• By Donald Zuhn —

    District Court for the District of OregonLast month, in Ni-Q, LLC v. Prolacta Bioscience, Inc., District Judge Michael H. Simon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Ni-Q, LLC that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,628,921, which is assigned to Defendant Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. ("Prolacta"), are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for failure to claim patent-eligible subject matter.  The District Court also determined on summary judgment that Ni-Q did not infringe the asserted claims of the '921 patent, even if those claims had been found valid.  We previously reported on this case in 2017 when the District Court denied Ni-Q's motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the claims of the '921 patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for failure to claim patent-eligible subject matter.

    Ni-Q had initiated the dispute between the parties by filing a complaint for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the '921 patent, as well as alleging a violation of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act.  Prolacta responded by filing a counterclaim against Ni-Q for money damages and injunctive relief, asserting that Ni-Q had infringed claims 1, 2, and 9 of the '921 patent.

    The '921 patent, which is entitled "Methods for testing milk," is directed to methods for testing mammary fluid (including milk) to establish or confirm the identity of the donor of the mammary fluid.  Independent claim 1 recites (emphasis in opinion):

    1.  A method for determining whether a donated mammary fluid was obtained from a specific subject, the method comprising:
        (a) testing a donated biological sample from the specific subject to obtain at least one reference identity marker profile for at least one marker;
        (b) testing a sample of the donated mammary fluid to obtain at least one identity marker profile for the at least one marker in step (a);
        (c) comparing the identity marker profiles, wherein a match between the identity marker profiles indicates that the mammary fluid was obtained from the specific subject; and
        (d) processing the donated mammary fluid whose identity marker profile has been matched with a reference identity marker profile, wherein the processed donated mammary fluid comprises a human protein constituent of 11-20 mg/mL; a human fat constituent of 35-55 mg/mL; and a human carbohydrate constituent of 70-120 mg/mL.

    Prolacta receives human milk from donors and processes it to make fortifier and other products for use in feeding premature and other medically fragile infants.  Ni-Q is also engaged in the procurement, production, and sale of human milk-based products for use in feeding premature infants.

    In construing the claims, the parties stipulated and the District Court adopted that the term "wherein a match" means "a determination that the marker(s) in the biological sample and donated fluid or milk are the same and that there are no additional unmatched marker(s)."  The District Court also construed the term "processing" to mean:  "One or more of the following: filtering, heat-treating, separating into cream and skim, adding cream to the skim, or pasteurizing."  Following the District Court's construction of the claims, Ni-Q filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that in view of the Court's claim construction, claims 1, 2, 4, 6-9, and 11 of the '921 patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to patent-eligible subject matter, and that it did not infringe the claims of the '921 patent because it did not perform all of the steps of the asserted claims.

    With respect to the issue of validity, Ni-Q argued that the asserted claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they are directed to a patent-ineligible natural law with no inventive concept to transform the natural law into patent-eligible subject matter.  More specifically, Ni-Q argued that the presence of identity markers such as DNA and proteins in a woman's tissue or milk is natural, and the nutritional levels required by the patent occur naturally.  Prolacta responded by asserting that the claims are directed to producing safer milk that is standardized with optimal nutritional values, contending that the claimed method recites steps for selecting for processing safe milk from health-screened donors and manufacturing a nutrient-enhanced human milk product.

    With respect to the first step of Alice/Mayo framework, the District Court agreed with Ni-Q that "the asserted claims are directed to the laws of nature," and that "[t]he presence of identity markers such as DNA in a woman's mammary fluid and other biological tissue is natural."  The Court explained that "[a]lthough the patent describes the human action of testing the original reference sample and the mammary fluid sample and comparing them, that does not convert the claim to patent-eligible subject matter," adding that "[t]he relationship of the markers in the samples exists naturally."  The Court determined that "Claim 1 merely describes the natural law that two different biological samples from the same individual contain the same identity markers and thus can be tested and compared."

    The District Court found Prolacta's argument that the claims are directed to producing safer milk that is standardized with optimal nutritional value to be unpersuasive, pointing out that the steps recited in claim 1 "require no step, method, or process relating to safety or the health screening of donors," but rather "merely require testing a reference sample of a donor, testing a sample of the donated mammary fluid, comparing the two test results, and processing only the mammary fluid when the two tests match," and noting that "[t]here is nothing in Claim 1 . . . that requires testing the donor for disease or drug use or anything else relating to health or safety."  According to the Court, claim 1 "is about identification—it does not suggest that its goal or purpose relates to safety or health concerns."  The Court also found to be unavailing Prolacta's argument that claim 1 covers a method of standardizing optimal nutrient level, noting that claim 1 "does not require that nutrient levels of donated mammary fluid be altered," but instead "merely requires that after processing is complete, the mammary fluid consist of wide-ranging levels of nutrients that, as conceded by Prolacta, are naturally found in human breast milk."  In finding that "Claim 1 . . . is impermissibly directed to a patent-ineligible subject," the Court concluded that:

    Claim 1 is a broad claim that is not limited to a particular application of natural law.  It is not limited to commercial human breast milk production, to certain processing that alter the makeup of the breast milk, or to testing breast milk donors for viruses, bacteria, drugs, or other health issues and then ensuring that later-donated milk matches the originally-screened donor.  Indeed, it purports to cover any use where: (1) a donor has donated a reference sample and mammary fluid that are tested for a match; (2) if there is a match, the donated mammary fluid is processed using any of the five types of processing; and (3) after processing, the mammary fluid contains the identified nutrient ranges.  Because these nutrient ranges are found naturally in breast milk, the claim's covered use could include, for example, researchers who are testing the efficacy of DNA comparisons between breast milk and other biological samples and in so doing heat-treat or pasteurize the milk.

    With respect to the second step of the Alice/Mayo analytic framework, Ni-Q argued that Prolacta's comparison of DNA to match the reference sample to the donated mammary fluid was not new or inventive, and that because processing can include pasteurization, that is also not a new or innovative step.  Prolacta responded that three aspects of the claims are new or inventive: (1) applying DNA analysis to mammary fluid; (2) selecting mammary fluid for processing based on a matching processing that ensured the donated fluid was from a specific subject, thereby eliminating the risk of communicable diseases in donated milk; and (3) requiring the recited nutrient ranges.

    The District Court rejected Prolacta's second and third arguments, stating that "the elimination of health concerns and communicable diseases in processed milk is not contained in any of the asserted claims (and therefore cannot provide an inventive concept) and the required nutrient ranges may not require any processing other than pasteurization of donated milk, which is not new or inventive."  The Court also took issue with Prolacta's first argument, noting that "nothing in the claims requires screening of the donor," and therefore, that Prolacta's "new application" — i.e., the genetic link between screened donors and donated milk and excluding milk containing DNA from unknown and unscreened donors –- "is not the application in the claims."  The Court also noted that the claims "do not require the matching be through maternal DNA," and that "[a]ny identity marker will suffice."  The Court therefore concluded that "the claims add no new or inventive concept not already known in the art," and that "[c]onsidering the steps 'as an ordered combination adds nothing to the laws of nature that is not already present when the steps are considered separately,'" quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012).  Thus, the Court found the claims to also "fail at step two" of the Alice/Mayo framework.

    Turning to the issue of infringement, Ni-Q asserted that it does not perform the "wherein a match" step of the asserted claims and therefore did not literally infringe the '921 patent or infringe the '921 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.  In particular, Ni-Q asserted that in view of the District Court's claim construction, the "wherein a match" step requires a determination that there are no additional unmatched markers between the biological sample and the donated fluid or milk, and that it never determined that there were no additional unmatched markers.  The Court again agreed with Ni-Q, finding that "the '921 Patent requires a determination that the milk processed had no additional unmatched markers," and determining that "because Ni-Q processed the milk and did not make that determination before processing, Ni-Q did not infringe the patent" (emphasis in opinion).  The District Court also concluded that Ni-Q did not infringe the '921 patent under the doctrine of equivalents because "[t]he purpose of the second step of the 'wherein a match' requirement—making sure there are 'no unmatched markers'—is to prevent contamination from unscreened donors," and "Ni-Q does nothing equivalent to that step to prevent contamination from other donors."

    The District Court therefore granted Ni-Q's motion for summary judgement, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, the asserted claims of the '921 patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that Ni-Q did not infringe the asserted claims even if they were valid.

    Ni-Q, LLC v. Prolacta Bioscience, Inc. (D. Or. 2019)
    Opinion and Order by District Judge Simon

  • CalendarMarch 12, 2019 – "Practical Tips on Patent Prosecution in India and China" (J A Kemp) – 3:30 to 4:30 pm (GMT)

    March 12, 2019 – Customer partnership meeting of Technology Center 2800, Semiconductor/Memory Workgroup and Printing/Measuring and Testing Workgroup (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 12:00 pm to 4:30 pm (EDT)

    March 14, 2019 – "Obvious-Type Double Patenting and PTEs After Breckenridge Pharmaceutical and Ezra Ventures LLC Decisions" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    March 14, 2019 – "IP for Agriculture and Plants" (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Biotech Committee) – 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (CT), Chicago, IL

    March 19, 2019 – "The Evolving Provenance of Obviousness-type Double Patenting" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    March 19, 2019 – "Japanese Patent Practice-Specialty Areas" (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) International Patent Committee) – 11:45 am to 1:00 pm (CT), Chicago, IL

    March 20, 2019 – "Drafting Software Patents to Survive Section 101 and AIA Challenges — Anticipating and Minimizing the Risk of 101, 103 Rejections, Recent Court Guidance" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    March 21, 2019 – "Key Issues Shaping the US IP Landscape" (Federal Circuit Bar Association) – 10:00 am to 6:00 pm (EST), Washington, DC

    March 21-22, 2019 – "Federal Circuit Practice & Procedure" (John Marshall Law School Center for Intellectual Property, Information & Privacy Law) – 9:00 am to 4:30 pm, Chicago, IL.

  • MBHB Logo 2McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP will be offering a live webinar entitled "The Evolving Provenance of Obviousness-type Double Patenting" on March 19, 2019 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  In this presentation, MBHB attorney and Patent Docs author Kevin Noonan and MBHB attorney Sarah Fendrick will explore the evolving provenance of obviousness-type double patenting in addressing the following topics:

    • Traditional confines of the doctrine
    • Federal Circuit expansion in Sun Pharma and Gilead
    •
    Retrenchment in Breckenridge Pharma and Ezra Ventures
    • Future prospects

    While there is no fee to participate, attendees must register in advance.  Those wishing to register can do so here.  CLE credit is pending for the states of California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.

  • Federal Circuit Bar AssociationThe Federal Circuit Bar Association will be hosting a program entitled "Key Issues Shaping the US IP Landscape" from 10:00 am to 6:00 pm (EST) on March 21, 2019 at the Army and Navy Club in Washington, DC.  Representatives from the judicial, legislative, and administrative communities will explore challenges confronting the IP profession and more during the program.

    Additional information regarding the program, including an agenda and list of speakers, can be found here.  Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here; the registration fee is $550 (FCBA Members) or $850 (non-members).

  • JMLSThe John Marshall Law School Center for Intellectual Property, Information & Privacy Law will be hosting an IP Executive Seminar on "Federal Circuit Practice & Procedure" from 9:00 am to 4:30 pm on March 21-22, 2019 in Chicago, IL.  The program, which will be presented by Donald Dunner of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, will offer a comprehensive study of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and its jurisdiction over patent cases from the perspective of an appellate practitioner.  The course will cover litigation strategies and the process of guiding a client through an appeal.

    Additional information about the program can be found here.  Those interested in registering for the conference online can do so here; the registration fee is $345 (general admission) and JMLS students, staff, and faculty can apply for free registration.

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Biotech Committee will be presenting a panel discussion entitled "IP for Agriculture and Plants" on March 14, 2019 from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (CT) at the offices of Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP in Chicago, IL.  The panel includes Audrey Charles, Patent Agent and Trademark Administrator, Ball Horticultural Company; Diana Horvath of 2Blades Foundation; and Laura Labeots of Husch Blackwell, LLP.

    There is no registration fee for the discussion.  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Drafting Software Patents to Survive Section 101 and AIA Challenges — Anticipating and Minimizing the Risk of 101, 103 Rejections, Recent Court Guidance" on March 20, 2019 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Michael L. Kiklis of Bass Berry & Sims and Stephen G. Kunin of Maier & Maier will guide patent practitioners on how to draft their patent applications to overcome both Section 101 and AIA challenges. This panel has decades of experience in Section 101 and has represented patent owners numerous times in AIA reviews.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What are the hurdles for patent counsel to demonstrate a software-related claim is not abstract?
    • In the event an abstract idea is identified, how can patent practitioners pass Alice's step two?
    • What guidance have the courts provided in recent decisions concerning patent eligibility for software-related inventions?
    • What best practices should counsel use to help software-related inventions survive AIA challenges?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $347.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) International Patent Committee will be presenting a program entitled "Japanese Patent Practice-Specialty Areas" on March 19, 2019 from 11:45 am to 1:00 pm (CT) at DePaul College of Law in Chicago, IL.  Part 1 of the program will address "How to pursue an invention directed to a method for treating a human body in Japan," and Part 2 of the program address the "JPO's Examination Guidelines on Internet of Things and Artificial Intelligence."  Each part of the program will include a discussion of the JPO's Examination Guidelines, comparison of JP practice with U.S. practice from a point of view of the examination guidelines, and a discussion of how to draft specification/claims in conformity with JP practice.

    The registration fee for the presentation is $20 (non-members), $10 (IPLAC members), or free (students).  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Rosa_chinensis_1795A rose may be a rose may be a rose (to paraphrase Gertrude Stein) but genetically roses (like many plant species) are wickedly complex.  The genus Rosa comprises about 200 species, although only 8-20 species are thought to have contributed to modern rose cultivars.  Rose genomic complexity is expressed, inter alia, in their chromosome structures, which is a genetic patchwork of sequences from a large number of cultivars, and as with many plants a significant percentage of Rosa species (about half) are polyploid.  The evolutionary history of these species has involved reticulate evolution, interspecific hybridization, introgression and polyploidization, which has contributed to the genetic variability and chromosome structure.  This provides broad phenotypic variability, in flower size, color, fragrance, medicinal properties, and other features selected for not (just) naturally but by generations of plant breeders.  For example, one of the first hybrids, "La France," produced in Europe beginning in the 18th Century, combined "growth vigor" characteristic of European rose varieties with the propensity for current blooming characteristic of Chinese roses (as well as color and scent signatures).  And this genetic complexity has made determining the rose genomic DNA sequence particularly difficult, despite its relatively small size (560 Mb).

    Last spring (appropriately) a team of scientists* revealed the first compilation of the rose genome in a paper published in Nature Genetics entitled "The Rosa genome provides new insights into the domestication of modern roses."  Relevant to the genetic mosaicism referenced above, these authors needed to produce a "homozygous" genotype from one of the heterozygous diploid rose progenitors, Rosa chinensis "Old Blush," in order to produce a reliable genomic rose sequence.  Upon sequencing, these scientists were able to produce 7 "pseudo chromosomes" corresponding to a homozygous genome; in nature roses have 7, 14, 28, 35, or 42 chromosomes.  The sequenced data suggested there are 36,377 protein-coding genes and almost 4,000 long noncoding RNA sequences in the rose genome.  Transposable elements comprised almost 68% of the rose genome, with long terminal repeat retrotransposons representing about half of these sequences.  Comparisons between related species permitted these researchers to identify an ancestral karyotype having 9 protochromosomes and 8,861 protogenes, with the ancestral strawberry and rose genomes were modeled into 8 protochromosomes comprising 13,060 protogenes, produced by two ancestral chromosomes fusions and one chromosome fission; the authors report that the strawberry ancestral genome experienced an extra fusion resulting in the modern genome, where the rose genome experienced one fission and two fusions, independently of strawberry.

    Turning to modern rose cultivars, sequencing detected "discrete levels of variant density along the genomes of hybrid cultivars" that could "reflect different introgression histories."  Three ancestral pools of diversity representing combinations of Cinnamomeae, Synstylae and Chinenses cultivar genomes could be found in various of the mosaic chromosomes detected by their sequencing results.  These results then were extended to identify candidate genes that may be involved in recurrent blooming (contributed by the Rosa chinensis ancestor.  One of these genetic events is "insertion of a [transposable element] in TFL1 (RoKSN), a repressor of floral transition responsive to activation by gibberellic acid," considered according to these authors as a major determinant in recurrent blooming and having arisen in Rosa chinensis cultivars.  The authors also report that two candidates for s second, recently detected locus associated with recurrent blooming, as being either "transcription factor SPT [] which is known to control flowering in Arabidopsis" and "DOG1, which is known to modify flowering by acting on miR156."

    Finally, these authors report "[d]ata mining of the rose genome combined with in-depth biochemical and molecular analyses of volatile organic compounds permitted identification of at least 22 biosynthetic steps in the terpene pathway that have not been characterized in the rose, two of which have not previously been characterized in other species."  These studies result in a proposal that negative regulation by microRNA mi156 of repressor of anthocyanin biosynthesis (SPL9) provides a regulatory hub that "orchestrates the coordination of production of both colored anthocyanins and certain terpenes," as illustrated in Figure 3 of the paper (click on image to enlarge):

    Figure 3
    The paper concludes by noting both the scientific benefits of the study and its practical implications:

    The very high-quality rose genome sequence reported in this study, combined with an expert annotation of the main pathways of interest for the rose . . . provides new insights into the genome dynamics of this woody ornamental and offer a basis to disentangle the seemingly mandatory trait associations or exclusions.  Furthermore, access to candidate genes, such as those involved in abscisic acid synthesis and signaling, paves the way for improving rose quality with better water-use efficiency and increased vase life.  Breeding for other characteristics such as increased resistance to pathogens should also benefit from these data and may lead to decreased use of pesticides.

    The rose is one of the most commonly cultivated ornamental plants anywhere in the world, making understanding of rose genetics economically as well as scientifically important.

    • Olivier Raymond, Jérémy Just, Marion Verdenaud, Philippe Vergne, Sébastien Carrère, Judit Szécsi, Léa François, Annick Dubois, Antoine Larrieu, Lauriane Perrier, Priscilla Villand, Claudia Bardoux, Véronique Boltz, Teva Vernoux, Michiel Vandenbussche & Mohammed Bendahmane** from the Laboratoire Reproduction et Développement des Plantes, Univ Lyon, ENS de Lyon, UCB Lyon 1, CNRS, INRA, Lyon, France; Jérôme Gouzy, Hélène Badouin & Ludovic Cottret from LIPM, Université de Toulouse, INRA, CNRS, Castanet-Tolosan, France; Hélène Badouin from Univ Lyon, Université Lyon 1, CNRS, Laboratoire de Biométrie et Biologie Evolutive UMR5558, Villeurbanne, France; Marion Verdenaud, David Latrasse, Magali Perez, Adnane Boualem, Abdelhafid Bendahmane & Moussa Benhamed from the Institute of Plant Sciences Paris-Saclay (IPS2), CNRS, INRA, University Paris-Sud, University of Evry, University Paris-Diderot, Sorbonne Paris-Cite, University of Paris-Saclay, Orsay, France; Arnaud Lemainque, Arnaud Couloux, Jean-Marc Aury, Mohammed-Amin Madoui, Karine Labadie & Patrick Wincker from CEA–Institut de Biologie François Jacob, Genoscope, Evry, France; Sandrine Moja, Jean-Claude Caissard & Sylvie Baudino from Univ Lyon, UJM-Saint-Etienne, CNRS, Saint-Etienne, France; Nathalie Choisne & Hadi Quesneville from UR1164–Research Unit in Genomics-Info, INRA, Université Paris-Saclay, Versailles, France; Caroline Pont & Jérôme Salse from INRA/UBP UMR 1095 Genetics, Diversity and Ecophysiology of Cereals, Clermont-Ferrand, France; Xiaopeng Fu from Key Laboratory of Horticultural Plant Biology, College of Horticulture & Forestry Sciences, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan, China; Shu-Hua Yang from Institute of Vegetables and Flowers, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Beijing, China; Florence Piola from Univ Lyon, Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1, CNRS, ENTPE, UMR5023 LEHNA, Villeurbanne, France; Benjamin Govetto, Yoan Labrousse & Manuel Le Bris from Aix Marseille Université, Avignon Université, CNRS, IRD, IMBE, Institut Méditerranéen de Biodiversité et d'Ecologie, Marseille, France; Céline Lopez-Roques from INRA, US 1426, GeT-PlaGe, Genotoul, Castanet-Tolosan, France; Pascal Heitzler from Institut de Biologie Moléculaire des Plantes, CNRS, UPR 2357, Strasbourg, France; Chang Liu from Center for Molecular Biology (ZMBP), University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany; and Patrick Wincker from CNRS, Université d'Evry, UMR 8030, Evry, France.
      ** Corresponding author
  • By Josh Rich —

    Supreme Court Building #1On the same day that the Supreme Court decided what the term "full costs" means under the Copyright Act,[1] it granted certiorari to consider what "all the expenses of [a district court review] proceeding" means under the Patent Act in Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc.  Specifically, according to the question presented by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve "[w]hether the phrase '[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings' in 35 U.S.C. 145 encompasses the personnel expenses the USPTO incurs when its employees, including attorneys, defend the agency in Section 145 litigation."

    Section 145 provides one of two routes for review of an adverse PTAB decision in a prosecution appeal.  In contrast to § 141, which is a direct appeal to the Federal Circuit with traditional deference to the Office's decision, § 145 permits an aggrieved applicant to present new evidence for de novo review in a District Court.  The statute provides that cost for that "[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant."  As we have reported in prior posts, the decisions in the NantKwest case bounced back and forth between finding that "expenses" includes attorney's fees and that it does not.  First, the District Court found that "expenses" did not include Patent Office attorney's fees.  On appeal, a panel of the Federal Circuit found that the term did include these expenses, over a dissent from Judge Stoll.[2]  But, sua sponte, the Federal Circuit granted review en banc[3] and reversed the panel holding with a 7-4 decision written by Judge Stoll.[4]

    In petitioning for certiorari, the USPTO argued that the en banc Federal Circuit decision was incorrectly decided; in addition, the Office raised three points as to why the Court should review specifically this decision.

    In arguing that the case below had been wrongly decided, the Office leaned heavily on two key sources: the 1836 Patent Act immediately prior to the enactment of § 145's predecessor and Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015), which involved applying an expense provision of the Lanham Act substantively identical to that of § 145.

    The 1836 Act referred to a "patent fund" used "for the payment of salaries of the officers and clerks herein provided for, and all other expenses of the Patent Office."[5]  Certain contemporaneous dictionaries (as well as current ones) also reflected that expenses can include the cost of labor.  But the Patent Office's course of conduct over the next 170 years did not reflect such an understanding of the meaning for "expenses."  The Office characterized its actions as exercising its discretion not to pursue attorney's fees — even for two years after the enactment of the AIA — but the truth is that it never asserted that it was entitled to such fees until the NantKwest case.

    The Shammas decision provided a contemporary insight into the meaning of § 145's "expenses" provision. The Lanham Act has a de novo review provision that was intentionally modeled on § 145; indeed, it originally referenced § 145's expenses provision rather than having its own.  The Fourth Circuit found that the Lanham Act provision included attorney's fees as part of the USPTO's expenses under that provision.

    In addition to these substantive arguments for review, the USPTO raised three other points as to why the Court should review this case.  First, the decision below was decided by the Federal Circuit en banc.  As a result, it would be binding on any subsequent trial court or Federal Circuit panel without further close consideration of the issue.  Thus, this case presented a unique final opportunity to consider a carefully reasoned decision on the particular point at issue.  Second, the NantKwest decision created a circuit split over two nearly identical statutory provisions in light of the Fourth Circuit's Shammas decision.  Third, the decision would have "significant practical consequences" for the USPTO in § 145 proceedings.  The greatest expense for the Office in such proceedings is often the salaries of the personnel (especially attorneys) working on the matter.  While the cost of those salaries may not be overwhelming in the face of the entire budget of the USPTO, they are significant — in this case, over $78,000 — and it would arguably be more consistent with the statutory intent to have the § 145 appellant bear them than pass them on to other patent applicants.

    NantKwest responded to the petition and argued that the case below, rather than the Shammas case, was correctly decided.[6]  The strong presumption in U.S. courts, unlike for example British courts, is that every party will bear its own attorney's fees regardless of the outcome of the case — a presumption known as the American Rule.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a statute must specifically and explicitly provide for the allowance of attorneys' fees if it is intended to deviate from the American Rule.  NantKwest argued that the Federal Circuit was correct in finding that § 145 did not reflect a specific and explicit exception to the Rule, and therefore did not intend to hold an applicant liable for the USPTO's attorneys' fees.

    NantKwest relied on a case decided between Shammas and the decision below, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).  According to NantKwest, not only did Baker Botts reflect the Supreme Court's rejection of the Shammas case's decision to ignore the American Rule in considering the Lanham Act analogue to § 145's expenses provision, it alleviated any risk of a circuit split — because Shammas was pre-Baker Botts and allegedly wrongly decided under the Supreme Court case, it should simply be ignored as having been incorrectly decided.  NantKwest also argued that cases involving statutes that allow non-prevailing parties to recover attorneys' fees start with the presumption of the American Rule and work from there; only by ignoring rather than expressly overcoming the American Rule, however, had Shammas and the panel below reached the decision that "expenses" should include attorneys' fees.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the Office's arguments sufficiently meritorious — and the case compelling enough — to decide the question.  Unfortunately, certiorari was granted too late on the Court's calendar to have the case heard this term.  Thus, we will have to wait until at least October to get an answer as to what constitutes "expenses" under § 145.

    [1] See Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., No. 17-1625, __ U.S. __ (Mar. 4, 2019).
    [2] https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/06/nantkwest-inc-v-matal-fed-cir-2017.html
    [3] https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/08/federal-circuit-orders-rehearing-en-banc-in-nantkwest-v-matal.html
    [4] https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/07/nantkwest-inc-v-iancu-fed-cir-2018-en-banc.html
    [5] See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357. §9, 5 Stat. 121 (emphasis added).
    [6] An interesting quirk in the case is that NantKwest is represented by Director Iancu's old law firm, Irell & Manella.