• By Michael Borella

    Supreme Court Building #1The Supreme Court's Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l case has been criticized for setting forth a patent eligibility analysis that is unworkably subjective.  As a consequence, the validity of particular types of inventions, especially those in the software and business method space, can be uncertain until undergoing judicial review.

    In a nutshell, Alice sets forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But elements or combinations of elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional will not lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.  While this inquiry is generally carried out as a matter of law, factual issues can come into play when determining whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional.

    Having said that, the test in practice usually amounts to eyeballing the claim and determining whether some of its elements recite or involve a judicial exclusion.  If so, the remaining elements are considered to determine whether they, individually or in combination, amount to significantly more.  In other words, § 101 includes a poor-man's form of prior art analysis.  Also, vague, non-specific or result-oriented elements have little or no weight in the "significantly more" inquiry.  So, § 101 also incorporates a form of enablement.

    Thus, the confusion.  But don't take my word for it.

    Judge Wu of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California panned Alice for setting forth an "I know it when I see it" test.  Judge Pfaelzer, a colleague of Judge Wu, wrote that the Supreme Court's patent eligibility cases "often confuse more than they clarify [and] appear to contradict each other on important issues."  Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit wrote that the post-Alice § 101 inquiry "renders it near impossible to know with any certainty whether the invention is or is not patent eligible."  Other Federal Circuit judges have expressed similar concern.  Judge Newman recently stated that "[t]he court's rulings on patent eligibility have become so diverse and unpredictable as to have a serious effect on the innovation incentive in all fields of technology."  Judge Moore is concerned that the § 101 analysis has become "enablement on steroids."  Former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Paul Michel stated that Alice "create[d] a standard that is too vague, too subjective, too unpredictable and impossible to administer in a coherent consistent way in the patent office or in the district courts or even in the federal circuit."

    I have previously written about how Alice can be stretched to find virtually any invention ineligible.  These tongue-in-cheek pieces explain how Edison's light bulb, Bell's telephone, and public-key cryptography — all considered to be groundbreaking inventions — could be interpreted to fail the Alice test.  Recently, my colleagues and I submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the American Axle v. Neapco case, making similar arguments.

    But today, let's discuss something a little different.  In 1981, the Supreme Court considered the patent-eligibility of a claim that had been rejected by the USPTO.  The invention involved a computer-controlled process for curing rubber.  The case was Diamond v. Diehr, and was for 30 years the gold standard on § 101 interpretation.  The claim was found to be eligible and the Court set forth a few simple principles to guide the § 101 inquiry (claims must be considered as a whole and novelty of elements has no bearing on patent-eligibility).  In 2014, the Alice Court did not overrule Diehr — and in fact went to lengths trying to justify how it's holding was consistent with the aforementioned principles.  But the justices left the rest of us scratching our collective heads, because Alice sure does seem to contradict Diehr in rather impactful ways.

    So this begs the question:  if one were to apply the Alice test to the claim of Diehr, could an argument be made that this claim is actually ineligible?  Given the malleability of Alice, the outcome is most certainly "yes".  Let's see how.

    Claim 1 of Diehr is shown below, enumerated for reference.

    A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
        (a)    providing said computer with a data base for said press including at least, natural logarithm conversion data (ln), the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press,
        (b)    initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
        (c)    constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding,
        (d)    constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),
        (e)    repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which is ln(v)=CZ+x where v is the total required cure time,
        (f)    repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and
        (g)    opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equivalence.

    Under Alice, there would be little dispute that elements (a), (e), and (f) are mathematical in nature.  Indeed, the Diehr Court essentially admitted as much.[1]  Thus, the Diehr claim would be considered to be directed to an abstract idea under part one of Alice.

    When applying part two of Alice, it is important to be cognizant of how the Federal Circuit has interpreted this portion of the test.  Notably, elements that involve mere gathering of data are also considered to be abstract (see Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A. and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.).  Thus, element (d) would actually be part of the abstract idea and would not qualify as an additional element.

    This leaves elements (b), (c), and (g) as candidate additional elements.  But as noted above, well-understood, routine, and conventional steps do not count in the "significantly more" calculus.  Further, elements describing steps at a high level, lacking in detail, or in a results-oriented fashion without reciting particular means for achieving those results, also do not contribute "significantly more" under American Axle and many other Federal Circuit holdings.

    Viewing these candidate elements individually, element (b) recites initiating a timer, element (c) recites measuring a temperature, and element (g) recites opening a press.  All of these claimed steps would have been well-understood, routine, or conventional at the time of invention.  For example, interval timers have been well-known in the art of computing for decades, temperature measurements have been common for hundreds of years, and opening a mold has been a conventional step in curing rubber since the advent of molds.  Therefore, considered individually, elements (b), (c), and (g) do not provide "significantly more".

    But what about their combination?  This is where the Diehr court found eligibility in the claim, writing that "a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made."  Alice, however, de-emphasized the role of such combinations of elements.

    Writing for the Alice court, Justice Thomas stated, "[c]onsidered as an ordered combination, the computer components of petitioner's method add nothing . . . that is not already present when the steps are considered separately."  He further explained, "[v]iewed as a whole, petitioner's method claims simply recite the [abstract idea] as performed by a generic computer."  These conclusory statements have been relied on heavily by the courts and the USPTO to essentially eviscerate the language of Diehr.

    To that point, one could argue that the claim of Diehr, when considered as an ordered combination, simply recites an abstract process performed by a generic computer, and that a series of abstract and conventional steps recited at a high level do not provide patent eligibility.  Alternatively, one could argue that elements (b), (c), and (g) are so vague that all elements of the Diehr claim are abstract.  And then, following the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Recognicorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,[2] find that adding more abstract elements to an abstract idea does not lift a claim over the § 101 hurdle.

    So, yes, Alice could be used to invalidate Diehr.  Such a notion should give one pause.

    Hopefully, the Court will eventually take up another § 101 case and begin its opinion with, "Ok, fine, what we really meant was . . . ."  Or Congress will step in to revert § 101 back to the language of the statute or at least that of Diehr.  Until then, we will have uncertainty in the form of Schrodinger's Patents — granted patents that are considered to be both valid and invalid until observed by a court.

    [1] "[I]n several steps of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used."

    [2] Reasoning that is questionable at best.  But similar reasoning can be found in other Federal Circuit cases and boatloads of USPTO Office actions.

  • By Michael Borella

    Federal Circuit SealThe legal concept of obviousness is tricky.  A claimed invention is found obvious if the prior art teaches or suggests all claim limitations and one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the relevant teachings of the references.  The inherent subjectivity of such an analysis can lead to reasonable people disagreeing on whether an invention is ultimately patentable.  But it does not end there — like an onion, obviousness has layers.[1]  Normally, whether the references themselves provide enabling disclosure is not relevant.  Except when it is.

    Raytheon is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 9,695,751, which was challenged by General Electric (GE) in an inter partes review before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).  Of note are claims 1-3 of the patent, shown in part below.

    1.  A gas turbine engine comprising:
        a fan including a plurality of fan blades . . . ;
        a compressor section;
        a combustor in fluid communication with the compressor section;
        a turbine section in fluid communication with the combustor, the turbine section including a fan drive turbine and a second turbine . . . ; and
        a speed change system configured to be driven by the fan drive turbine to rotate the fan about the axis; and
        a power density at Sea Level Takeoff greater than or equal to 1.5 lbf/in3 and less than or equal to 5.5 lbf/in3 and defined as thrust in lbf measured by a volume of the turbine section in in3 measured between an inlet of a first turbine vane in said second turbine to an exit of a last rotating airfoil stage in said fan drive turbine.

    2.  The gas turbine engine as recited in claim 1, wherein the fan drive turbine has from three to six stages.

    3.  The gas turbine engine as recited in claim 2, wherein said number of fan blades is less than 18 and the second turbine has two stages.

    In the words of the court, "[t]he '751 patent generally claims a geared gas turbine engine with two turbines and a specific number of fan blades and turbine rotors and/or stages."  Further, the "key distinguishing feature of the claims is the recitation of a power density range that the patent describes as being 'much higher than in the prior art.'"  Here, power density is defined as sea-level-takeoff (SLTO) thrust divided by the engine turbine volume.

    During the proceeding, Raytheon disclaimed claims 1 and 2 (among others), leaving claim 3 as representative.  GE's obviousness contentions for claim 3 relied only on a single reference, a non-patent literature document by Knip.

    Knip is "a 1987 NASA technical memorandum that envisions superior performance characteristics for an imagined advanced turbofan engine incorporating all composite materials."  It is undisputed that such an engine could not be built in 1987 and still cannot be built today.  But such speculation allowed Knip "to assume aggressive performance parameters for an advanced engine, including then-unachievable pressure ratios and turbine temperatures."  Nonetheless, Knip does not disclose SLTO thrust, turbine volume, or power density for this hypothetical engine.  GE asserted that "because power density is a result-effective variable, even if Knip did not disclose a turbine section volume and/or SLTO thrust that resulted in a power density within the claimed range, it would have nevertheless been obvious to a skilled artisan to modify the thrust and/or turbine volume for Knip's engine to optimize the power density."

    Before the PTAB, Raytheon argued that "GE's expert employed a flawed methodology in deriving the power density of Knip's advanced engine from the parameters that Knip disclosed," and that Knip's disclosure failed to enable a skilled artisan to make the claimed invention.  GE countered by stating that "the issue of whether Knip enabled its advanced engine was irrelevant to the question whether a skilled artisan reviewing Knip could make the '751 Patent's engine (using any already available materials) without undue experimentation."  Note the subtle difference in the points being made — Raytheon is alleging that Knip does not enable one to make the invention of the '751 patent, while GE is addressing whether Knip enables one to make Knip's own engine.

    In any event, the PTAB ultimately found Knip enabling because it allowed "a skilled artisan to "determine a power density as defined in claim 1, and within the range proscribed in claim 1."  As a result, the PTAB concluded that Knip rendered the claims obvious.

    On review, the Federal Circuit set forth the delicate interactions between obviousness and enablement.  Writing for the Court, Judge Chen noted that "[i]n general, a prior art reference asserted under § 103 does not necessarily have to enable its own disclosure, i.e., be 'self-enabling,' to be relevant to the obviousness inquiry."  To that point, "a reference that does not provide an enabling disclosure for a particular claim limitation may nonetheless furnish the motivation to combine, and be combined with, another reference in which that limitation is enabled."  Further, "such a reference may be used to supply claim elements enabled by other prior art or evidence of record."

    Thus, the point at issue in this case was whether a skilled artisan could have made the claimed invention regardless of whether the cited references are self-enabling.  Of particular relevance to single-reference obviousness contentions such as one made by GE, is that "a standalone § 103 reference must enable the portions of its disclosure being relied upon."

    The Court found that the PTAB erred by focusing on whether Knip enabled determination of a power density.  The PTAB should have considered "whether Knip enabled a skilled artisan to make and use the claimed invention."  The PTAB's conclusion of obviousness could have been supported "if GE had presented other evidence to establish that a skilled artisan could have made the claimed turbofan engine with the recited power density."  But that did not happen.  Therefore, according to the Court, "Knip's self-enablement (or lack thereof) is not only relevant to the enablement analysis, in this case it is dispositive."

    The Court also found GE's use of expert testimony to be lacking, because its expert constructed "a computer model simulation of Knip's imagined engine" rather than the actual engine.  In contrast, Raytheon's expert presented unrebutted evidence of non-enablement — the "unavailability of the revolutionary composite material contemplated by Knip."  Raytheon also "submitted evidence that the exceptional temperature and pressure parameters cited in Knip had not been achieved through other means as of the priority date."

    Moreover, GE argued that a skilled artisan could achieve the claimed power density by optimizing Knip's engine.  But the Court rejected this notion, stating that "[i]f a skilled artisan cannot make Knip's engine, a skilled artisan necessarily cannot optimize its power density."

    For these reasons, the Court reversed the PTAB's finding of claim 3 to be obvious.

    This case is interesting, though it presents an avenue for arguing for non-obviousness that is unlikely to be available in practice very often.  Here, the Knip reference was admittedly speculative, and gaps between Knip's speculation and reality matched up with the gaps in GE's arguments.  By adding in other references or reasoning, the outcome may have differed.  Perhaps the holding here is best summarized by Judge Chen writing "if an obviousness case is based on a non-self-enabled reference, and no other prior art reference or evidence would have enabled a skilled artisan to make the claimed invention, then the invention cannot be said to have been obvious."

    [1] Also like an onion, obviousness as a legal principle has the ability to make one involuntarily cry.

    Raytheon Technologies Corp. v. General Electric Co. (Fed. Cir. 2021)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Lourie, Chen, and Hughes
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Chen

     

  • CalendarApril 20, 2021 – "Global Patent System Challenges" (Federal Circuit Bar Association) – 11:00 am to 12:00 pm (ET)

    April 22, 2021 – "Dispute Resolution Challenges: Innovation, Self-Help, and Judicial Systems" (Federal Circuit Bar Association) – 10:00 am to 11:00 am (ET)

    April 22, 2021 – "Using Persuasion Techniques to Achieve Litigation Success: Part Two" (Fitch Even) – 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (ET)

    April 26-27, 2021 – Paragraph IV Disputes Conference (American Conference Institute)

  • Federal Circuit Bar Association_2The Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) will be offering a remote program entitled "Global Patent System Challenges" on April 20, 2021 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm (ET).  Michael Sandonato of Venable I Fitzpatrick will moderate a panel consisting of Raman Bonn of Continental AG, Haifeng Huang of Jones Day, George Sevier of Dyson, and Robert Stoll of Faegre Drinker.

    There is no registration fee for FCBA and EPLAW members and the registration for non-members is $75.  Additional information regarding the program can be found here.

  • Fitch EvenFitch Even will be offering a webinar entitled "Using Persuasion Techniques to Achieve Litigation Success: Part Two" on April 22, 2021 from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (ET).  Karl R. Fink, Nikki Little, and Timothy P. Maloney of Fitch Even will discuss the following topics:

    • Expert witness selection and reports
    • Written and oral communications with the court
    • Trial

    While there is no cost to participate in the program, advance registration is required.  Those interested in attending the webinar can register here.

  • Federal Circuit Bar Association_2The Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) will be offering a remote program entitled "Dispute Resolution Challenges: Innovation, Self-Help, and Judicial Systems" on April 22, 2021 from 10:00 am to 11:00 am (ET).  Sabine Age of Hayng Rokh Monegier will moderate a panel consisting of Roberta Carapeto of Licks Attorneys; Claudia Frost of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP; Greg Gramenopoulas of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP; Nick Matich of McKool Smith; and Claus Melarti of RPX.

    There is no registration fee for FCBA and EPLAW members and the registration for non-members is $75.  Additional information regarding the program can be found here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Federal Trade Commission (FTC) SealThe Federal Trade Commission (FTC) spent the better part of a decade attacking the practice of innovator drug companies settling ANDA litigation by providing payments to generic applicants challenging the validity of Orange Book-listed patents (see "The FTC's Thinking Does Not Make It So Regarding Reverse Payment Agreements"; "Federal Trade Commission Issues Report on Reverse Settlement Agreements in FY2010"; "FTC Releases Another Report on Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements in ANDA Litigation"; "The FTC Is at It Again").  These agreements were termed "reverse payment" settlements because unlike in most patent suits, the defendant secured a payment from the patentee (as part of its campaign, the FTC termed these "pay-for-delay" agreements).  The Commission persisted in its efforts despite most Federal Courts of Appeal deciding that, rather than being anticompetitive, the agreements frequently resulted in generic drugs coming to market much earlier than would be expected (see Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2010); and Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (11th Cir. 2012)).  One basis for the FTC's persistence was the belief that branded drug companies settled because they were aware that their patents were invalid and thus improperly tried to extend their "monopoly"; of course this position supposed not only that innovator drug companies were willing to contravene the antitrust laws but perhaps more importantly that the Commission's bureaucrats had a better understanding of the pharmaceutical industry than the executives making the decisions.  Persistence being what it is, the FTC finally prevailed in finding a Circuit Court (the Third) to accept its arguments (see "The Federal Trade Commission Finally Wins One"), leading to the Supreme Court deciding the issue in FTC v. Actavis.

    That decision was anything but a complete victory for the Commission's position.  Indeed, Justice Breyer wrote a relatively nuanced opinion holding, most importantly, that such settlements were not a per se antitrust violation (the FTC's original position).  Rather, the Court held that such agreements must be evaluated under the "rule of reason."  However, reasonableness (i.e., how tightly tethered to reality) of any such determination depends in larger part on the reasoner, and this characteristic (or flaw) is illustrated in the first full-fledged appellate affirmance of the FTC in a reverse payment settlement case, Impax Laboratories v. FTC, decided earlier this week.

    The case arose over a settlement between branded drug maker Endo against Impax over its extended-release oxymorphone opioid drug product, Opana ER.  The agreement, entered into before the Supreme Court's Actavis decision, included a number of facts that the FTC used to support its position that the agreement was anticompetitive.  Impax was the first filer, and thus its settlement created a "bottleneck" against later-filing generic competitors due to its 180 exclusivity period to which Impax was entitled as first filer.  In addition, Endo engaged in "product hopping," wherein it substituted out another Opana ER formulation (a "crush-resistant" form less amenable to abuse) and withdrew its original FDA approved drug from the market, which would have severely limited Impax's market share from sales of a generic version of the original formulation.  According to the 5th Circuit's opinion:

    But extending the period in which it could sell Opana ER without competition was just one of Endo' s priorities.  The drug maker had something else in the works:  It planned to move consumers to a new brand name drug that would not face competition for years.  Endo would remove the original Opana ER from the market, replace it with a crush-resistant version of the drug, and obtain new patents to protect the reformulated drug.  While Impax's generic would still eventually reach the market, it would not be therapeutically equivalent to Endo' s new branded drug and thus pharmacists would not be able to automatically substitute the generic when filling prescriptions.  This automatic substitution of brand drug prescriptions, promoted by state laws, is the primary driver of generic sales.  So, if Endo succeeded in switching consumers to its reformulated drug, which would be just different enough from the original formulation to preclude substitution, the market for Impax' s generic would shrink dramatically, preserving Endo's monopoly profits.

    The timing of the agreement was also a factor:  Endo and Impax were not able to come to an agreement until right before the expiration of the Hatch-Waxman 30-month stay of FDA approval (although it must be said that the 5th Circuit's opinion seemed not to appreciate the risks for Impax of "launching at risk" prior to a final determination in its favor in the ANDA lawsuit).

    Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Impax delayed its launch until January 1, 2013, 30 months later than any "at risk" launch scenario without the agreement.  Endo agreed not to bring its own branded generic to market in competition with Impax's product until after the 180-day exclusivity period had passed (July 1, 2013).  Endo also agreed to pay Impax a "credit" should its own Opana ER sales fall by 50% or more after the parties entered into the agreement and before Impax's generic entered the market (as a result, inter alia, of Endo's product hop).  Endo also broadly licensed its relevant patents to Impax, and entered into an agreement to co-develop a Parkinson's disease drug, funded in part by a $10 million payment to Impax with provisions for up to an additional $30 million depending on development of the new product.  As a consequence of Endo's product hop, Impax was entitled to and received $102 million in credits due to the shrinking market share of the original Opana ER formulation.  The product hop formulation proved to have its own safety concerns, however, and Endo withdrew it from the market in 2017.  The result is that "Impax's generic is the only extended-release oxymorphone available to consumers today."

    The FTC brought actions separately against Endo and Impax; Endo settled and Impax put up a fight.  While the Administrative Law Judge found that the agreement's procompetitive benefits outweighed any anticompetitive effects the Commission decided otherwise, leading to this appeal (in the form of a petition for the Court to overrule the Commission).

    The Fifth Circuit unanimously affirmed the Commission's decision and denied Impax's petition.  In doing so, it set forth and followed Justice Breyer's formula for applying the rule of reason to the facts provided in the agreement.  The Court gave deference to the Commission's factual findings and reviewed any legal judgments de novo.  The panel recognized the burden shifting inherent in applying the rule of reason.  First, the burden was on the Commission to show that the agreement had an anticompetitive effect.  Then Impax was empowered to demonstrate any procompetitive effects, and if so the Commission had the opportunity to establish that those procompetitive effects could have been achieved "through less anticompetitive means" (which provides at least some of the potential for mischief illustrated by this decision).  Finally, if the FTC should fail in this step a court is empowered to balance the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive benefits.  Of course, if this balance rests on the anticompetitive side of the comparison the agreement is illegal.

    In applying these rubrics, the Court held that the FTC had established anticompetitive effects (or that the agreement "created the potential for anticompetitive effects," citing Doctor's Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. All., Inc., 123 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1997)) of the agreement.  The Court considered "increased prices, decreased output, or lower quality goods" specifically or "[e]liminating potential competition" to be "by definition, anticompetitive," citing United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1973).  Here, the size of the payment ($102 million) was sufficiently large that Impax did not challenge the FTC's determination that this aspect of the agreement was anticompetitive, and the Court agreed (the opinion also values Endo's agreement not to market a branded generic version of Opana ER to have provided an additional $24.5 million in "projected profits" to Impax).  Unlike other cases where such benefits as "avoided litigation costs" justified the reverse payment in view of the small sums of such payments ($3 million for example) here the significant amount of the direct payment ($102 million) was itself sufficient to satisfy the anticompetitive effect prong of the Supreme Court's analytical framework for the Commission and the Court.  Importantly, the Court rejected Impax's argument that it should consider the "strength" of the patent (i.e., the likelihood that it would have not been invalidated had the lawsuit gone to trial) based in part of the Supreme Court's rejection of this argument in its Actavis decision (although the decision is replete with the unjustified argument that the size of a reverse payment is an accurate gauge ("a strong inference") of the "weakness" of the underlying patent).  But the fact that, as it turned out, Impax is the only marketed generic version of extended release Opana is not relevant according to the opinion, based on the principle that "the impact of an agreement on competition is assessed as of 'the time it was adopted,'" citing Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985).

    The panel then turned to Impax's evidence of procompetitive benefits.  While the Commission had conceded that certain provisions could have procompetitive effects, the fact that the agreement permitted Impax's generic drug to come to market nine months prior to patent expiry and that Endo licensed its other relevant patents did not outweigh the anticompetitive effect of the reverse payment.  The Court avoided ruling on this aspect of the Commission's decision because alternatively the Commission decided that any procompetitive benefits could have been achieved by a less restrictive alternative.  The concept is clear: "[a] restraint [of trade] is unreasonable when any procompetitive benefits it produces 'could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means,'" under Ohio v. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018).  The policy justification is that this rule permits courts to "smoke out" anticompetitive practices or "pretextual justifications" for an unlawful restraint (a concept the Court finds in an academic paper rather than a judicial decision).  Following this logic, the opinion poses the question of whether "the good [could] have been achieved equally well with less bad."  The Commission based its decision that the parties could have come to a "less bad" agreement on "industry practice, economic analysis, expert testimony, and adverse credibility findings discounting the testimony of Impax's lead settlement negotiator."  The "less bad" alternative would have been, predictably, an earlier generic market entry date without the credits that led to the $102 million reverse payment (It should be kept in mind that this figure was not specifically contemplated when the agreement was negotiated; indeed, under different factual circumstances unlinked to the terms of the agreement there might have been no payment.)  The factual predicate for the Commission's determination included that "most settlements between brand and generic makers do not include reverse payments" (30% in settlements between 2004-2009; ironic in view of the FTC's purple prose regarding the scope of the "pay-for-delay" problem during those years).  In addition to adverse credibility determinations for Impax's chief negotiator, the Commission performed an ex post facto economic analysis that it would have been reasonable for Endo to permit earlier Impax market entry "if it could have kept the more than $100 million it ended up paying Impax."  Indeed that may have been the case, but at the time of the agreement (which the Court earlier in its opinion established as the timeframe for evaluating the competitiveness vel non of the agreement) this eventual payment may have been recognized as a risk but was not a certain cost of later Impax market entry.  Nevertheless, because this is a question of fact, the Court granted the Commission deference and thus found that Impax had not overcome the grounds the Commission asserted in favor of this conclusion.

    And this illustrates the analytical limitations of the Actavis inquiry into ANDA settlement agreements having reverse payment provisions.  Ultimately, far after the fact the FTC and its cadre of economists impose their conclusions on the parties' behavior which, as in this case, can be a mixture of ex ante and ex post analyses focused on the Commission's goal of preventing any agreement that can be cast as "pay-for delay."  While a worthwhile goal of influencing generic earliest generic drug entry, the Commission now as then has a blind spot to the economic realities under which parties in Hatch-Waxman litigation exist and come to these agreements.  The benefit in such agreements is almost always that a generic drug comes to market earlier than it would have if the parties had continued ANDA litigation to its outcome.  Sometimes the branded innovator will prevail in such litigations and sometimes they will not.  But the fact that sometimes the parties come to a commercially reasonable settlement reflects their considered evaluation of the risk under which each party operates and the consequences of prevailing or not.  Not all patents that are invalidated objectively should be nor are all patents that are upheld.  And there have been instances (remarkably few) where just what the Commission fears has come to pass (a true "pay for delay"), but in at least one instance even pre-Actavis that agreement was struck down as being anticompetitive.  The principal consequence of the Supreme Court's Actavis decision has been parties to ANDA litigation coming to settlement agreements less easily challenged by FTC or consumer groups (see "The Effects of the Actavis Decision on Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements in ANDA cases — Four Years After"), and in that way this decision is an anomaly due to the timing that the agreement was entered into prior to the refinement in the law by Actavis.  But this decision illustrates the sometime consequences of FTC's crusade against settlement agreements in ANDA litigation, which is not and has not always been in the public's interest.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    ToolGenSenior Party ToolGen Inc. has filed a protective order in each of Interference Nos. 106,126 (naming as Junior Party the Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Harvard University) and 106,127 (naming as Junior Party University of California/Berkeley, University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier, collectively "CVC") ('126 protective order and '127 protective order).  The protective orders, patterned after the one entered by the Board for CVC in Interference No. 106,115 as Junior Party, protect from public disclosure ToolGen's priority statement until such time (if ever) that either of these interferences enter the Priority Phase (likely to be late this year).

    Each Protective Order requires that confidential information be labeled "PROTECTIVE ORDER MATERIAL" and that disclosure be limited to the Parties (including, for CVC: Caribou Biosciences, Inc.; Intellia Therapeutics, Inc.; CRISPR Therapeutics AG; ERS Genomics Ltd.; TRACR Hematology Ltd., and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and for Broad: The United States Government (National Institute of Health (NIH)); and Editas Medicine, Inc.), their in-house counsel and their representatives; expert witnesses, under the proviso that such an expert is not "a competitor to any party, or a consultant for, or employed by, such a competitor with respect to the subject matter of the proceeding; and 'other employees,'" which expressly include anyone not otherwise expressly set forth in the Order, provided that they sign an undertaking agreeing therein to keep confidential whatever they learn know about ToolGen's priority statements and the factual predicates thereof.  ToolGen can oppose such disclosure but bears the burden of showing why the Board should restrict any such individual from access.  Also encompassed in the Protective Order are Office personnel and their staff, all of which are burdened by the same confidentiality provisions.

    These confidentiality restrictions govern what efforts at maintaining confidentiality are required for all encompassed by the Order.  Also, any submissions for which confidentiality should be maintained under the Order should be filed/served in redacted and non-confidential versions, with any redacted version having filed therewith a Motion to Seal, justifying the grounds for seal under the protective order.  The documents will remain sealed unless, "upon motion of a party and after a hearing on the issue, or sua sponte, the Board determines that some or all of the redacted information does not qualify for confidential treatment."

    Each Protective Order contains a document entitled a "Standard Acknowledgment for Access to Protective Order Material" that anyone obtaining access to such materials shall be compelled to sign to get access.                                                                                                     

  • By Donald Zuhn

    Leahy  PatrickIn a letter sent to President Joseph Biden at the end of March, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, and Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC), Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, asked the President to "prioritize the appointment of intellectual property officials within the Executive Branch over the coming weeks."

    Tillis  ThomSenators Leahy (at right) and Tillis (at left) note that "[e]nsuring that the intellectual property of creative artists, inventors and small businesses is meaningfully protected" constitutes a top priority for them, and point out that IP-intensive industries account for 45 million jobs and more than 38 percent of U.S. GDP.  Recognizing the importance of IP to the Nation's culture and economy, the Senators ask the President to "move expeditiously to fill key Executive Branch positions that promote and protect intellectual property rights at home and abroad."  Among those key positions for the Senators are the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, and the Chief Innovation and Intellectual Property Negotiator within the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

    The Senators close their letter by indicating that "IP-intensive industries are poised to continue to be an engine for growth," especially in view of the damage to the economy caused by the coronavirus, and expressing their commitment to with the President and his Administration "to swiftly confirm qualified nominees for these critical positions."

    President Biden's selection for Secretary of Commerce, former Rhode Island Governor Gina Raimondo, was confirmed by the Senate on March 2, 2021.  The Administration has yet to nominate an Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    University of California-BerkleyLast December, Junior Party University of California/Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (hereinafter, "CVC") filed its Substantive Motion No. 3 under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(1) asking for judgment of unpatentability for all claims in interference under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) or (if post-AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) for "failure to name all inventors of the alleged invention" against Senior Party The Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Harvard University (hereinafter, "Broad") in Interference No. 106,115.  Recently, Broad filed its opposition to this motion.  At the time, Broad filed a responsive motion asking for leave to correct inventorship, and CVC recently filed its motion opposing Broad's attempt to effect a post hoc inventorship correction, the details of which are set forth herein.

    CVC begins its opposition brief by asserting that Broad has not established that it is entitled to this relief, as required under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(b).  The basis of this argument comes first from the language of the statutes — 35 U.S.C. §§ 116 and 256 — permitting inventorship correction.  This language requires an applicant or patentee, respectively, provide proof of the facts surrounding the change and an identification of the inventors who should properly be named ("on application of all the parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed").  Second, CVC argues that Broad did not provide consent for one of the individual — Shauiliang Lin — to be added as an inventor.  Third, CVC alleges that the motion is barred by laches and submitted in bad faith.  And finally, CVC argues that as a matter of jurisdiction the Director — not the Board — has sole authority to change inventorship and that there is no evidence that the Director has delegated this authority to the Board.

    CVC's first argument is a matter of applying the statutory requirements to Broad's motion.  CVC argues that Broad's motion is defective because the motion represents that all that is needed is to pay the appropriate fee and name the proper inventors.  This ignores the requirements set forth in the statutory language quoted above, according to CVC, citing Loken-Flack, LLC v. Novozymes Bioag, A/S, No. 105,996, 2015 BL 165619, *2-3 (P.T.A.B. May 27, 2015).  CVC asserts that Broad's motion is devoid of any evidence regarding the contribution the newly named individuals made to the claimed invention.  Because Broad as movant has the burden of showing it Is entitled to the relief requested under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(b), CVC maintains that Broad needs to "explain how each (currently unidentified) person contributed to the conception of at least one claim of each of Broad's involved patents and application" and "provide evidence to support those assertions," citing Henkel Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 105,174, 2008 WL 5783337, at *20-25 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 28, 2008).  Moreover, CVC notes that Broad contends in its motion that it need not concede that inventorship is incorrect, which puts Broad in "the untenable position of, on the one hand, arguing that inventorship is correct and, on the other, having to affirmatively set forth why inventorship should be corrected," a situation of Broad's own making according to the brief.  And Broad's reliance on precedent is unavailing according to CVC because the circumstances here differ from those in that cited precedent.  CVC argues that while "Broad appears to believe that if CVC wins its motion on incorrect inventorship, then Broad automatically meets its burden to correct inventorship," this is an incorrect reading of the statute and precedent, due to "binding concessions" made with regard to statements presented to the European Patent Office under declaration in a related application.

    CVC's arguments regarding putative inventor Lin are straightforward, to the extent that the statute requires "all parties" to apply for the correction, citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1971), for the proposition that "when the Commissioner is asked to correct innocent errors of misjoinder or nonjoinder, all parties must apply for relief to comply with the requirements of the first and second paragraphs of § 256."  CVC further argues that the PTAB cannot waive this requirement, citing Chien Ming Huang v. Tzu Wei Chen Food Co., 849 F.2d 1458, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

    CVC's laches argument is based on the time — 8 years — between Broad's motion and when the "error" in inventorship arose (2013, when the Broad conducted "inventorship studies" on the patents in interference).  CVC asserts that the Board can impose laches as an equitable sanction under In re Stephen B. Bogese II, 303 F. 3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  CVC also characterizes Broad's failure to correct inventorship in 2013 as "unreasonable behavior" supporting its resort to laches.  Broad's failure to effect the change in inventorship eight years ago that its motion seeks (improperly) from the PTAB now is the basis of CVC's bad faith allegation, alleging specifically that "to achieve a strategic advantage—and without any excuse—Broad ignored this knowledge" for the need to correct inventorship (although CVC does not set forth what "strategic advantage" Broad sought to achieve thereby).  CVC also disputes Broad's assertion that its intent is not at issue, stating that "[t]he intent of an interference party seeking a change of inventorship in the middle of the priority phase after submitting its priority brief is highly relevant" and "[g]iven the consequences such a change may have, the candor with which that change is solicited is paramount."  Directly seeking recourse to the duty of candor under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, CVC asserts that:

    In the face of evidence that Broad intentionally misidentified the inventors of its involved patents and applications, as demonstrated by its own attorney's sworn declaration, and pursuant to the Federal Circuit's suggestion in Stark[v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997)], the PTAB should address whether there was bad faith in the original inventorship determination and deny Broad's motion.

    Finally, the brief asserts its jurisdictional argument that the Board is not competent to grant Broad's motion because that authority resides in the Director.  Citing Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Arkema Inc., 939 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (which CVC concedes may be merely informative if not controlling), the brief argues that the proper procedural process would be for Broad to "(1) seek the Board's authorization to file a motion; (2) file the authorized motion, asking the Board to cede its exclusive jurisdiction to permit the Director's consideration of a certificate; and, (3) if the motion is granted, ask the Director to issue a certificate" (the Director then deciding whether to grant the certificate).Which of course Broad has not done.

    Broad has its opportunity to reply on April 19, 2021.