By Kevin E. Noonan –

It has been one of Justice Gorsuch's signature judicial goals to overturn the Court's Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. decision and while it has taken seven years for a case to arise giving him the opportunity to persuade his colleagues to do so, the Loper case provided that opportunity (regardless of the amount of effort or lack of it required to accomplish the goal).

The concurrence sets out the issue not as one between the co-equal branches of our government but as "between individuals and the government," providing a populist gloss otherwise not mentioned in either the majority opinion or dissent (and perhaps providing a glimpse into the philosophical underpinnings of the Justice's passion for overturning Chevron).  Terming the Chevron approach to be a "radically different approach" the Justice's opines that over time "the error of this approach became widely appreciated" and uses as evidence the Court's refusal to apply the doctrine since 2016 (nicely illustrating the judicial maneuver decried by Justice Kagan in her dissenting opinion of "overruling-through-enfeeblement").  As stated right at the outset, the Justice has penned his concurrence to "address why the proper application of the doc­trine of stare decisis supports that course" (something the dissent vigorously opposes and the majority opinion discussed more cursorily).

The Justice begins his concurrence with his history of judicial norms, including stare decisis over time, seeking to clarify what in his view is the proper role of judges and to what extent they are (or should be) bound by prior decisions.  In England, the judge's role was limited to specifically not make law (which was restricted to the King and Parliament) but to interpret it in the context of the historical consolidation of England into a single kingdom.  But a judge's opinion and "the law" were not considered "one and the same thing," the Justice providing his own citation to Blackstone (1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 71 (1765)).  Rather than bind later judges, an earlier judge's decision was considered to be "evidence" of what the law was which varied with the weight later judges gave them.  These distinctions were also considered regarding the effect on later cases of "[d]icta, stray remarks, and di­gressions" (given less weight but were not considered entirely worthless) as opposed to "[a]n opinion's hold­ing and the reasoning essential to it."

The relevance of this historical/rhetorical sojourn, according to the concurrence, is that "there are good reasons to think that the common law's understandings of judges and precedent outlined [herein] crossed the Atlantic and informed the nature of the 'judicial Power' the Constitution vests in federal courts" under Article III.  These include that in addition to being drafted and adopted "against the back­drop of these understandings" there are specific passages in our Constitution that support the Justice's insight and interpretations (in his view, of course) throughout that document (which are set out in the concurring opinion).  In this context is the important principle that the judiciary is a "neutral party" [that can] 'interpret and apply' the law without fear or favor in a dispute between others," citing Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 866 (1824) (the need thereof being consistent with the rather adversarial view of "citizens and their government" espoused at the beginning of the concurrence, rather than mere allocation of the capacity to decide between different branches of those citizens' government).  And the concurrence suggests that the limited power of stare decisis in England was transported to this country due to these similarities (suggesting darkly a broader attack on established legal principles that could lead to unbridled judicial hegemony over established law).  "Plucking" (or at least cherry picking) from numerous 19th Century decisions and extrajudicial statements by past statesmen (Including Abraham Lincoln) the concurrence weaves a tapestry swathed in apparent reasonableness diminishing the power of stare decisis as never being binding on future courts but rather providing evidence or guidance regarding what the later law should or could be.  The Justice's conclusion from these assessments are summarized in the opinion as three "lessons":

First, "a past decision may bind the parties to a dispute, but it provides this Court no authority in future cases to depart from what the Constitution or laws of the United States ordain."  This principle is supported by consideration of "flawed" decisions and when that flaw is constitutional or related to particular statutes and the Court's capacity for correction (and thus not bound by stare decisis).

Second, "[w]hile judicial decisions may not supersede or revise the Constitution or federal statutory law, they merit our 'respect as embodying the considered views of those who have come before,'" citing Ra­mos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 105 (2020).  A judge must "weigh his view of what the law demands against the thoughtful views of his predecessors" which are "a font of established wisdom richer than what can be found in any single judge or panel of judges."  Precedent's primary power is the power to persuade later judges, the concurrence maintains.  (Ironically, the principles of workability and reliance, the first of which was used by the majority to support their decision to overturn Chevron, "do not often supply reason enough on their own to abide a flawed decision" but do they provide sufficient motivation to overturn it?).

Third, "it would be a mistake to read judicial opinions like statutes" because judicial decisions "render a judgment based only on the fac­tual record and legal arguments the parties at hand have chosen to develop" (those decisions being made before a backdrop of earlier decisions and settled law being unmentioned).  The concurrence properly notes that judges must "appreciate the possibility that different facts and different legal arguments may dictate a different outcome (but unspoken is the principle that this does not imply that these differences mandate or permit changes in settled law).  The concurrence, placing the blame on the innately digressive characteristic of judges, asserts that many decisions are infused with "va­pours and fumes of law" (citing 2 The Works of Francis Bacon 478 (B. Montagued. 1887)) (apparently meaning dicta) that "cannot 'control the judgment in a subsequent suit,'" citing Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821).

The upshot of these considerations in the concurrence is the judicial Goldilocks principle that there is a "just right" amount and degree of precedential authority that such earlier decisions can be given (that "sweet spot" being defined only by the decision maker to which the issue is posed).  Citing Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022), the Justice asserts that over reliance on stare decisis can "turn stare decisis from a tool of judicial humility into one of judicial hubris."

The concurrence applies these "lessons" to Chevron as follows:

Lesson 1, because Chevron deference contra­venes the law Congress prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act.

Lesson 2, because Chevron deference runs against mainstream currents in our law regarding the sep­aration of powers, due process, and centuries-old interpre­tive rules that fortify those constitutional commitments.

Lesson 3, because to hold otherwise would effectively require us to endow stray statements in Chevron with the authority of statutory language, all while ignoring more considered language in that same decision and the teach­ings of experience.

The concurrence's explication of these conclusions mirror the analysis in the majority opinion (and won't be repeated here; see "Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024)") except to the extent they do not.  Regarding the APA in Lesson 1 the concurrence is concerned that an agency can interpret a statute outside the scope of what a court has, can, or would do, and such interpretations can be changed at any time by the agency that could "effectively overrule not only their own past interpretations of a law but a court's past interpretation as well."  Lesson 2 "cannot rescue Chevron deference in Justice Gorsuch's opinion because "[i]f stare deci­sis calls for judicial humility in the face of the written law, it also cautions us to test our present conclusions carefully against the work of our predecessors" (reiterating the arguments here and in the majority opinion regarding "how our predecessors traditionally understood the judicial role in disputes over a law's mean­ing"; these arguments include citations to Marbury v Madison, The Federalist, and United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.).  And again raising the possibility that a court would need to defer insofar as "the government could propound a 'reasonable' view of the law's meaning one day, a different one the next, and bind the judiciary al­ways to its latest word" or that the Executive could override judicial precedent.  Giving the Executive branch due respect does not require courts to defer wherein "by no means [can the Executive's decisions] con­trol the action or the opinion of this court in expound­ing the law with reference to the rights of parties litigant before them," citing Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558, 567 (1858).  Justice Gorsuch's assessment of the Chevron regime is that "it did not merely depart from our precedents.  More nearly, Chevron defied them."

The concurrence also sees a parallel between King George's efforts to dominate the colonial judiciary and Chevron, and the American response to the King's effort by making "considered judgment to build judicial independence into the Constitution's design [by] vest[ing] the judicial power in decisionmakers with life tenure" under Article III (as well as other bases for judicial independence).  In the Justice's view, Chevron deference undermines all that (citing many of the aspects of the Chevron regime recited in the majority opinion's grounds for overturning Chevron).  The opinion sees Chevron as enabling the Executive branch to "effectively judge the scope of their own lawful powers," citing Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 296–297 (2013).  And citing Blackstone the interpretive powers granted the Executive bureaucracy echoes the capacity Blackstone warned about should "magistrates" be permitted to "discard an old meaning and assign a new one to a law's terms, all without any legislative revi­sion" under circumstances where a "reasonable bureaucrat may change his mind year-to-year and election-to-election," thereby reducing or destroying public certainty (wherein "the people are left to guess about their legal rights and responsibilities" as a result).

Justice Gorsuch's analysis of the Chevron regime is frankly disparaging, terming the determinations of ambiguity to be something of a "Snark hunt" (some judges see it everywhere, some judges never see it) but in any case where these decisions always inure to the "benefit" of the Federal government (and the courts' assessment of whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is also fraught with ""wildly different" approaches and reached wildly different conclusions" even in similar cases, citing Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2152 (2016) (the cases before the Court on appeal illustrating this situation in the Justice's view).

The concurrence also has little use for claims that allegiance to Chevron involves reliance interests, asserting that "the whole point of Chevron defer­ence is to upset [reliance interests]," ostensibly because "executive officials can replace one 'reasonable' interpretation with another at any time, all without any change in the law itself" (citing National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982–983 (2005), as an example of such changes in how agencies interpret the law; tellingly that decision arose prior to any of these changes).  The concurrence purports to be concerned with the effects of such changes on "ordinary people" because "sophisticated entities" (and, ominously, "their lawyers") can take steps (from "keeping up" with such changes to lobbying), illustrating the "ordinary people" example with Buffington v. McDonough involving an Air Force veteran injured in the line of duty that fell afoul of regulations ("self-serving," according to the Justice) involving disability benefits.  The concurrence asserts that the government used Chevron to convince a court that the Department of Defense's interpretation of the statute resulting in the loss of those benefits was reasonable (it was not sufficiently unreasonable for the Court to grant certiorari, apparently).  The Justice also includes the story of a case in which he presided at the appellate court in which the Board of Immigration Appeals overturned an earlier interpretation of a rule to the detriment of immigrants who had relied on it (other examples among the "so many" are further cited in the opinion).  The concurrence pits "the Constitution, the APA, and our longstanding precedents" against government claims that Chevron deference "has become a 'fundamenta[l] . . . ground rul[e] for how all three branches of the government are operating together,'" further illustrating the fundamentally adversarial tone of the concurrence (and to a lesser degree the majority opinion).

The concurrence also characterizes Chevron as "a counter-Marbury revolution, one at war with the APA, time honored precedents, and so much surrounding law" that is the result of "endow[ing] a stray passage in a judicial decision with extraordinary authority."  In Chevron, a "bare quorum" of the Chevron Court (the same quorum reaching the majority's decision) affirmed the Environmental Protection Agency's definition of the term "stationary sources."  According to the concurrence, from "bits and pieces" of this decision arose the Chevron analytical regime that the concurrence and majority opinions so mightily complain about, wherein much of these bits and pieces of legal analysis not arising from positions taken by the government (and of course not taking into account the majority's and concurrence's concerns regarding contrary considerations  under the APA).

The concurrence attempts to normalize the disregard for stare decisis in the Court's overthrow of Chevron by first "blaming" deceased former Justice Scalia for promoting the Chevron regime in NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 133–134 (1987), and then, acting like a repentant apostate losing faith with its consequences and arguing for the Court to reconsider it in Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 U.S. 597, 617–618, 621 (2013), and Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U.S. 92, 109–110 (2015).  The concurrence notes that several current members of the Court began to show similar reservations, so much so that the Chevron decision was effectively ended (by what Justice Kagan's dissent terms "overruling-through-enfeeblement") until this case raised the opportunity to, in Justice Gorsuch's words, "place[] a tombstone on Chevron no one can miss."

Ultimately, the concurrence bases its justification for overturning Chevron as an opportunity to correct mistakes, and certainly there is an argument to be made that if there is a Court where it can be inappropriate to use stare decisis as a guiding principle (insofar as it prevents mistake correction) it is the Supreme Court (see "Alternative Reasoning for Supreme Court's Life Sciences Subject Matter Eligibility Jurisprudence").  But that aspect of the Court's power under Article III comes with the need for due consideration of the consequences, something apparently understood by the dissent more readily than either the majority or the concurrence, for whom it appears that correcting doctrinal error is more important that (potentially) throwing into chaos how the laws enacted by Congress are executed (and inflating the powers of unelected judges to counter the policies of their elected officials).  This decision creates another governance experiment in a system whose very existence is an experiment.  If it fails during the tenure of any of the Justices who concurred with this decision it can be hoped that in their turn they will have the "judicial humility" to admit their mistakes.

By Kevin E. Noonan –

In addition to Justice Gorsuch's concurrence (to be discussed in a later post), the three "liberal" Justices on the Court differed from their colleagues and thought overturning the Chevron precedent to be both erroneous and unnecessary.  Their dissent, written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, took a dim view of the majority's legal reasoning and the consequences of their decision.

Instead of looking into the Court's distant past for support, the dissent begins by reminding the majority (and us) that "[f]or 40 years, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. . . . has served as a cornerstone of administrative law."  Unlike the majority, who apparently believe that the Chevron precedent renders judges unable to judge, the dissent apprehends that under this precedent "a court uses all its normal interpretive tools to determine whether Congress has spoken to an is­sue" (and if so "the agency's views make no difference").  It is in the instances where Congress has not spoken clearly, and "if the court finds, at the end of its interpretive work, that Congress has left an ambiguity or gap" that the issue is joined whether the agency or the courts, in the first instance decides how the law will be interpreted and applied.  The dissenting Justices believe that the agencies, not the courts, are (usually, but not exclusively) best equipped to make these choices and that this allocation of decision-making is the right choice ("the rule is right") and (inherently at least) consistent with Congressional intent.  This is because such decisions can involve "scientific or technical subject matter," or require an understanding of "complex and interdependent regulatory programs," neither of which are usually within a court's skill (or knowledge) set.  The current regime also accommodates the "chain of command" between the agencies and the President, "who in turn answers to the public for his policy calls" (and is accountable thereto; this, after all was the line of reasoning used by the Chief Justice in upholding the constitutional validity of the Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius).

The dissent accuses the majority of "flipping the script" on this "almost obvious choice," with "[a] rule of judicial humility giv[ing] way to a rule of judicial hubris."  This is the most recent of a pattern of the Court "too often tak[ing] for itself decision-making authority Congress assigned to agencies," the dissent citing National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595  U.S. 109 (2022), West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022), and Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023), in support of this allegation.  As a consequence, the majority has turned the Court "into the country's administrative czar" "[i]n one fell swoop."  And in doing so, the majority has made a "laughing-stock" of stare decisis, which the dissenting Justices assert "remind judges that wisdom often lies in what prior judges have done" and provide "a brake on the urge to convert 'every new judge's opinion' into a new legal rule or regime," Justice Kagan reciting the dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 388 (2022), quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Com­mentaries on the Laws of England 69 (7th ed. 1775) (trumping the majority's basis on our history with legal opinion contemporaneous with the Founders).  And paralleling the majority's suggestion that Congress could overrule their decision by statute (a false assertion based on the legal grounds for that decision), here the dissent asserts as one basis for considering erroneous the majority's dismissal of stare decisis in this case is that Congress, for the past forty years, has not done so by overruling Chevron (making the application of stare decisis "supercharged" in this instance).  The dissent characterizes the majority's opinion as "a bald assertion of judicial authority" that "disdains restraint, and grasps for power."

The dissent also provides its own explication of the origins of the Chevron doctrine and consequences it has had on administrative law for the past four decades.  That origin is the unavoidable ambiguities that arise when Congress enacts laws and sometimes where those ambiguities are intentional; see, e.g., the Biologics Price Control and Innovation Act (the subject of a later post), where Congress could not have unintentionally delegated to the Food and Drug Administration responsibility for developing a biosimilar approval pathway (the statute is replete with instructions that "the Secretary" shall act to implement the specific provisions recited therein).  In addition, the dissent sets forth the myriad ways Congress through intent or mistake could so delegate, or for which the issue addressed by the agency could not have been anticipated by the drafters (indeed, at its core the issue is the extent to which Congress passes to the Executive branch the responsibility to execute and enforce the laws; for example, once Congress has declared war legislators do not then micromanage how the President or Secretary of Defense, much less military commanders prosecute the war on the battlefield).  The dissent discusses instances from the case law developed over the past four decades to illustrate the point, including Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. FDA, 514 F. Supp. 3d 66, 79–80, 93–106 (DC 2020) (regarding the definition of a protein under 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1); Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F. 3d 1136, 1140–1145, 1149 (CA9 2007) (defining "distinct populations" of certain species of squirrels); Bellevue Hospital Center v. Leavitt, 443 F. 3d 163, 174–176 (CA2 2006) (defining "geographic areas" related to hospital reimbursement); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F. 3d 455, 466–467, 474–475 (CADC 1998) (defining noise levels permissible by aircraft over the Grand Canyon); and Chevron itself, regarding "stationary sources" of air pollution).  The dissent recognizes that in each case the statutory language had more than one reading that would be "reasonable" and that the question that thus arises is "Who decides which of the possible readings should govern?"

The answer over the past forty years has been that the agencies should decide, and courts defer in instances where there isn't a "single right answer" (otherwise neither the courts nor the agencies decide, because Congress has spoken; see Ki­sor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 588 (2019)).  And under Chevron when a court, "after using its whole legal toolkit" finds that there is no unambiguous definition by Congress, the Court has (and should) defer to the agency tasked with implementing the law and (presumably) having the technical and experiential knowledge and expertise to be in the best position to do so, the dissent stating that "the court must cede the primary interpretive role").  The role of the courts, as the dissenting Justices see it, should be (and has been) "only as a backstop to make sure the agency makes a reasonable choice among the possible readings."  (In a footnote, the dissent explicates several routine instances and circumstances where what Congress intended is presumed, including ones against extraterritoriality of U.S. laws, prospective (rather than retrospective) application of the laws, and against repeal by implication.)  The rationale for agencies rather than courts to resolve ambiguities (the "why" the dissent provides) set forth in the dissenting opinion include the idea that "agencies often know things about a statute's subject matter that courts could not hope to" know (particularly when the statute implicates scientific or technical questions, illustrated by Justice Kagan by the portion of the biosimilar statute regarding when an amino acid polymer is considered a protein, the Justice posing that the first question facing a court trying to resolve the ambiguity would be "What even is an alphaamino acid polymer?").  Another example is the decision regarding distinct vel non species of squirrels; in this case, the dissent speculates that "[a] court could, if forced to, muddle through that issue and announce a result" but reasons that the specialized expertise of the Fish and Wildlife Service would "do a better job of the task."

The dissent next addresses a different scenario, wherein the ambiguity arises from "a complex regulatory regime" and how it functions effectively.  Taking the squirrel example again, the dissent cites instances where prior decisions can be understood by the agency (but perhaps slightly less effectively, seeing as the cited earlier case law might be effectively understood by a court).  The dissent's better point is that an agency makes these distinctions all the time as part of its operations as an agency, while courts address these issues much more sporadically.  A similar scenario, and an agency's superior ability to reasonably interpret the law, cited in the dissent involves the Medicare reimbursement issue involving the term "geographic area" mentioned above, the dissent positing:

It would make sense to gather hard information about what reimbursement levels each approach will pro­duce, to explore the ease of administering each on a nation­wide basis, to survey how regulators have dealt with simi­lar questions in the past, and to confer with the hospitals themselves about what makes sense[,]

and suggesting that the Department of Health and Human Services is better equipped to make these assessments.  (In this regard, the majority's suggestion that evidence from the parties and amici can substitute seems particular jerry-rigged in comparison.)

Turning to the policy rationale, the dissent minimizes the legal basis for the decisions the majority's decision shifts from the agency to the courts.  Using the regulation of noise levels over the Grand Canyon as an example, the dissent recognizes that the question of "How many flights, in what places and at what times, are consistent with restoring enough natural quiet on the ground?" is "a policy trade-off of a kind familiar to agencies—but peculiarly unsuited to judges."  In addition to expertise and familiarity, the dissent asserts that because Federal agencies are "subject to the supervision of the President, who in turn answers to the public," citing Kisor, Congress may rely on the "accountable actor" to better use "wise policy to inform its judgements" rather than an independent judiciary (turning on its head the majority's argument of the historical antecedents and necessity of judicial primacy).

The dissent recognizes that deference is not always the answer, stating that the Chevron regime had been "fine-tuned" over time in recognition of this reality.  The majority's disparagement of these refinements as evincing flaws in the system "are anything but" according to the dissent, citing Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 519–520 (2018) (which precludes an agency from interpreting a statute it does not implement); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–227 (2001); and Encino Motor­cars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211, 220 (2016) (for instances where the agency fails to use, or use properly, its "rulemaking or adjudicatory authority").  The dissent notes that the Court has even fashioned an "extraordinary cases" exception to Chevron's general rule of deference, in instances where questions of vast "economic and political significance" are involved, citing King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485-486 (2015).

The result of Chevron and its forty years of application has been a "carefully calibrated framework [that] 'reflects a sensitiv­ity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches'" according to the dissenting Justices' assessment, citing Pauley v. Beth En­ergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991).  That framework is expressly set forth in the dissent:

Where Congress has spoken, Con­gress has spoken; only its judgments matter.  And courts alone determine when that has happened: Using all their normal interpretive tools, they decide whether Congress has addressed a given issue.  But when courts have decided that Congress has not done so, a choice arises.  Absent a legislative directive, either the administering agency or a court must take the lead.  And the matter is more fit for the agency.  The decision is likely to involve the agency's sub­ject-matter expertise; to fall within its sphere of regulatory experience; and to involve policy choices, including cost-benefit assessments and trade-offs between conflicting val­ues.  So a court without relevant expertise or experience, and without warrant to make policy calls, appropriately steps back.  The court still has a role to play: It polices the agency to ensure that it acts within the zone of reasonable options.  But the court does not insert itself into an agency's expertise-driven, policy-laden functions.  That is the ar­rangement best suited to keep every actor in its proper lane.  And it is the one best suited to ensure that Congress's stat­utes work in the way Congress intended.

The dissent then addresses and rejects the majority's "points in reply."  First is the assertion that courts, not agencies, have any "specialized competence" in resolving the ambiguities that raise the questions before the Court.  The dissent responds, "Score one for self-confidence; maybe not so high for self-reflection or -knowledge" (and later calling the majority's position "malarkey") and while acknowledging a court's capacity to "construe legal texts, hopefully well" credits the first step of the Chevron test to "take full advantage of that talent."  The reason for deference under Chevron, the dissent asserts, is when a "court must admit that standard legal tools will not avail to fill a statutory silence or give content to an ambiguous term."  The question is not one of legal acumen but rather "one or more of: subject-matter expertise, long engagement with a regulatory scheme, and policy choice," in which courts "'have no special competence'—or even legitimacy."

The majority's second argument is that the existence of an ambiguity or gap in statutory language does not "necessarily reflect a congressional intent that an agency" have "primary interpretive authority."  The dissent concedes the premise, but the basis for the Chevron regime is a presumption that is applied in a case-by-case basis because while it "does not maintain that Congress in every case wants the agency, rather than a court, to fill in gaps" there needs to be a "default rule" regarding which would be the best source of the best resolution of the ambiguity or gap.  The majority's contention that ambiguities and gaps are unintentional is an insufficient justification for the dissent, first because many are not unintentional (in the sense of being unforeseen) and second (the dissent asks) why should that matter, if it is merely an inherent consequence of the legislative process and execution of the statutes by the appropriate agency?  (And the dissent's rejoinder, as in the majority on the converse position is that if Congress doesn't want the agency to take this role "all it needs to do is say [so]").  Which Congress has never done (being "the proof . . . in the [legislative] pudding") and has in fact rejected proposed legislation that would have abolished the Chevron regime "across the board," citing S. 909, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (2019) (still a bill, not a law); H. R. 5, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., §202 (2017) (same).

Turning to the majority's reliance on the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and its putative incompatibility with Chevron purported in the majority opinion, the dissent asserts that Chevron and the APA are "perfectly compatible."  In the dissent's view, Section 706 (cited extensively in the majority opinion) merely provides for judicial review of agency actions.  Citing academic legal authorities, the dissent says that the text itself "does not resolve the Chevron question" as the majority interprets it to do.  As the dissent sees it, the deficiency is that Section 706 does not set forth any standard for judicial review, either deferential under Chevron or de novo as the majority opinion would have it.  The dissent notes that Section 706 does specify standards of review, for example deference to agency factfinding (substantial evidence) and policymaking (abuse of discretion).  The dissent differs with the majority's conclusion that Congress would have included similarly deferential review standards for legal questions if that was its intent; there are other portions of the Section where a de novo standard of review is set forth (resulting in references to standards of review "running around Section 706").  The dissent also notes that most "respected commentators" (including contemporaneous writers such as Professor Kenneth Culp Davis) agree with the preference in the Section for deferential review ("They did not see in their own time what the majority finds there today"), citing examples (perhaps not the commentators that the majority Justices read or respect) and conceding in a footnote that at least one such "respected commentator" took the contrary view agreeing with the majority.  But this is a new interpretation of the APA by the Supreme Court, which until this decision did not appreciate the invalidating contradictions between Chevron and the APA asserted by the majority (although this is a feature of most instances where the Court reverses longstanding precedent, perhaps accounting for the rarity thereof).  And history is not on the majority's side, either according to the dissent, insofar as courts had become more deferential to administrative agencies during the New Deal (and to be fair, World War II), citing Justice Breyer's contribution to an administrative law treatise for this information and Supreme Court decisions, Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941) and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), as examples of deferential judicial review of agencies' statutory interpretation.  The dissent asserts additional cases (to counter the majority's allegation that these Justices "plucked" these two cases as exceptions) and dismisses the majority's reliance on purportedly inconsistent instances of deference pre-APA as making the majority's further argument that Section 706 prohibits deference "fall[] flat."

Finally, the dissent addresses the abandonment of stare decisis by the majority on the basis that while not intended to be an "inexorable command" to do so requires "far more" than the majority provides in its opinion.  The extent of this "far more" for the dissent is "above and beyond thinking it wrong."  This is particularly the case where, as here, the decision "will cause a massive shock to the legal system, 'cast[ing] doubt on many settled constructions' of statutes and threatening the interests of many parties who have relied on them for years," citing Kisor.  Stare decisis is a doctrine of "judicial modesty" that, like Chevron itself, "tell judges that they do not know everything, and would do well to attend to the views of others."  As a practical matter, the dissent asserts that the Court itself has upheld Chevron "at least 70 times" and the inferior courts have made decisions based on Chevron on "thousands and thousands of occasions" (more than 18,000 at last count).  And the dissent criticizes the majority for "overruling-through-enfeeblement" of decisions a majority disagrees with by refusing to apply a precedent and disparaging it in those opinions as the basis to overrule (finding equally feeble the majority's argument/evidence that the Chevron regime is "unworkable" due to there being "no single 'answer' about what 'ambiguity' means," which seems to be a reasonable definition of ambiguity).  Paradoxically, the dissent contends, Chevron promotes agreement between how judges interpret ambiguous statutes (as compared with de novo review) and thus does not deserve the majority's contention that it causes "too much judicial divergence."  Perhaps equally paradoxically in the dissent's view the regime the majority impose to replace Chevron is itself problematic to implement, and these Justices see the deference to an agency's "body of experience and informed judgment" under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944), to be at future risk for judicial meddling (it would not take much to infer a similar judgment about the majority's opinion here).

"At its core," the dissent concludes, "Chevron is about respecting that allocation of responsibility—the conferral of primary authority over regulatory matters to agencies, not courts" coming from a time when "when we [the Court] knew what we are not."  The majority, according to the dissent, does not respect that judgment, giving courts "power to make all manner of scientific and technical judgments," "the power to make all manner of policy calls, including about how to weigh com­peting goods and values," and "puts courts at the apex of the administrative process as to every con­ceivable subject—because there are always gaps and ambi­guities in regulatory statutes."  "In every sphere of current or future federal regulation," the dissent asserts, "expect courts from now on to play a commanding role" which "is not a role Congress has given to them" but "a role this Court has now claimed for itself, as well as for other judges."

Albeit easy to cast along conventional philosophical lines, both the majority and dissenting opinions were outcome-oriented, although the dissent was frankly so while the majority opinion dressed up this aspect with a patina of history and how the Founders would consider the question (in an age where the modern concept of an administrative agency was unknown).  Indeed, the majority was almost disdainful toward the consequences of wiping out forty years of precedent to reach their outcome, showing somewhat flexible allegiance towards stare decisis and other legal principles.  This attitude is fraught with at least some danger, insofar as the Court's institutional authority is intimately related to and dependent upon its institutional integrity.  To the extent that the majority reject Chevron as being completely wrongly decided (even going so far as to dismiss the Court's judgment by six Justices in a decision supported by just as many (or few) here) both are brought into question.

The Demise of Chevron Deference

By Kevin E. Noonan –

Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court overturned the "Chevron deference" principle from its 1984 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (and it did so expressly and with no equivocation, stating "Chevron is overruled").

This case (decided below on Chevron principles) arose over a dispute involving regulation on fishing (and the amount thereof) in an area within 200 nautical miles beyond the U.S. territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore).  The regulations were enacted under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.) and are administered by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  These regulations are intended to prevent overfishing and are promulgated by the NMFC based on recommendations by eight regional councils comprised of coastal state representatives, stakeholders (e.g., fishermen), and members of the NMFC.  The NMFC, for its part, includes mandatory limitations on annual catch and specifies ("prohibit, limit, condition, or require") types and amount of fishing gear permitted to be used, as well as requiring a certain proportion of the catch to be used in scientific research.  At issue in this case was the requirement that "one or more observers be carried on board" domestic vessels "for the purpose of collecting data necessary for the conservation and management of the fishery" under § 1853(b)(8), the cost of which to be borne by "(1) foreign fishing vessels operating within the exclusive economic zone (which must carry observers), [under] §§1821(h)(1)(A), (h)(4), (h)(6); (2) vessels participating in certain limited access privilege programs, which impose quotas permitting fishermen to harvest only specific quantities of a fishery's total allowable catch, [under] §§1802(26), 1853a(c)(1)(H), (e)(2), 1854(d)(2); and (3) vessels within the jurisdiction of the North Pacific Council, where many of the largest and most successful commercial fishing enterprises in the Nation operate, [under] §1862(a)," albeit capping the costs for the latter two categories, with parties in noncompliance being subject to sanctions imposed by the Secretary of Commerce.  This case arose when the NMFC changed its practices to newly impose these fees on Atlantic herring fishermen (to which they objected because it could reduce their annual returns by up to 20%).  (The circumstances under which some of the petitioners fished included having to pay observers in some instances where no herring were caught at all, due to vagaries in their catch on a particular fishing trip.)

Petitioners' argument was that while Congress provided the agency with "broad implicit authority" to impose this program it also expressly provided by statute a requirement for three industry funding programs that did not include herring fishing.  The Court granted certiorari expressly to decide whether Chevron should be "overruled or clarified."

The opinion, written by the Chief Justice and joined by the five conservative Justices (with the three liberal Justices dissenting) first sets forth the relationships between the three branches of the federal government, starting with Article III, from which the Court recognizes that the judiciary is the final arbiter of the "interpretation of the law" (as the "the proper and peculiar province of the courts," citing Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers No. 78).  The opinion recited, from Marbury v, Madison to the present day, its consistent allegiance to the supremacy of the courts in interpreting the laws Congress enacts while "according due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes."  However, such respect cannot "supersede" the judiciary's judgment, "[o]therwise, judicial judgment would not be independent at all."

The opinion then presents a disquisition regarding the expansion of the Executive branches de facto powers under President Roosevelt's New Deal, maintaining that from that time until the Chevron decision "the Court continued to adhere to the traditional understanding that questions of law were for courts to decide, exercising independent judgment."  The opinion notes that determinations of fact were a different matter (and it might be noted should remain so under Dickinson v. Zurko, at least with regard to factual matters before the Patent and Trademark Office), being binding on courts if there was "evidence to support the findings," citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51 (1936), under the principle that Congress had the power to designate agencies for fact-finding within the ambit of their expertise.  However, the opinion reminds, the Court did not extend agency deference to questions of law, citing United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940); Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); and Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 681–682, n. 1 (1944), as examples, while reiterating the principle that decisions of the Executive Branch were entitled to "great weight" under American Trucking Assns.  In this regard, the opinion also assesses the Court's decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), having the effect that decisions by agencies based on their "specialized expertise" could be resorted to properly by litigants and courts for "guidance even on legal questions" under certain circumstances ("the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control").

The opinion also sets forth what it considers cases decided anomalously wherein agencies' legal interpretations were given deference.  These include Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (due to Congress having given the agency the authority to make the legal determination at issue), and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (same).  But the opinion particularly identifies these cases as exceptions "cabined to fact-bound determinations," and thus consistent with the Court majority's general theme of judicial supremacy, including in other (legal) aspects of these outlier decisions.  Accordingly the opinion can place even these cases permitting agency legal determinations to be consistent with this general (and Constitutionally mandated) rule.  And even regarding factual agency decisions the opinion terms the Court's treatment thereof to be "far from consistent," citing several learned treatises and Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 156 (1944), for this assessment.

Despite this history, the Court's judgment (leading to its overturning Chevron) of more  recent judicial history is that the degree of deference to agencies' legal interpretation was departure from this earlier jurisprudence, contrary to the provisions for judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and particularly 5 U.S.C. § 706.  The opinion cites as the political motivation for the APA Congress's appreciation for "a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices," albeit based on the Court's interpretation of that intent enunciated in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1948); somewhat ironically the opinion also cites a decision, Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670–671 (1986), handed down only two years after Chevron that the APA was enacted as part of a "comprehensive rethinking of the place of administrative agencies in a regime of separate and divided powers" that impliedly did not impact the scope and reach of Chevron, at least at that time and that iteration of the Court.  In reciting the majority's appreciation of the parsing of responsibilities between agencies and the courts by the APA (§ 706), the opinion finds codification of "the unremarkable, yet elemental proposition" of judicial primacy as set forth earlier in the opinion "dating back to Marbury" and thus finding a legislative imprimatur on this principle the enunciation of which should be unnecessary under the majority's interpretation of the Constitutional grounds therefor.  The majority recognizes in contrast there are certain instances where  Congress "mandate[s] that judicial review of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential" under § 706(2)(A)(abuse of discretion) and § 706(2)(E)(lack of substantial evidence).  But to the extent the APA was intended to be "the fundamental charter of the administrative state," Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 580 (2019), the opinion posits that "Congress surely would have articulated a similarly deferential standard applicable to questions of law had it intended to depart from the settled pre-APA understanding that deciding such questions was" reserved exclusively for the courts, which Congress in the majority's opinion did not do ("The text of the APA means what it says," an assertion supported to the majority's satisfaction by the legislative history and "various [contemporaneous] commentators").

In something of a rhetorical aside, the majority opinion recognizes that when expressly authorized by Congress (citing in footnotes 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5846(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, and 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) of the Environmental Protection Act), agencies can exercise "a certain degree of discretion," such as in giving meaning to statutory terms, citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977), or to "'fill up the details' in a statutory scheme," citing Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825), in a way that gives agencies some "flexibility" regarding the scope and meaning of terms like "appropriate" and "reasonable," citing Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015).  Nevertheless, the majority opinion asserts that "the best reading of a statute" is that even under these exceptional circumstances "the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits" (and of course, even recognizing these exceptions the majority's legal analysis, set forth below, precludes Congress from generally conferring broad interpretive powers on administrative agencies).

With this explication as prelude, the majority contends and bases the opinion on "[t]he deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing agency action cannot be squared with the APA."  In explaining their bases for this conclusion, the majority notes the history regarding legal review of agency decisions between enactment of the APA and Chevron as being on a "statute by statute" basis.  Chevron (ironically noted as being "decided . . . by a bare quorum of six Justices") changed all that, or course, in a "marked departure from the traditional approach."  In this regard, the opinion expressly setting forth the Chevron doctrine as it has been developed in the almost four decades since it was handed down by the Court.  The threshold question is whether Congress evinced a clear intent regarding ("ha[d] directly spoken to") the legal issue in question; if so, "that is the end of the matter."  If not, the Chevron Court enunciated (without "mentioning the APA, or acknowledging any doctrinal shift") a "two-step process":  first, "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue" and second, in instances where a reviewing court has determined Congress did not so speak (or is ambiguous) to decide whether the agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute" and defer thereto, ignoring "traditional interpretive tools." Asserting that, initially the Chevron decision "seemed destined to obscurity," citing a retrospective law review article, the majority characterizes subsequent reading and application of the two-step test as the "governing standard" within a few years of the decision.  Moreover, this judicial metamorphosis was justified as being consistent with Congressional intent and based on agency expertise, citing in support Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–741 (1996); Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 276–277 (2016); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 315 (2014); and National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005), raising at least some questions on the continued viability of these decisions.

The doctrinal issue in the majority's view is the failure of subsequent decisions (and the impossibility thereof in the majority's view) for reconciling the Chevron framework with the APA.  The opinion sets forth the contradictions supporting the majority's view of that impossibility using the express statutory language of § 706.  This amounts to courts "mechanically afford binding deference to agency interpretations, including those that have been inconsistent over time" (emphasis in opinion), "even when a pre-existing judicial precedent holds that the statute means something else."  And in doing so the opinion asserts "Chevron turns the statutory scheme for judicial review of agency action upside down."  Chevron (and the dissent, according to the majority opinion) confuse ambiguities in a statute with a delegation of statutory interpretation to the agency.  It has been the role of the judiciary to "routinely confront statutory ambiguities in cases having nothing to do with Chevron—cases that do not involve agency interpretations or delegations of authority" according to the opinion, statutes often having ambiguities needing interpretation and this having always been the role of the judiciary to resolve.  Recourse to "permissible" agency interpretation "makes no sense" unless it is an interpretation by a court according to the opinion.  "Chevron gravely erred . . . in concluding that the inquiry [i.e., statutory construction] is fundamentally different just because an administrative interpretation is in play," the opinion states.  And when the issue is an ambiguity regarding the proper scope of an agency's powers "abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate" (emphasis in opinion).

The majority reject the government's justifications in favor of Chevron (being consistent with Congressional intent based on subject matter expertise, "uniform construction" of the law, and leaving policy decisions to political actors) based on the judiciary's greater expertise in deciding legal issues, as set forth in Kisor and here because the majority recognize that "[c]ourts . . . do not decide such questions blindly" and have the parties and amici to rely upon for such technical information.  Thus the majority find unnecessary courts deferring to agency interpretation of the law under Chevron (and as often in questions of judicial interpretation the Court notes that "to the extent that Congress and the Executive Branch may disagree with how the courts have performed that job in a particular case, they are of course always free to act by revising the statute").  Regarding uniform construction, the majority reject this reasoning, inter alia, because "there is little value in imposing a uniform interpretation of a statute if that interpretation is wrong."  And "[t]he view that interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions amounts to policymaking suited for political actors rather than courts is especially mistaken" in the majority's view as misunderstanding ("a profound misconception") of the courts' role, if only because "the Framers crafted the Constitution to ensure that federal judges could exercise judgment free from the influence of the political branches."  The opinion sets forth succinctly the majority's view of judges' role in the process, having the obligation "to independently identify and respect such delegations of authority, police the outer statutory boundaries of those delegations, and ensure that agencies exercise their discretion consistent with the APA."

Putting the final nail in Chevron's coffin, the opinion states that "Chevron's justifying presumption is . . . a fiction," citing judicial utterances from Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas and using a history of the Court's decisions "pruning its presumption[s]" underlying Chevron as evidence thereof "in an effort to match Chevron's presumption to reality," citing for procedural distinctions United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001), and Justice Breyer's quotation of Mead to that effect in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 597 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting), as well as the distinctions raised by the Court in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U S. 211, 220 (2016), again relying on Mead, and for substantive applications (or refusal to apply Chevron) King v. Burwell, 576 U S. 473, 486 (2015).  The Court has required express delegation, as in West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), and refused to apply Chevron principles to judicial review questions, Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990); or schemes not administered by the agency, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 519–520 (2018) (there being "mixed signals" by the Court in criminal applications, comparing Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014), with Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 704, n. 18 (1995).  These decisions amount to a "byzantine set of preconditions and exceptions, [wherein] some courts have simply bypassed Chevron, saying it makes no difference for one reason or another" (followed by a footnote setting forth six examples and a spate of scholarly assessments).

This analysis ends with the reality that the Supreme Court "has not deferred to an agency interpretation under Chevron since 2016," citing Cuozzo.  And the majority's opinion that "[a]t best, our intricate Chevron doctrine has been nothing more than a distraction from the question that matters:  Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action?" while "at worst, it has required courts to violate the APA."

The only remaining issue for the majority is the question of stare decisis, a doctrine whose relevance is fraught with ambiguity for the Supreme Court (see "Alternative Reasoning for Supreme Court's Life Sciences Subject Matter Eligibility Jurisprudence").  Here the majority rejects the contention that stare decisis requires the Court to uphold Chevron ("It does not").  Applying the stare decisis considerations ("the quality of [the precedent's] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, . . . and reliance on the decision," citing Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 203 (2019) (quoting Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. 878, 917 (2018)) "all weigh in favor of letting Chevron go."  This is because the majority believe the principles enunciated in Chevron have been "fundamentally misguided," primarily because none of the cases applying this precedent have "grappled with the APA" (at least not how  these six Justices believe it needs to be grappled with).  The opinion cites the efforts to "revise its foundations and continually limit its application" and the "cottage industry" of legal scholars "attempting to decipher its basis and meaning," as well as concurring and dissenting opinions in earlier decisions by the Court "questioning its premises," with citations supporting this assertion.  With evident disdain, the majority assert that Chevron "[f]or its entire existence" was but a "rule in search of a justification," citing Knick, adding "if it was ever coherent enough to be called a rule at all."  As a practical matter, the majority believe the Chevron rule is "unworkable," due in part to the ambiguous meaning(s) to the requirement that a statute is ambiguous to justify deference to an agency's legal interpretation(s).  Legal principles that are "in the eye of the beholder" result in arbitrary decisions, the majority maintain, being "an impressionistic and malleable concept" (the majority citing the dissenting opinion here as "proving the point" insofar as the guidance for courts to "reach Chevron's second step when it finds, 'at the end of its interpretive work,' that 'Congress has left an ambiguity or gap'" as "being no guide at all").  "The statute still has a best meaning, necessarily discernible by a court deploying its full interpretive toolkit" is the majority's guiding principle and a case being an "agency case" does not relieve a court of its responsibility to interpret the statute (and excoriating the dissent's "test" as being "all the dissent can come up with, after four decades of judicial experience attempting to identify ambiguity under Chevron," as evidence of the "futility of the exercise").  The majority see nothing but failed attempts at clarifying the Chevron doctrine and in the process becoming "an impediment, rather than an aid, to accomplishing the basic judicial task of 'say[ing] what the law is'" under Marbury.  "At this point, all that remains of Chevron is a decaying husk with bold pretensions" in the majority's opinion, not worthy of being retained on stare decisis principles.

Turning to reliance interests (which form another basis for retaining earlier decisions on stare decisis grounds), the majority do not find the characteristics of a "stable background rule" that would justify maintaining the Chevron precedent.  In addition to courts ignoring or turning away from the rule, the doctrine does not provide "a clear or easily applicable standard," citing Janus.  Indeed, the majority opine that Chevron "affirmatively destroys" reliance interests by granting "a license authorizing an agency to change positions as much as it likes, with '[u]nexplained inconsistency' being 'at most . . . a reason for holding an interpretation to be . . . arbitrary and capricious,'" citing Brand X Internet Services.  And Chevron "allows agencies to change course even when Congress has given them no power to do so," according to the majority, which "fosters unwarranted instability in the law," and leaving "an eternal fog of uncertainty" as a result.  It is the Court's responsibility to correct its mistakes and not an occasion for the law to change erratically; in order for the law to "develop in a principled and intelligible fashion," citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986), the Court must "leave Chevron behind.

Finally, the majority disavows any interpretation that this decision should call into question earlier decisions relying on or invoking the Chevron standard, based on statutory stare decisis principles and because "[m]ere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a "'special justification'" for overruling such a holding, because to say a precedent relied on Chevron is, at best, "just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided," citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).

The closing paragraph provides Chevron's epitaph:

Chevron is overruled.  Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.  Careful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that inquiry.  And when a particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it.  But courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.

This decision has been met with predictions that it will result in release of an unbridled judiciary on the workings of the administrative state (the propensity for the judiciary to act in this fashion pre-Loper has been discussed; see "The Tyranny of the Judiciary").  That is not the only outcome, and alternatives and potential outcomes (as well as an explication of the dissent in Loper) will be the subject of future posts.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024)
Opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett; concurring opinions by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch; dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson as it applies to No. 22–1219; Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22–451