• IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "2022 PTAB Year in Review" on January 19, 2023 from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (ET).  Joshua Goldberg, Tom Irving, Sydney Kestle, Gracie Mills, and Trenton Ward of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP will discuss some of the most significant developments in PTAB practice in 2022 and how those developments will impact future cases, important precedent promulgated last year, and Director Vidal's impact on the PTAB during 2022, including a summary of those cases where Director Review was granted.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $150 for non-members or free for IPO members (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in attending the webinar should register here.

  • Bereskin & ParrBereskin & Parr will be offering a presentation entitled "Europe's New Unitary Patent & Unified Patent Court: Strategies for Canadian Applicants & Patent Holders" at 12:30 pm (EST) on January 19, 2023.  Denis V. Keseris of Bereskin & Parr will review Europe's new Unitary Patent (UP) and Unified Patent Court (UPC) and set out strategies for taking advantage of (or avoiding) this new system.

    Those wishing to register for the presentation can do so here.

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be offering an overview of the Patent Public Search tool from 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm ET on January 17, 2023.  Librarians from the Patent and Trademark Resource Center Program, who are experienced with educating users on USPTO search tools, will show attendees how to use the new tool.

    Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • China_webinar2023_featureThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "China IP Developments: A View from the Ground" from 7:00 pm to 8:00 pm (ET) on January 17, 2023.  On-the-ground China intellectual property experts from the USPTO will provide important information about the current status of IP protection and enforcement in China.  The program will feature presentations by three current or recent USPTO IP attachés posted to China:  Conrad Wong, an attorney-advisor in the USPTO’s Office of Policy and International Affairs, and until 2022 the IP attaché with the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou, China; Duncan Willson, IP Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China; and Juli Schwartz, IP attaché with the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai, China.

    Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) will offer a webinar entitled "Exploring the Future of Innovation-driven Growth & the Role of IP" from 9:00 am to 11:30 am (ET) / 3:00 pm to 5:30 pm (CET) on January 18, 2023.  U.S. industry leaders from Cargill, Dell, DuPont, Google, Hewlett Packard, Tenneco and Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. will be discussing:

    • What is the role of IP in unleashing the Digital Age and the Deep Science wave: "business as usual" or something novel?
    • What are the ramifications of these innovation waves on the use and impact of IP?
    • What relationship exists between innovation-related growth, IP, and global challenges?

    WIPORemarks will be provided by WIPO Assistant Director General Marco Aleman, USPTO Director Kathi Vidal, IPO Vice President Krish Gupta, and IPO Executive Director Jessica Landacre.

    There is no registration fee to attend the webinar, but advance registration is required.  Additional information regarding the webcast can be found here.

  • PIUGPatent Information Users Group, Inc. (PIUG) will be offering a webinar on "The Unitary Patent (UP) and Unified Patent Court (UPC)" at 10:00 am (EST) on January 18, 2023.  Julia Gwilt and Kate Hickinson of Appleyard Lees will discuss how the UP and UPC will impact existing European patents and applications, and key decisions patent owners will need to make for their European portfolios.

    Attendees must be PIUG Members or PIUG Public Discussion Members to attend.  Those interested in attending the webinar can register here.

  • We-full-webThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be offering its next Women's Entrepreneurship (WE) event from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (ET) on January 18, 2023 at the Collier Museum at Government Center in Naples, FL.  Leaders in the intellectual property community and women entrepreneurs will share their stories and tips on why protecting IP—via patents, trademarks, copyrights, or trade secrets—is key to starting and maintaining a successful business.  Among the speakers will be the Honorable Kate O'Malley (Ret.), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; Chrissybil Boulin, Founder, Jump Start Tutoring Center; Vaishali Udupa, Commissioner for Patents, USPTO; and Kathi Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO.

    Those interested in registering for the event, can do so here.

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be offering a webinar providing advanced tips for frequent users of the Patent Public Search tool from 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm ET on January 18, 2023.  Librarians from the Patent and Trademark Resource Center Program will show attendees how to use additional features of the Patent Public Search tool to save time and conduct a more thorough patent search, and cover the following topics:

    • Tag patent documents based on criteria you set.
    • Write notes on documents as you review them.
    • View only those sections of a patent that have your search words.
    • Use other features to make your search easier.

    Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • By Michael Borella

    In a recent article, we argued that patent law's current subjective and inconsistently-applied mental process doctrine is erroneously based on a false equivalence between human and machine cognition.  Notably, inventions that would require machine implementation to be of any practical use at all are mistakenly barred from patentability because they are allegedly directed to "mental" processes.  This mental process doctrine has been growing and expanding over the last 50 years despite having at best a poor grounding in both fact and law.

    In the meantime, the talk of the Internet these days is ChatGPT, a large language model that is capable of producing remarkably human-like text.  Trained on a corpus of millions of human language documents, ChatGPT can generate impressive results from a simple prompt.

    For example, I asked ChatGPT to "write a rap song about trickle-down economics invoking Adam Smith and Ronald Reagan."  It came back with the following (from which two verses and the chorus are excerpted):

    Adam Smith and Ronald Reagan,
    Two icons of the trickle down scene.
    They preached the gospel of supply and demand,
    And said the economy would be freed from government's hand.

    The theory goes like this: the rich invest,
    And the benefits of their success will be expressed.
    Through higher wages and more jobs, it's a win-win,
    But some say the reality is much more grim.

    It's the trickle down, the trickle down,
    Where the wealth flows from the top to the ground.
    It's the trickle down, the trickle down,
    Where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, it's the trickle down.

    Not bad.  ChatGPT can also explain the difference between a patent and a trademark:

    A patent is a form of intellectual property that gives the person who holds the patent the exclusive right to prevent others from making, using, selling, and importing an invention for a limited period of time, usually 20 years from the filing date of the patent application.  Patents are granted for new, useful, and non-obvious inventions or discoveries.

    A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, or design, or a combination of these, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods or services of one party from those of others.  A trademark can be a brand name, slogan, logo, or other distinctive mark that is used in connection with a product or service.  Trademarks are used to protect brand identity and ensure that consumers can easily identify and distinguish one company's products or services from those of another.

    In summary, a patent protects an invention, while a trademark protects a brand or logo.

    Also not bad.  In addition, ChatGPT can write text in the style of a particular author, essays on virtually any topic, and even computer code.[1]  It can also answer questions.  Thus, the text that it generates encompasses the functionality of search engines and Wikipedia, but adds a new aspect — it can create.  That is where things get sticky.

    Not only are ChatGPT creations cogent enough to make school teachers reach for their aspirin bottles, they may suggest to naïve users that ChatGPT is intelligent, wise, and human-like.  While ChatGPT would not pass the Turing Test in its current incarnation, it is good enough to fool the easily fooled.

    And those, naïve, easily fooled types might attempt to use ChatGPT's impressive performance on some tasks to justify patent law's mental process doctrine.  After all, ChatGPT output sure seems to be based on something at least similar to human cognition.

    But even if it quacks like a duck that does not mean that it flies south for the winter.  ChatGPT's internal operation is little like that of a human brain, even if you limit your analysis of the human brain to language.

    In short, ChatGPT is autocomplete on steroids.  Underlying ChatGPT is a transformer-based large language model that is trained by a massive amount of text to predict the next word of a sentence given the first n words of that sentence.  In order to get it to respond to queries, a second model is trained, one in which thousands of prompts and associated responses are generated (some automatically, some manually), and human reviewers rate the quality of each response with respect to its prompt.  A further model is trained to predict how well a human would rate each response.  Then, ChatGPT is trained to generate responses that would be highly-rated by a human.[2]

    This does not resemble our current understanding of human cognition.  For example, as far as we know human beings use cognitive models to represent real-world objects and their behavior.  Based on these models, humans can make predictions of what these objects would do in new situations.  Thus, a child might (hopefully) be able to infer that a stove hot enough to boil water will be painful to touch.

    In contrast, modern computer language models struggle making such predictions.  This is a general problem in artificial intelligence — unless a model is specifically programmed or trained with data representing a scenario, its prediction of what may occur or what it should do in that scenario may be way off the mark.

    For an example of this, ask ChatGPT to write a review of a well-known movie, such as Star Wars or Titanic.  The result will be impressive.  Then ask it to write a review of a lesser known, newer movie.  Prepare for disappointment.  A number of comical and disturbing ChatGPT fails have been noted.

    Further, human beings have a theory of mind, in that we assign mental states to other persons in order to understand their behavior.  ChatGPT does not do this and therefore cannot modulate its output based on the emotions exhibited by a user.  Despite the fact that ChatGPT can provide you with a definition of a person, it does not actually understand what a person is and it lacks the ability to emote.  It might be able to simulate various emotions but it does not have the ability to have emotions of its own or to exhibit true empathy.[3]

    Moreover, ChatGPT does not know whether it is generating text that represents the truth.  It has no concept of "truth" and no way of verifying that what it is saying is accurate, much less a moral compass to guide its actions.  And it has been known to generate very convincing falsehoods.

    So don't ask ChatGPT for psychological help, dating advice, or who to vote for.  And if you do, take its output with a huge dose of skepticism.  ChatGPT creations are merely sophisticated pastiches of the writing on which it was trained.

    What this all leads to is the inevitable conclusion that ChatGPT's often remarkable language skills are not anything like a human mental process.  Therefore, using the existence of ChatGPT to justify mental process doctrine in patent law is disingenuous at best.  So let's cut off that avenue of inquiry before anyone foolishly decides to venture down its path.

    [1] On the other hand, I asked ChatGPT to "write an article about Alice v CLS Bank in the style of Kurt Vonnegut," and the result was rather bland with mild sarcasm sandwiching a textbook description of the case.  So it goes.

    [2] See https://pub.towardsai.net/chatgpt-how-does-it-work-internally-e0b3e23601a1 for a more detailed technical description.

    [3] Here, I am not trying to contend that there is something magical about human beings, just that AI models still have a long way to go in their ability to simulate human intelligence and may continue doing so in a way that is quite distinct from human cognition.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan –

    Federal Circuit SealAs the dodo of patent practice, the number of interferences has been steadily dwindling since enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2012 abolished the practice in favor of a "first inventor to file" regime and a derivation proceeding for instances where a patentee is found to have taken the invention from the true inventor (35 U.S.C. § 135).  And while the various CRISPR interferences between The Broad Institute and the University of California (Nos. 105,048 and 105,115) and those parties and ToolGen (Nos. 106,126 and 106,127) and Sigma-Aldrich (Nos. 106,132 and 106,133) have garnered more attention than other interferences combined, there remain a few other remaining interferences and in one of them, Dionex Softron GmbH v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a determination by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in favor of the Junior Party.

    This interference was in an interesting procedural posture, wherein both parties copied each other's claims to provoke an interference.  Agilent made the first attempt and failed, copying claims to Dionex's U.S. Application No. 15/596,738, now U.S. Patent No. 10,031,112.  After Agilent amended its claims in U.S. Application No. 15/965,402, Dionex copied those claims in its U.S. Application No. 16/016,866, and the interference was declared.  The Count in Interference No. 106,109 was Claim 1 of Agilent's application:

    A method of operating a liquid chromatography system, the liquid chromatography system comprising a liquid chromatography column and an injection valve, the method comprising:
        isolating a sample loop of the liquid chromatography system from a high-pressure fluidic path in fluid communication with the liquid chromatography column, wherein the high-pressure fluidic path is at a pump pressure, wherein the sample loop is in fluid communication with the injection valve and the sample loop comprises a metering device for loading a sample on the sample loop, and isolating the sample loop comprises placing the injection valve in a PRESSURE COMPENSATION position, wherein a volume of the metering device is defined by a chamber in which a piston is reciprocatingly mounted;
        determining a movement amount of the piston within the chamber from a first position to a second position to increase a pressure in the sample loop from an essentially atmospheric pressure to the pump pressure, based on the pump pressure; and
        while the sample loop is isolated from the high pressure fluidic path, decreasing the volume of the metering device to increase the pressure in the sample loop from the essentially atmospheric pressure to essentially correspond to the pump pressure of the high-pressure fluidic path;
        wherein decreasing the volume includes forwarding the piston within the chamber by the determined movement amount from the first position to the second position;
        wherein the metering device and the sample loop are in fluid communication in each position of the injection valve.

    (wherein the italicized limitations were relevant to the issues before the Federal Circuit on appeal).

    The PTAB denied Dionex's motion that Agilent's claims were not supported by an adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, finding that the specification whose adequacy was required was Agilent's '402 application because that was the application from which the claim was copied.  The issue, regarding the italicized limitation above was whether "determining a movement amount" needed to occur before "forwarding the piston" based on the disclosure of Dionex's '116 application (although Dionex conceded that certain terms, like "determining," should be construed under Agilent's '402 specification).  The Board held that Agilent's '402 specification provided an adequate written description under § 112, first paragraph, because using the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard there was no basis for Dionex's asserted temporal limitation (i.e., that there was a movement determination prior to piston movement).  Under the Board's construction, there could be such a determination while the piston was moving and the limitation under this interpretation was adequately described by the '402 specification.

    On the priority merits, the Board held for Agilent on corroborated evidence that its inventor had reduced the invention to practice (June 1, 2007) prior to Dionex's earliest asserted conception date (December 4, 2007).  The evidence was provided by testimony of one of two co-inventors, Kretz, corroborated by two co-workers, Berndt and Bäuerle.  Their corroborating testimony was that Kretz had successfully tested a prototype of the claimed invention by his asserted June 1, 2007 reduction to practice date.  This testimony was consistent with documentary evidence initially created on April 4, 2006 and having modifications as late as November 11, 2008, which document was attested by Agilent's expert to describe a functional apparatus falling within the interference Count.  The Board rejected Dionex's argument that the described apparatus did not have a pressure sensor needed to provide equalized pressure as recited in the Count, based on testimony by Bäuerle that the pump used in the prototype had an internal pressure sensor.  Finally, the Board refused to draw an adverse inference against Agilent from the failure of the second named inventor, Glatz, to testify or from the absence of contemporaneous technical drawings, schematics, and other documentary evidence in light of the adequacy of the testimony introduced by Agilent.  This appeal followed.

    The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Stark joined by Judges Reyna and Chen.  Regarding the § 112, first paragraph, issue, the Federal Circuit agreed with the PTAB that the '402 application was the proper source of an adequate written description, as the "originating specification" under Agilent Techs., Inc v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473 (Fed. Cir. 1997); and In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  Agilent's earlier failure to provoke an interference by coping Dionex's claims did not change this result according to the panel.  The Federal Circuit also agreed with the PTAB's claim construction regarding whether there was a temporal component in the claim language, i.e., whether the "determining" activity must antecede "forwarding" of the piston.  While conceding the general rule that a method claim does not necessarily require steps to be performed in the order they are recited in the claim, the opinion notes that there are instances where "logic or grammar" requires a particular order, citing Mformation Techs, Inc v. Rsch. in Motion, Ltd., 764 F3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  This was not such a case, the panel concluded, and thus the Board's determination was supported by substantial evidence (including expert testimony) as a question of fact.

    The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board's priority determination, based on actual reduction to practice having been achieved prior to Dionex's conception date and being supported by sufficient corroborating evidence.  The panel affirmed the Board's application of the "rule of reason" regarding corroborating testimony under Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998), where there is "sufficient circumstantial evidence of an independent nature" to support inventor Kretz's testimony concerning his actual reduction to practice.  The opinion characterizes Dionex's arguments on these issues to be "mistaken" insofar as the Board properly credited testimony of contemporary witnesses of inventor Kretz's work and actual reduction-to-practice of an apparatus within the scope of the interference Count.  While the witnesses, particularly Bäuerle, may not have known every detail of the apparatus the Court held that "omniscience is unnecessary under the rule of reason" in Cooper and that any inadequacy in witness Berndt's understanding that was the basis of his testimony was not disqualifying because it was independent of inventor Kretz's testimony and the Board could find "some collaborative value" in it.  Regarding the exhibit, the panel rejected Dionex's challenge, saying it was "without merit" because the Board relied on the exhibit "as it existed at the relevant date" (emphasis in opinion), as corroborated by witness Bäuerle.  Finally, the Court rejected Dionex's argument that the Board should have drawn an adverse inference from second inventor Glatz's failure to provide testimony, saying there is no per se requirement to infer that an inventor's failure to testify should be considered harmful to her co-inventor, citing Borror v. Herz, 666 F.2d 574 (C.C.PA. 1981), and that the Board had discretion that it had not abused on this record regarding inventor Glatz's failure to testify.  In the absence of such a mandate that the Board draw the adverse inference, the Court held there was no error by the Board in not doing so and thus affirmed the Board's priority determination in favor of Agilent.

    Dionex Softron GmbH v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2023)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Reyna, Chen, and Stark
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Stark