• CalendarApril 26, 2020 – 2022 Global Series Spring Session (Federal Circuit Bar Association and European Patent Lawyers Association) – 8:30 am to 6:00 pm (ET), Washington, DC

    April 26, 2022 – "Trending Topic in Brazil: Discussion on the Possibility of Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) in View of the Delay of the BPTO (Brazilian Patent Office)" (Dannemann Siemsen) – 12:00 pm (BRT)

    April 26-27, 2022 – Paragraph IV Disputes Conference (American Conference Institute) – New York City

    April 28, 2022 – "The Influence of Women in IP: Women and the Unified Patent Court" (OxFirst Limited) – 15:00 to 16:00 (GMT)

    April 28, 2022 – "Patenting and Litigating Pharmaceutical Salts" (IPWatchdog and Barash Law) – 12:30 pm (ET)

    April 28, 2022 – "The Power of Corporate Pledges" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm (ET)

    May 24, 2022 – Examination practices and procedural guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 103 obviousness rejections (Part 2) – virtual Instructor-Led Training (vILT) series (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 9:00 am to 11:00 am (ET)

    May 25, 2022 – Examination practices and procedural guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 103 obviousness rejections (Part 2) – virtual Instructor-Led Training (vILT) series (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm (ET)

    May 26, 2022 – Examination practices and procedural guidance for 35 U.S.C. § 103 obviousness rejections (Part 2) – virtual Instructor-Led Training (vILT) series (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm (ET)

  • FCBA & EPLAWThe Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) and European Patent Lawyers Association (EPLAW) will be offering their 2022 Global Series Spring Session on April 26, 2020 from 8:30 am to 6:00 pm (ET) at the Army and Navy Club in Washington, DC.  The program will include presentations on the following topics:

    • International Trends in SEP/FRAND
    • The Intersection of Data and IP
    • Standard Setting – How Do Standards Impact Innovation and Trade?
    • Section 101 – What If?
    • Trade Secrets – From Enforcement to Unique Issues in the Virtual Setting
    • Pros and Cons of Waivers
    • USMCA and IP
    • Experts – A Comparison of Different Jurisdictions and What Works Best

    The registration fee for the program is $100 for private practitioners who are FCBA or EPLAW members and $50 for government/academic/retired FCBA or EPLAW members, and $400 for non-members.  An agenda for the program, including detailed descriptions of the program's sessions, a list of speakers, and registration information can be found here.

  • Dannemann SiemsenDannemann Siemsen will be offering a webinar entitled "Trending Topic in Brazil: Discussion on the Possibility of Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) in View of the Delay of the BPTO (Brazilian Patent Office)" on April 26, 2022 at 12:00 pm (BRT).  José Eduardo Cardozo of Martins Cardozo Advogados Associados, Justin Pine of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), and Luiz Augusto Lopes Paulino of Dannemann Siemsen will address the ongoing debate regarding the possibility of PTA (Patent Term Adjustment) in view of the delay of the BPTO (Brazilian Patent and Trademark Office) in examining patent applications, a topic that surfaced after the Supreme Court revoked the right for applicants to have an automatic 10-year-term from grant, and which has resulted in patentees seeking PTA before the Brazilian courts.

    Those wishing to register for the webinar can do so here.

  • OxFirstOxFirst Limited will be offering a webinar entitled "The Influence of Women in IP: Women and the Unified Patent Court" on April 28, 2022 from 15:00 to 16:00 (GMT).  Marina Tavassi of BonelliErede, and formerly the President of the Court of Appeal; Julia Dias of Huawei; and Katie Colart of Kirkland & Ellis will address the following questions relating to women in IP and ask what can be done to remove gender barriers in intellectual property:

    • Under the Unified Patent Court (UPC), should the opportunities for women be stronger established?
    • Should women judges, given equal qualification and competence, be given priority in the selection process?
    • Should there be adjustments made to allow judges who are also parents to participate in the UPC?
    • Is there a need to come to grips with more gender-neutral language under the UPC?

    While there is no cost to participate in the program, those interested in attending the webinar should register here.

  • IPWatchdogIPWatchdog and Barash Law will be offering a webinar entitled "Patenting and Litigating Pharmaceutical Salts" on April 28, 2022 at 12:30 pm (ET).  Gene Quinn of IPWatchdog, Inc.; Stephen Byrn of Purdue University and Improved Pharma; Steven Zeman of Grünecker Patent Attorneys and Attorneys at Law; and Eyal Barash of Barash Law, LLC will focus on questions related to obviousness and inventive step, enablement and written description sufficiency, and scientific aspects of pharmaceutical salts, and address issues related to litigation of patents directed to such salts from both a legal and expert witness point of view.

    There is no registration fee for this webinar.  However, those interested in registering for the webinar, should do so here.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "The Power of Corporate Pledges" on April 28, 2022 from 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm (ET).  Brett Alten of Hewlett Packard Enterprise; Bowman Heiden of the Tusher Center for the Management of Intellectual Capital, UC-Berkeley; Allen Lo of Meta Platforms: and Corey Salsberg of Novartis will discuss the origin of corporate pledges regarding lowering carbon footprints, increasing diversity within organizations, and sharing IP in the fight against COVID, how these pledges can impact organizations, and whether they work.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $150 for non-members or free for IPO members (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in attending the webinar should register here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Sigma-AldrichOn December 3rd, Junior Party the Broad Institute, Harvard University, and MIT (collectively, Broad) filed its Contingent Preliminary Motion No. 2 in Interference No. 106,133 (which names Sigma-Aldrich as Senior Party), asking the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to add claims 52-54 of Broad Application No. 16/177,403 to the interference, pursuant to the provisions of 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(i) and 41.208 and Standing Order ¶ 203.2.  The motion is contingent on the Board granting Broad's Substantive Preliminary Motion No. 1 to substitute the Count.  On March 16th, Sigma-Aldrich filed its Opposition.

    The claims that were the subject of Broad's Motion recite a CRISPR method in eukaryotic cells that cleaves both strands and repairs the break by integration of a template polynucleotide.  Claim 52 is generic with regard to the guide RNA species, comprising dual-molecule and single-molecule (sgRNA) species:

    52.  A method comprising: introducing into, or expressing in, a eukaryotic cell having a DNA molecule,
        (I) a Cas9 protein or one or more nucleotide sequences encoding the Cas9 protein,
        (II) an RNA or one or more nucleotide sequences encoding the RNA, the RNA comprising:
            (a) a first RNA comprising a first ribonucleotide sequence and a second ribonucleotide sequence, and
            (b) a second RNA, and
        (III) a template polynucleotide,
        wherein, the second RNA forms an RNA duplex with the second ribonucleotide sequence, and wherein, in the eukaryotic cell, the first ribonucleotide sequence directs the Cas9 protein to a target sequence of the DNA molecule, whereby the Cas9 cleaves both strands of the DNA molecule and the cleavage is repaired by integration of the template polynucleotide into  the DNA molecule in the eukaryotic cell.

    Claim 53 (dual molecule RNA species) and claim 54 (single-molecule RNA species) recite the two alternative species.  Broad asserted that these claims were deemed allowable by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Examiner on November 15, 2021.

    Sigma-Aldrich's Opposition notes that this motion will become moot should the Board deny Broad's Preliminary Motion No. 1 to change the Count.  Sigma-Aldrich also asserts that none of the claims in the '403 application have been allowed (or considered in condition for allowance) by the Examiner, prosecution of that application having been suspended with the Declaration of this Interference.  Should the Board reach the merits, Sigma-Aldrich contends that Broad has not applied the one-way obviousness test and to address whether these claims 52-54 satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).

    With regard to the allowability vel non of these claims, Sigma-Aldrich sets forth the Board's conditions for granting Broad leave to file Contingent Motion No. 2 but then asserts that Broad has not fulfilled the condition that the claims be in condition for allowance, characterizing Broad's position as being "misleading" and citing several assertions from the Contingent Motion that state or imply that the Examiner has made an allowability determination.  Sigma-Aldrich cites (and relies upon) its earlier-filed Opposition to Broad Motion No. 1 on why claims 52-54 of the '403 application were not allowed by the Examiner.

    On the merits, Sigma-Aldrich cites the one-way obviousness test in support of its position that Claims 53 and 54 are not patentable over Proposed Count No. 3 (they would have been obvious) and thus the Board should not grant the Motion.  Finally, Sigma-Aldrich argues (as it has elsewhere) that the Broad P1 provisional application does not provide adequate written description support for Claims 52-54 of the '403 application.  In this regard Sigma-Aldrich argues that "the limited Section 112 analysis for a constructive reduction [to] practice is not the same as a full Section 112 analysis for compliance with the written description requirement," citing Google LLC v. Parus Holdings, Inc., 2021 Pat. App. LEXIS 6203 at *11 (PTAB Oct. 29, 2021) (the distinction being that satisfaction of the former requires disclosure of but a single embodiment within the scope of the Count while satisfaction of the written description requirement must show an adequate description throughout the full scope of the claims corresponding to the Count, citing Zynga, Inc. v. IGT, 2014 Par. App. LEXIS 753 at *24 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2014)).  Finally, Sigma-Aldrich argues that Broad did not even address whether Claims 52-54 of the '403 application were patentable in its Contingent Motion No. 2, nor that "Broad fails to address the fact that Broad's intervening AIA Application 61/842,322 disclosed and claimed 'wherein the gene product is luciferase,' which limitation was not disclosed or claimed in any of Broad's pre-AIA applications."  Once again, Sigma-Aldrich refers to and relies upon its Opposition to Broad Preliminary Motion No. 1 which addressed many of these same issues.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealPersonal jurisdiction is one of those basic concepts in civil procedure that evokes strong memories in most lawyers, of their first year in law school, cases like International Shoe, Burger King, Helicopteros, and World-Wide Volkswagen, and perhaps even a bit of painful nostalgia for a time when they were maybe a little overwhelmed by the process of learning the law.  But there is a reason considerations like personal jurisdiction are part of the basic introduction to legal education, not the least of which is the real-world consequences that can arise involving them.  A case illustrating this reality was decided recently in Apple Inc. v. Zipit Wireless, Inc. (and as a bonus, the Federal Circuit expressly disclaimed a misapprehension by the District Court that it had enunciated a bright line rule regarding personal jurisdiction in patent cases).

    The lawsuit on appeal was a declaratory judgment action brought by Apple in the Northern District of California, but the dispute predated the filing of Apple's complaint by several years.  As described in the Federal Circuit's opinion, Zipit approached Apple in 2013 regarding its assigned patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,292,870 and 7,894,837, which claimed "wireless instant messaging devices that use Wi-Fi to send and receive instant messages."  For the next three years, there were "several rounds of correspondence" between them as well as an in-person meeting in Cupertino, home of Apple corporate headquarters (and in the Northern District).  This correspondence and these communications involved whether Apple was willing to purchase the patents outright or license them, inter partes review proceedings involving the patents, and whether Apple was infringing based on technical details of its products (as well as the possibility of willful infringement).  These discussions were fruitless and Zipit filed a patent infringement lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia on June 11, 2020, which Zipit two weeks later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice; this was followed by Apple filing the declaratory judgment suit that was the basis for this appeal nine days after Zipit voluntarily dismissed its Georgia action.

    Because it is relevant to the personal jurisdiction question, the opinion set forth in some detail the history of the negotiations between the parties:

    The record before the district court indicates that Zipit first traveled to Apple's Cupertino headquarters on December 3, 2013.  Following this in-person meeting, the parties had "at least" four "detailed calls" in December 2013, February 2014, and March 2014.  During these meetings and calls, Apple and Zipit discussed licensing the patents-in-suit and Apple's contentions that it "does not practice any Zipit patent claims" and that the "patents[-in-suit] are invalid."  Indeed, the parties went so far as to exchange competing drafts of a license agreement in August and September 2014 but ultimately did not reach any agreement.  Zipit traveled to Apple's Cupertino offices for a second in-person meeting to continue discussions on January 13, 2015.

    Following the January 2015 meeting, Apple and Zipit exchanged numerous letters and emails throughout 2015 and 2016.  The first email, dated July 18, 2015, was sent by Mr. Stephen Risley (Zipit's outside counsel) regarding "Apple's Ongoing Infringement" of the patents-in-suit.  This email, directed to Apple's in-house counsel (Mr. Rudhir Patel) sought a "definitive response" from Apple regarding the parties' ongoing discussion of Apple's "purchase and/or license" of the patents-in-suit.  Referencing a discussion that had taken place the day prior, Mr. Risley also attached for Apple's review Zipit's opposition brief to a petition for IPR of the '837 patent.  He also noted that additional briefs as to other patents were forthcoming.  Mr. Risley concluded:  "I understand that Apple will review Zipit's IPR briefs and respond to Zipit in 1-2 weeks."

    Apple responded two months later.  On September 25, 2015, Mr. Patel sent Mr. Risley a letter reiterating Apple's view that it "does not need a license" to the patents-in-suit "because Apple does not practice any" claims of the patents-in-suit and the claims are invalid.  In describing its grounds for noninfringement, Apple referred specifically to deficiencies in claim charts it had received from Zipit.  Apple also stated that its view that the claims were invalid was "confirmed by [its] review of the materials before the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board], and additional prior art not being considered" in the pending IPRs.

    The discussions escalated.  On October 14, 2015, Mr. Risley sent a responsive letter addressed to Mr. Patel (with Apple's Cupertino office listed on the address line) regarding "Apple's Ongoing Willful Infringement" of the patents-in-suit.  In the letter, Mr. Risley conveyed Zipit's "continue[d]" belief that "Apple has and continues to willfully infringe" the patents-in-suit.  He concluded the letter by referencing willful infringement a second time:  "Zipit is confident that if it becomes necessary a Court will view your September 25, 2015 [letter] as nothing more than a transparent attempt by Apple to justify Apple's past, present, and future willful infringement of Zipit's patents."  Apple responded to this letter on December 8, 2015.  Mr. Risley sent another email to Mr. Patel five months later on April 7, 2016.  In this email, Mr. Risley informed Apple that the Board had "confirmed the patentability of all claims" of the patents-in-suit.  He concluded the letter by once again stating Zipit's belief "that Apple has and continues to infringe" the patents-in-suit.

    The parties thereafter had another phone call on April 26, 2016, after which Mr. Patel, on May 2, 2016, responded in writing to Zipit's latest letter.  Mr. Patel reiterated Apple's belief that the patents-in-suit are invalid notwithstanding the Board's patentability determination in the IPR proceedings.  In response to Zipit's continued allegations of infringement, Apple explained that it had "repeatedly refuted those allegations" and that Zipit had failed to substantively respond to Apple's positions in this regard.  The letter concluded:  "Should Zipit substantively respond to Apple's explanation of why Apple's products do not fall within the scope of [the patents-in-suit] Apple will further consider Zipit's positions [citations to the record deleted throughout].

    The District Court granted Zipit's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).  Although the District Court found that Apple had established "minimum contacts" that satisfied the California long-arm statute and were consistent with constitutional due process limitations on jurisdiction (and that Zipit had not rebutted Apple's "presumptively reasonable" showing thereof), the District Court held that the Federal Circuit had set forth a bright-line rule that "the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . would be unconstitutional when '[a]ll of the contacts were for the purpose of warning against infringement or negotiating license agreements, and [the defendant] lacked a binding obligation in the forum,'" under Levita Magnetics Int'l Corp. v. Attractive Surgical, LLC, Case No. 19-cv-04065-JSW, 2020 WL 4580504, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020), and Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Lab'ys, Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  This appeal followed.

    The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, in an opinion by Judge Stoll, joined by Judges Hughes and Mayer.  The Court began by acknowledging that the California long-arm statute extended "to the full extent allowed by the due process clauses of the United States Constitution" and thus limited its analysis accordingly.  Citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), the opinion asserts that the issue in determining the appropriateness of finding due process arising in personal jurisdiction situations was whether a defendant's "conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."  The three factors set forth in Supreme Court opinions involving personal jurisdiction set out in the opinion are (1) whether a defendant has "purposefully directed" activities at forum residents; (2) whether the claim to be adjudicated "arises out of or relates to" defendant's activities in the forum; and (3) whether asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant would comport with "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" under the World-Wide Volkswagen decision.  As the opinion sets out, "[t]he first two factors comprise the 'minimum contacts' portion of the jurisdictional framework . . . .," citing Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc. v. Plano Encryption Techs. LLC, 910 F.3d 1199, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  Under circumstances where minimum contacts are satisfied, the Court says, assertion of personal jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable except where the presumption is successfully rebutted by the defendant.

    Here, the Federal Circuit, considering the litany of contacts Zipit had with Apple, a resident of the forum, agreed with the District Court that the minimum contacts standard had been satisfied.  This conclusion was supported by the Federal Circuit's finding of personal jurisdiction in Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co., 848 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017), where defendant's activities consistent of two notice letters and a single visit with the accused infringer; the panel found "Xilinx [to be] virtually indistinguishable from the facts of this case, where Zipit likewise sent multiple communications to Apple in California and traveled twice to California to discuss allegations of infringement and the prospect of Apple licensing or purchasing the patents-in-suit."  (The opinion sets forth several other decisions supporting personal jurisdiction under analogous circumstances.)  The Federal Circuit rejected Zipit's argument that its conduct was not sufficient to raise a reasonable presumption that the minimum contacts standard had been satisfied based on the Court's decision in Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  The panel found significant differences ("material factual distinctions") in the facts here and in Autogenomics (which are set forth in a footnote).

    The opinion traced back the District Court's error in finding a bright-line rule against asserting personal jurisdiction based on notice letters to Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc, 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998), where the Federal Circuit said that "[p]rinciples of fair play and substantial justice afford a patentee sufficient latitude to inform others of its patent rights without subjecting itself to jurisdiction in a foreign forum."  But while this sentiment and the policy arising from it are "no doubt relevant," according to the opinion, particularly to the extent it is directed towards settlement of incipient lawsuits, the panel rejected the argument by Zipit and the District Court's opinion that it reflects or establishes a patent-specific, bright-line rule, citing for example Trimble Inc. v. PerDiemCo LLC, 997 F.3d 1147, 1156–57 (Fed. Cir. 2021), and setting out several analogous personal jurisdiction decisions in other circuits over controversies in other areas of law.

    But such a policy does not overcome the constitutional considerations set forth by the Supreme Court in Burger King and other personal jurisdiction cases, the panel opined.  To be perfectly clear, the opinion states that:

    [T]he district court erred in reading our precedent as creating a bright-line rule that communications directed to "the attempted resolution" of the parties' dispute regarding the patents-in-suit trumps all other considerations of fairness and reasonableness.  Although some of our earlier precedent relying on Red Wing Shoe suggests that there is such a bright-line rule . . ., Supreme Court precedent (both pre- and post-Red Wing Shoe) has made clear that jurisdictional inquiries cannot rest on such bright-line rules—there are no "talismanic jurisdictional formulas."  Rather, "'the facts of each case must [always] be weighed' in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice'" [citations omitted].

    Having dispensed with this ground of error, the opinion then assessed whether Zipit satisfied the Supreme Court's counter rubric regarding whether a defendant could overcome the reasonable presumption of personal jurisdiction on the basis of:

    [1] "the burden on the defendant," [2] "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," [3] "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," [4] "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and [5] the "shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."

    While recognizing that Zipit had asserted some evidence relating to some of these factors (e.g., that there would be some burden in litigating in California because the company, its officers, and employees including inventors resided in South Carolina), on balance Zipit did not assert sufficient facts to convince the Federal Circuit that it had rebutted the reasonable presumption that the District Court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Zipit.  (It didn't help Zipit's argument that their executives had travelled to the district twice to meet with Apple during licensing negotiations.)  Even Zipit's filing its Georgia lawsuit was evidence that it should have "reasonably foreseen" that Apple would respond with a declaratory judgment suit according to the Federal Circuit.

    While acknowledging that "we have no doubt that Zipit's initial contacts with California can be fairly viewed as attempting to settle its dispute with Apple out of court, e.g., by way of a patent license," which was "an important fact we consider and weigh in Zipit's favor," the opinion noted that "Zipit's communications with Apple arguably went further, extending over the course of several years and reaching beyond license negotiations to include the sale of its patents."  While this attempt at settlement was on Zipit's side of the scales under the Burger King test, the panel held that, on balance, these considerations did not counterbalance their opinion that Zipit had not rebutted the reasonable presumption that the minimum contacts standard had been satisfied and that the District Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Zipit within the bounds of constitutional due process.

    Apple Inc. v. Zipit Wireless, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2022)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Hughes, Mayer, and Stoll
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Stoll

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Sigma-AldrichOn December 3rd, Junior Party the Broad Institute, Harvard University, and MIT (collectively, Broad) filed its Substantive Preliminary Motion No. 1 in Interference No. 106,133 (which names Sigma-Aldrich as Senior Party), asking the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to substitute the interference Count, pursuant to the provisions of 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.121(a)(1)(i) and 41.208(a)(2).  On March 16th Senior Party Sigma-Aldrich filed its Opposition to Broad's Motion.

    As a reminder, Broad's Proposed Substitute Count takes the "McKelvey" format (comprising in the alternative a claim from one of each Party's applications in interference); the proposed change is in the portion of the Count reciting Broad's claims:

    Proposed Count No. 3 (numbered presumably for consistency with other pending CRISPR-related interferences):

    Sigma-Aldrich Application No. 15/456,204 (as declared)

    or

    Claim 2 of Broad Application No. 16/177,403:

    52.  A method comprising: introducing into, or expressing in, a eukaryotic cell having a DNA molecule,
        (I) a Cas9 protein or one or more nucleotide sequences encoding the Cas9 protein;
        (II) an RNA or one or more nucleotide sequences encoding the RNA, the RNA comprising: (a) a first RNA comprising a first ribonucleotide sequence and a second ribonucleotide sequence, and (b) a second RNA;
    and
        (III) a template polynucleotide;
        wherein, the second RNA forms an RNA duplex with the second ribonucleotide sequence, and
        wherein, in the eukaryotic cell, the first ribonucleotide sequence directs the Cas9 protein to a target sequence of the DNA molecule, whereby the Cas9 cleaves both strands of the DNA  molecule and the cleavage is repaired by integration of the template polynucleotide into the DNA molecule in the eukaryotic cell.

    In proposing this Substitute Count, Broad emphasizes Sigma-Aldrich's contentions during prosecution that its invention comprised "cleave + insertion" CRISPR methods in eukaryotic cells which were patentably distinct from embodiments comprising "cleavage only" followed by non-homologous end joining of the cleaved DNA target.  In making this Motion, Broad clearly intends to cabin Broad's claims at risk in the interference to a small subset of its claims.

    In support of its Motion, Broad relied heavily on Sigma-Aldrich's arguments taking substantially the same position in Interference No. 106,132 against Junior Party the University of California, Berkeley; the University of Vienna; and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, "CVC") (see "Sigma-Aldrich Files Substantive Preliminary Motion 1 to Change the Count in Interference No. 106,132"), including arguments Sigma-Aldrich has made regarding the propriety of its claims not being part of other interferences having interfering subject matter limited to "cleavage only" eukaryotic CRISPR methods:

    Sigma is properly not a party to those pending 'cleavage only' interferences because all of Sigma's involved claims are directed solely to the patentably distinct 'cleavage plus integration' technological advance in the art.

    Sigma-Aldrich's Opposition's first argument for the Board to deny Broad's Motion No. 1 is procedural, that Claim 52 of U.S. Application No. 16/177,403 (the '403 application) had not been determined to be allowable when Broad filed its motion.  In addition, Sigma-Aldrich contends "Broad's Claim 52 is exceedingly broad for at least eight reasons," as well as being properly subject to the first inventor to file requirements under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (and thus ineligible for consideration in an interference).  Sigma-Aldrich also contends that" Broad never even asserts, let alone demonstrates, that "cleavage plus altering gene expression" is patentably distinct from "cleavage plus integration by [Homology-Dependent Recombination] HDR" (in a footnote providing a tally that "[o]f Broad's 461 involved patent claims, 340 claims are directed to "cleavage plus altering gene expression" (or an analogous recital), 42 claims are directed to insertion of a "template", and 8 dependent claims are directed to "cleavage plus integration by HDR"). Finally, Sigma-Aldrich asserts that Broad has neglected to "explain how Claim 52 is patentable over Sigma P1."  Citing Louis v. Okada, 2011 Pat. App. 21 LEXIS 24048, at *10 (BPAI May 25, 2011), Sigma-Aldrich contends that a party in an interference must show that there is a genuine need to change the Count and not make a "change for change's sake."

    With regard to the procedural deficiencies of Claim 52, Sigma-Aldrich asserts that Claim 52 on the date Broad files its motion had not been determined to be allowable by the Examiner and, indeed, prosecution of the '403 application had been suspended by the Examiner due to the Declaration of the '133 Interference (and is still suspended).  As Sigma-Aldrich notes, "[i]nexplicably, the Examiner indicated Claim 52 was allowable 9 days before Time Period 3 in the interference (the deadline for filing Oppositions to each party's Preliminary Motions, as well as arising after cross-examination of each party's expert witnesses).  This "after-the-fact (and procedurally improper)" occurrence doesn't provide Broad with justification to file its Motion prior to the Examiner's allowance of Claim 52, Sigma-Aldrich asserts.  And moreover, Sigma-Aldrich contends that Broad's filing of their motion is contrary to the Board's mandates when it granted leave on September 20, 2022 for the parties to file their preliminary motions, specifically:

    Broad's proposed Count 3 also includes Sigma application 15/456,204 claim 31, as in Count 1, but replaces Broad patent 8,697,359, claim 15 with Broad application 16/177,403 claim 52, which has not yet been determined to be allowable.  (See Broad List, Paper 21, 5:7–6:12.)

    Authorization for this motion is GRANTED to the extent that Broad may present arguments to substitute current Count 1 with proposed Count 3 wherein the Broad portion of the count reflects a patented or allowable claim.  The motion shall be entitled "BROAD MOTION 1."

    Sigma-Aldrich sets out a timeline for the Board's consideration, and in particular Broad's assertion in the motion that Claim 52 had been allowed (which seems at a minimum premature):

    Image 1
    As set forth in its Opposition, Sigma-Aldrich identifies four substantive changes between the version of Claim 52 contained in Broad's proposed Count No. 3 and Claim 52 as allowed:  the amendment "(1) introduces the new limitation of cleaving "both strands" of the DNA; (2) converts the active language limitation that "the template polynucleotide repairs" the cleavage, to the passive language limitation that the cleavage "is repaired by integration of the polynucleotide into the DNA molecule"; (3) introduces the term "integration" into the claim for the first time; and (4) removes the limitation that the cleavage repair is "by homology directed repair."  Moreover, Sigma-Aldrich contends that the Examiner did not in fact indicate Claim 52 was allowable, either upon filing the amendment or in the "miscellaneous communication – no action count" communication issued thereafter, characterizing Broad's assertions to the contrary "misleading."  Sigma-Aldrich reproduces portions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) website to illustrate its argument in this regard, supported by copies of Office Actions containing express statements such as "The request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance."

    Sigma-Aldrich cites this evidence in support of its argument that Claim 52 was not in condition for allowance before the deadline date of Time Period 1, when Preliminary Motions were due.  This evidence is also an indication that the Examiner's actions "indicating" Claim 52 was allowable are procedurally irregular, according to Sigma-Aldrich because, inter alia, they "change[d] the fundamental operative facts for a contested Motion pending before the Board," which "is inconsistent with at least the spirit of the USPTO's rules."  "[C]ountenancing such ex parte maneuvering to alter key facts that are in an active inter partes dispute," Sigma-Aldrich contends, threatens to "undermine the Board's sole jurisdiction over the disputed subject matter, and would encourage future parties to similarly leverage ongoing ex parte prosecution to gain a possible strategic advantage in a co-pending interference."  These allegations, of course, raise issues going far beyond this Motion and this Interference and implicate the Board's institutional legitimacy.  In this interference Sigma-Aldrich contends that these activities are prejudicial.

    The Opposition then asserts that on the merits Broad has failed to satisfy its burden that changing the Count is necessary in this interference, specifically with regard to lacking the assertion that such a change will accommodate a party's "best proofs."  In addition, Sigma-Aldrich contends that the "best proofs" of its invention Broad asserts do not require a donor template, even though proposed Count 3 expressly requires a donor template, citing Broad's affirmative assertions in its Motion No. 1.  Sigma-Aldrich also characterizes Broad's arguments to use the term "non-template claims" to "fabricate" a self-serving argument Sigma-Aldrich says it has not made.  Sigma-Aldrich further argues that Broad has mischaracterized its arguments regarding what is patentably distinct, and also has failed to argue that Count 1 recites two patentably distinct inventions.  Continuing its theme of Broad's mischaracterizations, Sigma-Aldrich states that "Broad alters the quotes of Sigma's arguments in that parallel interference [No. 106,132] in a misleading attempt to redraft CVC's claim limitation into two separate components:  "such as 'cleaving or editing' or 'modulating transcription,'" whereas Sigma-Aldrich contends that it made clear in that interference that "CVC's claims permit proofs of invention directed to cleavage alone" (emphasis in brief).  (Sigma-Aldrich makes a similar argument with regard to there being any patentable distinction between Sigma's claims to "cleavage + integration by HDR" and Broad's claims to "cleavage + altering gene expression.")  Sigma-Aldrich reminds the Board that its position, made in its List of Proposed Motions, was that Count 1 encompassed CRISPR-mediated cleavage in a eukaryotic cell either to integrate a heterologous DNA sequence or alter expression of the targeted gene sequence (Sigma-Aldrich attesting to have taken the same position before the Board in the '132 Interference; indeed, Sigma-Aldrich expends several pages of its Opposition outlining specifically how its positions taken in  this interference are "entirely consistent" with its positions taken in the '131 Interference).  And, as Sigma-Aldrich notes, "[e]ven assuming arguendo that Sigma had raised a distinction between "cleavage plus integration" claims and so-called "Non-Template Claims" (which as discussed above is not true), Broad itself—as the movant—does not make any such contention in its motion."  Broad has been content, according to Sigma-Aldrich, with "rel[ying] on Sigma's supposed arguments, while purposely taking no position itself on that (completely self-fabricated) issue" (emphasis in brief), citing almost two dozen instances of this alleged rhetorical conduct in Broad's Motion.  It is but a short hop in Sigma-Aldrich's argument to its conclusion that Broad has accordingly not satisfied its burden that there is a good reason to change the Count in this interference.  Sigma-Aldrich further argues that Broad has not shown that its "best proofs" include both sgRNA and dgRNA species.

    Sigma-Aldrich also sets forth a claim chart, comparing Claim 15 and 18 of its U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (which form the basis for Broad's contribution to Count 1 as declared in this interference with Broad's Claim 52 of U.S. Application No. 16/177,403:

    Image 2
    Sigma-Aldrich argues that this comparison shows that "Broad's unallowed Claim 52 is excessively broad and thus grossly inadequate to reasonably conform to either of the parties' inventions, not the least of which is that Claim 52 is not even limited to a CRISPR-Cas9 system."

    These arguments include that:

    • "Broad Claim 52 is not limited to a "standard" CRISPR-Cas9 system, illustrated by this claim comparison:

    Image 3
    • "Broad's Claim 52 encompasses NHEJ end ligation, which is fundamentally different from homology-directed repair," illustrated by this claim comparison:

    Image 4
    • "Broad Claim 52 encompasses a system with no tracr-RNA/Activator RNA that interacts with the Cas9 protein," end ligation, which is fundamentally different from homology-directed repair," illustrated by this claim comparison:

    Image 5
    • "Broad Claim 52 encompasses a crRNA/Targeter RNA that performs all of the guiding functions of the guide RNA (emphasis in brief)," illustrated by this graphic:

    Image 6
    • "Broad Claim 52 does not require that the guide RZNA hybridize to/bind with the target sequence," illustrated by this claim comparison:

    Image 7
    • "Broad Claim 52 encompasses a split-Cas9 System, which Is beyond the scope of this interference and Broad's disclosed proofs of invention," illustrated by this graphic from Broad's Application 61/915,267:

    Image 8
    • "Broad Claim 52 encompasses a guide RNA genus, but Broad's Disclosed proofs of invention are limited to a sgRNA species," and

    • "Broad Claim 52 encompasses a wild-type Cas9 protein that would not be capable of entering a eukaryotic cell."

    Sigma-Aldrich illustrates its AIA-related argument, that Broad's '403 application is not entitled to pre-AIA treatment with this graphic, showing the disjuncture between pre- and putatively post-AIA priority dates:

    Image 9
    The basis for Sigma-Aldrich's assertions is that these applications claim embodiments comprising luciferase, which Sigma-Aldrich contends is not disclosed in any pre-AIA priority documents and thus breaks the benefit chain to pre-AIA treatment, a position Sigma-Aldrich argues it has taken since filing an Appendix to its List of Proposed Motions, and supported by this table:

    Image 10
    Sigma-Aldrich's final two arguments in its Opposition are that, to the extent that claim correspondence is at issue between the parties it has addressed those arguments more fully in its Opposition to Broad's Preliminary Motion No. 3, and that the final deficiency in Broad's arguments in support of its motion to change the Count is that its motion fails to assert, much less establish, that its proposed Count 3 is patentable to Broad over Sigma's Provisional Application No. 61/734,256.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    New York TimesOn a spring Saturday in a year when three major holidays — Easter, Passover, and Ramadan — coincided or overlapped, The New York Times Editorial Board decided it was time to announce that the "United States Patent and Trademark Office is in dire need of reform" ("Save America's Patent System," The New York Times, April 16, 2022).  Were that the case, the Times' rhetoric would deserve serious consideration; as it is, the Times continues a history of wrongheaded, faux populist rhetoric that comes to the entirely wrong conclusion.

    This is evinced immediately by the principle basis for the sentiment regarding the patent system — "Drugs cost too much!" — and the basis for this conclusion:  the Initiative for Medicines, Access and Knowledge (I-MAK), a policy advocacy group dedicated to lowering drug prices by attacking the patent system.  The Times' reliance on I-MAK is particularly inopportune in light of recent events.  First, Professor Adam Mossoff of George Mason University's Antonin Scalia School of Law published a report for the Hudson Institute, entitled "Unreliable Data Have Infected the Policy Debates Over Drug Patents," that raised serious issues over the data I-MAK relies upon in making its policy arguments regarding the relationship between drug pricing and patents.  Professor Mossoff's critique was sufficiently provocative that Senator Thom Tillis wrote to I-MAK asking them to explain themselves (see E. McDermott, Tillis Wants More Info on I-MAK and Other Data Driving Anti-Patent Narratives Around Drug Pricing).  I-MAK responded, not with the information the Senator requested but with a reiteration of their rhetoric (see E. McDermott, I-MAK Defends Integrity of Its Patent Data in Response to Tillis Letter), prompting the Senator to ask for further clarification.  Professor Mossoff's analysis suggests the Senator will have a long wait for a satisfactory answer.

    The Times also wrongfoots its example of so-called "patent evergreening" — insulin manufacturers providing devices for administering doses of the drug.  The Times might have had a point if drug companies had taken off the market traditional insulin in vials and administered by patient injection with syringes — but a simple search shows that this is not the case.  What these devices supply are ways for a patient to readily inject the correct dose, therefore improving compliance and avoiding dosage mishaps, which improves clinical outcomes and so is desirable to physicians because it avoids complications, thus reducing costs to payors such as insurance companies.  And it is the very "simplicity" of the technology that prevents any one company from dominating the injection device market — after all, many different drugs besides insulin are delivered using such devices — and that both warrant and require patent protection, lest knockoffs flood the marketplace.  This protects both American industry — from whence exactly does the Times Editorial Board suppose such cheap knockoffs would arise? — as well as providing the return on investment that regulatory approval costs require to incentivize development of products having such benefits for patients, their doctors, the insurance industry, and (because the bulk of drug costs are borne by the U.S. government one way or the other) taxpayers.  And should the Times Editorial Board wish to understand rather than grandstand about this issue, there is academic scholarship, such as Professor Erika Lietzen's work in "The 'Evergreening' Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship" and "Distorted Drug Patents" that would provide much better information for their readers.

    The editorial resurrects for a new age an idea current at the turn of the century — that applicants could "wear down" examiners who would then grant patents "out of kindness, I suppose" — which created the ill-considered Claims and Continuation rules changes promulgated by the Patent Office encouraged by scholarship untethered to the realities of the Office or patent prosecution (see "The 'Word' on the New Continuation Rules (from the USPTO Webcast)" — Part I and Part II); they were enjoined by the District Court of East Virginia (see "Tafas v. Dudas; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Dudas (E.D. Va. 2007)") and invalidated six months later.  These limitations on prosecuting patents were particularly deleterious for the type of complicated technology common in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical arts, where patent examiners, who are typically not lawyers and, while having degrees and perhaps experience in the relevant technologies are not "cutting edge," understandably require time to absorb and apply patent law to claims for such complex inventions.  Ironically, it is the very diligent gatekeeping function that the Times Editorial Board alleges the examiners are not doing that causes the delays that require applicants to pursue lengthy prosecution efforts (all while the twenty years from filing term clock is ticking and applicants are losing time during which commercial products embodying their inventions have exclusivity).

    Paradoxically, the very means by which Congress has provided a mechanism for eliminating "bad patents" (which frequently just means someone else's patent that prevents you from selling something you'd like to; see "The IPO's Marc Adler on Patent 'Quality'"), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and the various flavors of post-grant review afforded challengers under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, come in for criticism, based on rules permitting the Board to refuse to institute a proceeding based on avoiding duplicate adjudications before the Office and in the courts (see M. Buttman, "Turning Away a Patent Challenge: The NHK-Fintiv Rule Explained," Bloomberg Law, March 3, 2021).  In doing so, the Editorial Board comes perilously close to accusing the former Director of instituting the rules improperly, and in the process (again ironically) illustrating why Justice Thomas and others advocate overturning the protections from libel suits by public officials in N.Y. Times v. Sullivan.

    Because no one can always be wrong — including the Times Editorial Board — there are a few, albeit precious few, reasonable ideas in the editorial.  One is giving examiners more time for examination, which could "solve" the excess prosecution "problem" the editors perceive exists.  Another is having increased public participation, although the means for achieving this goal smacks of the same motivation that has made virologists out of financial advisors during the pandemic — the idea that people who actually understand the process and issues are somehow suspect.  And the idea asserted by the Times Editorial Board that the PTO does not coordinate with other agencies like the FDA and FTC is just wrong and illustrated by an example not representative of the realities of patent prosecution, such as the duty of candor and the penalty for violating it called inequitable conduct.

    Perhaps the editors will be motivated to look into some of the deficiencies of their reasoning and understanding of the real issues facing innovation that the patent system grapples with, like "efficient infringement" by large companies with the financial wherewithal to expropriate smaller companies' inventions (see "The Proper Role of the Federal Circuit" and "The ACLU, Working for the Man").  But this is unlikely because reality does not fit the editors preconceived notion of what "everybody knows" (see "The Road to Hell Is Paved with What Everybody Knows").  The editorial pages of the Times have a long history with this type of prejudice (see "Science Fiction in The New York Times"; "The Anti-Patent Beat Goes on at The New York Times"; "Anti-Patent ("Sullivan?") Malice by The New York Times"; "The Continuing Assault on Innovation at The New York Times"; "War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength"; "New York Times to Innovation: Drop Dead"; and "More Patent Nonsense from The New York Times") and frankly there is no reason to think it will change.  There is nothing in this latest editorial to the contrary.