• By Kevin E. Noonan —

    University of California-BerkleyThe parties (University of California/Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier, Junior Party, and The Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Harvard University, Senior Party) to the newly declared interference over patents for CRISPR technology (see "CRISPR Battle Joined Again"), yesterday submitted to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board their proposed motions for the initial phase of the interference.  As is typically the case in these submissions, each party filed motions to place them in the best procedural position for the main event in the interference, a determination of who deserved priority to CRISPR, specifically embodiments of the technology for use in eukaryotic cells.

    Broad InstituteAs a reminder, an interference proceeds in two stages.  The first stage involves the parties presenting motions that can modify the count, have certain claims declared outside the scope of the count (or vice versa), seek to establish an earlier priority date, and ask for a finding that their opponents' claims are invalid under any of the provisions of the patent statute.  If these motions are not decided in a way that would disqualify one or both parties, then the interference will move to a second stage, where the Junior Party (Berkeley, unless it can establish an earlier priority filing date) will present its proofs of conception and reduction to practice and the Senior Party will be permitted to oppose.  The Senior Party is under no obligation to present proofs earlier than its earliest filing date unless the Junior Party evinces evidence of (at least) earlier conception.  In practice, the parties can both be expected to submit their priority evidence.

    Berkeley's motions reflected their position before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office during examination that they deserve priority to eukaryotic embodiments of CRISPR (despite the decisions to the contrary by the PTAB and the Federal Circuit).  Under the acronym "CVC" (for California, Vienna, and Charpentier, the three parties challenging the Broad's entitlement to eukaryotic CRISPR), Junior Party's Motion 1 is an "expedited" miscellaneous motion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(3) for benefit of an earlier non-provisional application and for the Board to redeclare the interference with CVC as the Senior party.  The basis for this motion is that the specification of the applications-in-interference have an identical specification to CVC's USSN 13/842,859, filed 3/15/2013 (pre-AIA).  CVC asks the Board to take these actions sua sponte because identical specifications are entitled to priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120.  To aid the Board, CVC provides in an Appendix a diagram showing how its applications are related:

    CVC application exhibit
    Interestingly, PTO documents show that the Examiner and interference specialists recommended giving CVC the priority benefit to the '859 application.

    CVC's Motion 2 requests benefit of priority to earlier provisional and non-provisional applications, specifically:

    [E]ach of CVC's involved applications 15/947,680; 15/981,807; 16/136,168; and 16/136,175 is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No. 14/685,504 ("the '504 application"), filed on April 13, 2015.  Each of CVC's involved applications 15/947,700; 15/947,718; 15/981,808; 15/981,809; 16/136,159; and 16/136,165 is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No. 15/138,604 ("the '604 application), filed on April 26, 2016, which in turn is a continuation of the '504 application.  The '504 application is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No. 13/842,859 ("the '859 application"), filed on March 15, 2013, which claims priority benefit to each of the following provisional applications: U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/652,086, filed on May 25, 2012 ("the '086 provisional" or "Provisional 1"); U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/716,256, filed on October 19, 2012 ("the '256 provisional" or "Provisional 2"); U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/757,640, filed January 28, 2013 ("the '640 provisional" or "Provisional 3"); and U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/765,576 ("the '576 Provisional" or "Provisional 4"), filed on February 15, 2013.

    In view of the extensive history of these filings, CVC asks the Board to increase the page limit for its brief.

    Motion 3, under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(1), asks the Board to treat the Broad's claims under the changes in the law effected by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act with regard to Section 102 and 103 of the Patent Act, and for judgment that these claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2016/0298138 to Sigma in view of extensive prior art (122 references) contained in another Appendix.  Ironically, this application is the basis for Sigma-Aldrich's "extraordinary" petition for the PTAB to redeclare the interference (see "Sigma-Aldrich Wants Its Piece of CRISPR Pie") to include this application.  The basis for Motion 3 is that the Sigma application was filed six days earlier than the earliest Broad priority application, and that due to irregularities in the Broad's filing, they cannot "swear behind" this reference.  Once again, CVC asks the Board to increase the page limits on this motion (in this case because there are 415 involved Broad claims at issue).  CVC also submits a contingent motion, Motion 4 for judgment of unpatentability if the Broad applications and patents are entitled to pre-AIA treatment, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over US 2016/0298138 to Sigma in view of extensive prior art contained in the Appendix.

    CVC's Motion 5, under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(1) asks for judgment of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) or (if post-AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) for "failure to name all inventors of the alleged invention.  [According to its proposal] CVC will demonstrate that Broad deliberately misidentified the inventors on its involved patents and applications . . . ."  Proper inventorship is important in the interference, inter alia, because the Board needs to know whose testimony can corroborate and whose needs to be corroborated under interference practice, where the uncorroborated testimony of an inventor is given no weight; see, Kolcraft Enters. v. Graco Children's Prods., Nos. 2018-1259, 2018-1260, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 19751 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2019).  The factual bases for this motion are differences between the named inventors in the patents- and applications-in-interference and the inventors named in a declaration by the Broad's patent attorney during a European opposition (EP 277146); it may be recalled that such irregularities involving a Rockefeller University inventor (Dr. Luciano Marraffini) not named in the EP application was the basis for that patent to be invalidated (see "The CRISPR Chronicles — Broad Institute Wins One and Loses One").

    CVC's most aggressive proposed motion is Motion 6 under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(1) for inequitable conduct.  According to CVC, "Broad made at least one affirmative material misstatement during prosecution of each of Broad's involved patents, applications, or parent applications to which they claim priority" — specifically, in a declaration by named inventor Zhang regarding actual reduction to practice of CRISPR-Cas9 in eukaryotic cells prior to May 2012.  CVC asserts that these statements are untruthful because the CRISPR system did not comprise tracrRNA, which is necessary for CRISPR to be functional.  CVC attempts to avoid the fate of a similar motion from the first CRISPR interference (for which the Board denied permission) on grounds that it is undisputed that tracrRNA is necessary for CRISPR function, using disclosure from U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/736,527 as well as in the Broad's involved patents and independent prior art.  CVC also asserts that Zhang's "conception" arose only after reading a Berkeley prior art disclosure.  The proposal for this motion extensively analyzes purported evidence for actual reduction to practice to show the Broad's asserted failure, alleging that the Broad "cherry-picked data" that "intentionally omitted the context that shows his claims of successful DNA cleavage to be false."  This motion applies to all the Broad's patents- and applications-in-interference because the alleged untruthful statements were submitted in all applications.

    CVC also makes similar allegations for another declaration submitted by a different inventor, which they contend evinced "a larger pattern of deception."  These allegations are supported by an e-mail from a Zhang lab member and named inventor on the Broad's provisional application (albeit in a context where there seems to exist an ax to grind against Dr. Zhang):

    The 15-page declaration of [Feng Zhang] and Le Cong's luciferase data is mis- and overstated to change the examiner's decision, which seems to be a joke. . . .

    After seeing your in virto [sic, in vitro] paper, Feng Zhang and Le Cong quickly jumped to the project without letting me know.  My lab notebooks, emails and other files like dropbox or gel pictures recorded every step of the lab's failure process.  I am willing to give more details and records if you are interested or whoever is interested to clear the truth. . . .

    We did not work it out before seeing your paper, it's really a pity.

    CVC's final Motion 7 is a miscellaneous motion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(3) to add CVC's U.S. Application Nos. 16/276,361; 16/276,365; 16/276,368; and 16/276,374 to the interference.  CVC also provides a pro forma motion for priority, to be decided during the priority phase of the interference if it is not resolved beforehand.

    The Broad's motions are predicated on their contention that this interference is "barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case" over the earlier-concluded interference (No. 106,048).  The Broad notes that the difference between the Count of the '048 interference and the Count in this interference as declared is that the prior Count did not require specific (covalent) linkage or fusion between the guide and tracr sequences, whereas that linkage was the basis for allowability of CVC's applications in this interference.  Accordingly, the Broad asks the PTAB to limit claims in interference to those having this limitation.  The Broad's Motion 1 under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(iii) and 41.208(a)(1) is for judgment based on interference estoppel, citing MPEP § 2308.03(b): "A judgment of no interference-in-fact bars any further interference between the same parties for claims to the same invention as the count of the interference."  The Broad asks that this motion be expedited.  Motion 2 under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(iii) and 41.208(a)(1) is related, for judgment based on CVC's failure to add a claim in the '048 interference reciting the linkage limitation, citing Woods v. Tsuchiya, 745 F.2d 1571, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 10 1985), and Ex parte Aoki, No. 2012-010117, 2015 WL 3827164 (P.T.A.B. June 15, 2015), for support.  The Broad further requests the Board issue a Notice to Show Cause (sub silentio apparently characterized as "Motion 3") why this interference is not precluded by judgment in the earlier '048 interference, based on the "showing" that CVC cannot antedate actual reduction to practice of applying CRISPR to eukaryotic cells in view of evidence of record in the '048 interference (CVC "cannot win on the merits" according to this portion of the Broad's argument).

    As a hedge against failing to prevail on these motions, Motion 4 (contingent) under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(i) and 41.208(a)(2) asks the Board to substitute the count with an alternative count that would be "broad enough to cover Broad's best proofs," specifically:

    Proposed Count 2

    A method comprising:
    introducing into, or expressing in, a eukaryotic cell having a DNA molecule,
    (I) a Cas9 protein or a nucleotide sequence encoding the Cas9 protein, and 
    (II) RNA or a nucleotide sequence encoding the RNA, the RNA comprising:
        (a) a targeter-RNA or a first RNA, the first RNA comprising a first ribonucleotide sequence and a second ribonucleotide sequence, and
        (b) an activator-RNA or a second RNA,
    wherein (II) (a) and (II) (b) are fused to one another or are covalently linked to one another with intervening nucleotides; and
    wherein, in the eukaryotic cell, the activator-RNA or the second RNA form an RNA duplex with the targeter-RNA or the second ribonucleotide sequence, and the targeter-RNA or the first ribonucleotide sequence directs the Cas9 protein to a target sequence of the DNA molecule, and the DNA molecule is cleaved or edited or at least one product of 20 the DNA molecule is altered.

    Should the Board substitute the present Count for this one, the Broad argues that only "claims 4, 11, and 18 of U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359; claim 5 of U.S. Patent No. 8,771,945; claim 5 of U.S. Patent No. 8,906,616; and claim 8 of U.S. Patent No. 8 9,840,713" should remain in the interference. Similar Motion 5 (contingent) under 37 C.F.R. 1 §§ 41.121(a)(1)(i) and 41.208(a)(2) asks the Board to substitute or add Count 3 to the interference:

    Proposed Count 3

    A method, in a eukaryotic cell, of cleaving or editing a target DNA molecule, or altering expression of at least one product encoded by the target DNA molecule, the method comprising:
        contacting, in a eukaryotic cell, a target DNA molecule having a target sequence with an engineered and/or non-naturally-occurring Type II Clustered 8 Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR)-CRISPR associated 9 (Cas) (CRISPR-Cas) system comprising:
    a) a Cas9 protein,
    and
    b) RNA comprising
        i) a targeter-RNA that is capable of hybridizing with the target sequence of the DNA molecule or a first RNA comprising (A) a first sequence capable of hybridizing with the target sequence of the DNA molecule and (B) a second sequence; and
        ii) an activator-RNA that is capable of hybridizing to the targeter-RNA to form an RNA duplex in the eukaryotic cell or a second RNA comprising a tracr sequence that is capable of hybridizing to the second sequence to form an RNA duplex in the eukaryotic cell,
    wherein, in the eukaryotic cell, the targeter-RNA or the first sequence directs the Cas9 protein to the target sequence and the DNA molecule is cleaved or edited or at least one product of the DNA molecule is altered.

    This claim is ("essentially") identical to the Count of the '048 interference for which the Broad asserts another "best proofs" justification.  The Broad takes the position that CVC would be estopped from showing priority to claims corresponding to this count based on the outcome of the '048 interference.

    Motion 6 through Motion 9, all under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(iii) and 41.208(a)(2) ask the Board to designate most of the Broad's claims as not corresponding to any or various permutations of the counts, in an effort to limit the Broad's exposure to losing their claims.  Motion 10 under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(ii) and 41.208(a)(3) requests priority benefit of the Broad's prior applications, having an earliest priority date of December 12, 2012; in view of the extensiveness of the list the Broad requests "at least" 35 pages for its motion and brief.  Motion 11 under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(iii) and 41.208(a)(1) seeks judgment against Berkeley on the grounds that the CVC claims are unpatentable for failure to satisfy the written description and/or enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and/or 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) and 35 U.S.C. § 103, based on "the PTAB's binding finding that a POSA in 2012 would require the results of successful eukaryotic experiments to have a reasonable expectation of success that CRISPR-Cas9 could be made to work in eukaryotic cells, and given that D1 and D2 indisputably fail to disclose any eukaryotic experiments," and citing numerous scientific references (including Broad references).  And Motion 12 under 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(3) asks the Board to require CVC to keep the Broad and the Board apprised of any notice of allowance in any pending, related applications.  Finally, the Broad also submits a pro forma motion for priority.

    The Board has set August 5th as the date for a teleconference with the parties jointly; shortly thereafter (typically less than a week) the Board will issue an Order notifying the parties as to which motions they are authorized to file and which have been deferred or denied.  During the call the parties are able to inform the Board more specifically of the bases for their motions, provide a proffer if the Board needs additional evidence or information, and provides opposing parties the opportunity to give the Board their views.  With the Order on which motions are permitted the Board will also set a briefing schedule; a sample schedule is as follows:

    TIME PERIOD 1

    File motions
    File (but serve one business day later) priority statements

    TIME PERIOD 2

    File responsive motions to motions filed in TIME PERIOD 1

    TIME PERIOD 3

    File oppositions to all motions

    TIME PERIOD 4

    File all replies

    TIME PERIOD 5

    File request for oral argument
    File motions to exclude evidence
    File observations

    TIME PERIOD 6

    File oppositions to motions to exclude
    File response to observations

    TIME PERIOD 7

    File replies to oppositions to motions to exclude

    DEFAULT ORAL ARGUMENT DATE

    The Board permits the parties to stipulate to extensions and revisions to the schedule except for the last three dates; the oral argument date is (relatively) inviolate (unless the Board needs to reschedule) and occurs about seven months after the end of Time Period 1.

    Patent Docs will provide the details of the Board's decisions on which motions it will permit the parties to file when they become available.

  • By Tim Fitzgerald* and Michael Finney** —

    Australia Coat of Arms'Swiss format' or 'Swiss-type' patent claims have a general structure similar to the following:

    Use of compound X in the manufacture of a formulation for the treatment of medical condition Y.

    Swiss-type claims were originally approved by the Swiss Patent Office as a mechanism to allow for protection of a new therapeutic use of a known compound (i.e., second or further medical use), given prohibition of claims to methods of medical treatment.[1] The claim format was subsequently accepted at the European Patent Office (EPO) and affirmed in the Enlarged Board of Appeal decision G05/83.  In particular, the Enlarged Board held that it was "legitimate in principle" to allow Swiss-type claims where the formulation was for a specified new and inventive therapeutic application, even where the process of manufacture did not differ from known processes using the same active ingredient.

    Under the provisions of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents 2000 (EPC 2000), claims in the format "Compound X for use in treating condition Y" ('European use format') are construed as use-limited for novelty purposes, and Swiss-type claims are no longer allowable in Europe.[2] Nevertheless, previously issued European patents containing Swiss-type claims have the potential to remain in force until at least 2031.[3] In recent years, there has been substantial judicial assessment of infringement requirements for Swiss-type claims of existing European patents, including in the UK.[4]

    In Australia, claims to methods of medical treatment are permissible[5] and, accordingly, Swiss-type claims are not necessary to achieve protection for new uses of a known therapeutic.  Nevertheless, Swiss-type claims have long been considered acceptable under Australian patent office practice.  Notwithstanding this, for many years Swiss-type claims went largely without judicial consideration in Australia.  Since 2015, however, several Australian decisions have issued which provide clarification of the role of Swiss-type claims in Australia.  Here we provide a high-level overview of applicable findings within these decisions, and conclude with a summary of current Australian law regarding Swiss-type claiming.

    Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634 ('Otsuka')

    In Otsuka, a decision of the Federal Court of Australia, a single judge (Justice Yates) provided the first detailed judicial consideration of Swiss-type claims in Australia.  As a key element of the decision, His Honour considered whether Swiss-type claims should be construed as method claims or product claims, and concluded that the subject matter of a Swiss-type claim is "appropriately characterised as method or process".[6] His Honour also prima facie accepted, although did not actively decide upon, established Australian patent office practice that novelty can be conferred for Swiss-type claims by the therapeutic use recited in the claim.

    Justice Yates' also expressed an obiter opinion in Otsuka in relation to infringement of Swiss-type claims.  His Honour's stated position was that the manufacturer of the composition would be the direct infringer of a Swiss-type claim, which again accorded with prior assumptions under Australian practice.  However, his Honour went on to comment that, in determining infringement of Swiss-type claims, "[t]he question is whether, objectively ascertained, the medicament that results from the claimed method or process is one that has the therapeutic use defined in the claim".[7] His Honour further noted that "[t]he question is not really about how the alleged infringer markets its product, although, plainly, its conduct in that regard may well assist in determining, objectively, whether the accused product has the claimed therapeutic use".[8]

    His Honour's obiter comments on infringement requirements were interpreted by some commentators as suggesting that a product will infringe a Swiss-type claim so long as it has therapeutic use that falls within the scope of the claims, regardless of the intended use of the product.  In conjunction with His Honour's acceptance of the proposition that Swiss-type claims can achieve novelty based on the recited therapeutic use, this could be seen to lead to a confounding result.  Specifically, under these circumstances, a Swiss-type claim reciting a new use could be granted for a previously known composition, with the known composition then infringing the claim by virtue of it being effective for the new use.  It appeared unlikely that His Honour had intended for such a result.  Accordingly, after Otsuka, some commentators (including the writers) called for clarification of the role of intended use of the manufactured product for the infringement of Swiss-type claims, noting that similar issues had (at that time) recently been judicially addressed in the UK.[9]

    Apotex Pty Ltd v Warner-Lambert Company LLC (No 3) [2017] FCA 94 ('Apotex')

    As for Otsuka, Apotex was an Australian Federal Court decision issued by a single judge (Justice Nicholas).  In Apotex, Justice Nicholas was asked to consider whether an offer made, during the term of a patent, to supply infringing products after patent expiry, would itself constitute infringement of the patent.  Relevantly, the patent in question (AU 714980) contained both an independent method of medical treatment claim and a corresponding independent Swiss-type claim.  Accordingly, His Honour assessed the question for each of these respective claim types.

    Justice Nicholas noted that, under Australian law, it is an infringement of a patent claim to "exploit" the claimed invention within Australia during the term of the patent, and that Schedule 1 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (henceforth, 'the Patents Act') defines "exploit" to include:

    (a) where the invention is a product – make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or

    (b) where the invention is a method or process – use the method or process or do any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use.

    In relation to the method of medical treatment claims, His Honour concluded that the method did not result in the making of any product, and therefore the reference in paragraph (b) to "any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use" meant that the paragraph (b) provisions could not apply to this method of treatment claim.  However, in relation to the Swiss-type claims, His Honour identified that the method results in the production of a product (a manufactured medicament), and that part (b) of the definition of "exploit" is applicable.  With this in mind, His Honour concluded that the definition of "exploit" under the Patents Act encompasses an offer made, during the term of the patent, to supply a product manufactured according to a Swiss-type claim after patent expiry, and that the Swiss-type claim had therefore been infringed.

    The decision in Apotex has confirmed that there can be clear benefits of including Swiss-type claims in Australian patents.  Importantly, this decision establishes that Swiss-type claims can offer a broader scope of protection than corresponding method of medical treatment claims, at least in relation to commercial offers by third parties.

    Commissioner of Patents v AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd [2017] FCAFC 129 ('AbbVie')

    In AbbVie, three judges of the Australian Federal Court heard an appeal from a decision of the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AATA).[10] AbbVie dealt with a highly specific aspect of Australian law, relating to the possibility of relying on Swiss-type claims to obtain an extension of term for pharmaceutical patents.

    Relevantly, Subsection 70(2) of the Patents Act deals with pharmaceutical patent extensions, and defines that a patent relating to a pharmaceutical substance may have its term extended by up to five years, where one or both of the following apply:

    (a)  one or more pharmaceutical substances per se must in substance be disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification;

    (b)  one or more pharmaceutical substances when produced by a process that involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, must in substance be disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification.

    In this case, AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd had applied for extensions of term for three Australian patents (AU 2012261708; AU 2013203420; AU 2013257402) on the basis of the inclusion of Swiss-type claims reciting a pharmaceutically active substance which is routinely produced by a recombinant DNA process (although this was not stated in the claim), attempting to rely on (b), above.  The Australian Commissioner of Patents had originally found that the Swiss-type claims were not valid basis for the requested extensions, however this decision had been overturned by the AATA.

    The Full Court overturned the findings of the AATA, and reverted to the original position of the Commissioner of Patents.  In doing so, the Full Court approved the determination in Otsuka, supra, that Swiss-type claims are method or process claims, not product claims.  The Full Court elaborated that such claims are directed to methods of manufacturing a formulation or medicament using an active substance, not to the formulation or the active substance itself.  On this basis, the Full Court decided that the active pharmaceutical substance recited in the Swiss-type claims, while produced by recombinant DNA technology, did not "fall within the scope" of these claims, and that the circumstances as per subsection 70(2)(b) of the Patents Act were therefore not met.

    AbbVie appears to clearly establish that Swiss-type claims cannot be relied upon for term extension of pharmaceutical patents in Australia.  More broadly, the Full Court's decision appears to clarify that, even in the case of subsection 70(2)(b) of the Patents Act, a pharmaceutical substance itself (as compared to a method involving the substance) must be claimed in order for an extension to be obtained.

    Apotex v ICOS Corporation (No 3) [2018] FCA 1204 ('ICOS')

    Among a number of other considerations in ICOS, a single Federal Court judge (Justice Besanko) was asked to assess whether importation into Australia of an infringing product, wherein the product was manufactured outside of Australia, could result in infringement of a Swiss-type claim directed to manufacture of the product.  With reference to the definition of "exploit" as per Schedule 1 of the Patents Act (set out above), Justice Besanko concluded that such circumstances would represent importation of a product produced according to a claimed method as per part (b) of the definition, and could indeed constitute infringement.

    Given that pharmaceuticals sold in Australia are frequently manufactured overseas prior to importation, Justice Besanko's ruling would appear to be of substantial practical relevance.  That is, if the scope of Swiss-type claims had been found to exclude use of products that have been imported into Australia after being manufactured elsewhere, a large proportion of Australian pharmaceuticals would escape infringement of these claims on that basis alone.

    Mylan Health (formerly BGP) v Sun Pharma (formerly Ranbaxy) [2019] FCA 28 ('Mylan')

    Nearly four years after Justice Yates' obiter comments in Otsuka, discussed above, Justice Nicholas provided the first formal consideration of the requirements for Swiss-type claim infringement in Australia, in the Federal Court decision of Mylan.  His Honour was required to determine whether sale in Australia of a pharmaceutical composition with suitable properties for use as recited in a Swiss-type claim would infringe the Swiss-type claim.

    In arriving at his decision, Justice Nicholas was guided by their Lordships' observations in the UK Supreme Court decision Warner Lambert Company LLC v Generics (UK) Ltd [2018] UKSC 56 ('Warner Lambert') which had issued the previous year.  In particular, His Honour accepted that Swiss-style claims should be construed as use-limited both for novelty and infringement purposes, where the scope of such claims relates to the therapeutic use to which the formulation is applied.  That is, the monopoly claimed was considered to relate to manufacture of a pharmaceutical composition for treatment of a particular medical condition.  His Honour further accepted that, in determining infringement of a Swiss-type claim, the intent of the manufacturer is relevant.  That is, for a Swiss-type claim to be infringed, it must be established that a manufacturer intended for the composition to be used for the recited condition.

    Justice Nicholas elaborated on the concept of intent, drawing further from Warner Lambert in discussing concepts of "objective intent" and "subjective intent" of a manufacturer.  His Honour explained that assessing subjective intent would require establishing the state of mind of the manufacturer and whether, in fact, the manufacturer had produced the product for the purpose recited in a Swiss-type claim.  His Honour explained that, in contrast, assessment of objective intent would be performed using a legal framework to decide, under all of the circumstances, if it should be considered that the product had been produced for the recited purpose, whether or not this was consistent with the manufacturer's actual state of mind.

    In Mylan, whether an objective or subjective approach was adopted, Justice Nicholas concluded that the evidence presented would be insufficient to support a finding of intent for infringement purposes.  Accordingly, His Honour did not believe it was necessary to determine which approach to establishing intent was correct, although His Honour appeared to favour an objective approach.[11] It is further relevant to note that, in regard to establishing objective intent, His Honour stated, obiter, that relevant considerations could include "approved product information ("PI") for the product, any product labelling, and the nature, size and other pertinent characteristics of the market into which the product is to be sold"[12] and that "[t]he fact that it may be reasonably foreseeable or even likely that a substantial portion of the product manufactured will be used to treat that condition is certainly not determinative at least not where the product is also used extensively in the treatment of other non-designated conditions."[13] These comments indicate that His Honour's characterisation of objective intent differs from that discussed in Warner Lambert.  Indeed, Justice Nicholas' concept of objective intent appears to incorporate elements of the "outward presentation test" propounded by Lord Sumption in Warner Lambert,[14] which was considered a separate test in that decision.

    At the time of writing, Mylan has been appealed to the Full Federal Court, including in relation to infringement of the Swiss-type claims.  Furthermore, while awaiting the outcome of this appeal, interim injunctive relief was applied for.[15] Interestingly, the application for injunctive relief was heard by Justice Yates, responsible for the decision in Otsuka, which provided an opportunity for His Honour to elaborate on his obiter comments on infringement of Swiss-type claims in that case.

    Essentially, Justice Yates noted that, in Mylan, Justice Nicholas had addressed the issue of intent with the benefit of the UK Supreme Court decision in Warner Lambert, and did not actively push back against Justice Nicholas' finding that a manufacture's intention in relation to therapeutic use of a product was relevant to infringement of Swiss-type claims.[16] Accordingly, Mylan appears to establish that intent is indeed relevant to infringement of Swiss-type claims.  However, the question of how to determine intent, in particular whether an objective or subjective approach should be used,[17] remains open.  The outcome of the Full Federal Court appeal is expected to provide further guidance in this respect.

    Summary

    As at writing, precedent is available in Australia for several significant issues relating to Swiss-type claims.  Critically, there appears to be agreement among all decisions issued that Swiss-type claims can be validly included within Australian patents; that these claims should be construed as method or process claims; and that the therapeutic use recited in a Swiss-type claim can confer novelty.

    It has also been confirmed, in Apotex Pty Ltd v Warner-Lambert Company LLC (No 3) [2017] FCA 94, that the scope of a Swiss-type claim will differ from that of a corresponding method of medical treatment claim.  Relevantly, at least in respect of third party offers to supply products after the expiry date of a patent, Swiss-type claims can offer broader protection than method of medical treatment claims.

    The potential for Swiss-type claims to be relied upon for pharmaceutical patent extension has also been judicially assessed, in Commissioner of Patents v AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd [2017] FCAFC 129.  It has been clearly established that such extensions cannot be obtained on the basis of Swiss-type claims, regardless of whether an active agent used in manufacture of the therapeutic composition is produced using recombinant DNA technology.

    Furthermore, Apotex v ICOS Corporation (No 3) [2018] FCA 1204 has provided clarification that infringement of Swiss-type claims of an Australian patent does not necessarily require manufacture in Australia.  This is of substantial practical consequence given that pharmaceutical products are commonly imported into Australia after manufacture overseas.

    Finally, Mylan Health (formerly BGP) v Sun Pharma (formerly Ranbaxy) [2019] FCA 28 provides initial precedent establishing that infringement of Swiss-type claims requires relevant intent on behalf of a manufacturer in relation to therapeutic use of a manufactured product.  The outcome of an appeal from this decision is expected to further clarify how intent is to be established, i.e., using subjective and/or objective approaches.

    Of course, there will remain some uncertainty regarding the proper judicial approach to Swiss-type claims in Australia absent determinations by the High Court.  Nevertheless, decisions issued over the last five years have vastly increased the available judicial precedent in this area of patent law.

    [1] Official Journal of the European Patent Office (1984) 11: 581-584.
    [2] See, EPO Guidelines for Examination G-VI, 7.1.
    [3] Or 2036 under Supplementary Protection Certificate provisions.
    [4] Including the UK Supreme Court decision in Warner Lambert Company LLC v Generics (UK) Ltd t/a Mylan and another [2018] UKSC 56.
    [5] Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 50. As are claims to therapeutics in ‘when used’ format, which have essentially the same scope as method claims, see Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (1980) 145 CLR 520.
    [6] With no useful distinction existing between the descriptors “method” and “process”, in the context of patent claiming. Otsuka at [120].
    [7] Ibid at [172].
    [8] Ibid.
    [9] Warner-Lambert Company, LLC v Actavis Group Ptc EHF & Others [2015] EWHC 72.
    [10] Re AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [2016] AATA 682.
    [11] Mylan at [102].
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Ibid at [103].
    [14] Warner Lambert at [84].
    [15] Mylan Health Pty Ltd v Sun Pharma ANZ Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 505.
    [16] Ibid at [86].
    [17] And any relevance of “outward presentation” as per 14, above, in this context.

    * Dr. Fitzgerald is a Senior Registered Patent & Trade Marks Attorney with IP Gateway Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys.

    ** Mr. Finney is a Senior Associate of Bennett & Philp Lawyers.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealThe interplay (or perhaps utilization) of inter partes review (IPR) in ANDA litigation was illustrated by the Federal Circuit in last month's Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Generico, LLC nonprecedential decision.

    The case arose over U.S. Patent No. 8,865,688 owned by Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH and exclusively licensed to Salix.  The claimed invention relates to a method for treating ulcerative colitis using extended-release, granulated mesalamine formulations, sold by Salix as 375 mg capsules under the brand name Apriso®.  The claimed method addressed known deficiencies in the art, particularly premature release of mesalamine, which prevented the drug from reaching the colon where it must act.

    Claim 1 of the '688 patent is representative:

    1.  A method of maintaining the remission of ulcerative colitis in a subject comprising
        administering to the subject a granulated mesalamine formulation comprising four capsules each comprising 0.375 g of granulated mesalamine once per day in the morning, without food, wherein:
        said method maintains remission of ulcerative colitis in a subject for a period of at least 6 months of treatment;
        remission is defined as a DAI score of 0 or 1;
        the granulated mesalamine formulation is not administered with antacids; and
        wherein 85% to 90% of the mesalamine reaches the terminal ileum and colon.

    Generico, LLC; Flat Line Capital LLC; and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. each successfully petitioned for inter partes review of the '688 patent.  Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), Mylan, Generico, and Flat Line Capital LLC argued that the claims of the '688 patent were obvious over two separate press releases by Salix and a scientific journal reference, in view of either of two other scientific journal references.

    In parallel litigation, Mylan filed its ANDA having a Paragraph IV certification and Salix filed suit; the District Court dismissed without prejudice Defendants' affirmative defenses and counterclaims in favor of the outcome of the IPR before the PTAB.

    In the IPR, the PTAB in a Final Written Decision determined that claims 1 and 16 were invalid for obviousness.  The PTAB construed the claim language, wherein the first ("administering to the subject a granulated mesalamine formulation comprising four capsules each comprising 0.375 g of granulated mesalamine once per day in the morning, without food") and fourth ("the granulated mesalamine formulation is not administered with antacids") limitations recited steps in the method while the other limitations ("said method maintains remission of ulcerative colitis in a subject for a period of at least 6 months of treatment"; "remission is defined as a DAI score of 0 or 1"; and "wherein 85% to 90% of the mesalamine reaches the terminal ileum and colon") recited the results of the practice of the method.

    Important to the PTAB's decision, the specification expressly defined "the DAI score":

    Ulcerative colitis disease activity was assessed using a modified Sutherland Disease Activity Index1 (DAI), which is a sum of four subscores based on stool frequency, rectal bleeding, mucosal appearance on endoscopy, and physician's rating of disease activity.  Each subscore can range from 0 to 3, for a total possible DAI score of 12.

    The asserted prior art taught the following:

    • Press release: Salix's own announcement regarding successful Phase III results with their mesalamine formulations

    • "Endonurse": another Salix press release regarding successful Phase III trial results

    • Davis: an academic paper showing that the presence of food in the stomach can increase acid and retard release from stomach, compromising mesalamine delivery to colon

    • Marakhouski: another academic paper comparing pellets vs tablet administration of 5-acetylsalacylic acid, and that pellets are more advantageous

    • Brunner: similar disclosure showing pellets advantageous over tablets

    The PTAB found the claims obvious in view of this prior art, considering Marakhouski as the primary reference, based on construction of the term "DAI score" to mean "remission is defined as a DAI score of 0 or 1, where the DAI score is a sum of four subscores."  As explained by the Federal Circuit:

    Specifically, the Board found that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the method of the September 2007 Press Release and Endonurse with the teachings of either Marakhouski or Brunner that the granulated mesalamine formulation could be administered without food.  The Board cited as its rationale the fact that all four prior art references pertain to the same or similar granulated mesalamine formulation for treatment of the same disease and because Marakhouski and Brunner teach that an advantage of a granulated mesalamine formulation is the ability to administer the drug independent of food.

    The PTAB also found the required reasonable expectation of success from Salix's press releases, wherein the absence of teaching that the drug must be administered with food was interpreted to support the claim term affirmative requiring that the drug not be administered with food; this conclusion was also supported by other asserted art (Davis) and expert testimony.  The Board also rejected Dr. Falk's contention that the art was deficient for not teaching a comparative food study, i.e, comparing the results of administration of mesalamine with and without food.  Finally, the Board rejected Dr. Falk's assertion of objective indicia of non-obviousness, characterizing this evidence as Salix's own failures which did not satisfy the "failure of others" secondary consideration.

    In the parallel litigation, the District Court construed the term "wherein 85% to 90% of the mesalamine formulation reaches the terminal ileum and colon" to provide both lower and upper limits on delivery percentages and found noninfringement based on the delivery performance of Mylan's generic drug and whether its formulation was a granulated mesalamine formulation.

    The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB's obviousness determination in the IPR and vacated as moot the District Court decision (and thus did not reach the correctness of the District Court's noninfringement determination), in an opinion by Judge O'Malley, joined by Judges Lourie and Reyna.

    Regarding the PTAB, the Court held that the Board correctly construed the DAI score limitation based on the express definition in the specification, using either the broadest reasonable interpretation test or the Phillips v. AWH test.  This conclusion was also supported by the patentee conceding that the DAI score was "ordinarily understood" to be the sum of four subscores.  In addition, the opinion notes that in patentee's specification, "when the DAI score was identified as being the sum of only two subscores [in the '688 specification] it was called a 'revised Sutherland Disease Activity Index' which is not a term used in the claims."  (This raises the possibility that Dr. Falk could file a narrowing reissue to amend the claims for validity, but the PTO might correctly determine that such an amendment would be broadening rather than narrowing.)

    Turning to the "without food" limitation, the Federal Circuit disagreed with Dr. Falk's contention that in this case the PTAB had changed the basis for its obviousness determination from institution to final written decision, contrary to SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  Here, the Court explained that what was prohibited was failing to give a patentee the opportunity to address the "new" grounds for the Board's decision.  This was not the case here, in the Federal Circuit's opinion, because Dr. Falk (in the Court's view) had sufficient notice and opportunity and did in fact address the question of whether drug administration without a "food effect" was recognized in the prior art (where the food effect is "that taking the formulation without food is preferable to taking it with food").  The panel also held that the skilled worker had a reasonable expectation of success of achieving the invention set forth in the claims (requiring that the patient not take food) even without the art teaching this feature (typically by containing a "food effect" study), based on "other rationales" for avoiding food, not specified in the opinion.

    Finally, the Court also affirmed the PTAB conclusion that, despite there being an affirmative limitation that administration occur "without food" the art did not need a food study to establish this effect because the specification taught that the formulation could be administered with or without food, and that the Board correctly did not find its obviousness conclusion contradicted by the asserted secondary considerations.

    This outcome shows that even under circumstances where the district court conducts a trial on infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), an ANDA defendant can benefit by moving its invalidity case to the PTAB and avoid the cost of putting on affirmative defenses and counterclaims before a lay judge not having the PTAB's purported expertise (or apparent anti-patent bias).

    Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Generico, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Nonprecedential disposition
    Panel: Circuit Judges Lourie, O'Malley, and Reyna
    Opinion by Circuit Judge O'Malley

  • By Michael Borella —

    USPTO SealOn July 1, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) designated four of its recent 35 U.S.C. § 101 decisions as informative.  Each of these decisions came down after and applied the USPTO's 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance.  Two resulted in claims being found eligible, and two had the opposite outcome.  While not binding on other PTAB panels or examiners, these cases are helpful in understanding how the PTAB is applying the Guidance.  In particular, the PTAB appears to be utilizing the Guidance in a fashion that is similar to how the subject matter eligibility inquiry is employed in the European Patent Office and certain other jurisdictions — as consideration of whether the claimed invention is a technical solution to a technical problem.

    The background of these decisions — not to mention the Guidance itself — is 2014's Alice Corp. vs. CLS Bank Int'l Supreme Court holding.  Therein, the Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand involves a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But elements or combinations of elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional will not lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.  While this inquiry is generally carried out as a matter of law, factual issues can come into play when determining whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional.

    Notably, the Guidance breaks the first part of the Alice test into two sub-steps.  In the former, one determines whether the claim recites a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea.  In the latter, one determines further "whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception."  To focus the analysis, the Guidance indicates that all abstract ideas should fall into one of three categories:  mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes.  Think of these as the "Three M's" – math, money, and mental steps.

    And now, on to the cases.

    Ex Parte Fautz (U.S. Patent App. No. 14/326,661)

    The claimed invention "generally relates to magnetic resonance (MR) tomography."  An MR device "use[s] reception coils to receive signals generated while scanning a subject," and the "invention optimizes the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) from the reception coils."  The PTAB focused its review on representative claim 8:

    Claim 8
    The Examiner rejected the claim under § 101, finding it "similar to abstract ideas relating to mathematical formulas and collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis."  The Examiner further found that "the MR tomography apparatus is an additional element that is well-understood, routine, and conventional in the art," while the "data collection and display are insignificant extra-solution activity."

    The PTAB disagreed.  Applying the Guidance, the PTAB quickly concluded that under the first part of Alice, the claim recites an abstract idea — notably three distinct mathematical formulas.  Continuing the inquiry, the PTAB then determined that the claim nonetheless integrates this abstract idea into a practical application thereof. 

    The PTAB found the claim to be similar in nature to that of Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, where mathematical concepts were used to solve a technical problem and that the recited device "is neither a token addition nor an abstract concept."  To come to this conclusion, the PTAB looked to the application's specification which pointed out drawbacks to existing surface coils in MR systems — these coils can result in poor image quality.  But, as described in the specification, the claimed invention improves the sensitivity of the coils, and thereby also improves image quality.

    Accordingly, the PTAB concluded that the claim is not directed to an abstract idea, is eligible, and that the second part of the Alice test need not be considered.

    Ex Parte Olson (U.S. Patent App. No. 11/715,923)

    This second case involves a "locally deformable registration of a catheter navigation system to an external model or external image data such that the invention operates to transform the coordinate system of a catheter navigation system to the coordinate system of an external model or external image data."  Representative claim 7 recites:

    Claim 7
    The Examiner found the claim abstract because it "relies upon collecting and comparing known information, comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options, organizing information through mathematical correlations, which are considered an abstract idea."  The Examiner further found that the claimed algorithm, the computer on which it runs, and the catheter navigation system, to all be generic.  The Examiner also stated that "Appellants do not claim any new and novel structures for the catheter and catheter navigation system."  Turning to part two of the Alice test, the Examiner found all of the additional elements to be well-known and conventional.

    On appeal, the PTAB quickly determined that, through its explicit use of equations, the claim recites an abstract idea — particularly, a mathematical concept.  But like Ex Parte Fautz, this abstract idea is integrated into a practical application.

    To that point, the PTAB observed that the claim focuses on "addressing problems arising in the context of registering a catheter navigation system to a three-dimensional image in connection with cardiac procedures."  Further, the limitations therein "apply the recited mathematical calculations to improve registration of a catheter navigation system to a three-dimensional image of a heart by accounting for non-linearities and inhomogeneities in the catheter navigation system and reduce errors in the localization field."  Looking again to the specification, the PTAB noted that the invention provides a technical improvement of "avoid[ing] errors introduced in the prior art, such as those introduced when an affine transformation is used."  The PTAB also found the claims to be analogous to those of Thales and Diamond v. Diehr, and that the mathematical concepts were applied to a particular machine — the catheter navigation system.

    Thus, the PTAB concluded that the claim is not directed to an abstract idea, is eligible, and again declined to apply the second part of the Alice test.

    Ex Parte Kimizuka (U.S. Patent App. No. 13/871,055)

    The claimed invention involves software for selecting a golf club with a suitable lift angle for a player based on data from hit balls.  According to this application's specification, "[a] club's loft angle relates to the orientation of its face and influences a hit ball's flight distance."  Claim 7, which was deemed representative, recites:

    A fitting method of a golf club, comprising the following steps of:
        creating a hit ball result database based on ball initial velocity prediction data, launch angle prediction data, and back spin prediction data, the ball initial velocity prediction data being data capable of predicting a ball initial velocity based on the dynamic loft and the blow angle, the launch angle prediction data being data capable of predicting a launch angle based on the dynamic loft and the blow angle, and the backspin prediction data being data capable of predicting a backspin based on the dynamic loft and the blow angle, wherein the hit ball result database is obtained by actual measurement and/or a simulation;
        measuring a subject's head speed, dynamic loft, and blow angle using a reference club;
        determining, by a processor, a suitable dynamic loft based on only the measured head speed, the measured dynamic loft, and the measured blow angle, the suitable dynamic loft being defined as a dynamic loft achieving a predetermined hit ball result, wherein the hit ball result database is used for determining the suitable dynamic loft, the hit ball result database includes correlation data between the dynamic loft and the blow angle which are created for each head speed, and the hit ball results in the dynamic lofts in the measured blow angle are compared using the hit ball result database;
        determining a dynamic loft difference from the suitable dynamic loft and the measured dynamic loft; and
        determining a recommended loft angle based on a loft angle of the reference club and the dynamic loft difference, wherein the hit ball result includes a flight distance.

    The Examiner rapidly disposed of this claim, finding it directed to an abstract mental process, with all additional elements being well-understood, routine, and conventional.  The PTAB generally agreed.

    The PTAB began by stating that, under broadest reasonable interpretation, the claimed steps could be performed in the mind (the Guidance allows one to ignore general hardware — such as the claimed processor — when making this determination).  Thus, the PTAB concluded that the claim recites an abstract idea.

    Turning to the next step in the Alice part one inquiry, the PTAB considered whether the claim involves an improvement to a technology or technical field.  The PTAB found that the golf club selection was a non-technical problem.  Notably, the claim did not "improve how the measurements are taken or improve how the golf club is manufactured."  The PTAB then reviewed the additional elements individually, finding that each is either a token element, is used for its intended purpose (and therefore is not improved), or embodies insignificant data collection.  Therefore, the claim was found to be directed to an abstract idea under part one of the Alice test.

    Applying part two (which is effectively quite similar to the second half of part one), the PTAB sought to determine whether the additional elements were just well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field.  Indeed, the processor, database, and measurements (alone and in combination) were considered to fit this bill based on reasoning similar to why they failed to integrate the claimed abstract idea into a practical implementation.

    Consequently the claim was deemed ineligible and the Examiner was affirmed.

    Ex Parte Savescu (U.S. Patent App. No. 12/468,616)

    Here, the claimed invention relates to software for creating "a life-cycle workflow for a project."  Representative claim 1 recites:

    A method for creating a life cycle workflow for a project comprising:
        creating one or more identifiable workflow stages for the project on a server computer, each of the one or more workflow stages corresponding to a specific sequence of workflow activities, wherein the creating further comprises using a workflow stage identifier as a property of the specific sequence of workflow activities for each of the one or more workflow stages;
        creating one or more identifiable workflow phases for the project on the server computer, each workflow phase includes one or more corresponding workflow stages;
        creating one or more project detail pages on the server computer, each project detail page being a web page that is made visible during a corresponding workflow stage;
        when a workflow stage is created, associating a workflow phase with the workflow stage, the workflow phase being selected from the one or more workflow phases on the server computer; and
        when the workflow stage is created, associating one or more project detail pages for the workflow stage.

    The Examiner rejected the claim as being directed to an abstract idea without any additional elements that amount to significantly more than that idea.  The PTAB affirmed the Examiner's rejections.

    Applying the Guidance, the PTAB pointed to the business nature of the claim ("determining a project name, describing the project's purpose, defining a project's scope, among other things") as indicative of "a concept related to managing relationships or transactions between people."  As such, the PTAB concluded that the claim recited certain methods of organizing human activity, one of the three categories of abstract ideas set forth in the Guidance.

    Moving on the next phase of the first part of the Alice test, the PTAB identified the claimed server and the step of "creating one or more project detail pages on the server computer, each project detail page being a web page that is made visible during a corresponding workflow stage" as the additional elements.  The PTAB found that the server was a generic computer, while the creation of project detail pages did not involve a technical improvement to how those pages were created.  The PTAB also found that, at best, the claim automated a process that could have been carried out manually.  All of this added up to a failure of the claim to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.

    Turning to part two of the Alice test, the PTAB looked to the additional elements again and found them to be well-understood, routine, and conventional features.  Therefore, the claim did not provide an inventive concept, and was determined to be ineligible.

    Analysis

    There are a few lines of reasoning running through these four cases that are worth pointing out.  For the two that were found meet the requirements of § 101, the claims therein are narrowly focused and provide a technical solution to a technical problem.  For each, the technical problem and technical solution were described in the specification, and explicitly reflected in the claim language.  On the other hand, for the two cases that failed the Alice test, the PTAB specifically stated that the claims were not addressing technical problems, and were broadly drafted.

    This suggests that the PTAB may be following a variant of the European view that eligible subject matter must be directed to a technical solution to a technical problem.  If so, that is problematic because there is no requirement in U.S. patent law that § 101 be applied so rigidly.  In fact, the Federal Circuit found the claims in DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com to be eligible despite their being focused on a technical solution to a business (non-technical) problem.

    Furthermore, a post-hoc evaluation of whether a claim is addressing a "technical" problem can be subjective.  For example, an invention that provides real-time updating of graphical user interfaces that display data about service-level agreement compliance can be viewed as addressing a technical problem (real-time updating of the interfaces) or a non-technical problem (evaluating contractual conformity).

    In any event, these four cases may help applicants determine whether a § 101 appeal to the PTAB makes sense.  If your claims fall into the technical solution to a technical problem camp, then an appeal may be viable.  Otherwise, you might be best off working a bit longer with the examiner.

  • CalendarAugust 15, 2019 – Technology Center 2800 customer partnership meeting (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 11:30 am to 4:30 pm (ET) on 

    August 20, 2019 – "Section 101 Reform: Prospects and Pitfalls" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    October 3-4, 2019 – Paragraph IV Disputes Master Symposium (American Conference Institute) – Chicago IL

  • MBHB Logo 2McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP will be offering a live webinar entitled "Section 101 Reform: Prospects and Pitfalls" on August 20, 2019 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  In this presentation, MBHB attorneys and Patent Docs authors Michael S. Borella and Kevin E. Noonan, and MBHB attorney Sarah E. Fendrick will discuss § 101 legislation introduced by Senators Tillis and Coons, and the process, politics, and prospects of meaningful legislative change, and the possible pitfalls in the legislation, from the political horse-trading certain to occur to the likelihood that the Supreme Court will find fault with any attempt to rein in their reconstruction of patent eligibility through judicial fiat.  The webinar will address the following:

    • The draft amendments to Sections 100, 101, and 112(f)
    • The stakeholders positions: biotech, pharma, high tech, academics, "public interest groups"
    • Issues solved and raised by the proposed amendments
    • Likelihood of passage

    While there is no fee to participate, attendees must register in advance.  Those wishing to register can do so here.  CLE credit is pending for the states of California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be holding a customer partnership meeting of Technology Center 2800, related to examination of circuits and optics, from 11:30 am to 4:30 pm (ET) on August 15, 2019.  The meeting will include discussions of the following topics:

    • Quality
    • TC 2800 Quality Initiatives
    • Appeal and Pre-Appeal
    • Interview Practice for Productive Prosecution
    • Clarity Round Table
    • Question and Answer Panel

    The meeting will be held at the USPTO's Clara Barton Auditorium, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA.  Those wishing to attend the meeting can register here.  Additional information regarding the customer partnership meeting, including how to participate via WebEx, can be found here.

  • ACIAmerican Conference Institute (ACI) will be holding its 7th Annual Paragraph IV Disputes Master Symposium on October 3-4, 2019 in Chicago IL.  The conference will offer presentations on the following topics:

    • A "Town Hall" Q&A Session — with industry leaders regarding what in-house counsel want from outside lawyers in Hatch-Waxman litigation
    • Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Reform Proposals
    •
    The Effects of Recent FDA Initiatives on Generic Drug Access and ANDA Litigation
    • Written Description and Subject Matter Eligibility challenges in Paragraph IV Litigation
    • Doctrine of Equivalents and its Effect on Hatch-Waxman Litigation
    • Magistrate Judge Town Hall on Role of Magistrates in Paragraph IV Proceedings
    • View from the Bench on trends, settlements, and timing from District Court Judge Chesler (D.N.J.)
    • Breakfast with three PTAB Judges
    • The Interplay between District Court ANDA Litigation and IPRs before the PTAB
    • FTC Keynote: Antitrust Developments Concerning Brands & Generics
    • Practical Strategies and Tactics for Effective Settlement Negotiations
    • The Global Approach to Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation
    • Understanding the Federal Circuit's "Blocking Patent" Doctrine post Acorda
    • "Unique" Pleadings Requirements for Rule 12(b) and 12(c) Motions in Hatch-Waxman Actions
    • Ethics: The Ethical Practice of Paragraph IV Litigation: New Developments Impacting Professional Responsibility in the Hatch-Waxman Arena

    In addition, two post-conference workshops will be offered on October 2, 2019.  The first, entitled "The Three C's: An Intimate Discussion on the Expectations of In-house Counsel from their Law Firm Partners" by the Hatch-Waxman Series Advisory Board will be offered from 9:00 am to 12:00 pm, and the second, entitled "Working Group on Biosimilars for the Hatch-Waxman Litigator" will be offered from 1:00 to 4:30 pm.

    The agenda for the Paragraph IV Disputes Master Symposium can be found here.  More information regarding the workshops can be found here and here.  A complete brochure for this conference, including an agenda, detailed descriptions of conference sessions, list of speakers, and registration form can be obtained here.

    The registration fee for the conference alone is $2,195 (or a special $1,595 in-house rate for pharmaceutical), or $3,295 ($2,695) for the conference and both workshops if registered before July 26th.  Patent Docs readers are entitled to a 10% discount off of registration using discount code D10-815-815DX01.  Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here, by e-mailing CustomerService@AmericanConference.com, or by calling 1-888-224-2480.

    Patent Docs is a media partner of ACI's 7th Annual Paragraph IV Disputes Master Symposium.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealThere has been much commentary, some of it incendiary, regarding whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is fulfilling its responsibilities under its enabling statute or failing to provide the proper pro-patent perspective in its response and implantation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The problem is illustrated by the comments provided by two members of the Court, Judges Lourie and O'Malley, in their concurrence and dissent, respectively, with the Court's per curiam denial of en banc review in Athena Diagnostics Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC.

    Judge Lourie voices the view, first enunciated by Judge Linn in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., that as an inferior appellate court, its hands are tied by the Supreme Court's decisions in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.:

    If I could write on a clean slate, I would write as an exception to patent eligibility, as respects natural laws, only claims directed to the natural law itself, e.g., E=mc2, F=ma, Boyle's Law, Maxwell's Equations, etc.  I would not exclude uses or detection of natural laws.  The laws of anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and written description provide other filters to determine what is patentable.  . . .  But we do not write here on a clean slate; we are bound by Supreme Court precedent.

    This view is apparently shared by seven of the Court's twelve members.  Judge O'Malley enunciates the countervailing view regarding what the Court should do to change this state of affairs, stating her opinion that the Court has gone astray in slavishly and too stringently applying the Supreme Court's precedent to unnecessarily restrict the scope of what is eligible (particularly with regard to diagnostic method claims, including the ones at issue before the Court in Athena):

    I agree with all my dissenting colleagues that our precedent applies the Supreme Court's holding in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) too broadly.  I write separately, however, because I believe that confusion and disagreements over patent eligibility have been engendered by the fact that the Supreme Court has ignored Congress's direction to the courts to apply 35 U.S.C. sections 101, et seq ("Patent Act") as written.  Specifically, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to read into Section 101 an "inventive concept" requirement—a baffling standard that Congress removed when it amended the Patent Act in 1952.  I encourage Congress to amend the Patent Act once more to clarify that it meant what it said in 1952.

    It is clear that Congress is the ultimate (or perhaps only) solution.  But if Judge O'Malley identifies the Federal Circuit's complicity in engendering the current situation, Judge Newman in dissent enumerates the Court's application of Supreme Court precedent to diagnostic method claims, all of these decisions invalidated the patents at issue:

    1. In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation, 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  The claimed invention is a method for screening for genes linked to inherited breast and ovarian cancer, by analyzing for certain mutations in the DNA.  The court held the claims ineligible under section 101 as directed to a law of nature, and also held that identifying genetic mutations is an ineligible abstract idea.

    2. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  The claimed invention is a method for detecting paternally-inherited fetal abnormalities by analyzing the blood or serum of a pregnant female.  The court held the claims ineligible under section 101, while recognizing that "detecting cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum that before was discarded as waste material is a positive and valuable contribution to science."  Id. at 1380.

    3. Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  The claimed invention is a method for detecting a coding region of DNA based on its relationship to non-coding regions, by amplifying genomic DNA with a primer spanning a non-coding sequence in genetic linkage to an allele to be detected.  The court stated that "the patent claim focuses on a newly discovered fact about human biology," id. at 1376, and that this is a law of nature and is ineligible subject matter under section 101.

    4. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  The claimed invention is a method for diagnosing risk of cardiovascular disease by analyzing for the enzyme myeloperoxidase ("MPO").  The court held that even though prior methods for detecting MPO were inferior, the discovery of how to directly analyze for MPO, and discovery of the relation to the risk of cardiovascular disease, although "groundbreaking, 'even such valuable contributions can fall short of statutory patentable subject matter.'"  Id. at 1363 (quoting Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1380).

    5. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. v. CEPHEID, 905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  The claimed invention is a method for detecting the pathogenic bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis ("MTB"), based on nucleotide content and a novel method of analysis.  The court stated that the method is new, unobvious, and "both faster and more accurate than the traditional MTB detection methods," id. at 1366, but held that the method is ineligible under section 101.

    6. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App'x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  The claimed invention is the novel immunoassay to detect the correlation between blood MPO levels and cardiovascular disease.  The court held that the claims are for a law of nature and ineligible under section 101.

    (Including Athena there are seven such cases.) (Conversely, as Judge Newman notes in her dissent, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly affirmed eligibility of "method of treatment" claims, in Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc.; Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.; Natural Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC; and Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.)

    Both Judge Moore (writing in dissent) and Judge Chen (concurring) also recognize the problematic nature of the Court's jurisprudence on patent eligibility.  And each agree with Judge O'Malley that Congress alone can address the issue, Judge Moore stating that:

    In the wake of Mayo, we have painted with a broad brush, suggesting that improved diagnostic techniques are not patent eligible.  Mayo did not go so far, and given the import of diagnostic techniques, we should reconsider this case and clarify our precedent.  Because my colleagues have declined to do so, there are no more options at this court for diagnostic patents.  My colleagues' refusal deflates the Amici's hopeful suggestion that our precedent leaves the eligibility of a diagnostic claim in front of the Federal Circuit "uncertain."  It is no longer uncertain.  Since Mayo, every diagnostic claim to come before this court has been held ineligible.  While we believe that such claims should be eligible for patent protection, the majority of this court has definitively concluded that the Supreme Court prevents us from so holding. No need to waste resources with additional en banc requests.

    For those keeping score, it appears that all (or almost all) of the members of the Court believe that their patent eligibility cases have been wrongly decided.  Chief Judge Prost, joined by Judges Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, Hughes, Taranto, and Chen believe the Court's hands are tied by Supreme Court precedent, while Judges Newman, Moore, O'Malley, Wallach, and Stoll believe the Federal Circuit has the basis to distinguish Supreme precedent and hold these claims (or at least claims 7-9 of Athena's claims at issue) are patent eligible.

    Judge O'Malley provides an additional avenue for Congressional intervention, related to the Supreme Court's resurrection of the "inventive concept" trope many believed was relegated to the dustbin of history by Section 103 in Giles Sutherland Rich's revision resulting in the 1952 Patent Act.  She provides an alternative to Senator Tillis' and Coons' proposed statutory abrogation of the judicial exceptions (which raises its own issues on Congressional authority and the Supreme Court's oversight on ultra vires legislative actions).  Judge O'Malley's suggestion is direct:

    Had the Supreme Court not disregarded Congress's wishes for a second time [by introducing "inventive concept" into its Section 101 calculus], perhaps the outcome in this case would be different.  . . .  Indeed, claims directed to uses of natural laws rather than the natural laws themselves would be eligible under § 101 as written.  Because the Supreme Court judicially revived the invention requirement and continues to apply it despite express abrogation, I dissent to encourage Congress to clarify that there should be no such requirement read into § 101; to clarify that concepts of novelty and "invention" are to be assessed via application of other provisions of the Patent Act Congress designed for that purpose.

    The issue for the Federal Circuit is not just that their views are so fractured, but that the dissension between the Judges regarding whether they should simply apply Supreme Court precedent (even incorrectly) until such time as the Supreme Court deign to address the issue, or whether their "special expertise" and Congressional mandate creates a responsibility to distinguish the Supreme Court's precedent when it does not properly apply, at least to provide incentive to the Supreme Court to provide (in its view) the correct interpretation of what is and what is not patent eligible.  In at least the view of five of the judges (and many in the patent bar) the Federal Circuit has failed in exercising it responsibility, to the extent that many openly speculate whether we need the Federal Circuit at all.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealLast month, the Federal Circuit affirmed decisions from four separate trials in the District of Delaware involving seven different defendants regarding validity and infringement of patents directed to an opioid addiction treatment in Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, S.A.

    The case arose in ANDA litigation over Indivior's suboxone film product Suboxone®, a rapidly dissolving film formulation of two active ingredients:  buprenorphine, which decreases a patient's need for opioids, and naloxone, which deters abuse.  The challenge for such formulations is drug content uniformity, i.e., having the ingredients homogeneously distributed in the films, which are produced from larger sheets that are cut into individual dosage units based on a particular size and shape to provide the appropriate dose of each drug.  U.S. Patent Nos. 8,017,150, 8,603,514, and 8,900,497, licensed by Indivior from Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc., disclose methods for mixing the drugs with a polymer, casting the mixture to produce a wet film, and then "controllably drying the film to produce a solid sheet having less than ten percent variance in active ingredient throughout any given area."  Relevant to the issues before the Court, prior art methods (involving drying the films by applying warm air to only the top surface) were inadequate to achieve content uniformity, with films produced in this manner having a "rippled" surface.  The invention overcame these limitations by "applying heat to the bottom of the film, introducing controlled microwaves, controlling the air flow above and beneath the film, and employing furnace filters."  A fourth patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,475,832, claims film formulations per se and is owned by Indivior.

    The specification of the '514 patent disclosed that "drug content uniformity is required by regulatory authorities yet difficult to achieve in practice because of problems in manufacturing the films" and "[m]ultiple factors in the film-making process can affect uniformity."  According to the claims of the '514 patent, "(1) the viscosity of the matrix must be "sufficient to aid in substantially maintaining non-self-aggregating uniformity" of the active ingredients (the "viscosity limitation"); and (2) the matrix must be "capable of being dried without loss of substantial uniformity of the active [ingredients]" (the "drying limitation").  The specification further discloses that "using conventional drying methods, which apply hot air to the top of the film, produces nonuniform films."  To overcome these issues, "the specification discloses controlled drying processes that differ from conventional techniques" that include "controlled bottom drying or controlled microwave drying."  The '150 patent is directed to uniform pharmaceutical films themselves and components thereof.

    Indivior brought suit against Dr. Reddy's Laboratories (S.A and Inc. entities); Watson Laboratories Inc.; Actavis Laboratories UT, Inc.; Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.; Par Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Intelgenx Technologies Corp.; and Alvogen Pine Brook, LLC.  The parties had engaged in ANDA litigation involving the '514, '497, and 150 patents brought in the District of Delaware.  Claim 62 of the '514 patent and claim 1 of the '150 patent are informative:

    62.  A drug delivery composition comprising:
        (i) a cast film comprising a flowable water-soluble or water swellable film-forming matrix comprising one or more so substantially water soluble or water swellable polymers; and a desired amount of at least one active;
        wherein said matrix has a viscosity sufficient to aid in substantially maintaining non-self-aggregating uniformity of the active in the matrix;
        (ii) a particulate active substantially uniformly stationed in the matrix; and
        (iii) a taste-masking agent selected from the group consisting of flavors, sweeteners, flavor enhancers, and combinations thereof to provide taste- masking of the active;
        wherein the particulate active has a particle size of 200 microns or less and said flowable water-soluble or water swellable film-forming matrix is capable of being dried without loss of substantial uniformity in the stationing of said particulate active therein; and
        wherein the uniformity subsequent to casting and drying of the matrix is measured by substantially equally sized individual unit doses which do not vary by more than 10% of said desired amount of said at least one active.

    1.  A mucosally-adhesive water-soluble film product comprising:
        an analgesic opiate pharmaceutical active; and
        at least one water-soluble polymer component consisting of polyethylene oxide in combination with a hydrophilic cellulosic polymer;
        wherein:
            the water-soluble polymer component comprises greater than 75% polyethylene oxide and up to 25% hydrophilic cellulosic polymer;
            the polyethylene oxide comprises one or more low molecular weight polyethylene oxides and one or more higher molecular weight polyethylene oxides, the molecular weight of the low molecular weight polyethylene oxide being in the range 100,000 to 300,000 and the molecular weight of the higher molecular weight polyethylene oxide being in the range 600,000 to 900,000; and
            the polyethylene oxide of low molecular weight comprises about 60% or more in the polymer component.

    Indivior accused Dr. Reddy's Labs of infringing the '514 and '150 patents, and both Dr. Reddy's Labs and Watson of infringing the '497 patent; Watson of infringing the '514 and '832 patents; and Alvogen of infringing the '514 and '497 patents.  (In a footnote, the opinion identifies the '514 patent claims asserted by Indivior against the various defendants:  claims 62–65, 69, 71, and 73 against Dr. Reddy's Labs; claims 62, 64, 65, 69, and 73 against Watson; and claims 62, 63, 65, 69, 71, and 73 against Alvogen.)

    In four bench trials the District Court found the '514, '497, and '150 patents were not invalid for obviousness and the '514 patent was not invalid for indefiniteness.  Regarding infringement, the Court found Watson infringed the '514 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), but that Dr. Reddy's Laboratories did not infringe the '514 patent nor the '150 patent, and Alvogen Pine Brook did not infringe the '514 patent.  Finally, the District Court found claims 15-19 of the '832 patent to be invalid.  (The Patent Trial and Appeal Board held claims 15–19 unpatentable as anticipated and obvious in a separate, parallel inter partes review proceeding.)

    The Federal Circuit affirmed all the District Court's determinations but vacated invalidation of claims 15-19 of the '872 patent as moot in view of the PTAB's IPR decision, in a decision by Judge Lourie joined by Judge Newman; Judge Mayer dissented based on his differing reading of the references asserted by Defendants against both the ‘514 and ‘150 patents.  The opinion sets forth its basis for affirming the District Court's finding of non-infringement of the '514 patent by Dr. Reddy's Laboratories and Alvogen based on claim construction of the drying limitation.  In both cases, the District Court construed the drying limitation of the '514 patent claims to mean "dried without solely employing conventional convection air drying from the top," and further that patentee's specification disclaimed (indeed, disparaged; see "Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, S.A. (Fed. Cir. 2018)") conventional convection air drying from the top surface of the film.  Similarly, the Court found that Alvogen's film manufacturing process dries the films primarily from the top and does not satisfy the drying limitation recited in the '514 patent claims.  Finding that Defendants used conventional convection air drying from the top surface of the film, the District Court found that Defendants did not infringe and the Federal Circuit affirmed.

    Regarding the District Court's determination that Watson infringed the '514 patent, the Federal Circuit held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it properly refused to reopen its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59.  Watson had amended its ANDA to eliminate bottom heating sources, but had not requested construction of the drying limitation in the claims of the '514 patent.  On these facts, the Federal Circuit found "no manifest injustice" in the District Court's decision despite the different outcomes for two generic versions of Indivior's patented films.  Separate trials had utilized separate strategies:  Dr. Reddy's Labs and Watson challenged the drying limitation in one case, but Watson did not in the other, and this justified the disparate outcomes regarding infringement.  The Federal Circuit opinion noted that "it is neither unusual nor unjust for a party to be bound by its litigation decisions, particularly here where Watson was fully aware of but did not request the claim construction it now seeks."  In addition, accepting the broader construction of this term strengthened Watson's invalidity position but at the expense of its noninfringement case.  On the merits, the District Court found that the viscosity of Watson's generic films fell "squarely within the most preferred range identified in the '514 patent."  The Federal Circuit found no clear error in this determination and affirmed.

    Regarding infringement of the '150 patent claims under Indivior's doctrine of equivalents contentions, the opinion notes that claim 1 of the '150 patent recites a pharmaceutical film with: (1) "at least one water-soluble polymer component consisting of polyethylene oxide [PEO] in combination with a hydrophilic cellulosic polymer [HCP]"; wherein (2) "the water-soluble polymer component comprises greater than 75% [PEO] and up to 25% [HCP]"; (3) the PEO comprises at least one L-PEO and at least one H-PEO; and (4) the L-PEO "comprises about 60% or more in the polymer component."  It was undisputed that Dr. Reddy's Labs substituted polyvinyl pyrrolidone for hydrophilic cellulosic polymer, and the District Court held that Indivior could not capture these formulations under the doctrine of equivalents because embodiments of the claimed films comprising PVP were disclosed in the '150 patent specification but not claimed.  Hence these embodiments were dedicated to the public according to the District Court, citing Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).  The Federal Circuit found no clear error in this determination and affirmed.

    Turning to Defendants' various invalidity contentions, the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that the claims of the '514 patent were not indefinite.  The basis for Watson's indefiniteness contention focused on the claim term "cast film comprising a flowable water-soluble or water swellable film-forming matrix" because the film is not "flowable" in its final dosage form.  Watson's position was that the recited property needed to be possessed by accused infringing article, but the District Court disagreed and analogized to the Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2009) case, where the claimed property was only present during assembly.  The Federal Circuit characterized as nonsensical the argument (which Watson and Teva advanced at trial) that the finished film product needed to be flowable to fall within the scope of the claim.  The Federal Circuit agreed with the District Court that "a product claim may recite elements 'in the state in which they exist during manufacture, before the final product exists'" and thus the claims were not indefinite.

    The Court also affirmed the District Court's decision that the claims of the '514 patent were not obvious.  Dr. Reddy's Labs asserted three prior art references at trial:  U.S. Patent Nos. 4,849,246 ("Schmidt"), 6,552,024 ("Chen"), and 5,881,476 ("Strobush").  The '246 patent discloses methods for making pharmaceutical films but Indivior proffered persuasive expert testimony that the uniformity of the film not assessed.  The '024 patent taught top-air drying pharmaceutical films.  And the '476 patent taught methods for drying non-pharmaceutical films without introducing "mottle."  The District Court found insufficient motivation to combine these references on two grounds.  First, there was no evidence that the '246 and '024 patents disclosed uniform drug content as a property of the disclosed films (a property required of the claimed invention), and second, the status of pharmaceutical films was "nascent."  In addition, the Court noted that there was even less motivation to combine the '476 patent because this reference did not disclose not a pharmaceutical film.  Finally, Indivior asserted evidence of secondary considerations that supported its nonobviousness position.

    The Federal Circuit found no clear error on these facts.  It found Dr. Reddy's Labs' arguments disputing the level of skill in the art used by the District Court to be "nitpicking," and that the District Court properly relied on expert testimony regarding the relationship between "mottle" in the prior art and uniformity as recited in the '514 patent claims.  The assertion by Dr. Reddy's Labs of the skilled artisan's expectation of success was undercut, in the Court's view, by the "multiple factors throughout the manufacturing process that contribute to the uniformity of pharmaceutical films, that adjusting the various factors would have been unintuitive, and that the field was still emergent at the time of invention."  The Federal Circuit found no clear error in District Court's finding regarding the totality of the evidence for these facts and affirmed the nonobviousness of the '514 patent claims.

    Finally the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's determination that Watson had not established by clear and convincing evidence that the claims of the '150 patent were obvious.  This determination rested on whether the '150 patent was entitled to the priority date of the earlier-filed U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/473,902, i.e., whether that application satisfied the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 for the '150 patent claims.  The District Court held that the priority claim was proper (and thus the '150 patent claims were not obvious), relying expressly on the following disclosure in the '902 application:

    For instance, certain film properties, such as fast dissolution rates and high tear resistance, may be attained by combining small amounts of high molecular weight PEOs with larger amounts of lower molecular weight PE[O]s.  Desirably, such compositions contain about 60% or greater levels of the lower molecular weight PEO in the PEO-blend polymer component.

    To balance the properties of adhesion prevention, fast dissolution rate, and good tear resistance, desirable film compositions may include about 50% to 75% low molecular weight PEO, optionally combined with a small amount of a high molecular weight PEO, with the remainder of the polymer component containing a hydrophilic cellulosic polymer (HPC or HPMC).

    The Federal Circuit found no clear error in this determination by the District Court because "the application discloses that a polymer component with 60% L-PEO has desirable properties and that the remainder of the component may include H-PEO and HCP," consistent with '150 patent claims.

    Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, S.A. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Mayer, and Lourie
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Lourie; dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Mayer