The
Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) will offer a panel
discussion entitled: "The
Role of Patent Agents in Intellectual Property in the Changing Economy" on
May 18, 2010 from 1:00 to 4:00 PM (CDT) at the John Marshall Law School in
Chicago, IL. The panel discussion,
which is being sponsored by IPLAC's Patent Agents Committee in conjunction with
the John Marshall Law School, will feature Heather Gerard, a Patent Liaison at
Promega Corp.; Troy Groetken of McAndrews Held & Malloy LTD; Dr.
Angeline-Rose Babel, a Patent Agent at McAndrews Held & Malloy LTD; David
J. Bremer, a Patent Agent at Sabre Technical Services Corp.; and Bob Smith, an
Attorney Search Consultant at Keith Ross & Associates, Inc. The registration fee for the panel
discussion is $5 (IPLAC members and students) or $10 (all other
attendees). Those interested in
registering for the panel discussion, can obtain a registration form here.

Patent Law Weblog
-
-
C5 (UK) will be
holding its 7th International Forum on Freedom to Operate on May 26-27, 2010 in
Munich, Germany. The conference
will provide practical advice on the biggest challenges facing freedom to
operate (FTO) assessments, including:• How to
effectively manage the FTO process to ensure the lowest cost, the highest
value, and the lowest risk;
• The latest EPO,
U.S., and European national case law on claim interpretation and validity;
• The newest
developments with SPC's and the pediatric exemption;
• When to buy a
patent and when to license to best clear the developmental path;
• The latest on
gene and research tool patenting and how it affects the FTO process; and
• How to manage a
patent thicket.
In particular, C5
faculty will offer presentations on the following topics:• Cost effective
and high value FTO assessment strategies:
From searching to data retention;
• Patent validity
and FTO search interpretation;
• How to thin
patent thickets;
• Focus on U.S.
developments;
• Update on the law
of SPCs and how they affect FTO;
• Targeted patent
and IP acquisition;
• Gene patenting
and brave new worlds in FTO: Where
are we now in Europe?
• Privilege and
confidentiality;
• Updates in patent
claim construction in the context of FTO;
• Changes in U.S.
Law: Method patents and
legislative reform; and
• Supporting
evidence in patent applications.An additional
workshop will be offered from 2:15 to 4:45 pm on May 27, 2010. The workshop, entitled "Reading
and Analyzing Claims in Patents and Patent Applications for Establishing
FTO" will provide information and insights for effectively establishing
FTO.
A complete brochure
for this conference, including an agenda, list of speakers, and registration
form can be downloaded here.The registration
fee is £1898 ($2,831.15) for the conference and workshop and £1399 ($2,149.33) for the conference alone.
Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here, by calling +44 (0) 20
7878 6888, by faxing a registration form to +44 (0) 20 7878 6896, or by
e-mailing registrations@C5-Online.com. -
By
Donald Zuhn —
On
April 6, the Federal Circuit, in MedPointe
Healthcare, Inc. v. Kozachuk, affirmed a decision of the District Court for
the District of New Jersey enforcing a settlement agreement regarding the
transfer of ownership of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,728,728, 5,942,540, and 6,515,019,
which are directed to clinical uses of the drug Felbamate to treat neurological
indications. The three patents
issued from applications that were filed by Defendant-Appellant Dr. Walter
Kozachuk eighteen months after he left the employ of Carter-Wallace, Inc., the predecessor of Plaintiff-Appellee
MedPointe Healthcare, Inc. During his
employment at Carter-Wallace, Dr. Kozachuk supervised clinical studies of
Felbamate. Under the terms of Dr.
Kozachuk's employment agreement with Carter-Wallace, he agreed to assign to
Carter-Wallace and its successors any and all inventions, discoveries, or
improvements made, discovered, or conceived by him during his employment.In
April of 2004, MedPointe brought suit against Dr. Kozachuk, claiming ownership
of the '728, '540, and '019 patents based on Dr. Kozachuk's breach of his
employment agreement and duty of loyalty, and seeking to correct the patents'
inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256.
In May of 2008, the parties participated in a settlement conference
before a magistrate, and following four hours of negotiations, placed the terms
of a settlement agreement on the record.
The terms included a $60,000 payment by MedPointe to Dr. Kozachuk; a
transfer of all right, title, and interest in Dr. Kozachuk's patents to
MedPointe; an agreement to arbitrate disputes over Dr. Kozachuk's ownership of
a pending U.S. patent application; and a reservation of rights by MedPointe
with respect to foreign patents or patent applications. Shortly after the conference,
MedPointe's counsel provided Dr. Kozachuk with a draft Settlement Agreement and
Release and draft Assignment, but Dr. Kozachuk refused to sign the documents. MedPointe responded by filing a motion
to enforce the settlement agreement, and the District Court, adopting the
findings and conclusions of the magistrate, ordered Dr. Kozachuk to execute the
settlement documents and imposed sanctions for MedPointe's attorneys' fees and costs incurred enforcing the settlement.On
appeal, Dr. Kozachuk argued that he did understand the proceedings in May of
2008 and had no intention of settling, the settlement terms were unconscionable
in that they required him to transfer patents assertedly worth millions of
dollars for $60,000, and the settlement agreement was unenforceable because his
attorney coerced him into settling by adopting a negative assessment of the
case and threatening to withdraw as counsel. MedPointe countered that the transcript of the settlement conference
and Dr. Kozachuk's e-mails and sworn statements demonstrated that the parties
agreed to the essential terms of a settlement at the May 2008 conference, there was no evidence that the $60,000 exchange for the transfer of Dr. Kozachuk's
three patents was unconscionable, and there was no evidence that Dr. Kozachuk's
counsel intended to (or did) pressure him into settling by threatening to
withdraw.In
an opinion issued per curiam, the
Federal Circuit agreed with MedPointe, rejecting all three of Dr. Kozachuk's
arguments. In response to Dr.
Kozachuk's assertion that he did understand the settlement proceedings and had
no intention of settling, the panel stated that "[t]he transcript of the
proceedings clearly evinces both parties' intent to settle the suit brought by
MedPointe on specific terms," noting that "[a]t no time did Kozachuk
ask for clarification or in any way indicate that he did not understand that he
was agreeing to a settlement on the terms stated by MedPointe's counsel." The panel also rejected Dr. Kozachuk's
argument that the settlement terms were unconscionable, determining that
although Dr. Kozachuk contended that the '728, '540, and '019 patents were
worth millions of dollars, he presented no evidence to establish their
worth. Lastly, the panel rejected
Dr. Kozachuk's argument that his attorney's behavior coerced him into accepting
the settlement, stating that "it strains credibility to think that
Kozachuk, who had already retained new counsel once during the litigation and
who worked with sophisticated business advisors, felt that he had no choice but
to settle because his counsel indicated a desire to withdraw in light of their
disagreements over the merits of the case." The panel also noted that to the extent that Dr. Kozachuk was
claiming inadequate representation by counsel, "it is
well-established that a party is bound by the actions of his counsel and may
not after the fact disavow counsel’s actions on his behalf."Medpointe Healthcare, Inc.
v. Kozachuk (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Nonprecedential
disposition
Panel:
Circuit Judges Lourie, Gajarsa, and Moore
Per curiam opinion -
By
Sarah Fendrick —
In
a notice published in the Federal Register (75 Fed. Reg.
15417), the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) announced that it is seeking nominations for three
members to both the Patent and Trademark Public Advisory Committees. The Public Advisory Committees serve to
review the policies, goals, performance, budget, and user fees of the
USPTO. Each elected member will
serve a term of three years. Committee
members must have "substantial
backgrounds and
achievement in finance, management, labor relations, science,
technology, and
office automation." 35 U.S.C. § 5(b)(3).Nominations
must be postmarked or electronically transmitted on or before June 11, 2010,
and should be sent (along with the nominee's resume) by
e-mail to PPACnominations@uspto.gov (for the Patent Public Advisory Committee);
by facsimile to the Chief of Staff's attention at 571-273–0464; or by regular
mail to the Chief of Staff's attention, Office of the Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO, Post Office Box
1450, Alexandria, Virginia 22313–1450. -
By
Donald Zuhn —
Sherry
Knowles, Senior Vice President, Global Patents for GlaxoSmithKline has
announced that she will be leaving GSK in June to start a consulting firm that
will focus on IP management, business development, and monetizing assets in the
area of pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals, and medical devices. Ms. Knowles (at right), who has led Global Patents
at GSK since 2006, played a significant role in the successful challenge to the
claims and continuation rules published by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
in August of 2007, helping to secure a preliminary injunction enjoining the
rules on Halloween in 2007, which injunction was made permanent by the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on April 1, 2008. Last fall, the USPTO finally rescinded
the controversial rules package before the Federal Circuit was to rehear GSK's
and Dr. Tafas' appeal en banc. Ms. Knowles has also been centrally
involved in developing GSK's Knowledge Pool for the treatment of neglected
tropical diseases in least developed countries.Managing
IP Magazine named Ms. Knowles one of the ten most influential people in
Intellectual Property in 2008, and earlier this year, the New Jersey
Intellectual Property Lawyers Association awarded Ms. Knowles, as the representative
of GSK, the Jefferson Medal for exceptional contribution to Intellectual
Property. In February, Ms. Knowles
published an article in the journal Science
on "Fixing the Legal Framework for Pharmaceutical Research" (see "Takings'
by Congress and the Courts").
Commenting
on her upcoming move, Ms. Knowles told Patent
Docs that she has thoroughly enjoyed her tenure at GSK and has been "very
impressed with the caliber and devotion of the GSK staff in creating and
protecting the market for new medicines." She said she plans to continue her "strong support for
the innovator community to help create an environment that fosters and protects
investment." Ms. Knowles
noted that she will continue to lead Global Patents until June, and will
continue to consult with GSK, subject to availability and the company's needs, after
she departs.For
additional information regarding this and other related topics, please see:•
"'Takings' by Congress and the Courts," April 1, 2010
•
"GSK Announces 'Open Innovation' Strategy to Combat Neglected
Tropical Diseases," February 3, 2010
•
"Alnylam to Donate RNAi Patents to Patent Pool," August 10, 2009
•
"'New Rules' Officially Rescinded," October 8, 2009
•
"Managing Intellectual Property Releases MIP 50," July 28, 2008
•
"No April Fool's Joke — Tafas and GSK Win on Summary Judgment,"
April 1, 2008
•
"GSK Secures Injunction," October 31, 2007 -
By Kevin E. Noonan —
It is a bedrock principle of patent practice that
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office gives the terms of claims under examination
their broadest reasonable construction. The rationale is that, in this way, the applicant has the opportunity to
argue or amend the claims to be as broad as the prior art permits, and
precludes the applicant from expanding beyond these limits the scope of granted
claims it asserts against accused infringers. Regardless of the soundness of this practice as a policy
matter, as applied by the Office it can (and frequently does) exceed the
boundaries of reasonableness: the
Office frequently takes a position regarding the scope of a claim term that is
completely unreasonable. As one
example, the Office has, on occasion, determined that essentially any nucleic
acid can hybridize with any other, since the complexity of almost any sequence
contains short stretches of sequence found in many other sequences; such
reasoning is then applied to reject any claim depending on specific
hybridization.
The practice of construing claim terms unreasonably
arose in an opinion handed down from the Federal Circuit today, In re Suitco Surface, Inc. Patentees appealed final rejection in
an ex parte reexamination based on
anticipation. The Federal Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Rader joined by Judges Prost and Moore, vacated and remanded
the Office's grounds of rejection based, in part, on the unreasonable
construction of claim terms that expanded their scope to encompass the prior
art.Reexamination was on U.S. Patent No. 4,994,514, which
claimed a "floor finishing material" used on "floor surfaces
[made] of wood, linoleum, terrazzo, [or] concrete," particularly as used
on bowling lanes and athletic courts. Representative claim 4 is in Jepson claim format (with emphasis added):4. On a floor having a flat top surface
and an improved material for finishing the top surface of the floor, the
improvement comprising:
at least one elongated sheet including a uniform flexible film
of clear plastic material having a thickness between about one mil and about
twenty-five mils and
a continuous layer of adhesive material disposed
between the top surface of the floor and the flexible film, the adhesive layer
releasably adhering the flexible film onto the top surface of the floor.The opinion notes that the underlined claim terms
had been construed during a prior litigation: "material for finishing" to mean "a material
that makes more durable the underlying surface of the floor, and is applied for
that purpose," and "uniform flexible film" to mean "the
material must be of a uniform thickness, and excludes material in which there
are any variations in thickness." The Federal Circuit in an appeal from grant of summary judgment against
the patentee, disagreed, saying:The text of claim 4 leaves little
ambiguity as to the meaning of "material" – namely, at least one
elongated sheet of a uniform flexible film of clear plastic having a thickness
between about one and about twenty-five mils. What remains in dispute is the
precise meaning of the phrase "for finishing." In the context of
claim 4, "finishing" clearly refers to providing a clear, uniform
layer on the top surface of a floor. Significantly, there is no indication in
claim 4 as to what level of durability, if any, the "finish" layer
must have. Thus, claim 4 implies a broad meaning for the term "finishing,"
which is consistent with the dictionary definition of "finish." See,
e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 464 (1984) (defining "finish"
as "the final treatment or coating of a surface," but not identifying
any specific properties).The District Court granted summary judgment a second time on remand, based on the "uniform
flexible film" limitation. The Federal Circuit again disagreed, based on whether the accused
infringing article was required to have a uniform thickness throughout. During the second remand, the defendant
3M (an amicus here) filed the ex parte
reexamination request which resulted in a stay of the remand litigation and,
ultimately, this appeal. Claims
4-8 were finally rejected as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 3,785,102 to
Amos and U.S. Patent No. 4,543,765 to Barrett, these rejections being the
subject matter of this appeal. (A
third rejection, based on U.S. Patent No. 4,328,274 to Tarbutton was not
appealed.)Briefly, the
Amos reference teaches "a floor covering pad comprising a plurality of
plastic sheets connected together by a plurality of adhesive layers . . .
designed to be used right before entry into a clean room or a hospital bay to
remove dirt from the shoes or wheels of incoming traffic." Each of the plurality of sheets is
exposed one at a time and allowed to function to remove dirt until the adhesive
on the sheet is filled, and then the sheet is removed and the next sheet is
exposed and so forth. The Barrett
reference teaches "the use of a clear plastic film connected to a floor
with an adhesive layer" to "temporarily protect a floor during
construction."During the
reexamination, the examiner asserted rejections based on anticipation by these
references, and the Board affirmed. The Board construed the two relevant claim terms more broadly that the District Court: the term "material
for finishing the top surface of a floor" was construed to mean "requiring
a material that is structurally suitable for placement on the top surface of a
floor." Thus, any layer
placed above a floor fulfilled this requirement, "regardless of whether it
was the top or final layer." The term "uniform flexible film" was construed by the Board to
mean "including, for example, a flexible film having the same thickness
throughout, as well as a flexible film having the same textured surface
throughout." Suitco
challenged the Board's decision affirming the asserted rejections based on
these constructions, particularly asserting that none of the prior art cited
the "uniform" limitation.
The Federal Circuit's opinion acknowledged the
practice before the Office that claim terms are to be given "their
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification,"
citing In re ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007), saying that its inquiry was
thus whether the Board's construction was "reasonable," citing In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1055 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). Applying these
principles, the Court directly held that the Office's construction of the term "material
for finishing" was unreasonable:The express language of the claims requires a "material for finishing
the top surface of the floor." '514 patent col.7 ll.67-68 (emphases
added). A material cannot be finishing any surface unless it is the final
layer on that surface. Otherwise, the material would not be "finishing"
the surface in any meaningful sense of the word.The PTO's proffered construction ignores this reality by allowing the
finishing material to fall anywhere above the surface being finished regardless
of whether it actually "finishes" the surface. Indeed, according to
the PTO, the finishing surface need only be "structurally suitable
for placement on the top surface of the floor" — i.e., several layers can be
placed on top of the "finishing" layer. If the PTO's construction
were accepted, a prior art reference with carpet on top of wood, on top of
tile, on top of concrete, on top of a thin adhesive plastic sheet anticipates
the claims in question because an adhesive plastic sheet falls at some point in
the chain of layers. This construction does not reasonably reflect the plain
language and disclosure of the '514 patent.The problem,
according to the Court, is that the Office has ignored the part of the standard
that limits the bounds of what is "reasonable" to what is consistent
with the specification: the rubric
is not merely that claims must be given "their broadest
reasonable construction" but that they be given "their broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification" (emphasis
added). Moreover, claims
are to be read "in light of the specification as it would be interpreted
by one of ordinary skill in the art," citing In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990).The opinion particularly rejects the Office's
reliance upon and justification of its construction because the patentee used
the term "comprising" in the claim. "The broadest-construction rubric coupled with
the term 'comprising' does not give the PTO an unfettered license to interpret
claims to embrace anything remotely related to the claimed invention,"
according to the opinion. Citing Schriber-Schroth
Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217 (1940) (perhaps on the panel's
mind after its extensive citation in the en banc Ariad v. Eli Lilly appeal), the Court held that the Office must
always construe claims "in light of the specification and the teachings of
the underlying patent." Here, both the "express language of the claim
and the specification" mitigated against the Office's construction, and "require
the finishing material to be the top and final layer on the surface being
finished."This opinion certainly provides ammunition for
applicants facing unreasonable interpretations of claim terms during
prosecution. It will be
interesting to see whether the Office adopts the Federal Circuit's restrictions on
unfettered claim interpretation, or continues with its occasional flights of
fancy in construing claim terms during prosecution.In re Suitco Surface, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Panel: Circuit Judges Rader, Prost, and Moore
Opinion by Circuit Judge Rader -
By
Sarah Fendrick —
Last week, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced the launch of a new ombudsman
pilot program that will provide patent applicants with more assistance with
application processing problems. The
new pilot program allows applicants experiencing problems during processing to
contact an ombudsman representative. The ombudsman representative will call the applicant within one day for
assistance in resolving the problem. The problems raised will be tracked and used to construct a website that
provides answers to commonly encountered issues. Additional information regarding the pilot program can be found in a notice the Office published in the Federal Register (75 Fed. Reg. 17380).In an Office press release announcing the launch,
USPTO Director David Kappos stated that the "program is a direct response to feedback we've received from members of the
patent community who have told us that they need a dedicated resource they can
turn to when they have concerns about the prosecution of their application." Director Kappos added that the Office was "always striving for ways to improve the
quality and efficiency of patent examinations, and we believe this initiative
is an important step forward on both these fronts."Applicants can
contact an ombudsman representative through the Ombudsman Pilot Program webpage. While the pilot program is being made available to
provide additional assistance, existing resources still remain
available to patent applicants.For additional information regarding this topic, please see:
• "USPTO Proposes Patents Ombudsman Pilot Program," November 12, 2009
-
By
Donald Zuhn —On
March 26, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court for
the District of Connecticut that U.S. Patent Nos. 5,328,824 and 5,449,767 are
invalid, affirmed the judgment of the District Court that U.S. Patent No.
5,476,928 is anticipated, and affirmed the judgment of the District Court that
5,082,830 is not infringed.
The
'824, '767, '928, and '830 patents, which are owned by Plaintiffs-Appellants
Enzo Biochem, Inc., Enzo Life Sciences, Inc., and Yale University
("Enzo"), are directed to various techniques for labeling and
detecting nucleic acids. More
particularly, the '824, '767, and '928 patents are directed to a compound, or a
method of using that compound as a detection probe. In this compound (shown below), a nitrogenous base B is
covalently attached, either directly or through a "linkage group"
(dotted line), to a chemical moiety A.
In
the asserted claims, the linkage group is recited functionally (rather than
structurally) as "not interfering substantially" with both
hybridization and detection (in the '824 and '767 patents) or detection alone (in the '928
patent). Chemical moiety A is
a label that facilitates detection, "compris[ing] at least three carbon
atoms and represent[ing] at least one component of a signalling moiety capable
of producing a detectable signal" (claim 1 of the '824 and '767 patents)
or "represent[ing] at least three carbon atoms and an indicator molecule
selected from the group consisting of fluorescent dyes, electron-dense
reagents, enzymes which can be reacted with a substrate to produce a visually
detectable reaction product, and radioisotopes" (claim 1 of the '928
patent). The '830 patent is
directed to a compound and a method of detection using a compound, wherein
the claimed compound is a nucleotide labeled with "at least one
non-radioactive moiety directly or indirectly attached to each of the 5′ and 3′
end nucleotides thereof," and the detection method is accomplished using a
"preformed detectable molecular complex."
In
June 2004, Enzo brought suit against Defendants-Appellees Applera Corp. and
Tropix, Inc. ("Applera") for infringement of the '824, '767, '928,
and '830 patents (as well as U.S. Patent Nos. 4,711,955 and 4,994,373, which
were not at issue in the appeal).
In October 2006, the District Court issued a claim construction ruling,
determining that the "not interfering substantially" functional language
for the linkage group means that "the linkage group neither substantially
interferes with the ability of the compound to hybridize with the nucleic acid
nor substantially interferes with the ability of [moiety] A to be detected." As for moiety A, the District Court
determined that for the '824 and '767 patents, "[moiety] A may be a part
of or the entire signalling moiety"; for the '928 patent, the plain
language of the patent "precludes a construction where A is the entire
[indicator] molecule"; and for the '830 patent, the term
"non-radioactive moiety" means "a moiety that is utilized in
indirect detection, i.e., a moiety that can be detected with a preformed
detectable molecular complex."Enzo
conceded that under the District Court's construction, it could not prove
infringement of the '830 patent, and the District Court granted summary judgment of
noninfringement to Applera.
Applera then moved for summary judgment of lack of written description, lack of enablement, indefiniteness, and anticipation with respect to the three
remaining patents. The District
Court granted summary judgment of indefiniteness and anticipation, finding the
"not interfering substantially" language in the asserted claims to be
indefinite because "[t]he specifications neither set forth how one would
gauge substantial interference, nor delimit the threshold at which interference
with the procedure prevents [the claimed] method from being implemented,"
and determining that the asserted claims were anticipated by three references (Kasai
et al., 1979; Pingoud et al., 1977; and Bauman, 1980).Indefiniteness
On
appeal, Enzo argued that the District Court incorrectly determined that the
"not interfering substantially" language in the '824, '767, and '928
patents is indefinite. In
particular, Enzo argued that the specifications provide specific examples of
linkage groups that do not substantially interfere with hybridization and
detection and a test for measuring the degree of interference (i.e., comparing the melting temperature
of a modified polynucleotide with that of an unmodified polynucleotide). Applera countered that nothing in the
patents explains how to measure "interference" or how to determine
whether such interference is "substantial."In
determining that the claims of the '824 and '767 patents are not indefinite,
the Federal Circuit noted that "[t]he claims in this case provide at least
some guidance as to how much interference will be tolerated." Pointing to a dependent claim that
recites the structure –CH=CH–CH2–NH–,
the panel observed that "[a] person of ordinary skill would presume that a
structure recited in a dependent claim will perform a function required of that
structure in an independent claim," and "[t]hus, it may be presumed
that the term 'not interfering substantially' in the independent claims allows
for at least as much interference as that exhibited when the linkage group has
the structure specified in the dependent claims."The panel also looked to examples of suitable
linkage groups, as well as criteria for selecting such linkage groups, disclosed
in the specification. For example,
the specification discloses that more preferred chemical linkage groups be
derived from a primary amine and have the structure –CH2–NH–, and
further, that thermal denaturation profiles and hybridization properties of a
polynucleotide can be used to measure the degree to which a linkage group
interferes with hybridization. In
view of the teachings in the specification, the panel concluded that the
specification indicates that "when a linkage group is incorporated into a
DNA strand having a length and sequence similar to those used in the
specification, a decrease in Tm of up to 5 oC implies that
the linkage group does not 'substantially interfere' with hybridization, and a
decrease of up to 15 oC is acceptable if the degree of cooperativity
and the extent of hyperchromicity are the same for the modified and unmodified
strands."Finally, the panel noted that during the
prosecution of the patents, Enzo overcame an indefiniteness rejection by submitting
a declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 listing eight specific linkage groups,
including the –CH=CH–CH2–NH– group listed in the
patents' dependent claims. Thus,
the panel concluded that:Because the intrinsic evidence here provides "a general guideline
and examples sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
determine [the scope of the claims]," the claims are not indefinite even
though the construction of the term "not interfering substantially" defines
the term without reference to a precise numerical measurement. When deciding whether a particular
linkage group is or is not "substantially" interfering with
hybridization within the meaning of the district court's construction, a person
of ordinary skill would likely look to the thermal denaturation profiles and
hybridization properties (including Tm) of the modified nucleotide,
to see whether they fall within the range of exemplary values disclosed in the
intrinsic evidence.(citations omitted).
The Federal Circuit similarly found the claim
language not indefinite with respect to detection (Wherein the '824 and '767 patents
concern the effect of the linkage group on hybridization and detection, the
'928 patent only concerns the effect of the linkage group on detection.) In support of this additional finding,
the panel noted that the eight linkage groups listed in the declaration "were
said not to 'interfere[] with the ability of biotin in an oligo- or
polynucleotide probe of this invention to form a detectable complex with one of
avidin, streptavidin or antibodies to biotin or iminobiotin.'" Thus, the panel concluded that:So long as moiety A can be detected within the level of detection
achieved by the applicants using the exemplary linkage groups disclosed in the
intrinsic evidence, a person of ordinary skill would understand that a
different linkage group (one that is not disclosed in the intrinsic evidence)
likewise does not "substantially interfere" with the detection of
moiety A.Anticipation
The Federal Circuit next addressed the issue of
anticipation, finding that Enzo had raised a genuine issue of material fact as
to the Kasai et al. and Pingoud et al. references sufficient to survive
summary judgment of anticipation of the '824 and '767 patents, but that Enzo had failed
to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the Bauman reference
and '928 patent. Looking at the
first two references, the panel noted that each "employ[s] a –CH2–NH–
linkage group, which arguably belongs to the set of linkage groups disclosed in
the patents-in-suit as 'even more preferred' embodiments," adding that
"[i]f unopposed, this evidence would entitle Applera to judgment as a
matter of law." At trial,
Enzo responded by offering an expert declaration stating that the –CH2–NH–
linkage group of Kasai et al. "would
not provide sufficient rigidity to prevent significant interference with
hybridization of a complementary polynucleotide," and "[i]ndeed, one
would predict based on the flexibility of this functional group and the
concomitant high degree of motion, there would be significant interference due
to free rotation about the single bonds."On appeal, Applera argued that Enzo's expert declaration
could not be credited because it conflicted with Enzo's Rule 132 declaration,
and further, because Enzo's expert offered no support for his assertion that
Kasai et al. would substantially
interfere. The Federal Circuit,
however, determined that:Viewing the [expert] declaration in a light most favorable to Enzo
requires that [the expert's] explanation be read as limited to the specific
one-carbon aminomethyl group [i.e., –CH2–NH–] disclosed in Kasai and
not as a sweeping condemnation of single bonds or an unyielding requirement of
double bonds. . . . [The expert's] statement that the
aminomethyl group disclosed in Kasai would substantially interfere and [the
Rule 132 declaration's] statement that a six-carbon diamine group would not are
not inconsistent, particularly when viewed in a light most favorable to Enzo,
as it must be.The panel also noted that while Enzo's expert
focused on the impact of the nature of the bonds in the linkage group (i.e., single or double) on hybridization
and detection, the specification also recognizes that the length of linkage
group impacts hybridization and detection.Lastly, the panel addressed Applera's argument that the –CH2–NH–
linkage group, which is described in Kasai et
al., was also within Enzo's "even most preferred" embodiments. In response, the Court determined that
Enzo's counterargument that "the 'even more preferred' language is
properly read as describing a subset of the preferred embodiments — i.e.,
those with carbon-carbon double bonds at the α-positition — such that the most
preferred embodiments have both a carbon-carbon double bond at the α-position,
and are derived from a primary amine and include a –CH2–NH– group,"
was reasonable and should have been credited on summary judgment.Turning to Pingoud et al., the Court noted that "[o]n its face, Pingoud notes
that there was substantial interference with hybridization." In particular, the panel pointed to a
statement in the reference that "[c]odon-anticodon interaction . . . is
severely affected by the [fluorescent labeling] modification," stating
that "'[c]odon-anticodon interaction' is indicative of hybridization, and
'severely affected' suggests substantial interference." The panel therefore concluded that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the linkage group disclosed
in Pingoud et al. substantially
interferes with hybridization. The
Court also rejected Applera's argument that the –CH2–NH– linkage
group, which is similarly described in Pingoud et al., was within Enzo's "even most preferred"
embodiment.Turning to the final reference, the panel noted
that in Bauman, hybridization is performed before moiety A is attached to base
B via the linkage group. Enzo
argued that in view of this chronology, Bauman did not anticipate the '928
patent. However, the Court
determined that "[i]t is irrelevant, for purposes of anticipation, what
method is used, much less what order of steps is used, to attach both moiety A
and the linkage group to base B."
The Court also noted that because the '928 patent is silent as to
hybridization, "[a]ll that is required of this particular linkage group is
that it not substantially interfere with the ability of A to be detected."Infringement
Addressing the last issue on appeal (i.e., infringement of the '830 patent),
the Federal Circuit first reviewed the District Court's construction of the
term "non-radioactive moiety," which the lower court had found to
mean "a moiety that is utilized in indirect detection, i.e., a moiety that
can be detected with a preformed detectable molecular complex." The Federal Circuit found the District Court's construction to be reasonable, and affirmed the lower court's
judgment of noninfringement with respect to the '830 patent. In response to Enzo's argument that the
District Court's construction violated the doctrine of claim differentiation
because dependent claim 14 adds "a preformed detectable molecular
complex" to claim 1, the panel stated that:[T]he district court's construction
imposes no requirement that a preformed detectable molecular complex is
actually present in claim 1; rather, it simply requires the "non-radioactive
moiety" to be capable of performing a function: "can be detected with a preformed detectable
molecular complex." Claim
Construction, 2006 WL 2927500, at *11 (emphasis added). Claim 1, unlike claim 14, is infringed
even in the absence of a preformed detectable molecular complex.Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Applera Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Panel:
Chief Judge Michel and Circuit Judges Plager and Linn
Opinion
by Circuit Judge Linn -
By Kevin E. Noonan —
The problem, according to the academics and the
pundits, is that patent exclusivity in certain areas (such as gene patents) could result in a "tragedy of the anti-commons," inhibiting
innovation. One of the many
manifestations of this tragedy, according to such august bodies as the National
Academy of Science and the Federal Trade Commission, was expected to be an
increase in litigation as patentees protected their exclusive rights. A related issue is the exposure to
patent infringement liability for university researchers in the aftermath of
the Madey v. Duke case, where the
Federal Circuit ruled that university research did not fall under the "common
law" experimental use exemption enunciated by Judge Story in Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120,
1121 (C.C.D. 1813), because university research was not performed for "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity
or for strictly philosophical inquiry," but as part of the university's "business
objectives" (teaching and research). The fear of this liability has led to proposals for basic research to be
entitled to a broad exemption.
The underlying
grounds for both types of concerns have once again been found to be non-existent,
in a study published in the April 4th edition of Nature
Biotechnology. The study, by Ann
E. Mills and Patti M. Tereskerz from the Center for Biomedical Ethics and
Humanities, program in Ethics and Policy in Heath Systems at the University of
Virginia, and entitled "Empirical analysis of major stem cell patent
cases: the role of universities"
is limited to stem cell patents and litigation involving such patents. The authors identified these patents as
being relevant to questions about the existence of an anti-commons tragedy
because such patents were expected to become more important with the policy
change on embryonic stem cell research by the Obama administration, and because
"there are few or no alternatives to patented technologies that enable
embryonic or adult stem cells to be directed into specific cell lineages"
and "[t]he interdependence of the technologies involved with these stem
cell patents and the fragmentation of their ownership across many organizations
could make the task of coordinating access to key technologies an intensive as
well as costly process, and so create an anti-commons in the field."The study
builds on earlier work by Bergman and Graf (2007, Nat. Biotechnol. 25:419–24), who
indentified three International Patent Classes where most stem cell patents can
be identified. Mills and Tereskerz
reviewed these IPCs from U.S. Patent and Trademark Office records for the
number of patents in the PTO database in each class claiming stem cells and the
number of these patents involved in litigation. The authors report identifying 67 cases involving 23
patents, where one patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605, owned by Monsanto) was
involved in 32 lawsuits. Of the
three IPCs, one (C07K 14/peptides having more than 20 amino acids; 605 relevant
patents) showed no patents involved in litigation, while the other two (C12N 5/undifferentiated
human, animal or plant cells, e.g., cell lines; tissues; cultivation or maintenance
thereof; culture media, 1,163 relevant patents, and C12 15/mutation or genetic
engineering; DNA or RNA concerning genetic engineering vectors, their
isolation, preparation or purification, 2094 relevant patents) showed no
statistically-significant difference in litigation when the fact that some
patents are involved in multiple litigations was taken into account.Turning to the specifics of the parties, 7/67 cases
involved university plaintiffs, and 5/28 plaintiffs were universities
(18%). In contrast, only 1/89 defendants
were universities. One plaintiff,
Monsanto, showed a decided preference for suing on "older" patents,
with U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605
being litigated 32 times, and U.S. Patent 4,940,835 being litigated three
times. Excluding cases involving
Monsanto as a plaintiff, there were between one and five litigated cases per year
between 1986 and 2007 involving patents from these IPCs, with the trend being
markedly downward since 1998.The authors conclude from their data that for these
(stem cell) patents, "the rate
of litigation to issued patents in the categories studied is extremely small, which
calls into question the claim that a large amount of litigation is causing an
anti-commons" (while noting that a patent from these IPCs that was
litigated tended to be litigated several times). The authors also note that, contrary to the popular
belief that universities would be defendants, in a significant number of cases universities
were plaintiffs, defending their own intellectual property. (Not noted in the main body of the
article was whether industry defendants were involved in suits where
universities were plaintiffs, a result expected if university protection of intellectual
property was being used to prevent commercial expropriation of technology
developed by universities with public monies.) In this regard, seven of twelve cases involving patents that had
been litigated multiple times had university plaintiffs.Regarding the
effects of the Madey decision, the
authors state that "it appears that the post-Madey fears of opening
a floodgate of litigation against universities is not being realized at the
moment." The
authors also compare their results with the results of two earlier studies by
Walsh and colleagues (National
Research Council, Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in Genomic and
Protein Research and Innovation, Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and
Protemic Research: Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health,
National Academies Press, 2006; and Walsh et
al., in Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy (eds. Cohen W. &
Merrill, S.) 285–340 (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2003). These studies showed that university
researchers were not sued by patentees for performing basic research (a result
supported by several other studies, including Walsh et al., 2003, "Science
and the Law: Working Through the Patent Problem," Science
299: 1020; Walsh et al., 2005, "Science
and Law: View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers," Science
309: 2002-03; Straus, 2002, Genetic
Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices; Nicol et al., 2003, Patents
and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing the
Australian Industry, Centre for Law & Genetics, Occasional
Paper 6; Nagaoka, 2006, "An
Empirical Analysis of Patenting and Licensing Practice of Research
Tools from Three Perspectives," presented in OECD Conference in
Research Use of Patented Inventions, Madrid).The authors cite
the Walsh studies for the proposition that patentees in industry "welcomed"
academic research, because it advanced knowledge about the patented
technology. Indeed, traditional
concerns were cited by scientists as being greater impediments than patents: "'unreasonable terms for obtaining research inputs'
was cited by 10% of survey respondents and 'too many patents covering needed
research inputs' was cited by only 3% of survey respondents as a reason for
project abandonment."The authors
conclude as follows:We find no evidence that Madey is
unleashing a floodgate of litigation in the areas we studied, despite the worry
voiced by the three reports cited above. We also find that for the stem cell
patents studied, universities are proactive (and have been before Madey)
in protecting their intellectual property, supporting the Madey contention
that the boundary between industry and academia is blurring.And yet, like an urban legend, the myth that
university researchers are at risk for patent infringement liability, or that
patents cause university researchers to abandon research areas for fear of litigation,
or that there is a tragedy of the anti-commons, persist, despite all evidence
to the contrary. The only rational
conclusion is that these fantasies support a political agenda that is
antithetical to patenting. Recognizing that these problems do not exist may be the first step in
rejecting the several solutions proffered for these purely political reasons.For additional information regarding this and other related topics, please see:
• "Science Progress Article Examines Impact of Gene Patents on Research," December 21, 2009
• "The Tragedy of a Bad Idea," August 25, 2009
• "Author of Nature Article Provides Rebuttal; Patent Docs Provides Surrebuttal," March 26, 2009
• "Genetic Diagnostic Testing: The 'Anti-Commons' Revisited?" March 25, 2009
• "The Effects of Intellectual Property Protection on Agricultural Research: Patents Are Not the Problem," February 3, 2009
• "Newsweek Joins the Anti-patent Bandwagon," January 26, 2009
• "Science Article Should Help Allay Gene Patenting Fears," December 17, 2008
• "Once Again, The New Yorker Gets It Wrong on Patents," August 10, 2008
• "Once Again, The New Yorker Gets It Wrong on Patents," August 7, 2008
• "BIO Report Indicts 'Patent Reform' Proponents," February 13, 2008
• "The True Tragedy of the Anti-Commons," October 8, 2007
• "The Future of DNA Patenting," February 20, 2007
• "The 'Anti-Commons' Aren't So Tragic, After All," October 27, 2006 -
By Sherri
Oslick —
About
Court
Report: Each week we will report briefly on recently filed
biotech and pharma cases.
Warner Chilcott Co. LLC et al. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc.
1:10-cv-00285; filed April 8, 2010 in the District
Court of Delaware• Plaintiffs:
Warner Chilcott Co. LLC; Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.
• Defendant:
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,192,938 ("Method
of Treatment Using Bisphosphonic Acid," issued March 20, 2007), licensed
to Warner Chilcott, following a Paragraph IV certification as part of Mylan's
filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic version of Warner Chilcott's
Once-a-Month Actonel® (risedronate sodium, used to treat and prevent
postmenopausal osteoporosis). View
the complaint here.
LEO Pharma A/S v. Tolmar Inc.
1:10-cv-00269; filed April 6, 2010 in the District
Court of DelawareInfringement of U.S. Patent No. RE39,706 ("Crystalline
Form of Vitamin D Analogue," issued June 26, 2007) following a Paragraph
IV certification as part of Tolmar's filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic
version of LEO's Dovonex® cream (calcipotriene monohydrate, used to treat
psoriasis). View the complaint here.
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. et al. v. Zydus
Pharmaceuticals (USA) Inc. et al.
3:10-cv-01723; filed April 5, 2010 in the District
Court of New Jersey• Plaintiffs:
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co.; Takeda Pharmaceuticals North
America, Inc.; Takeda Pharmaceuticals LLC; Takeda Pharmaceuticals America,
Inc.; Ethypharm, S.A.
• Defendants:
Zydus Pharmaceuticals (USA) Inc.; Cadila Healthcare Ltd.Infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,464,632 ("Rapidly
Disintegratable Multiparticular Tablet," issued December 7, 1995), 6,328,994 ("Orally Disintegrable Tablets," issued December 11, 2001),
and 7,431,942 (same title, issued October 7, 2008) following a Paragraph IV certification
as part of Zydus' filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic version of
plaintiffs' Prevacid® SoluTab (lansoprazole delayed release orally
disintegrating tablets, used to treat ulcers, gastroesophageal reflux disease,
erosive esophagitis, and pathological hypersecretory conditions, including
Zollinger-Ellison syndrome). View
the complaint here.
Promote Innovation LLC v. Eisai Inc.
2:10-cv-00119; filed April 4, 2010 in the Eastern
District of TexasFalse marking based on Eisai's marking of its
Gliadel® products indicating these products are covered by U.S. Patent No.
4,789,724 ("Preparation of Anhydride Copolymers," issued December 6,
1988), which is expired. View the
complaint here.
Promote Innovation LLC v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc.
2:10-cv-00122; filed April 4, 2010 in the Eastern
District of TexasFalse marking based on Takeda's marking of its
Kapidex® products indicating these products are covered by U.S. Patent Nos.
5,026,560 ("Spherical Granules Having Core and Their Production,"
issued June 25, 1991), 5,045,321 ("Stabilized Pharmaceutical Composition
and its Production," issued September 3, 1991), and 5,093,132 (same title,
issued March 3, 1992), which are expired. View the complaint here.
Promote Innovation LLC v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
2:10-cv-00120; filed April 4, 2010 in the Eastern
District of TexasFalse marking based on BMS' marking of its Zerit
product indicating this product is covered by U.S. Patent No. 4,978,655 ("Use
of 3'-deoxythymidin-2'-ene (3'deoxy-2',3'-didehydrothymidine) in Treating Patients
Infected with Retroviruses," December 18, 1990), which is expired. View the complaint here.
Promote Innovation LLC v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Inc.
2:10-cv-00121; filed April 4, 2010 in the Eastern
District of TexasFalse marking based on Ranbaxy's marking of its
Exelderm® product indicating this product is covered by U.S. Patent No.
4,055,652 ("1-[.beta.(R-thio)phenethyl]imidazoles and Derivatives Thereof,"
issued October 25, 1977), which is expired. View the complaint here.
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. et al. v. Macleods
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
1:10-cv-00532; filed April 1, 2010 in the District
Court of the District of Columbia• Plaintiffs: Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.;
Novartis Pharma AG; Novartis International Pharmaceutical Ltd.
• Defendant: Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd.Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,866,581 ("Penciclovir
for the Treatment of Post Therapeutic Neuralgia," issued February 2, 1999)
following a Paragraph IV certification as part of Macleods' filing of an ANDA to
manufacture a generic version of Novartis' Famvir® (famciclovir, used for the
treatment of acute herpes zoster (shingles), the treatment or suppression of
recurrent genital herpes in immunocompentent patients, the treatment of
recurrent herpes labialis (cold sores) in immunocompetent patients, and the
treatment of recurrent mucotaneous herpes simplex infections in HIV-infected
patients). View the complaint here.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA
Inc.
1:10-cv-00264; filed April 1, 2010 in the District
Court of Delaware• Plaintiffs: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.;
Novartis Corp.; Novartis Pharma AG
• Defendant: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.Infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,849,911 ("Antivirally
Active Heterocyclic Azahexane Derivatives," issued December 15, 1998) and
6,087,383 ("Bisulfate Salt of HIV Protease Inhibitor," issued July
11, 2000), both licensed to BMS, following a Paragraph IV certification as part
of Teva's filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic version of BMS's Reyataz®
(atazanavir bisulfate, used to treat HIV infection). View the complaint here.