• By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealIn a conundrum worthy of a law school civil procedure examination, plaintiff Gensetix found itself apparently with no remedy for infringement by Baylor College of Medicine, Diakonos Research Ltd., and William Decker of patents licensed from the University of Texas (UT), when UT refused to join as a necessary party on sovereign immunity grounds.  The Federal Circuit, in a fractured decision reminiscent of the alignment of the judges in Amgen v Sandoz, remedied this situation in its decision last Friday in Gensetix, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System.

    The case arose related to Gensetix' exclusive license of UT-owned patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 8,728,806 and 9,333,248 relating to methods of modifying a patient's immune system to kill cancer cells.  Defendant Dr. Decker had invented the claimed methods when we was a UT faculty member and then left (as professors are wont to do) to join the faculty at Baylor.

    The license between Gensetix and UT provided that Gensetix was obliged to pursue infringement at its own expense and was entitled to any recovery from such enforcement efforts.  However, should Gensetix fail to pursue its legal remedies within six months of obtaining knowledge that there was infringement, UT had a secondary right to pursue enforcement of these patents (with a corresponding entitlement to any recovery).  There were provisions in the contract of mutual cooperation between the parties of any such lawsuits.  Importantly, however, the contract also contained an express provision that UT did not waive its sovereign immunity as a State by entering into the contract.

    Gensetix attempted to join UT under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 19(a) as an involuntary plaintiff upon filing suit against Baylor and Dr. Decker when UT refused to voluntarily join.  UT responded with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) on the grounds that as an arm of the State, UT was shielded from compulsory joinder by the State's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  Baylor responded by arguing that UT was a necessary party because it was the owner/assignee of the patents-in-suit and thus, if State sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment precluded involuntary joinder then the District Court should dismiss under Rule 19(b).  The District Court agreed and dismissed the case.

    The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part (as to the sovereign immunity issue), reversed-in-part (as to the motion to dismiss), and remanded, in a decision by Judge O'Malley joined by Judge Newman with regard to reversing the District Court's grant of Baylor's motion to dismiss and Judge Taranto on affirming UT's exercise of sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of Texas.  Judge O'Malley's opinion with regard to the sovereign immunity issue was straightforward.  The Eleventh Amendment (as interpreted by the Supreme Court; the actual wording of the Amendment is more limited in scope) precludes involuntary joinder of a State in a lawsuit brought by a citizen of the State or other States (or a foreign country, for constitutional completeness).  The opinion rejects the distinction advanced by Gensetix that by its terms the Amendment merely "bars suits brought by private citizens against the state."  Rather, the Court noted that the Amendment has a broader sweep than that, citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 n.5 (1999), insofar as the amendment "serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties," citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996).  The Court found no basis for Gensetix' proposition that these principles do not apply in the context of joining a State as an involuntary plaintiff, distinguishing Gensetix' cited authority, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997), on the grounds that in Regents the arm of the State had brought the lawsuit in California and the issue was whether it could be forced to litigate in Indiana on a motion to transfer (i.e., whether sovereign immunity could be used to enforce which district court heard the matter; it could not).  Indeed, the opinion finds this distinction "dispositive," in that UT was not a plaintiff in this case, did not bring the action ab initio, and had refused to join as a plaintiff.  Under these circumstances, the Court held that State sovereign immunity precluded joining UT as an involuntary plaintiff under Rule 19(a).

    Finally, the panel majority rejected Gensetix' contention that UT entering into an exclusive contract imposed an "implied obligation" (an argument that registered with Judge Newman in her dissent on this issue; vide infra) to support Gensetix' infringement suit against Baylor and Dr. Decker.  "[I]t is of no moment that the license agreement requires initiation of an infringement suit by Gensetix or cooperation by UT in any infringement suit," according to the opinion, because "[a]lthough UT willingly entered into the license agreement, so too, did Gensetix" and Gensetix was aware of the express reservation of sovereign immunity that was also part of that contract.

    With regard to the issue of whether Rule 19(b) required the District Court to dismiss the case in the absence of UT as a necessary plaintiff, Judge Newman joined Judge O'Malley in concluding that it did not.  Reviewing the District Court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard, the Court held that dismissal was an abuse of discretion because the circumstances were not consistent with the reasoning behind the Rule.  Rule 19(b) provides that, where a necessary party cannot be joined, "the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed."  This inquiry has been understood to depend on four considerations:  "(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered might prejudice the missing required party or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided (3) whether a judgment rendered in the required party's absence would be adequate; and (4) 'whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.'"  The District Court based its decision to dismiss on "three out of the four Rule 19(b) factors weigh[ing] in favor of dismissing the case."  With regard to the first factor, the District Court held that "a judgment rendered in UT's absence might prejudice UT or the parties to the litigation," citing A123 Systems, Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (that risk being that UT's patent(s) might be invalidated).  This precedent was not apropos here, according to the panel majority on this issue, because unlike in A123 Systems, Gensetix had a license in every field making identical the parties' interests in the patents-in-suit.  "The prejudice to UT is minimal, or at least substantially mitigated, because, unlike the licensee in A123, Gensetix will adequately protect UT's interests in the validity of the patents-in-suit," according to the opinion.  As to the second prong, the District Court had dismissed this as a risk inherent in patent licensing from a sovereign, which the panel majority held was an abuse of discretion because "the district court should have given weight to the fact that Gensetix is without recourse to assert its patent rights because UT cannot be feasibly joined."  Also contrary to the proper application of the District Court's discretion was its application of the third prong, because according to the panel majority there was no risk to defendants of multiple suits because the contract provided Gensetix with the primary right to sue and UT with a secondary right triggered only if Gensetix did not sue within six months of knowledge of infringing activity.  As for the fourth prong, the majority held that the District Court did not properly weigh as a factor that Gensetix had no ability to assert its licensed patent rights in the absence of UT as a party unless the District Court denied Baylor's motion to dismiss.

    The panel majority on this issue held that the District Court's error was that instead of considering these factors it relied too heavily on UT's status as an arm of the State and the sovereign immunity asserted on that basis.  The District Court's grant of Baylor's motion to dismiss was an abuse of discretion according to the panel majority and accordingly the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded on those grounds.

    Judge Newman's opinion, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment, was based on her opinion that State sovereign immunity should not be used as a shield in cases like this one where the "arm of the State" actively engaged in licensing its patents to private parties.  The Eleventh Amendment, according to Judge Newman, "does not insulate a State from its contractual obligations."  "[T]he State must pay its bills," according to Judge Newman, and in like manner it must comply with its contractual obligations.  The Judge cited Justice Breyer's dissent in College Savings Bank in this regard, wherein "[w]hen a State engages in ordinary commercial ventures, it acts like a private person, outside the area of its 'core' responsibilities, and in a way unlikely to prove essential to the fulfillment of a basic governmental obligation."  In Judge Newman's view, UT's position is directly contrary to its obligation under the terms of the contract with Gensetix to "cooperate" with regard to patent infringement litigation brought in the first instance by Gensetix under rights granted by the contract.  Judge Newman disagreed with the majority that upholds that exercise of sovereign immunity.

    With regard to the Rule 19(b) issue, Judge Newman concurred with the result but would have held that UT transferred sufficient rights to Gensetix in its license that Gensetix should be entitled to sue infringers "in its own name" without joining UT as a necessary party.

    Judge Taranto, concurring in part and dissenting in part, believes that the District Court properly dismissed under Rule 19(b), relying on Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008), which held that "when a sovereign entity is a required party under Rule 19(a), is protected against joinder by sovereign immunity, and makes a non-frivolous assertion that it will be prejudiced by a suit proceeding in its absence, a district court is generally obligated to dismiss the suit under Rule 19(b)."  While the panel majority distinguished Pimentel on its facts, Judge Taranto believes that such distinctions are inadequate and the Federal Circuit erred in reversing the District Court's decision to dismiss.  Judge Taranto sees the Supreme Court's holding in Pimentel as a "bright line rule" mandating dismissal.  The Judge also sees that there could be an occasion for UT's patent interests to be harmed in its absence and to be precluded from relitigating the bases for such harm should the need for UT to assert these patents arise.  And as for Gensetix' predicament, Judge Taranto cited the Supreme Court's recent Allen v. Cooper decision for the reality that "state sovereign immunity jurisprudence contemplates that patent owners may be left without a remedy when States are involved."

    Gensetix, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas System (Fed. Cir. 2020)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, O'Malley, and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge O'Malley; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Circuit Judge Newman; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Circuit Judge Taranto

  • By James L. Lovsin —

    Federal Circuit SealLast week, in Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Hulu, LLC, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may consider patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for substitute claims.  The appeal raises issues of finality as well as the Board's authority.  Judge O'Malley filed a dissenting opinion—nearly as long as the majority opinion—on both issues, which may signal that this case could be headed for rehearing.  Judge O'Malley stated that as a result of the Court's decision, "when it comes to substitute claims, the Board can engage in full-blown examination."

    The parties were involved in parallel district court litigation and IPR related to U.S. Patent No. 8,566,960 (the '960 patent).  In the IPR appealed from here, the Board issued a Final Written Decision, concluding that all of the granted '960 claims were unpatentable and denying Uniloc's motion to amend because the proposed substitute claims were patent ineligible.  Hulu opposed the proposed substitute claims on multiple grounds, including § 101.

    Meanwhile, the District Court dismissed Uniloc's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the '960 claims were invalid for lack of patentable subject matter.  The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed and Uniloc did not file a cert. petition in the Supreme Court.

    The Board's final written decision predated the Federal Circuit's affirmance in the district court litigation by about a week.  However, after the Federal Circuit affirmance, Uniloc sought rehearing on the IPR at the Board.  The Board denied rehearing on the merits rather than concluding that the IPR was moot because of the District Court invalidity judgment.

    On appeal, Uniloc challenged the Board's authority to consider § 101 in resolving a motion to amend.  While Hulu defended the Board's authority, it also argued that the appeal was moot because of the District Court judgment.  The PTO intervened, arguing that the appeal was not moot and the Board had authority to consider § 101 for proposed substitute claims.

    Mootness

    The majority (Judges Wallach and Taranto) addressed mootness both procedurally and substantively.  To begin, the majority found that Hulu waived the mootness argument.  Hulu never raised it with the Board on rehearing and never filed a cross-appeal with the Court seeking vacatur of the Board's decision.  In any event, the majority rejected Hulu's argument on the merits, noting that Uniloc can receive relief on appeal if the Court agrees that the Board erred in considering § 101.

    Judge O'Malley dissented on mootness.  She explained that once the District Court's invalidity judgment became final, the '960 patent ceased to exist.  Because the '960 patent was a nullity, Uniloc could not substitute claims into it.  Put another way, after the '960 patent was invalidated, Uniloc had nothing to give up for the substitute claims.

    The majority disagreed with Judge O'Malley's understanding of a substitute claim.  Rather, the majority explained that substitute claims exist whether or not the original claims do.

    Although the Board's authority to consider § 101 for substitute claims is the bigger issue here, it will be interesting to see how the impact of a district court judgment on motions to amend and substitute claims in IPR develops.  Judge O'Malley's concerns with finality in this appeal echo her disagreement with the Federal Circuit's Fresenius line of cases.  The Supreme Court denied a cert. petition on that issue last month—Chrimar Systems, Inc. v. Ale USA Inc., 19-1124.

    The Board's Authority to Consider § 101

    The majority concluded that the text, structure, and legislative history of the America Invents Act confirm the Board's authority.  The majority and dissent engaged in dueling statutory construction of §§ 311, 316(d), and 318 in regard to this question.  In short, the majority concluded that § 311's limit of IPR petitions to certain §§ 102 and 103 unpatentability grounds does not apply to motions to amend and substitute claims.

    The majority also explained that Federal Circuit case law on inter partes reexamination supported the Board's authority.  In this regard, the majority relied on In re NTP, 654 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2011), where the Court held that priority under § 120 could be considered in reexamination.  In dissent, Judge O'Malley distinguished reexamination from IPR.  She noted that unlike reexamination conducted by a patent examiner, IPR is an adjudication conducted by an APJ.  With respect to NTP, Judge O'Malley noted that unlike § 101, § 120 is not a patentability provision, and that the NTP Court acknowledged that in reexamination original claims cannot be challenged on § 101 grounds.

    Further, the majority rejected Uniloc's argument that Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc), forecloses the Board's authority to consider § 101 for substitute claims.  The majority explained that while Aqua Products stands for the petitioner bearing the burden of proof on unpatentability of substitute claims, that case is silent on whether a petitioner, like Hulu, can raise a § 101 challenge to such claims.  In dissent, Judge O'Malley explained that the plurality opinion in Aqua Products (joined by five of the eleven judges rehearing that appeal) addressed a question closely related to the majority's and dissent's disagreement about the statutory interpretation of § 318 in this appeal.

    Going forward, it will be interesting to see how often § 101 is used to oppose and deny motions to amend in IPR and whether resolving motions to amend becomes "full-blown examination" as Judge O'Malley predicts.

    Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Hulu, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2020)
    Panel: Circuit Judges O'Malley, Wallach, and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Wallach; dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge O'Malley

  • CalendarAugust 5-6, 2020 – Advanced Summit on Life Sciences Patents Conference (American Conference Institute)

    August 18, 2020 – "CRISPR Ownership Disputes: Current Status and Future Prospects" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    September 11, 2020 – IP, Technology & Social Justice in the Age of Coronavirus (Center for Intellectual Property, Information & Privacy Law at UIC John Marshall Law School and Institute for Intellectual Property & Social Justice) – 7:40 am to 3:00 pm (CT)

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Secondary Considerations: Latest Guideposts" on July 30, 2020 from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (ET).  Paul Ainsworth of Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox; Jennifer Huang of Fish & Richardson, PC; and Stephen Yoder of IBM Corp. will review and analyze the latest judicial guideposts regarding the role and weight of objective indicia in evaluating the non-obviousness of a claimed invention, and focus on recent decisions from the Federal Circuit and PTAB, which have clarified the nexus aspect of this issue.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (IPO member) or $150 (non-member) (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • LexisNexisLexisNexis IP and IPWatchdog will be offering a webinar entitled "A Conversation with the Commissioner: A Look Inside Patent Processes at the USPTO" on July 30, 2020 at 12:00 pm (ET).  Gene Quinn of IPWatchdog.com and Megan McLoughlin of LexisNexis IP will be joined by Drew Hirshfeld, Commissioner for Patents; Jay Kramer, Group Director Patent Operations; and Matthew Such, Group Director Patent Operations of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for a discussion that will focus on the patent classification system, how applications are routed to art units, how applications are assigned to patent examiners, and other processes at the USPTO.

    There is no registration fee for this webinar.  However, those interested in registering for the webinar, should do so here.

  • Mathys & SquireMathys & Squire will be offering a webinar entitled "Supplementary Protection Certificates in Europe (Part 1)" on July 30, 2020 from 6:00 to 7:00 pm (GMT Summer Time).  Peter Arch and Alexander Robinson of Mathys & Squire LLP will provide an introduction to the basic requirements for obtaining Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) protection, the types of products which can be protected, and the scope and duration of protection.

    While there is no cost to participate in the program, those interested in attending the webinar can register here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Bat ResearchAs the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted life throughout the world this spring, bats have been a prominent feature in news stories and recriminations about how the pandemic started (and being blamed even more than happenings in China, although to be fair the effects of the pandemic, good and bad, have been more the consequence of how countries and their citizens and their leaders have reacted to the virus than merely the virus itself).  In view of the state of modern biology, it is not surprising that the bat genome is an interesting area of study, and this week an international team of researchers published results that shed light on bat biology and evolution (if not on their propensity to harbor viruses capable of such devastating effects on humans).

    The paper, entitled "Six reference-quality genomes reveal evolution of bat adaptations," was published in Nature.  As the authors explain, the paper provides "the first reference-quality genomic sequence of six bat species, specifically Rhinolophus ferrumequinum, Rousettus aegyptiacus, Phyllostomus discolor, Myotis myotis, Pipistrellus kuhlii, and Molossus molossus (only a few of the 1,400 known bat species, comprising 20% of all existing mammalian species).  This genomic information allowed these scientists to elucidate bat evolutionary antecedents, specifically their origin within the Scrotifera, a broad group that encompasses most placental mammals.  Not surprisingly, these studies also revealed positive selection for hearing-related genes, and selective loss of certain immunity-related genes, in particular ones (such as NF-κB regulators) related to inflammation.  There is a striking expansion of antiviral APOBEC3 genes the authors believe is related to the bat's exceptional immunity to viral infection.

    The researchers had a number of unique phenotypic traits exhibited by bats to explore for their genetic bases, including flight, echolocation, extreme longevity, and perhaps more relevant to their current notoriety, unique immunity.  Applying what they termed "state-of-the-art sequencing technologies and assembly algorithms," these scientists report that they were able to generate contiguous genomic sequences that were ~100-fold more contiguous than earlier attempts (and thus less prone to error) and at ~100% completeness.  From these data, the authors report they annotated between 19,122 and 21,303 protein-coding genes with an annotation quality higher than that obtained to date for dog, cat, horse, cow and pig, and surpassed (not surprisingly) only by mouse and human annotated genomic sequences.  The size of the bat genome determined using these analyses is approximately 2 gigabasepairs (Gb), which the researchers characterize as being smaller than for other placental mammals (which range from 2.5-3.5Gbp).  This disparity was found to be related to lower content of transposable elements in the bat genome, with there being extreme variability (in both type and number) of more recently inserted transposable elements compared with other mammals.

    Evolutionarily, the genomic sequence data is consistent with one of four clades that diverged in the late Cretaceous (100-66 million years ago, Mya), illustrated by this diagram (click to expand):

    Bat Genetic Tree(where green designates the Laurasitheria which contain the origins of bats; blue, Euarchontoglires; orange, Xenarthra; and yellow, Afrotheria).  These results arose from comparisons of 12,931 orthologous protein-coding genes and 10,857 orthologous conserved noncoding elements from genomes of 48 mammalian species.

    Having developed these phylogenetic relationships, the authors next turned to what they termed "the genomic basis of exceptional traits" that have arisen in bats.  These comparisons identified nine genes having undergone positive selection from ancestral species, including LRP2, TJP2, and SERPINB6 genes, all of which are involved, inter alia, in hearing.  Specifically, these genes are expressed in cochlea and, in humans are associated with deafness.  Interestingly, the LRP2 gene contains a sequence change that encodes an amino acid substitution (methionine) specific to bats capable of echolocation; bats that do not express this phenotype — such as pteropodid bats — have a different amino acid (threonine) encoded at this position.  Patterns of inheritance of microduplications in the TJP2 gene were interpreted by these scientists to mean that the echolocation-related mutations arose in bat ancestors but were lost in bats who do not exhibit this trait, providing an evolutionary answer to the question of whether echolocation had arisen multiple times independently in these bats.

    The comparative screening experiments also provided information on genes related to immunity.  These included "the B-cell-specific chemokine CXCL13, the asthma-associated NPSR1 and INAVA (a gene that is involved in intestinal barrier integrity and enhancing NF-κB signaling in macrophages).  Ten additional immunity-related genes identified in these studies included "IL17D and IL1B (which are involved in immune system regulation and NF-κB activation), and LCN2 and GP2 (which are involved in responses to pathogens)."  These genes showed the presence of "bat-specific" sequence variants that had undergone positive selection during bat evolution, supporting their role in the development of the pathogen-resistance phenotype seen in bats.  In addition to these bat-specific sequence variants, the paper reports ten genes lost or inactivated in bats that are expressed in non-bat members of the Laurasiatheria.  These include two genes, LRRC70 (known to "potentiates cellular responses to multiple cytokines and amplif[y] NF-κB activation mediated by bacterial lipopolysaccharides") and IL36G (that encodes a pro-inflammatory interleukin).

    Another group of immune-related genes are those that have been differentially amplified in bats; most relevant are genes in the APOBEC gene family which is expanded in bats at the APOBEC3 locus (which encodes "DNA- and RNA-editing enzymes that can be induced by interferon signaling and are implicated in restricting viral infection and transposon activity").  These genes were found as a "small" expansion in ancestral bat species and "multiple, lineage-specific expansions that involve up to 14 duplication events" in later-arising bat species.  Consistent with the evolution of pathogen (particularly viral) resistance in bats, the genomic analyses reported in this paper found evidence of prior viral infection in the form of endogenous viral elements (EVEs) in three predominant non-retroviral forms.  These genes encoded viral envelope (env) proteins similar to alpha retroviruses which had previously been thought to be confined to avian species.

    The paper also reports evolution-related changes in non-coding RNAs.  These results showed that "nearly all of the annotated noncoding RNA genes are shared across all six bat genomes . . . , and between bats and other mammals [for example, 95.8–97.4% are shared between bats and humans]."  Of the 286 known conserved miRNA gene families found in mammals, eleven were "significantly contracted" in bats and thirteen were lost.  For single-copy miRNA genes, one (known as miR-337-3p) had unique variation in bats related to binding specificity and was "pervasively expressed."  The researchers also reported finding 122-261 novel miRNAs, with twelve being shared in all six bat species interrogated (two of which were shown to be functional in regulating gene expression).

    The authors conclude by stating:

    Our conservative genome-wide screens investigating gene gain, loss and selection revealed novel candidate genes that are likely to contribute tolerance to viral infections among bats.  Consistent with this finding, we also found that bat genomes contain a high diversity of endogenized viruses.  We also uncovered genes involved in hearing that exhibit mutations specific to laryngeal-echolocating bats and ancestral patterns of selection.  . . .  Finally, we identified and experimentally validated miRNAs that are evolutionary novelties or that carry bat-specific changes in their seed sequence.  Changes in these important regulators of gene expression may have contributed to changes in developmental and behavioural processes in bats.

    And perhaps more importantly these researchers recognized that:

    These high-quality bat genomes, together with future genomes, will provide a rich resource to address the evolutionary history and genomic basis of bat adaptations and biology[].  These genomes enable a better understanding of the molecular mechanisms that underlie the exceptional immunity and longevity of bats, allowing us to identify and validate molecular targets that ultimately could be harnessed to alleviate human ageing and disease.  For example, we predict that our reference-quality bat genomes will be tools that are heavily relied upon in future studies focusing on how bats tolerate coronavirus infections.  This is of particular global relevance given the current pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and ultimately may provide solutions to increase human survivability—thus providing a better outcome for this, and future, pandemics.

    * The researchers hie from the Max Planck Institute of Molecular Biology and Genetics, Institute of Systems Biology, and Institute of Physics, Dresden, DE; The Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, NL; the School of Biology and Environmental Science, the Conway Institute of Biomolecular and Biomedical Science, and the Earth Institute, University College Dublin; the Australian National University, Canberra;  the Department of Biological Science, Texas Tech; the Department of Ecology and Evolution, and Consortium for Inter-disciplinary Environmental Research, SUNY Stony Brook; Department of Sciences, John jay College of Criminal Justice; Department of Biological Sciences, University of Bristol; Department of Biology, University of Konstanz; Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, Panama City; ISEM, University of Montpellier; Zoological Institute and Museum, University of Greifswald; Department of Migration, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, Radolfzell; Vertebrate Genomes Laboratory and the Laboratory of Neurogenetics of Language, The Rockefeller University; Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Chevy Chase, Maryland; Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, NL; and the Facility of Computer Science, Technical University, Dresden

  • Note:  The below is a sarcastic parody, in the spirit of our earlier sarcastic parodies.

    By Michael Borella —

    Cover US 4 405 829WASHINGTON D.C., June 23, 1984.  In a unanimous decision, the Federal Circuit has ruled U.S. Patent No. 4,405,829 invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, finding the claimed invention directed to an abstract idea.  The '829 patent, assigned to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), was the brainchild of three of its professors, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman.  Lauded in academic circles as one of the first viable public-key cryptosystems and duly granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Court nonetheless found that the patent lacked an inventive concept necessary for patentability.

    Soon after issuance, MIT sought to license the patent to various companies developing security software and hardware.  Speaking under condition of anonymity, in-house counsel at one of these companies said, "We knew that there was no way the courts would uphold this patent, so there was no reason to take it seriously."  A number of these potential licensees joined a declaratory judgment action, asking the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts to find the claims of the patent ineligible.  The District Court did so, and MIT appealed to the Federal Circuit.

    Claim 1, which was agreed to be representative, recites:

    Claim 1

    The Court began its analysis "by first determining whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea."  This did not take long, as it noted that, "[t]he focus of the claims, as is plain from their terms, is on encoding a message into ciphertext using mathematical techniques and decoding the message from the ciphertext using complementary mathematical techniques — that is all abstract."

    MIT countered, arguing that the claimed invention was "revolutionary in nature."  It asserted that, prior to the '829 patent, encryption was largely based on symmetric keys.  Such systems involved using a key to encrypt a message to ciphertext, and the same key again to decrypt the ciphertext back into the message.  The disadvantage of such a system is that the symmetric key had to first be shared or distributed across an insecure medium in order to be effective.  The claimed invention, according to MIT, overcame this technical barrier by generating two mathematically inverse keys — a public key (e), and a private key (based on d, p, and q).  The security of the system relied on the intractability of factoring large prime numbers (p and q).  Further, MIT contended that the claimed cryptosystem would facilitate "many future innovations, such as electronic commerce, virtual private networks, security of stored data, and military communications."

    The Court was not convinced, stating that "even if the techniques claimed are groundbreaking, innovative, or brilliant, that is not enough for eligibility — a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea."  Notably, the Court found that "the subject matter is nothing but a series of mathematical calculations based on selected information."  Moreover, the Court was skeptical about the potential of the claimed cryptosystem, relying on statements made by the challengers' expert indicating that "it would be dozens of years before computers were powerful enough to carry out the claimed exponentiations a reasonable time frame."

    Finding the claim directed to an abstract idea, the Court moved on to determining whether the remaining elements of the claim constitute an inventive concept.  Such a concept needs to be "sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent eligible application."  Here, the Court found that all additional elements, such as the encoding means, decoding means, and communications channel, "merely invoke well-understood, routine, conventional components and activity to apply the abstract idea identified previously."  Indeed, the Court noted that the encoding means and decoding means were "functionality claimed at a high level of generality, thus failing to limit the claim to a particular embodiment of this abstract idea."  Particularly, "nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than an off-the-shelf, conventional computer, or components thereof."

    MIT attempted to establish that its technique was unconventional, but the Court rapidly shot down that notion.  It held that "the mathematical principles that MIT refers to may indeed be innovative, but they are also abstract," and "one cannot argue that a concept held abstract under part one of the analysis is inventive under part two."  Additionally, the Court observed that "the allegedly unconventional technique did no more than apply longstanding, well-understood mathematical operations — multiplication, exponentiation, and modulus, for example."

    Thus, the claims lack an inventive concept and fail the § 101 test.  The Court summed up by stating, "[a]n inventor who makes an advance such as this one cannot obtain patent protection for the advance itself and must seek protection outside of patent law, such as in the law of trade secrets."

  • By Michael Borella —

    Introduction

    Federal Circuit SealPacket Intelligence sued NetScout in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,665,725, 6,839,751, and 6,954,789.  The District Court ruled that all three patents were valid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 102, and infringed.  The § 101 dispute was tried at the bench.  NetScout appealed.

    The core technological aspects under dispute are described reasonably well in the '789 patent as follows:

    Some prior art packet monitors classify packets into connection flows.  The term "connection flow" is commonly used to describe all the packets involved with a single connection.  A conversational flow, on the other hand, is the sequence of packets that are exchanged in any direction as a result of an activity—for instance, the running of an application on a server as requested by a client.  It is desirable to be able to identify and classify conversational flows rather than only connection flows.  The reason for this is that some conversational flows involve more than one connection, and some even involve more than one exchange of packets between a client and server.

    A hypothetical example of this might be that a packet monitor examining packets only on the granularity of TCP connection flows (defined by a 5-tuple of source and destination IP address, source and destination port, and protocol) might not be able to identify two TCP connection flows involving in the same transaction as being related to one another as members of a conversational flow.  Notably, the '789 patent has a June 1999 priority date, a time frame in which this type of packet monitor typically was only able to identify flows based on static filters.  Today's packet monitors largely have the ability to dynamically identify multiple related flows.

    Claim 19 of the '789 patent was agreed upon to be representative, and recites:

    19.  A packet monitor for examining packets passing through a connection point on a computer network, each packet conforming to one or more protocols, the monitor comprising:
        (a) a packet acquisition device coupled to the connection point and configured to receive packets passing through the connection point;
        (b) an input buffer memory coupled to and configured to accept a packet from the packet acquisition device;
        (c) a parser subsystem coupled to the input buffer memory and including a slicer, the parsing subsystem configured to extract selected portions of the accepted packet and to output a parser record containing the selected portions;
        (d) a memory for storing a database comprising none or more flow-entries for previously encountered conversational flows, each flow-entry identified by identifying information stored in the flow-entry;
        (e) a lookup engine coupled to the output of the parser subsystem and to the flow-entry memory and configured to lookup whether the particular packet whose parser record is output by the parser subsystem has a matching flow-entry, the looking up using at least some of the selected packet portions and determining if the packet is of an existing flow; and
        (f) a flow insertion engine coupled to the flow-entry memory and to the lookup engine and configured to create a flow-entry in the flow-entry database, the flow-entry including identifying information for future packets to be identified with the new flow-entry, the lookup engine configured such that if the packet is of an existing flow, the monitor classifies the packet as belonging to the found existing flow; and if the packet is of a new flow, the flow insertion engine stores a new flow-entry for the new flow in the flow-entry database, including identifying information for future packets to be identified with the new flow-entry,
        wherein the operation of the parser subsystem de-pends on one or more of the protocols to which the packet conforms.

    We will discuss the Court's § 101 analysis of this claim.

    In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand involves a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But elements or combinations of elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional will not lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.  While this inquiry is generally carried out as a matter of law, factual issues can come into play when determining whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional.

    Notably, procedure for the proper application of this test with the abstract idea exception has been inconsistently defined and is confusing in practice.  A potentially more workable definition of patent eligibility is that a claim is directed to an abstract idea if all of its elements are either non-specific, address a non-technical problem, or known in the art.  Thus, a claim is more likely to survive a § 101 challenge if one or more elements thereof have three qualities:  specificity, a technical problem that they solve, and some degree of novelty.

    The Majority Opinion

    Judge Lourie wrote for the majority, which was he and Judge Hughes.  The majority provided an overview of the District Court's § 101 analysis, of note being that the District Court made a series of factual findings with respect to the claimed invention versus the prior art and based its holding of eligibility on those findings.

    In any event, the majority framed its opinion by stating that "[i]n our eligibility analysis, we consider the claim as a whole and read it in light of the specification."  The majority cited to a number of previous Federal Circuit decisions relating to the patent-eligibility of computer-implemented and networking inventions.  In this, the majority emphasized that the inquiry often turns on "whether the focus of the claims is on a specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which computers are invoked merely as a tool."

    With the § 101 framework in place, the majority agreed with the District Court that claim 19 was not directed to an abstract idea.  Particularly, "claim 19 purports to meet a challenge unique to computer networks, identifying disjointed connection flows in a network environment" and provides "detail how this is achieved in several steps."

    Moreover, "[t]he asserted patents' specifications make clear that the claimed invention presented a technological solution to a technological problem."  They "explain that known network monitors were unable to identify disjointed connection flows to each other, and the focus of the claims is a specific improvement in computer technology: a more granular, nuanced, and useful classification of network traffic."

    NetScout argued that Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC mandates limiting the Alice part one analysis to the specification's concrete embodiments.  But the majority observed that Two-Way Media stands for the notion that the claims, "not the specification, must include an inventive concept" under Alice part two.  Since the majority concluded that claim 19 was not abstract under part one, it did not have to reach part two.

    Accordingly, the claimed invention was found to be patent-eligible.

    Judge Reyna's Dissent

    Judge Reyna wrote in dissent because, in his view, "the claims are directed to the abstract idea of identifying data packets as belonging to conversational flows rather than discrete connection flows."  Judge Reyna stressed that "the asserted advance over the prior art is the classification of data packets according to the flow of data associated with given activities rather than potentially disjointed exchanges transmitted over individual connections."  And, he found this distinction to be "conceptual, not technological, in the absence of specific means by which that classification is achieved."

    The crux of the disagreement between Judge Reyna and the majority is that Judge Reyna limited his § 101 inquiry to the language of the claim, while the majority looked to the specification.  Judge Reyna noted that claim 19 recites "only a general method of sorting data packets according to any flow, not a specific means of sorting packets by conversational flow," and that "the claim does not recite how the individual packets are actually identified as belonging to a conversational flow beyond the functional requirement that identifying information is used."

    Judge Reyna admitted that the specification provides the necessary detail, but "[n]one of these processes or components are recited in claim 19, and the claim elements have not been construed as limited to the structures and processes disclosed in the embodiments."  Thus, "the components and operations actually recited in the claims do not provide the specificity required to transform a claim from one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of achieving it."  Without this detail, Judge Reyna believes that the invention is drawn to information processing "falling within the realm of abstract ideas."

    Conclusion

    The majority found claim 19 to be a reasonably specific technical invention that provided an advance over the prior art.  Judge Reyna disputed this finding because he views the claim as being non-specific in terms of its technical character, thereby making any such improvement to be too abstract for patenting.  The case turned on a disagreement in fundamental principle — when and how should one read the technical aspects of a specification into the broader language of the claims, if at all?  Until this question is answered, the appropriate level of detail to place into claims will remain an open issue.

    Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Systems, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2020)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Lourie, Reyna, and Hughes
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Lourie; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Circuit Judge Reyna

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Supreme Court Building #1Arthrex recently filed a(nother) certiorari petition with the Supreme Court, this time in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., which has also been the subject of petitions from the U.S. government and Smith & Nephew.  (This is the later-decided case between the parties, and has as its hallmark the Federal Circuit's decision that Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, or PTAB, were improperly appointed under the Appointments Clause because they are principal officers requiring Presidential appointment and Senate approval).

    The Questions Presented are:

    1.  Whether the court of appeals' severance remedy is consistent with congressional intent, where Congress has long considered tenure protections essential to secure the independence and impartiality of administrative judges.

    2.  Whether the court of appeals correctly held that the elimination of APJ tenure protections was sufficient to render APJs inferior officers, even though their decisions still are not reviewable by any principal executive officer.

    The genesis of the questions Arthrex petitions the Court to review, according to its petition, is "Congress's decision to grant administrative patent judges ("APJs") final authority to revoke previously issued patents" wherein there is "[n]o superior officer in the Executive Branch can review their decisions."  These characteristics are those of principal officers, Arthrex argues, and the Federal Circuit was correct in so deciding.  Where the Federal Circuit erred, in Arthrex's view, was in not leaving it to Congress to remedy the situation but rather by imposing a judicial fix:  it "eliminated the tenure protections that shield APJs from politics and improper influence."  "That remedy," Arthrex contends, "not only contravenes congressional intent, but fails to cure the Appointments Clause violation."  This is because the inter partes review procedures enacted in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) were intended to be "adjudicative and fair," and this intent would be thwarted if as a consequence of the Federal Circuit's decision APJs could be removed "for policy reasons, political reasons, or no reason at all."  And Arthrex argues that the remedy does not cure the constitutional infirmity, because APJs remain principal officers to the extent that "they still have the power to issue final decisions on behalf of the agency without any possibility of review by a principal officer."  This cannot be what Congress intended (i.e., where "the fate of patents rests with subordinate officers issuing final decisions while trying to please their superiors and preserve their jobs"), Arthrex argues in view of the importance ("the backbone") of intellectual property to the American economy.

    After a brief history of APJs (originally, "examiners-in-chief"), including their status as principal officers from 1861 until 1975 (when Congress changed the law) and a synopsis of their powers and duties, the petition asserts that it was only in 1980 (when Congress created "an administrative scheme" that was ex parte reexamination) that the PTAB's predecessor, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interference, was permitted to invalidate a duly-granted patent.  (Technically, the BPAI was not created until 1984 when Congress merged the Board of Appeal with the Board of Interferences.)  The petition makes the distinction that in enacting IPRs, Congress created (intentionally) the first adjudicative "scheme" as opposed to the earlier "examinational" proceedings.

    Following an explanation of the proceedings below (both before the PTAB and the Federal Circuit), the petition makes its substantive arguments for the Court to grant the petition.  First, Arthrex argues that severability, as the Federal Circuit fashioned it in its remedy, is deserving of the Court's review because the tenure protections of the statute that would be severed have evinced Congressional intent to ensure impartial adjudications in review of administrative agency actions.  The Federal Circuit rewrote the statute in a way that would "give it an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure viewed as a whole" which is improper, citing Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018).  This required the Federal Circuit to conclude that "Congress was more concerned about providing a potent new mechanism for canceling patents than about the impartiality of the adjudicative process through which those property rights may be revoked."  But this is a decision for Congress not the courts, Arthrex argues.  In addition, as a consequence of reduced impartiality and independence, the integrity of the IPR regime will be compromised.  This concern has historical antecedents, including Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 130, 132 & n.2 (1953), and several reports from committees looking into the situation, including Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 61 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 720, 723 (1936); Administrative Management in the Government of the United States 37 (1937); Attorney General's Comm. on Admin. Procedure, Final Report 46 (1941); Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. 81 (June 21, 1945), under circumstances where administrators were dependent for their "day-to-day" employment.  Arthrex argues that Congress heeded these concerns by enacting the Administrative Procedures Act in 1946 which established the civil service protections the Federal Circuit severed in its decision below, codified as 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a); this interpretation was supported by portions of the legislative history quoted by Arthrex in its petition.

    Arthrex's argument isn't based solely on Congressional intent; the petition argues that there are "significant due process concerns at stake" requiring the parties to be afforded a "fair trial in a fair tribunal," citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975).  APJs' neutrality is threatened by removing these civil service protections Arthrex argues because "it permits superiors to exert subtle yet powerful influence over adjudications without the accountability that comes from a transparent review process."  These concerns are particularly relevant to the administrative adjudications provided by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act because of the drastic change those proceedings occasioned on U.S. patent law.  An important requirement for the type of adjudications Congress intended (mimicking civil litigation) requires a "disinterested decisionmaker," Arthrex argues.

    For all these reasons Arthrex asserts that the Federal Circuit's decision "fundamentally distorted" the IPR regime because it "discarded a safeguard Congress has long considered imperative for agency adjudicators" and which is "indispensable to make the trial-like proceedings Congress created in the AIA actually fair." The petition cites in support dissents from denial of rehearing en banc from several of the Federal Circuit judges (including Judges Dyk and Hughes) and cites similar concerns from Members of Congress.  There is also a risk that courts reviewing the decisions from other agencies having ALJs appointed under the same constitutionally flawed procedure will mimic the Federal Circuit and thus put neutrality in agency adjudications at risk in 27 different agencies and 2,000 ALJs, as well as 10,000 adjudicators who are not ALJs.  All of which are reasons for the Court to grant certiorari, Arthrex argues, because "[a]bsent review, other courts could follow the same path, imperiling the fairness of administrative proceedings across the government."

    Turning to jurisprudential principles the petition argues that the Federal Circuit's severance provisions "def[y] settled principles," because courts are unable to produce by severance a statute giving it effects "altogether different from [those] sought by the measure viewed as a whole" (i.e., as Congress enacted it), citing Murphy.  The Federal Circuit panel used as its basis for severance of APJ protections that Congress would have intended to have "a Board whose members are removable at will rather than no Board at all" due to the importance of the IPR proceedings enacted under the AIA.  The flaw in that reasoning, according to Arthrex, is that "Congress was trying to improve patent review—not mow down patents by any means necessary" (although there have been occasions that reasonable patent practitioners might have questioned that conclusion).  Arthrex concludes that Congress "plainly intended" APJs to have "the tenure protections it has long considered essential to independent and impartial adjudication" at least in view of the "billions of dollars of intellectual property" that their decisions can affect.

    The other source of error Arthrex asserts in its petition is an eminently practical one:  "[i]t does not fix the problem" which is that because "there is still no principal executive officer who can review APJ decisions" APJs themselves are principal officers.  This portion of the petition disputes the Federal Circuit's application of the Edmond v. U.S. decision which Arthrex argues established under parallel facts and circumstances that Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges were inferior officers.  520 U.S. 651 (1997).  Similarly, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), the Court itself relied on review vel non of decisions to find that members of the Board were inferior officers.  Justice Alito raised "serious questions under the Appointments Clause" for railroad arbitrators in Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U.S. 43 (2015).  Arthrex further argues that in cases (including Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), and Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018)) where the Court found ALJs to be inferior officers their decisions were reviewable by a principal officer.

    This distinction is important because "a hallmark of principal officer status" is being able to speak for the United States without review by a superior.  Arthrex finds this tradition existing "from the earliest days of the Republic" and is a tradition extending from those antecedents in patent law (back to the original Patent Act, Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-110).  The primacy of principal officers is "a cornerstone of the modern administrative state" Arthrex contends, reflecting "long-continued policy of Congress [to] jealously confine[] the power of final decision in matters of substantial importance to a few principal administrative officers" (citing inter alia the APA, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)).  Arthrex characterizes the authority of APJs to render decisions appealable only to Article III courts (specifically, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court) as being a "sharp departure from precedent and tradition" unless APJs are principal officers.

    Finally, Arthrex argues that the Federal Circuit exceeded its jurisprudential bounds by not leaving it to Congress to amend the statute, and that it promotes "inertia" by providing its own remedy as imperfect as Arthrex argues it is.  Congress, after all, "is far better positioned to determine how best to revise the statute" because it "can edit a statute as it sees fit."  It can also "weigh competing policy concerns," employ a broader perspective regarding the "full impact" of any statutory revisions, "select from a range of historically grounded remedies that are not available to the courts," or even abandon inter partes review entirely, citing the STRONGER Patents Act of 2019, H.R. 3666, 116th Cong. (July 10, 2019) (thus providing a provocative but not entirely unrealistic closing to the petition).