• By Michael Borella

    Federal Circuit SealWhen the Supreme Court began poking around into the law of patent eligibility just over a decade ago, the invention topics that it considered under the abstract idea exception were limited to types of financial transactions.  The invention of Bilski v. Kappos was directed to hedging and that of Alice v. CLS Bank was directed to escrow.  While both inventions were ostensibly computer implemented, they involved software being applied to just one rather narrow field of endeavor.

    The Court's findings of invalidity in both cases are open to criticism both on procedural and substantive grounds, and these decisions could have been held to the facts of their cases or those of cases similar thereto.  But that did not happen.  We have seen a continuous expansion of the scope of what is considered to be "abstract" occur in a way that would make 19th-century imperialists jealous.

    Since Bilski and Alice, the Federal Circuit has grown the exception to encompass business methods in general, software in general, and more recently mechanical devices and processes involving such devices.  Notably, an electric car charger was deemed abstract in ChargePoint v. SemaConnect, as was a garage door opener in Chamberlain Group v. Techtronic Industries.  More recently, the controversial decision in American Axle v. Neapco found that a method for tuning driveshaft liners that improved damping capabilities was directed to nothing more than a law of nature and therefore ineligible.  American Axle is up for Supreme Court review, but no one expects that the justices will admit that their subject matter eligibility jurisprudence is a Gordian Knot that requires reformulation by way of a sword.

    Which brings us to last week's eligibility decision that came down from the Federal Circuit, this one involving a camera.  Yanbin Yu and Zhongxuan Zhang sued Apple and Samsung for alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,611,289.  Claim 1 of the '289 patent, which was considered representative of all asserted claims, recites:

    1.  An improved digital camera comprising:
        a first and a second image sensor closely positioned with respect to a common plane, said second image sensor sensitive to a full region of visible color spectrum;
        two lenses, each being mounted in front of one of said two image sensors;
        said first image sensor producing a first image and said second image sensor producing a second image;
        an analog-to-digital converting circuitry coupled to said first and said second image sensor and digitizing said first and said second intensity images to produce correspondingly a first digital image and a second digital image;
        an image memory, coupled to said analog-to-digital converting circuitry, for storing said first digital image and said second digital image; and
        a digital image processor, coupled to said image memory and receiving said first digital image and said second digital image, producing a resultant digital image from said first digital image enhanced with said second digital image.

    The camera of claim 1 has some fairly specific hardware requirements, such as a pair of closely positioned image sensors, lenses, A-D circuitry, memory, and a digital image processor.  Also, the camera is configured to carry out a fairly broad set of tasks, such as producing a first image and a second image, producing a resultant digital image from said first digital image enhanced with said second digital image.  It is the latter functionality that was the focus of the majority opinion from Judges Prost and Taranto, and the perceived nature of this functionality ultimately doomed the claims.

    In Alice, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand involves a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But elements or combinations of elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional will not lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.  While this inquiry is generally carried out as a matter of law, factual issues can come into play when determining whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional.

    Last year, the Federal Circuit provided a major clue as to how to think about patent eligibility in practice.  In Dropbox Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs. Inc. the Court wrote that "an inventive concept exists when a claim recites a specific, discrete implementation of the abstract idea where the particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over the prior art."  This suggests that in order for a claim that is otherwise directed to an abstract idea to be successful under § 101, it should have three qualities: specificity, a technical solution that it provides, and some degree of novelty.  More particularly, there should be a nexus between these three factors — specificity, technical character, and novelty should appear in the same claim element or at least be explicitly linked in some fashion in the recitation of the claim.

    On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the District Court found that claim 1 was invalid under § 101 because the claim was directed to the abstract idea of "taking two pictures and using those pictures to enhance each other in some way."  The District Court also opined that there was a "complete absence of any facts showing that the claimed elements were not well-known, routine, and conventional."  Yu appealed.

    Applying part one of the Alice test, the Federal Circuit quickly agreed with the District Court.  The majority noted that this process involves "asking what the patent asserts to be the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art."  On review of the language of claim 1 and Yu's specification, the majority found that the claim is "directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invokes generic processes and machinery rather than a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology."

    It was undisputed in the District Court that "the idea and practice of using multiple pictures to enhance each other has been known by photographers for over a century."  The majority then took this as given and concluded that the hardware aspects of the claimed camera were generic and conventional.

    Yu argued that the specification described the technical advance provided by the claimed hardware configuration.  But the majority was unconvinced, finding that the specification described the benefits and advantages of a more specific hardware configuration (a "four-lens, four-image-sensor configuration in which three of the sensors are color-specific while the fourth is a black-and-white sensor") than what was claimed.  According to the majority, "the mismatch between the specification statements that Yu points to and the breadth of claim 1 underscores that the focus of the claimed advance is the abstract idea and not the particular configuration discussed in the specification that allegedly departs from the prior art."

    Holding claim 1 abstract under part one of Alice, the majority moved on to part two.  Here, it reiterated the points made above regarding the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the hardware configuration.  Yu argued that this configuration was actually unconventional because the claim was allowed by the USPTO "over multiple prior art references."  The majority was unpersuaded, however, and stated that "even if claim 1 recites novel subject matter, that fact is insufficient by itself to confer eligibility."

    As an aside, this reasoning illustrates the logical contortions that the current application of § 101 forces one to go through.  Claim 1 was considered to be abstract because some of its features were in the prior art and therefore lacked novelty.  But Yu's argument that the claim as a whole was novel has no weight in the § 101 realm.  This type of Kafkaesque reckoning from the Federal Circuit is not new and dates back to 2014's Ultramercial v. Hulu.

    In any event, there is no evidence in this opinion that the majority properly considered the combination of elements in claim 1 as required by Alice.  Consequently, the majority ruled that Yu's claims failed the § 101 requirements and were invalid.

    Writing in dissent, Judge Newman kicked off by stating that "[t]his camera is a mechanical and electronic device of defined structure and mechanism; it is not an abstract idea."  Put another way, if you can drop it on your foot, it is not an abstract idea.

    Judge Newman criticized the majority for departing from the language of claim 1 when considering its eligibility.  She wrote:

    I repeat: claim 1 is for a digital camera having a designated structure and mechanism that perform specified functions; claim 1 is not for the general idea of enhancing camera images.  The camera of the '289 patent may or may not ultimately satisfy all the substantive requirements of patentability, for this is an active field of technology.  However, that does not convert a mechanical/electronic device into an abstract idea.

    Judge Newman also took a dim view of the majority's consideration of prior art under § 101.  In her opinion, Diamond v. Diehr and the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act make it abundantly clear that there is an "explicit distinction" between §§ 101 and 102, and that the majority's wedging of § 102 factors into a § 101 analysis is improper.  She observed that "[s]ection 101 ineligibility does not arise simply because a device embodies minor and predictable differences from the prior art, as the majority holds."[1]

    Instead, Judge Newman found that there is historical support for considering claim specificity in the § 101 inquiry.  She wrote:

    [T]his reasoning has solidified the foundations of eligibility, drawing on the fundamental distinction between breadth of general scientific principle, and its embodiment in practical application.  This distinction between a general concept and its specific application is implemented in the Patent Act.

    So, it appears that she is willing to consider some incorporation of § 112 considerations into § 101.  This is perhaps in contrast to her colleague, Judge Moore, who coined the term "enablement on steroids" to describe how some panels of the Federal Circuit require that the claims (and not just the specification) enable one to practice the invention.

    Judge Newman concluded her dissent with a few pointed thoughts on novelty and non-obviousness being part of the eligibility calculus:

    In the current state of Section 101 jurisprudence, inconsistency and unpredictability of adjudication have destabilized technologic development in important fields of commerce.  Although today's Section 101 uncertainties have arisen primarily in the biological and computer-implemented technologies, all fields are affected.  The case before us enlarges this instability in all fields, for the court holds that the question of whether the components of a new device are well-known and conventional affects Section 101 eligibility, without reaching the patentability criteria of novelty and nonobviousness.

    The digital camera described and claimed in the '289 patent is a mechanical/electronic device that easily fits the standard subject matter eligibility criteria.  Neither the panel majority nor the district court decided patentability under Section 102 or Section 103, having eliminated the claims under Section 101.  The '289 claims warrant review under the substantive criteria of patentability—a review that they have never received.

    The fresh uncertainties engendered by the majority's revision of Section 101 are contrary to the statute and the weight of precedent, and contrary to the public's interest in a stable and effective patent incentive.

    Yu v. Apple (Fed. Cir. 2021)
    Panel:  Circuit Judges Newman, Prost, and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Prost; dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Newman

    [1] While Judge Newman's interpretation of the law is logical and arguably how it should be interpreted, it is fair to note that Justice Breyer wrote in Mayo v. Prometheus that "the §101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the §102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap."  But he did not specify or discuss any further the nature of this overlap.  The blame for the current incursion of prior art concerns into questions of eligibility falls largely on the Federal Circuit.

  • CalendarJune 15, 2021 – "Federal Circuit Update on Claim Construction: Evolving Standards" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    June 15, 2021 – "Saving the World with Patents: Is the TRIPS Waiver Helping or Hurting Innovation?" (IPWatchdog and LexisNexis) – 11:00 am (ET)

    June 15-16, 2021 – Biotechnology/Chemical/Pharmaceutical (BCP) Customer Partnership Meeting (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office)

    June 22-22, 2021 – Summit on Biosimilars & Innovator Biologics: Legal, Regulatory, and Commercial Strategies for the Innovator and Biosimilars Marketplace (American Conference Institute)

  • MBHB Logo 2McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP will be offering a live webinar entitled "Federal Circuit Update on Claim Construction: Evolving Standards" on June 15, 2021 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  In this presentation, MBHB attorney Bradley J. Hulbert will provide a current update of Federal Circuit case law, as the Court continues to refine its approach toward determining the scope of patent claims.  The webinar will also provide a description of:

    • A framework for understanding how the Federal Circuit determines the "ordinary and customary" meaning of claim terms.
    • The Court's most significant, recent instructions for resolving "the distinction between using the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim and importing limitations from the specification into the claim."
    • How the Court now determines a patent applicant has disavowed claimed subject matter.
    • The Court's refinements in interpreting preambles, coined terms, and "wherein clauses."
    • Indicators as to when a narrowing amendment is "merely tangential," such that an amended claim still covers insubstantially different devices or methods.
    • Further constraints on when a claim limitation would be improperly vitiated if construed to cover an accused device or method.

    While there is no fee to participate, attendees must register in advance.  Those wishing to register can do so here.  CLE credit is pending for the states of California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.

  • IPWatchdogIPWatchdog and LexisNexis and will be offering a webinar entitled "Saving the World with Patents: Is the TRIPS Waiver Helping or Hurting Innovation?" on June 15, 2021 at 11:00 am (ET).  Brian Arthur Pomper of Akin Gump; Melissa Brand, Assistant General Counsel, IP, Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO); Sarbani Chattopadhyay of LexisNexis; and Gene Quinn of IPWatchdog will discuss the petition by South Africa and India at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to waive most of the protections in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and whether this is helping or hurting innovation.  The panel will also address the following topics:

    • The R&D regarding vaccination has been an ongoing process — you can see the correlation in patent filing statistics with the different virus outbreaks of previous years.
    • How patent analytics can provide insight into where a company is focusing their innovations even before they announce the innovations.
    • The patent data shows that prior to the Covid-19 outbreak, patents related to SARS and MERS vaccines, mRNA vaccines, and spike protein-based vaccines were already being developed.
    • The TRIPS Waiver pros and cons, is it more helpful or harmful to innovation?

    LexisNexisThere is no registration fee for this webinar.  However, those interested in registering for the webinar, should do so here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Junior Party University of California/Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (hereinafter, "CVC") and Senior Party The Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Harvard University (hereinafter, "Broad") each filed Motions to Exclude Evidence and Requests for Oral Hearing in Interference No. 106,115.

    University of California-BerkleyCVC's motion to exclude is directed to "declarations of Benjamin Davies (Ex. 3435), Mark Kay (Ex. 3436), Alan Lambowith (Ex. 3437); Paul Simons (Exs. 3438 and 3440); Erez Lieberman Aidan (Ex. 3439), Greg Hannon (Ex. 3441 and 3442), Mark Isalan (Ex. 3443), Caixao Gao (Ex. 3446); Adam Bogdanove (Ex. 3449), Thierry VandenDriessche (Ex. 3450), Bryan Cullen (Ex. 3451), Paula Cannon (Ex. 3452), portions of the Third Declaration of Ronald Breaker (Ex. 3448)," and certain documentary exhibits.  The legal basis for the motion is that these exhibits and testimony "seeks to exclude violates the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Standing Order (Paper 2), and the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)."

    With regard to CVC's arguments based on the Rules of Evidence, CVC objects to Broad being permitted to rely on testimony proffered in support of its motion that has not been offered for witness cross-examination by CVC.  This is prejudicial to CVC, the motion explains, because "it had no opportunity to confront and challenge these witnesses on their statements, including their purported recollections, proffered opinions, and potential biases."  This testimony is particularly relevant because Broad has relied on it to show whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have expected CRISPR-Cas9 to work in eukaryotic cells in early 2012; this testimony thus involves "disputed facts at the heart of [Broad's] opposition" to CVC's priority position.  In addition, because "[m]any of these witness statements were submitted in foreign patent office proceedings" they were not sworn to under oath and also constitute hearsay and thus should not be entered into evidence.

    In addition to CVC's objections based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the motion asserts that this evidence is contrary to Standing Order (SO) ¶ 157.3, which provides that testimony not subject to cross-examination can be excluded.  Permitting Broad to rely on such unchallenged testimony is also contrary to relevant precedent, including Rose v. Frazer, Inf. No. 104,733 Paper 73 at 4 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 29, 2002); Praxair Distrib., Inc. v. INO Therapeutics LLC, IPR2015-00529, Paper 33 at 2 (PTAB Dec. 22, 2015); and Mexichem Amanco Holdings S.A. de C.V. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., Case IPR2013-00576, Paper 36 at 3 (PTAB Sept. 5, 2014), as well as 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(c).  This precedent stands against Broad's arguments that cross-examination is unnecessary because the statements contained therein are part of the "public record" according to CVC.

    CVC points out for particular objection portions of Dr. Breaker's declaration as hearsay for relying on declarations of others he stated show that others in the field shared his opinions with regarding to eukaryotic CRISPR embodiments; to do so would contravene Federal Circuit precedent according to CVC, citing Wi-Lan Inc., v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 992 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2021).  In addition to striking the specified portions of Dr. Breaker's testimony, CVC asks the Board to give no weight to citations of Dr. Breaker's opinion in Broad's priority motions, oppositions, and replies.  And because Dr. Breaker's reliance on unchallenged opinions of others is accordingly unreliable, those portions violate Daubert as well, according to CVC's brief.  To an anticipated response by Broad that an expert is entitled to rely on hearsay in forming their opinions, CVC argues that while true an expert cannot be used as a "conduit" for bringing hearsay to the factfinder for the truth of the matter asserted, citing the Federal Circuit's reliance on Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013), in its Wi-Lan Inc., v. Sharp Electronics Corp. decision.

    With regard to certain exhibits, CVC objects as hearsay to recent books about CVC inventors including Walter Isaacson (The Code Breaker: Jennifer Doudna, Gene Editing, and the Future of the Human Race) and Kenneth (sic) Davies (Editing Humanity: The CRISPR Revolution and the New Era of Genome Editing) that CVC contends the Broad proffered as "purported evidence of the timing, difficulty, challenges, and the role different people played in the events leading up to the CVC inventors' fame and accolades."  Rather than providing admissible evidence, CVC contends that these books are the authors' words and interpretations of information they gathered and that the authors are without personal knowledge of the events they describe.  Nor have these authors submitted declarations under oath nor been made available for deposition.  And as "hearsay within hearsay" (as being the authors' hearsay statements regarding what others have said to them) these exhibits are inadmissible under FRE 805.  As stated by CVC in its motion, "[t]here is no hearsay exception for a published book, even a popular one."

    Broad InstituteBroad's motion to exclude is more limited, being specifically directed to testimony from Dr. Phillip Zamore regarding "how a person having ordinary skill in the art ("POSA") allegedly would have understood (1) the March 2011 Deltcheva et al. reference's disclosures regarding tracrRNA, (2) the RNAi, pre-mRNA, and DNA systems he alleges are relevant to Deltcheva et al.'s disclosures, and (3) Dr. Zhang's October 24, 2011 email regarding the role of tracrRNA in the CRISPR-Cas9 cutting complex."  According to Broad, what Dr. Zamore's declaration did not attest to was "(1) whether a 2012 POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success of using CRISPR-Cas9 in eukaryotic cells; (2) the state of the art after the Jinek 2012 paper; or (3) relevant prokaryotic-based systems, such as Group II introns," all of which were issues upon which CVC Priority Motion.  But these issues were attested to not by Dr. Zamore in support of CVC's priority claims but by another witness, who did not opine on them.  Thus, CVC's proffer of Dr. Zamore's testimony on these matters is an attempt, in Broad's view, to "untimely seek[] to obtain expert testimony on these topics via improper re-direct testimony by Dr. Zamore" (i.e., during Broad's cross-examination of CVC's witness).  And Broad asserts that its cross-examination of Dr. Zamore was properly limited to "the actual opinions expressed in Dr. Zamore's declaration and his qualifications," and thus did not "open the door" to the testimony CVC elicited on redirect examination.

    The brief recites specific portions of Dr. Zamore's redirect testimony to illustrate that Broad terms "an obviously rehearsed question and answer session that attempted to add to the record new testimony regarding reasonable expectation of success."  Broad's brief sets forth with specificity the testimony Broad asks the Board to exclude:

    Table
    Broad's basis for this relief is that the Board "allowing the challenged po1tions of Dr. Zamore's testimony into evidence here would prejudice Broad" because "Broad was denied a fair opportunity to prepare a full rebuttal to Dr. Zamore on topics such as prior art systems and reasonable expectation of success given such opinions were not in Dr. Zamore's declaration and only proffered for the first time on a purported re-direct, after Broad's opposition was filed."

    Both Broad and CVC request oral hearing and present a list of issues for the Board to resolve.  For Broad, these issues include Broad's Motion No. 5 for judgment of priority, as well as CVC's Opposition Motion and Broad's Reply; Broad's motion No. 9 to exclude evidence (as well as any opposition by CVC and reply by Broad); CVC's Motion No. 2 for priority judgment, as well as Broad's Opposition and CVC's Reply; CVC's Motion No. 3 for misjoinder of inventorship, Broad's Opposition, and CVC's Reply; and Broad's Contingent Motion No. 6, CVC's Opposition, and Broad's Reply for Correction of Inventorship if the Board grants CVC's Motion No. 3 on misjoinder.  Broad also lists for the Board any motions to exclude by CVC and "any other issues that the PTAB would like Senior Party to address."

    For CVC the issues on which CVC asks the Board to hear oral argument include CVC's Motion No. 2 for priority judgment, as well as Broad's Opposition and CVC's Reply; CVC's Motion No. 3 for misjoinder of inventorship, Broad's Opposition, and CVC's Reply; CVC's Motion No. 7 to exclude evidence, as well as any Broad Opposition and CVC Reply; Broad's Motion No. 5 for judgment of priority, as well as CVC's Opposition Motion and Broad's Reply; and Broad's Contingent Motion No. 6, CVC's Opposition, and Broad's Reply for Correction of Inventorship if the Board grants CVC's Motion No. 3 on misjoinder.  CVC also includes any other issues "raised by Broad during oral argument or issues the PTAB would like CVC to address."

    The Board in its discretion will decide whether to grant these requests for oral hearing and set a hearing date in due course.

    Finally, Broad has filed an unopposed Miscellaneous Motion (No. 8) pursuant to Standing Order ¶¶ 121 and 123 to seal redacted material under the protective order contained in portions of the deposition transcripts of two CVC witnesses, Erik Joseph Sontheimer (Ex. 6214) and Rodolphe Barrangou (Ex. 6212).  This testimony relates to financial disclosures and licensing information that, if disclosed, would "compromise privacy interests and competitively sensitive information about licensing held by non-parties to this proceeding."  Broad makes the case that the redactions are "narrowly tailored" to minimize negative impact on the public, and that the redacted information is not necessary for the public to understand the context or substantive merits in the interference.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Federal Circuit SealIn Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Baxter Corp. Englewood, the Federal Circuit overturned a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in an inter partes review that claims in the challenged patent were not invalid for obviousness.

    The patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 8,554,579, is directed to telemedicine methods and particularly to methods for preparing patient-specific doses of pharmaceuticals.  Claim 8 was considered representative by the Court:

    8.  A system for preparing and managing patient-specific dose orders that have been entered into a first system, comprising:
                            . . .
        a dose preparation station for preparing a plurality of doses based on received dose orders, the dose preparation station being in bi-directional communication with the order processing server and
        having an interface for providing an operator with a protocol associated with each received drug order and specifying a set of drug preparation steps to fill the drug order, the dose preparation station including an interactive screen that includes prompts that can be highlighted by an operator to receive additional information relative to one particular step and includes areas for entering an input;
        . . . and wherein each of the steps must be verified as being properly completed before the operator can continue with the other steps of drug preparation process, the captured image displaying a result of a discrete isolated event performed in accordance with one drug preparation step, wherein verifying the steps includes reviewing all of the discrete images in the data record . . . .

    The claim terms at issue, both of which are recited in representative claim 8, are "highlighting" and various forms of the concept of "verification," as indicate in the claim as set forth above.  Becton, Dickinson asserted three prior art references in support of its IPR challenge sounding in obviousness:  U.S. Patent No. 8,374,887 ("Alexander"), U.S. Patent No. 6,581,798 ("Liff"), and U.S. Patent Publication No. 2005/0080651 ("Morrison").  The Board had found that the skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the Alexander and Liff references, and even the combination of all the references.  Similarly, the Board found Baxter's evidence of secondary considerations to be weak, according to the Federal Circuit's opinion.  Nevertheless, the Board found that the Alexander reference, taken alone, did not render obvious the "verification" limitation, or that the combination of the references did not render obvious the "highlighting" limitation of the challenged '579 patent claims.

    The Federal Circuit reversed the Board's determinations, in an opinion written by Judge Dyk, joined by Judges Prost and Clevenger.  The panel first addressed the "verification" limitation.  According to the Court, the Board's application of its construction was not supported by substantial evidence.  Specifically, the Court held that the Board erred in concluding that the primary reference, Alexander, only disclosed that the remote pharmacist may verify but not that she must verify "each and every step before the operator is allowed to proceed."  The opinion states that in the panel's view "'may' does not mean 'occasionally,' but rather that one 'may' choose to systematically check each step."  This is significant because the Court found that in the context of the prior art Alexander specification "[t]here is no significant difference between that teaching of Alexander and the '579 patent's verification requirement, which the Board construed as requiring that 'the system will not allow the operator to proceed to the next step until the prior step has been verified.'"  The Court rejected Baxter's arguments to the contrary that unverified prescription filling was within the scope of the Alexander teaching (which argument was based on deposition testimony of Becton's expert), nor that use of the term "the system" in the Alexander process implicated a mechanical "hard stop" to the prescribing function, the Court stating that "[n]othing in the construction requires a mechanical stop as opposed to requiring authorization from a pharmacist to continue."  Accordingly, the panel held that the Board's determination to the contrary was not supported by substantial evidence.

    With regard to the "highlighting" limitation the opinion notes that this limitation is tied to embodiments having "an interactive screen that includes prompts that can be highlighted by an operator to receive additional in-formation relative to one particular step," as illustrated by Figure 10 of the '579 patent:

    Image 1
    The Court's understanding of the Board's construction of this term was that "the only missing element of this limitation [in the Alexander reference] is the ability to highlight prompts to receive more information concerning drug preparation steps."  And this feature was disclosed in the Liff reference in the panel's assessment (albeit in the physical rather than the virtual, computer realm; as stated in the opinion the system disclosed in the Liff reference comprises "a cabinet adapted to store a variety of prepackaged pharmaceuticals in a plurality of bins for filling patient prescriptions"; the Liff system was illustrated by Figure 14F of that patent:

    Image 2
    The Board had characterized its non-obviousness determination based on the highlighting limitation to be a "close case"; the Court disagreed.  To the panel, the Liff patent's teachings regarding highlighting for one purpose (i.e., patient characteristics) clearly would not have precluded the skilled worker from applying the highlighting function to another feature (e.g., information regarding the prescription order).  In the panel's view, their decision was predicated on the Supreme Court's teachings in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007), that "[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results."  In addition, the panel relied on KRS for the principle that "[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton" with regard to the question of whether the "additional information that might be relevant" was limited to what the Liff reference expressly disclosed.

    In an interesting aside, the Court considered the issue of whether the Alexander reference was properly prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), because all claims in that patent were subsequently cancelled in an IPR.  Baxter argued that this eliminated the statutory requirement that the reference be "granted" and hence § 102(e) no longer applied.  The panel rejected that interpretation of the statute, saying that the Alexander reference satisfied the statutory terms because "the grant[] had occurred" and that the statute did not require the patent be currently valid to qualify as prior art.

    Finally, the panel addressed Baxter's secondary considerations evidence, agreeing with the Board that it was "weak" and did not rebut the prima facie case.

    The Court's invalidation outcome is rare with regard to an obviousness determination by the PTAB because it is equally rare that the Board does not amass sufficient evidence to be considered substantial and thus is not entitled to deference under Dickerson v. Zurko.  But where, as here, an IPR petitioner can demonstrate sufficient paucity of factual basis supporting the PTAB's non-obviousness determination, the outcome is unsurprising no matter how infrequent it may be in practice.

    Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Baxter Corp. Englewood (Fed. Cir. 2021)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Prost, Clevenger, and Dyk
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Dyk

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Broad InstituteSenior Party The Broad Institute, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (collectively, "Broad") recently filed its reply to Junior Party The University of California/Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, "CVC") opposition to its motion for priority in Interference No. 106,115.

    CVC's opposition raised two grounds for the PTAB to base a decision that CVC should prevail in the priority phase of the interference.  The first is that Broad inventor Zhang derived the invention claimed in the patents-in-interference from disclosure of CVC's conception from Dr. Marraffini.  Dr. Marraffini was in possession of CVC's invention because he was a confidential reviewer of the manuscript later published in Science as Jinek et al. (2012, "A Programmable Dual-RNA-Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive Bacterial Immunity," Science 337: 816–21).  Dr. Marraffini also attended a CRISPR conference at Berkley on June 26, 2012 where the Doudna lab disclosed its CRISPR findings.  Indeed, CVC's opposition brief contained a comparison between what was disclosed at the meeting, what Dr. Marraffini disclosed to Dr. Zhang, and what Dr. Zhang communicated to his colleague Dr. Cong, first author on the paper published in the January 2013 issue of Science and containing Broad's disclosure of CRISPR practiced in eukaryotic cells:

    Image 1
    Second, CVC argued that once its seminal finding was made public, that CRISPR could be performed using sgRNA, no fewer than five labs ("Church (Harvard), Kim (ToolGen), Joung collaboration, and Chen (Sigma-Aldrich)"), including the Zhang lab, were able to perform eukaryotic CRISPR using routine, conventional laboratory methods, as evidenced by scientific papers from these labs published in Science in January 2013.  Indeed, CVC's opposition brief argued that Dr. Zhang's alleged reduction to practice in June 2012, after receiving the information regarding sgRNA from Dr. Marraffini, is itself evidence of CVC's complete conception, because the information Dr. Marraffini communicated to Dr. Zhang came from Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier.

    Broad raises three flavors of argument against these allegations.  The first is procedural:  Broad argues that CVC's derivation arguments, arising for the first time in their opposition, are untimely and improper, because they needed to be raised in a substantive motion filed with Board permission under Bd. R. 121 and 37 C.F.R. § 41.208.  According to Broad, CVC was aware of these circumstances prior to deposing Dr. Marraffini and had the knowledge and opportunity to request the Board's permission to file a substantive motion at the appropriate time earlier in this interference.  Accepting these arguments now, according to Broad, is unduly prejudicial (it is unlikely any CVC argument would not be somewhat prejudicial to Broad) because it has deprived Broad the opportunity to submit its own opposition to these allegations complete with declaration testimony and the opportunity to depose CVC's declarants.  (This argument loses some of its rhetorical punch in view of the Board's granting Broad the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Marraffini during CVC's deposition; see "PTAB Grants CVC Motion for Marraffini Deposition," but is certainly true for the other declarants.)

    Broad's second argument is entirely substantive:  Broad provides its rebuttal to CVC's allegations of derivation, relying heavily on citations to the evidentiary record (which presumably will not pose as challenging a task to evaluate as it does the casual observer); specifically, as an example, the brief provides this table showing Broad's possession of every aspect of eukaryotic CRISPR except the sgRNA embodiments prior to Dr. Marraffini's disclosure:

    Table 1
    The focus of much of these arguments is Broad's allegation that its lead inventor, Dr. Zhang, had successfully reduced eukaryotic embodiments of CRISPR using "dual RNA molecule" (i.e., the structural tracrRNA and the sequence-specific crRNA) versions in 2011 through early 2012, and that his immediate success in reducing to practice sgRNA embodiments (the subject of this interference) after Dr. Marraffini disclosed them was the consequence of those efforts, and not because CVC's inventors had complete conception of the invention falling within the scope of the interference Count:

    CVC claims Zhang surreptitiously took the entire invention from CVC through Marraffini.  But the truth is simpler and in no way nefarious: Zhang included a small, single adaptation that the CVC inventors chose to put into the public domain.  He was so far ahead of CVC with the work that mattered—creating a functioning eukaryotic CRISPR-Cas9 system—that he was able to reduce the chimeric RNA system to practice multiple times as memorialized in his complete, groundbreaking manuscript, all while CVC struggled and failed despite their multiple, highly experienced eukaryotic co-collaborators.

    In this regard, Broad's Reply continues its litany of reasons why it contends CVC's inventors failed to reduce eukaryotic CRISPR to practice to such an extent that the Board should conclude that their conception was incomplete until actually reducing such embodiments to practice at CVC's earliest priority date in this interference, January 23, 2013.  (This date is far after Broad's earliest claimed priority date, June 26, 2012, and its several actual reduction to practice dates in the month or two thereafter.)  Specifically, Broad argues (again) that mere disclosure of sgRNA embodiments of CRISPR-Cas9 is not enough for conception (discounting CVC's argument that once CVC showed activity of these constructs in vitro routine microinjection methods, which CVC showed were functional in zebrafish, were enough to provide complete conception).  These arguments weave a careful mixture of alleging that conception required that an inventor have a reasonable expectation of success for conception to be complete and an argument that the Board's decision that the Jinek reference (containing the experimental results that support CVC's reduction to practice) was insufficient to render Broad's invention obvious as decided by the Board in its final decision in the earlier interference between the parties (Interference No. 105,048) supports its allegations here that CVC's conception was incomplete at its earliest claimed conception date.  In this regard, Broad provides some inspiring rhetoric (e.g., "CVC is trying to wish away the forest of evidence by focusing on a single, irrelevant tree").  Also in this regard, Broad apparently has abandoned its earlier reliance on the principle of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice in its attack on CVC's conception ("simultaneous conception/reduction to practice is irrelevant on the facts"), seemingly being content to rely on evidence of CVC's purported failures of actual reduction to practice or statements supporting the uncertainty in achieving functional CRISPR in eukaryotic cells by CVC's inventors.

    Broad's third argument alleges that CVC's fact witnesses (Drs. Barrangou and Sontheimer) supporting their derivation arguments should be disregarded due to bias, because they are all involved with Intellia Therapeutics, a company commercializing eukaryotic CRISPR embodiments with Jennifer Doudna, one of CVC's lead inventors, and Dr. Marraffini, as well as their testimony being "inconsistent with the facts."

    In addition to these arguments, Broad addresses several less critical points raised in CVC's opposition, including whether the testimony of certain of their declarants should be disregarded because it is uncorroborated inventor testimony (as well as arguing that this testimony is unnecessary to establish Broad's actual reduction to practice).  Also, Broad argues that CVC's allegations that some of Broad's arguments raised in opposition to  CVC's conception are "lack[ing] candor" and "a sham" involve requirements asserted by the Board in its decision that there was no interference-in-fact in the '048 Interference (Broad taking the opportunity to accuse CVC of "fabricating a story inconsistent with the state of the art in 2012 and the prior decisions of the PTAB and Federal Circuit").  And Broad argues that CVC's opposition does not refute Dr. Zhang's conception or any evidence regarding their actual reductions to practice (this being the consequence, of course, of CVC's decision to assert its derivation argument, for which the relative ease of Broad's reduction to practice CVC argues is evidence of their own complete conception as conveyed by Dr. Marraffini to Dr. Zhang).  Included in these arguments are a rebuttal of CVC's argument that Dr. Zhang did not understand the need or function of tracrRNA, based on specific citations to the Broad's evidence, and Broad's assertion that far from being routine and conventional, "CVC itself identifies no less than 12 adaptations that Zhang made to his CRISPR-Cas9 system to overcome the numerous eukaryotic challenges" in achieving CRISPR functional in eukaryotic cells.

    Both parties have filed Motions to Exclude evidence that involve some of the testimony relied upon by the other party with regard to their priority positions, which will be the subject of future posts.

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be holding its next biotechnology/chemical/pharmaceutical (BCP) customer partnership meeting, as a virtual meeting, on June 15 and 16, 2021.  The agenda for the meeting is as follows:

    June 15, 2021

    • Welcoming and Opening Remarks (1:00 – 1:10 pm ET) — Daniel Sullivan and Gary Jones, Directors, and Renee Claytor, Director (Acting), TC1600, USPTO

    • COVID-19 Prioritization Examination Pilot and CARE Act Updates (1:10 – 2:00 pm) — Kery Fries, Senior Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Administration (OPLA), USPTO

    • Application of Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) to Search & Routing of Patent Applications (2:00 – 2:30 pm) — Fereydoun G. Sajjadi, SCE SPE, TC1600, USPTO

    • Interview Practice Review (2:30 – 2:50 pm) — Bethany Barham, SPE, TC1600, USPTO

    • Break (2:50 – 3:00 pm)

    • Precedential and Informative Decisions (3:00 – 3:30 pm) — Kalyan Deshpande, Lead Administrative Patent Judge, PTAB, USPTO

    • Appeals (3:30 – 4:00 pm) — Michael Cygan, Eric Jeschke, and Kristi Sawert, Administrative Patent Judges, PTAB, USPTO

    • Motions to Amend Practice in AIA Trials (4:00 – 4:00 pm) — Michelle Ankenbrand, Lead Administrative Patent Judge, PTAB, USPTO

    • Legal Experience and Advancement Program (LEAP) (4:30 – 5:00 pm) — Amanda Wieker, Administrative Patent Judge, PTAB, USPTO

    • Closing Remarks (5:00 – 5:05 pm) — Directors, TC1600, USPTO

    June 16, 2021

    • Welcoming and Opening Remarks (12:30 – 12:35 pm ET) — Daniel Sullivan and Gary Jones, Directors, and Renee Claytor, Director (Acting), TC1600, USPTO

    • TC Decided Petitions (12:35 – 1:00 pm) — Scarlett Goon, QAS, TC1600, USPTO

    • Rule 130 Declarations Practice under the American Invents Act (AIA) (1:00 – 2:30 pm) — Kathleen Fonda, Senior Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Administration (OPLA), USPTO

    • Patent Stakeholder Support Division (SSD) – An Overview (2:30 – 2:50 pm) — Sudhanshu C. Pathak, Pro Se Assistance Program Coordinator, Office of Patent Experience, USPTO

    • Break (2:50 – 3:00 pm)

    • WIPO Standard ST.26 (for Sequence Listing) Introduction (3:00 – 4:30 pm) — Anne Gussow, QAS, TC1600, USPTO, and Mindy Brown SPE, TC1600, USPTO

    • Patent Electronic Business Center (4:30 – 5:00 pm) — Jeffery Wong, Project Manager, OPIM, USPTO, and Marcus Jackson, Team Lead, OPIM, USPTO

    • Closing Remarks (5:00 – 5:05 pm) – Directors, TC1600, USPTO

    Additional information regarding the BCP customer partnership meeting, including registration information for those wishing to attend the meeting or register for online participation, can be found here.  An agenda for the BCP customer partnership meeting can be found here.

  • HGF Limited and Knobbe Martens will be offering a webinar entitled "Developing Effective Patent Strategies for Personalized Medical Devices in Europe and the US" on June 9, 2021 at 11:00 am (ET).  Adam Hines of HGF, and Christy Lea and Sabing Lee of Knobbe Martens will explore considerations for implementing an effective strategy to secure patent protection for personalized medical devices, and to steer through a potentially crowded competitive landscape, with a particular focus on comparing the European and US jurisdictions.  The webinar will cover:

    • an overview of the growth in patent applications for personalized medical devices and examples of patent claims that can protect them;
    • considerations for drafting and prosecuting patent applications directed to personalized medical devices and how these approaches differ between Europe and the U.S.;
    • a case study examining litigation, in the U.S., of a patent portfolio with claims covering personalized medical devices and how defendants challenged patent validity.

    Those wishing to register can do so here.