the time of the compressing the data block and the storing the compressed data block is less than the time of storing the data block in uncompressed form.

    Of note is that these patents and their family members had survived previous § 101 challenges.  Particularly, "Magistrate Judge John D. Love of the Eastern District of Texas considered the patent eligibility of the '728, '530, and '908 patents, as well as the eligibility of members of the '203 and '751 patents' families, in two separate cases."  In these cases, Judge Love found the claims patent-eligible under both parts of the Alice test, and his findings were adopted by other judges in the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Massachusetts.

    Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge O'Malley began by discussing the de novo standard of review that is used by the Federal Circuit when reviewing § 101 decisions.  She noted that "we remain a court of appeal not a court of original jurisdiction," and that "[d]istrict courts have an obligation to provide us with a reviewable decision, commensurate with the issues before it."  This standard "does not justify resolving a complex legal issue without an opinion or reasoned analysis."

    Based on this understanding, the Court held that the record on appeal was insufficient for review.  It pointed to four errors made by the District Court.

    First, the oral transcript did not clearly set forth the District Court's rationale for its decision.  To that point, "the district court repeatedly inquired whether claim limitations were novel" and "later expressed a view that the claimed invention of the '751 patent was 'obvious'—but not in the patent sense, 'like it's common sense.'"  Judge O'Malley admitted that novelty and non-obviousness "are not wholly divorced from some aspects of the § 101 inquiry," but that "they are rarely issues appropriate for resolution on the pleadings."  She went on to state that these concepts are not relevant under part one of Alice, and that the District Court's subjective common sense is not relevant to the § 101 test.  Further, there was no evidence in the record that "the district court considered the claims as a whole or, for that matter, seriously considered any claims beyond claim 25 of the '751 patent."

    Second, the District Court failed to tie its description of the inventions to any representative claim and then apply the "directed to" analysis of Alice to that understanding of the claimed invention.  Judge O'Malley also questioned the District Court's high-level summary of the inventions ("choosing a compression method based on the data type").  She stated that this characterization "seems to miss that the claims expressly achieve this result in certain ways, involving examining data blocks and not relying just on a descriptor."  Moreover, "the district court improperly equated the presence of an abstract idea with a conclusion that the claims are directed to such an idea."

    Third, the District Court failed to address why it disagreed with the other judges that had previously found the claims eligible.  Judge O'Malley elucidated the type of analysis that she was expecting:

    This is not to say that those judges were necessarily correct in their assessment of this issue nor that the court was bound by those conclusions.  We mean only to say that, when deciding the motions to dismiss in this case, the court should have, at a minimum, provided a considered explanation as to why those judges were wrong.  This could have been done expressly; the court could have cited the earlier cases and distinguished them.  Or the analysis could have been implied; the court could have analyzed the arguments for eligibility in such a way that the reasons for the differing conclusions are apparent.  Here, however, rather than take either approach, the court recited a series of legal conclusions and § 101 cases, without analysis.

    Fourth, prior to and during oral argument, Realtime cited cases that purportedly would support its position that the claims were eligible (Visual Memory LLC v. Nvidia Corp., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., and DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com).  But the District Court did not even mention these cases in its analysis.  As stated by Judge O'Malley, "there are often very fine lines between those cases and between what is patent eligible and what is not," and "[a] detailed analysis of those cases and the record before the district court is often needed if we are to appropriately assess the court's resolution of a § 101 challenge."

    For all of these reasons, the Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the District Court for further proceedings.  In short, Judge O'Malley's position is best captured in a statement made at the beginning of the opinion:

    [D]istrict courts might be tempted to opt for an effective coin toss rather than a reasoned analysis when faced with a challenge under § 101.  This is especially so where the abstract idea exception is invoked.  But the system is not supposed to work that way.  The parties are entitled to more and the Court of Appeals needs more.

    Realtime Data LLC v. Reduxio Systems, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2020)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, O'Malley, and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge O'Malley; concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Taranto

  • Federal Circuit Refuses to Issue Stay in Mandate Pending Certiorari Decision

    By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealOne of the most interesting (albeit troubling) decisions by the Federal Circuit in the past year or so was its decisions, by a panel and then in denying review en banc, in American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC.  In addition to expanding (beyond recognition) the capacity for courts to invalidate patents on lack of subject matter eligibility grounds, the case illustrated the fractured nature of the Court on this question (with the judges being equally divided on the rehearing en banc petition).  Another aspect was a pair of strong dissents by Judge Moore, at both stages, where she expressed her view that the Court had embarked on a course that resembles "enablement on steroids" and "turns the [Section 101] gatekeeper into a barricade."

    On Friday, the Court denied American Axle's motion to stay issuance of the Court's mandate while awaiting the Supreme Court's decision on its petition for certiorari.  The Court's order cited the standard, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d)(1), that such a motion be granted only if "the petition would present a substantial question and that there is good cause for a stay."  More specifically, an appellant must show:

    (1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay. In close cases the Circuit Justice or the Court will balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the respondent [citing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010)].

    Here, the original panel — Judges Dyk, Moore, and Taranto — denied the motion on the grounds that American Axle had not shown the required irreparable harm.  Certain claims having been held unpatentable (more properly, not patent eligible), the Order notes that there is nothing left for the District Court to do in response to the mandate.  For the remaining claims, remanded for further proceedings, the Court rejected American Axle's argument that further proceedings according to their mandate would have the parties incur "[s]ignificant burdens and expenses" as a consequence.  But "[c]ontinued litigation . . . cannot be irreparable injury," citing Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) ("Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury"); Commonwealth Oil Refin. Co. v. Lummus Co., 82 S. Ct. 348, 349 (1961); (Harlan, J., in chambers) (denying motion for stay of the mandate where the only Nara v. Frank, 494 F.3d 1132, 1133 (3d Cir. 2007); and United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5212, 2001 WL 931170, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).

    It would be understandable for a patent practitioner reading this to believe the Court's Order was unremarkable and the denial routine.  That understanding is disturbed if not shattered by Judge Moore's concurring opinion.  The Judge writes "to elaborate on how [the three-prong test adopted by . . . sister circuits and several individual Justices and relied on by the Court] apply [to this case]" (although agreeing that American Axle has not satisfied the irreparable harm prong of the test).

    The Judge notes that the Supreme Court grants certiorari "to provide lower courts with much-needed guidance, ensure adherence to our precedents, and resolve a Circuit split."  But what we have here, in Judge Moore's opinion, "is worse than a circuit split—it is a court bitterly divided."  She says the Court is "at a loss as to how to uniformly apply § 101," as illustrated by their unanimous (albeit ultimately fruitless) plea for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services. Paradoxically, she writes, while "[t]here is very little about which all twelve of us are unanimous, especially when it comes to § 101.  We were unanimous in our unprecedented plea for guidance."  This case, on the other hand, is not "progeny" of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. or Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l.  Rather, "[i]t is our own dramatic expansion of a judicial exception to § 101" according to Judge Moore.  While the Court has "struggled to consistently apply the judicially created exceptions to this broad statutory grant of eligibility," it has "slowly creating a panel dependent body of law and destroyed] the ability of American businesses to invest with predictability."  And this case is a model of [their] divide" on the issue.  The Judge then repeats in brief her concerns raised in her dissents from the panel opinion and the denial of rehearing en banc:

    In a divided panel here, we struggled to marry these concepts into an administrable distinction between eligible and ineligible claims.  The majority concluded as a matter of law that claims to a manufacturing process are not eligible for patent protection because they are directed to a law of nature even though no law of nature appears in the claims, the patent, or the prosecution history. Under the majority's new "Nothing More" test, claims are ineligible when they merely make use of a natural law.  We have strayed too far from the text of the statute.

    For these reasons the Judge believes there is "a reasonable probability certiorari will be granted."

    Judge Moore's concurrence then continues to draw the distinctions she believes are relevant between this case and prior Supreme Court subject matter eligibility precedent, saying that the claims at issue in this case "are not directed to a business method, internet or financial method" nor diagnostic method claims. Instead, the decision in this case "is a patent killing judicial exception of our own creation," one that "broadens the judicial exceptions in a way that threatens to swallow the whole of the statute."  Her opinion notes the Supreme Court's penchant for applying a correction when the Federal Circuit has "defied precedent or strayed from our mandate by claiming de novo dominion over factual issues," citing inter alia, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 324–27 (2015); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).  And, according to Judge Moore, the Court "repeats this mistake again" in this case.  The Court applied the law de novo in the face of contrary expert testimony and a complete lack of a single mention of the putative "natural law" (Hooke's law) in claims, specification or prosecution history, she states.  The significance:  "[t]his is simply not our role as appellate judges" she writes.  And procedurally Judge Moore believes that the Court's remand has usurped the District Court's discretion regarding whether to consider a new defense which will result in both the court and the parties being "forced to undertake significant, expensive and burdensome process addressing this new defense."

    None of these burdens amount to irreparable harm and accordingly Judge Moore concurred with the decision to deny American Axle's motion to stay.  But in a broad judicial hint, her concurrence concludes by saying:

    It bears noting, however, that although we have not stayed our mandate, the district court retains "the power to stay proceedings" as to claim 1 and the dependent claims, which "is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants" [citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)].

    American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC (Fed. Cir. 2020)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Dyk, Moore, and Taranto
    Order by Circuit Judge Dyk; concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Moore

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealAt least some of the judges on the Federal Circuit have been reported to have voiced some frustration regarding the number of appeals of decisions by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board that are on the Court's docket, particularly Board decisions in inter partes review.  There being little evidence that this trend will not continue, the Court recently rendered its decision of Board decisions in two related appeals, in St. Jude Medical, LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve LLC.

    The matter arose in two inter partes review proceedings, wherein St. Jude challenged the claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,540,782, directed to an artificial heart valve and systems for introducing the valve.  More specifically, the '782 patent discloses and claims an artificial heart valve that can be administered using a catheter (thereby forgoing open heart surgery) and can be placed without removing the patient's damaged valve.  The opinion asserts that the claimed artificial valve has three components: "a valve element, a frame, and a band."  System claims for introducing the valve recite components for installing the artificial valve comprising "a holder, a manipulator, and an ejector."  Claim 1 of the '782 patent is representative of the artificial heart valve claims at issue:

    1.  An artificial valve for repairing a damaged heart valve having a plurality of cusps separating an upstream region from a downstream region, said artificial valve comprising:
        a flexibly resilient frame sized and shaped for insertion in a position between the upstream region and the downstream region, the frame having a plurality of peripheral anchors for anchoring the frame in the position between the upstream and the downstream region and a central portion located between the plurality of peripheral anchors;
        a band attached to the frame limiting spacing between adjacent anchors of said plurality of peripheral anchors; and
        a flexible valve element attached to the central portion of the frame and adjacent the band, said valve element being substantially free of connections to the frame except at the central portion of the frame and adjacent the band, said valve element having an upstream side facing said upstream region when the frame is anchored in the position between the upstream region and the downstream region and a downstream side opposite the upstream side facing said downstream region when the frame is anchored in the position between the upstream region and the downstream region, said valve element moving in response to a difference between fluid pressure in said upstream region and fluid pressure in said downstream region between an open position in which the element permits downstream flow between said upstream region and said downstream region and a closed position in which the element blocks flow reversal from said downstream region to said upstream region, wherein the valve element moves to the open position when fluid pressure in said upstream region is greater than fluid pressure in said downstream region to permit downstream flow from said upstream region to said downstream region and the valve element moves to the closed position when fluid pressure in said downstream region is greater than fluid pressure in said upstream region to prevent flow reversal from said downstream region to said upstream region. (relevant claim limitations in italics).

    The relevant recitations regarding the system for installing the valve in independent claim recites:

    an instrument including

    a holder having a hollow interior sized for holding the artificial valve when the frame is in the collapsed configuration;

    an elongate manipulator attached to the holder for manipulating the holder into position between the upstream region and the downstream region; and

    an ejector mounted in the hollow interior of the holder for ejecting the artificial heart valve from the hollow interior of the holder into position between the upstream region and the downstream region.

    (relevant claim limitations in italics).

    The Board instituted both IPRs  In IPR-105, St. Jude asserted that the challenged claims (1, 2, 4–8, 10–13, 17–19, 21, 22, and 25–30) were unpatentable as anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,957,949 to Leonhardt or obvious over a combination of the '949 patent and the combination of U.S. Patent No. 4,339,831 to Johnson and U.S. Patent No. 5,413,599 to Imachi.  In IPR-106, St. Jude asserted that claims 1, 2, 6, and 28 were anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,855,601 to Bessler or obvious or a combination the '601 patent with the '831 and '599 patents.  (Another patent, to Anderson, asserted against the '782 patent in the IPR-105 proceeding was not considered in the Federal Circuit's opinion.)

    The primary reference asserted in the IPR-105 proceeding, the '949 patent, taught artificial valves implanted by catheter into the heart or esophagus.  Its relevant components are "a biological valve, a valve stent, and graft material," the latter component comprising "'thin-walled biocompatible, flexible and expandable, low-porosity woven fabric' [that] is 'arranged to surround [the] stent.'"  The primary reference asserted in the IPR-106 proceeding, the '601 patent, disclosed an artificial heart valve that could be "compressed or expanded, and the installed unit include[d] a rigid stent member and a flexible valve member with a cuff portion."  Secondary references, the '831 patent, disclosed an artificial heart valve with a "durable and flexible membrane," and the '599 patent taught a medical valve apparatus that the opinion characterized as "not [being] the subject of substantial discussion" in the Federal Circuit's opinion.

    In the IPR-105 proceeding, the Board held that St. Jude had not established that the challenged claims were anticipated by the '949 patent nor obvious over the combination of the '949 patent taken in light of the '831 patent and the '599 patent.  In the IPR-106 proceeding, the Board held that St. Jude had established that challenged claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 were anticipated by the '601 patent but rejected St. Jude's anticipation arguments with regard to claim 28 and their arguments for all claims regarding obviousness.  Specifically, the opinion identified the dispositive issue as the Board's construction of the claim element "band," as "a structure generally in the shape of a closed strip or ring," which the opinion characterized as "slightly broadening" St Jude's construction from "circular" to "closed."  Under its construction the Board held that St. Jude had not proven that the '949 patent disclosed a band because (according to St. Jude) in the '949 patent disclosure the band "covered the entire length of the frame, like a sleeve" and was accordingly not a "strip" or a "ring."  The Board held that St. Jude thus failed to bear its burden of showing anticipation by a preponderance of the evidence.  Each party filed their appeal on the issues decided against them by the Board.

    In an opinion by Judge Taranto, joined by Judges Newman and O'Malley, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision in IPR-105 and reversed the decision that Bessler anticipated the '782 patent claims in IPR-106.  The Court also affirmed the Board's decision that the challenged claims in both IPRs were not obvious over the combination of asserted prior art.  The opinion identified the sole issue on appeal in IPR-105 to be the Board's claim construction of the term "band."  St Jude's construction of a "circular" band excluded, for example, oval shapes, and that the band disclosed in the '949 patent extended over the entire structure that was not claimed in the challenged '782 patent claims.  Moreover, the panel stated that the Board's conclusions were consistent with elements of its claim construction that St. Jude had either asserted or acquiesced to and specifically rejected St. Jude's argument on appeal referencing a dictionary definition for the word "band."  Nor, according to the panel, were these limitations disclosed in the specification of the '782 patent.  The opinion stated that "[t]he more fundamental problem with St. Jude's basis for its argument, however, is that it simply does not address the terms 'strip' and 'ring' [as components of the band] which St. Jude itself proposed and now accepts as the defining terms of the claim construction."  Under these circumstances the Court stated that "[t]he adopted claim construction governs" and under that construction the '949 patent does not anticipate the '782 patent's challenged claims.

    Both parties appealed the Board's decision in IPR-106, Snyders on the grounds that the '601 patent anticipated claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 of the '782 patent and St. Jude on the ground that claim 28 of the '782 patent was not anticipated by the '601 patent.  Snyders argued that the Board had made three errors of claim construction, but the Federal Circuit's decision found that one of these was in error and was sufficient for the panel to reverse the Board's anticipation determination.  The construed term was "how the frame is sized and shaped," which Snyders argued was incorrect because "it covers frames sized and shaped for installation with the native valve removed, rather than only with the troubled native valve remaining in place."  With regard to this limitation the Board found that "'[t]he claim language does not require the frame be sized and shaped for insertion into a damaged heart valve,' but 'only that the frame is sized and shaped for insertion in a position between the upstream region and the downstream region.'"  This was error in the panel's view because the Board did not consider the further disclosure in the '601 patent that the native valve was required to be replaced, which the challenged '782 patent claims expressly did not require.  The panel opinion found support for the argument that structural features of the claimed artificial valve was consistent with this lack of a requirement for native valve removal in the plain meaning of the claim language, as well as express disclosure to that effect in the '782 specification.  Specifically, the specification disclosed that "the frame is sized and shaped for insertion between the plurality of cusps C of the damaged heart valve in a position between an upstream region and a downstream region" (emphasis in opinion).  The significance for the Court was that this language indicated that the term "sized and shaped" "is not meant to refer only to placement in a position between the upstream and downstream regions, but also to fitting between the cusps of the intact native valve."  This interpretation is consistent, according to the opinion, with further disclosure in the '782 specification of the benefit of not needing to remove the native heart valve as an improvement over the prior art and in particular the deficiencies in the '601 patent in this regard.  Because the '601 patent does not meet the "size and shape" limitation as construed by the Federal Circuit, the panel reversed the Board's determination that the '782 patent claims were invalid for anticipation.

    Turning to St. Jude's grounds for appeal, the panel first addressed the argument that the Board had erred in not finding the '601 patent anticipated claim 28, directed to a system for inserting the claimed heart valve.  The panel rejected St. Jude's argument (related to whether the '601 patent disclosed the "manipulator" recited in claim 28 of the '782 patent) because "[c]laim 28 contains exactly the same 'sized and shaped' limitation for the valve as does claim 1, requiring a valve meeting that limitation (among others) in combination with an instrument used to install the valve."  Accordingly, claim 28 is not anticipated by the '601 patent for the same reason the Court held that claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 of the '782 patent were not, and affirmed the Board's decision on that basis.  The Court also rejected St. Jude's argument that the Board erred in not finding claims 1, 2, 6, 8, and 28 of the '782 patent invalid for obviousness over the asserted art.  The Court's basis for this decision was that the grounds for the Board's decision were a factual determination regarding "whether a skilled artisan would be motivated to make the proposed combination to arrive at the claimed invention."  And the panel held that St. Jude had not satisfied its burden to show that the Board did not have substantial evidence supporting its decision.  Because the Federal Circuit must give deference to factual determinations of the Board, unless an appellant can show a lack of substantial evidence, the Court affirmed the Board's decision that the cited references did not render obvious the challenged claims of the '782 patent.

    The Court gave costs to Snyders.

    St. Jude Medical, LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve LLC (Fed. Cir. 2020)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, O'Malley, and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Taranto

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Perception by the five human senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch) varies significantly between individuals and populations.  Some use these differences to their advantage, such as sommeliers capable of detecting exquisite shadings in wines (or even the difference between the taste of Coke and Pepsi; see Malcolm Gladwell's Blink).  Taste and smell are closely correlated, and the genetic bases of these differences and interdependencies have the potential to provide insights on how these differences can be accounted for, to better understand the genetic bases of perception itself.

    Recently, an international* team of researchers published a paper entitled "Sequence Variants in TAAR5 and Other Loci Affect Human Odor Perception and Naming," Current Biology 30: 1-11, that shed some light on these genetic questions.  Olfactory receptors (OR) in humans, as in most mammals, are encoded by genes having high DNA sequence diversity.  These genes (termed "canonical olfactory genes") are supplemented by genes involved in olfaction of amines termed trace amine-associated receptors (TAAR), a family of G-protein coupled receptors.  But OR genes have been reduced during primate evolution; in humans, most of these genes are inactive pseudogenes, wherein out of 855 genes in this group only about 400 encode functional genes involved in olfaction.  As a consequence, each individual has "a highly personalized set of functional ORs."  The question posed by these researchers was "[h]ow does genetic sequence diversity in this unusual class of genes translate to perception and behavior?"

    The study was performed with 9,122 Icelanders, first to establish phenotype and then to correlate phenotype with genetic variants.  In their phenotypic assessments, a challenged cohort of almost 10,000 Icelanders were tested for perception of five different smells: licorice; cinnamon; fish; lemon; and menthol.  Participants ranged in age from 18-96 years old; the mean age was 55.3 years and 44% were men.  Each participant was asked to identify the smell and then provide "pleasantness" and intensity ratings for each.  Consistent with common experience perception of intensity decreased with age, but the fish odor was consistently the least pleasant.

    Armed with this phenotypic data, the researchers then used whole genome sequencing from 28,075 individuals to interrogate 36.5 million sequence variants.  These researchers report that they found sequence variants in three loci that correspond to phenotypic differences in olfaction.  The first was a low frequency (2.2%) missense variant of the TAAR5 gene (pSer95P) associated with reduced intensity olfaction of (although increased aversion to) "fishy" smells (primarily triethylamine based).  Perhaps not paradoxically, these individuals rated the fish smells less unpleasant that individuals not bearing this variant allele; indeed, some of these individuals exhibited anosmia regarding the smell of fish.  Protein modeling predicted that this amino acid sequence variant would be expected to interfere with protein function (not surprising for a change that incorporates a Proline residue); the position of this change is shown in the figure:

    2020-10-20 Imagedescribed in the paper as follows: "Ser95Pro in helix II is highlighted in green.  The adjacent amino acid Arg94, which is known to be important for TAAR5 ligand interaction, is purple.  The conserved proline Pro89, highlighted in blue, induces a bend below in the helix."

    Wider genetic analysis showed this variant allele to be present at a frequency of 1.7% in Swedes, 0.8% in Southern Europeans, and 0.2% in Africans.  The significance and uniqueness of this TAAR5 variant was shown in comparison with seven other coding variants in the gene (all of which were present in the Icelandic population at >10-fold lower frequencies) wherein none of these variants affected perception of fish smell intensity.  The study was replicated with 2,204 Icelanders and found the same associations in this population.

    Variants in two canonical olfaction genes were found associated with licorice (trans anethole): OR6C70 (pLys233Asn, having an allele frequency of 23%) and OR6C68 (pPhe110Ile and pArg309Leu), which are part of about 300 correlated sequence variants found in OR genes on chromosome 12.  The OR6C70 variant was associated with perception of increased  intensity for the smell of licorice (and pleasantness ratings) as well as reduced intensity perception for lemon aromas.  These variants are also differentially distributed among human populations, occurring in 19% in Europeans, 52% in Africans, and 57% in East Asians.

    The third variant reported by these researchers was an intergenic variant on chromosome 11 (arising at a frequency of 32%) that was associated with identifying cinnamon (trans-cinnamaldehyde) as well as a reduced perception of lemon aroma intensity.  Two additional intergenic variants were also detected at this locus, at frequencies of 32% in Europeans, 43% in Africans, and 49% in East Asians.

    Compared with earlier genome-wide association studies only one previously detected variant (within an OR gene cluster on chromosome 11) correlated with any of the phenotypes (increased pleasantness for lemon aroma) tested in this study.

    The authors speculate regarding the significance of these results to explain selection against sensitivity to fish smells in an Icelandic culture dependent on fish and without traditional means (besides freezing) for preservation.  They also discuss the difficulty humans have with naming smells (which has led to speculation that the sense of smell is "muted" in humans compared with other animals), and consider whether this difficulty stems from deficiencies in "brain circuitry" in the piriform cortex and elsewhere in the brain.  They state that "[i]t could be that the effects on odor naming are mediated by sensory perception, i.e., increased or reduced sensitivity. However, we cannot rule out that variation in OR receptors results in altered neuronal connectivity, leading to the observed differences in naming."

    The authors conclude their study by noting:

    Altogether, our results provide a unique window into the effects of sequence diversity on human olfaction.  An individual's personalized OR repertoire gives rise to myriad differences in perception and behavior, including olfactory language, which we are only beginning to understand.  Using a genome-wide approach, we show that variation in the non-canonical OR gene TAAR5 influences human odor responses.  Variants in the two canonical OR loci discovered here are associated with increased odor intensity and naming, in contrast to the general view that greater tolerance for mutations in the human OR repertoire—as witnessed by greater sequence diversity—leads to reduced olfactory ability.  When coupled with evidence for geographical differences in allele frequencies, this raises the possibility that the portion of the extensive sequence diversity found in human OR genes that affects our sense of smell is still being honed by natural selection.

    *deCODE Genetics, Rejkjavik; University of Iceland; and University of Gothenburg, SE