• Calendar

    February 8, 2011 – Corporate Intellectual Property Law Conference (Law Bulletin Publishing Company) – Chicago, IL

    February 9, 2011 – Patent Claim Indefiniteness: Enzo v. Applera (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 PM (ET)

    February 9-10, 2011 – BioPharma IP Innovations Summit (Strategic Solutions Network) – Miami, FL

    February 16-17, 2011 – Life Sciences Collaborative Agreements and Acquisitions*** (American Conference Institute) – New York, NY

    February 16-17, 2011 – Biotech & Pharmaceutical Patenting (IBC Legal) – Munich, Germany

    March 16-17, 2011 – FDA Boot Camp*** (American Conference Institute) – New York, NY

    ***Patent Docs is a media partner of this conference or CLE

  • IPO #2 The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Patent Claim Indefiniteness: Enzo v. Applera" on Wednesday, February 9, 2011 beginning at 2:00 PM (ET).  The IPO webinar will address the question:  just how definite do the claims of a patent need to be?  The webinar will look at the Federal Circuit's decision in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp. that reversed a district court's judgment that two Enzo patents were invalid for indefiniteness; in mid-December, the U.S. Supreme Court asked the Solicitor General to weigh in on Applera's appeal.  The webinar will consider not only the issues raised by the Enzo case, but also the ways a patent can presently be found indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, including indefinite means-plus-function claims and apparatus-plus-method claims in such cases as Telcordia, Aristocrat, Finisair, and IPXL.  The speakers include John Dragseth of Fish & Richardson P.C.; Prof. Michael Meurer of Boston University School of Law; and Mark Pals of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP.  The registration fee for the webinar is $120 (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Law Bulletin The Law Bulletin Publishing Company will be holding its annual Corporate Intellectual Property Law Conference on February 8, 2011 in Chicago, IL.  The conference will address the following topics:

    General Sessions

    • The State of the USPTO — "Strategic Perspectives on Intellectual Property: Inside and Out (of the USPTO)" — Sharon Barner, former Deputy Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
    • Protecting Trade Secrets

    Patent Track Sessions

    • Patent Mismarking: 2010 and Beyond
    • The Scope of Patentability

    An agenda for the conference can be found here, and additional information about the conference can be found here.  The registration fee for the conference is $109.  Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Senate Floor The Senate Judiciary Committee met today and passed S. 23, the Patent Reform Act of 2011, sending it to the Senate floor for consideration.  The vote was 15 ayes, no nays, and on abstention (by Senator John Cornyn, R-TX).  But prior to the vote, there were several (but fewer than expected) amendments presented and adopted, and several Senators who voiced their intention to bring amendments to the Senate floor and, if they were not included in the final bill, these Senators could not pledge their support.

    Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) spoke extensively on changes in this bill from the Managers' Amendment to S. 515 passed by the committee in the last Congress.  These changes, specifically to the post-grant review provisions of the bill, made it possible for him to support the measure, as he proposed it be amended.  He voiced his "deep misgivings" about previous versions of the bill, and praised Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) for taking his suggestion and meeting with senior U.S. Patent and Trademark Office officials to address concerns that post-grant review would be difficult to implement and increase the backlog and patent application pendency.  The bill as amended would have two differences from earlier versions that the Senator believes will be important:  first, inter partes post-grant review would be conducted by the USPTO as an adjudicated proceeding, unlike the present system which is substantially similar to ex parte prosecution (albeit with third party requestor commentary).  Senator Kyl called these proceedings "cumbersome" and "slow" and said that the system proposed in the bill would address these concerns by having each party present their evidence (and, presumably, rebuttal by patentee) to the Patent Office, which would then render a decision on whether the requestor had shown one or more claims to be invalid.  The evidence would be limited to prior art printed publications and patents, and there would be no discovery (and, presumably, no evidence of on-sale activity or § 112 deficiencies).  In addition, the threshold for granting review would be heightened from the present "substantial question of patentability" standard to a "reasonable likelihood of invalidity" standard, which the Senator hailed as being fair to patentees (by reducing or eliminating spurious or non-meritorious requests) and challengers (since there should be little justification for complaint if a requestor did not have sufficient evidence to satisfy a reasonable likelihood standard).  The Senator contrasted this expected outcome with the present ex parte and inter partes re-examination regimes, where 95% of requests are granted, "many clearly unnecessary and some sought to gain advantage in litigation," which he characterized as a "gross waste of PTO resources."  The Senator also noted that these provisions would provide incentives for challengers to "front-load" their evidence, enable the Patent Office to meet the one-year deadline for deciding post-grant review challenges, and to protect patentees from harassment by requests of dubious merit.  Senator Kyl's amendment was unanimously approved by the committee by voice vote.

    Senate Seal Several Senators voiced concerns over business method patents, but while an amendment by Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Kyl was not put to a vote, the sentiments of several of the committee members were strongly expressed.  Senator Kyl called the Federal Circuit's State Street decision allowing business method patents a "serious error," something not permitted by other patent systems, and that has resulted in "thousands of invalid business method patents [that] remain on the books and [are] used to extract large sums of money from defendants."  He supports the establishment of a temporary procedure for the PTO to invalidate these patents, to remove a "blight on the economy" more cheaply than by litigation.  Senator Schumer said he would offer a business method patents provision on the Senate floor, calling business method patents a "plagu[e on] the financial sector," "anathema" to a patent system intended to protect technological innovation, and that business methods permit protection of "abstract and common concepts" because the nature of the financial services industry prevents the Patent Office from recognizing prior art (presumably because most businesses have traditionally kept such methods as trade secrets).  He said that business method patents are litigated thirty times more frequently than all other patents, and that his amendment would let companies "targeted" by business method holders to go before the PTO and demonstrate the patent invalid over prior art, using an undescribed "efficient administrative proceeding."  Senator Schumer also stated that he would not be able to support passage of the bill by the Senate if it did not contain some provisions for addressing business method patents.  Senator Feinstein (D-CA) would go even further in her remarks, suggesting that the bill should simply ban business method patents altogether.

    Senator Grassley (R-IA) proposed an amendment that passed on voice vote to ban methods for tax (avoidance) strategies.  He noted that this problem came to his attention when several Certified Public Accountants were sued by a tax strategy patentee, and that his amendment was intended to protect taxpayer rights (i.e., the inalienable right to pay as little in taxes as possible legally).  He said that such patents "encumber the use of the tax laws" by taxpayers, and can result in taxpayers having to pay a fee to a patentee for merely complying with the tax code, citing protection that would give private parties the "exclusive use" of loopholes in the tax code.  "All taxpayers" should have equal access to tax strategies, in the absence of which the fairness of the system could be threatened, according to Senator Grassley.  He specifically pointed out that his amendment would not ban software tools for preparing tax returns.

    The committee also approved by voice vote "technical" amendments, and Senator Feinstein's "compromise" on willfulness, but did not vote on amendments to the "first-inventor-to-file" provisions or Senator Schumer's "generic drug" amendment.  The committee also did not vote on Senator Tom Coburn's (R-OK) fee diversion amendment, which he will introduce during debate on the Senate floor.  Senator Leahy gave Senator Coburn the floor for a (relatively) long discussion of his proposed amendment, which was supported by several other committee members.  Senator Coburn asserted that there was a "contract with America" that patent fees were collected to pay for patent examination, and that "if an American pays a fee he should get what he pays for" and not for funding other aspects or parts of the government.  He called intellectual property protection something that needs to be done in an expeditious and timely manner and produce "quality" patents, and that excess monies collected by the Patent Office should be used to provide additional services by the Office to examine and grant additional patents, rather than being diverted for other uses.  He said he believed this was part of a bigger effort to adjust spending, debt, and the economy.

    Senator Durbin (D-IL) raised a question that shed light not only on why Senator Coburn did not offer his amendment for consideration by the committee but also how legislators think about questions involving revenue.  He asked who should be responsible for oversight on how PTO monies are spent, in view of the interests of the Appropriations Committee in federal revenue.  Senator Coburn indicated that he believed the Judiciary Committee had that authority, although he backtracked slightly when Senator Durbin mentioned the Appropriations Committee staff dedicated to monitoring how monies were spent by various agencies.  Senator Coburn countered that there is "not enough" oversight by Congress, although comments by other Senators indicated that this was not merely a "turf war" but a more fundamental question of how appropriation decisions are made (and perhaps the consequences of having other committees exert influence on these issues).  Senator Coburn's comments on fee diversion were supported by Senators Grassley and Christopher Coons (D-DE) (the latter saying there is a "delicate relationship" between how the different Congressional committees could exercise oversight), and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) called fee diversion "despicable" in supporting this amendment, also saying fee diversion was a "tax on innovation."  Senator Cornyn called these provisions "central to the bill" which he predicted would have a "big impact on the country, on intellectual property rights and the economy."

    The bill now moves to the Senate floor for eventual consideration.  There has not yet been a patent reform bill introduced in the House of Representatives.

  • By Donald Zuhn —

    Kohl, Senator Last week, Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) (at right) introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 27) in the Senate.  The bill, which is co-sponsored by Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Susan Collins (R-ME), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Al Franken (D-MN), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), and Bernard Sanders (I-VT), is designed to prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating generic drug companies for delaying the entry of generic drugs into the market.

    In a section entitled "Findings," the bill notes that "[p]rescription drugs make up 10 percent of the national health care spending but for the past decade have been one of the fastest growing segments of health care expenditures."  The bill states that "[u]ntil recently, the [Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (or Hatch-Waxman Act)] was successful in facilitating generic competition to the benefit of consumers and health care payers — although 67 percent of all prescriptions dispensed in the United States are generic drugs, they account for only 20 percent of all expenditures."  According to the bill, "[i]n recent years, the intent of the [Hatch-Waxman] Act has been subverted by certain settlement agreements between brand companies and their potential generic competitors that make 'reverse payments' which are payments by the brand company to the generic company."  The bill asserts that "[t]hese settlement agreements have unduly delayed the marketing of low-cost generic drugs contrary to free competition, the interests of consumers, and the principles underlying antitrust law," and contends that "[b]ecause of the price disparity between brand name and generic drugs, such agreements are more profitable for both the brand and generic manufacturers than competition, and will become increasingly common unless prohibited."

    The bill would allow the Federal Trade Commission to initiate an enforcement proceeding "against the parties to any agreement resolving or settling, on a final or interim basis, a patent infringement claim, in connection with the sale of a drug product."  In such proceedings, "an agreement shall be presumed to have anticompetitive effects and be unlawful if — (i) an ANDA filer receives anything of value; and (ii) the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the ANDA product for any period of time," unless "the parties to such agreement demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the agreement."  The bill lists a number of factors to be considered in determining whether the parties to the agreement have met the above burden.  The bill also provides a number of penalties for violating the Act, including a civil penalty in the amount of three times the value received by an NDA holder or given to an ANDA filer that is in violation of the Act.

    Senator Kohl's bill is similar to the bill (S. 369) that he introduced in the last Congress, which would have added a new section to The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) that would have made it unlawful "for any person, in connection with the sale of a drug product, to directly or indirectly be a party to any agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim in which — (1) an ANDA filer receives anything of value; and (2) the ANDA filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell the ANDA product for any period of time" (see "Bill to Prohibit Reverse Payments Introduced in the Senate").  When introducing S. 369, Senator Kohl called reverse payment agreements "backroom" deals that constitute "one of the most egregious tactics used to keep generic competitors off the market."  The new bill marks the third straight Congress in which Senator Kohl has introduced legislation intended to prohibit reverse payments.

  • By James DeGiulio —

    Jury Awards Abbott $16M in Tarka Patent Suit Against Glenmark

    Abbott Laboratories #1 Abbott Laboratories has been awarded $16 million in its suit against Glenmark Pharmaceuticals over a generic version of the blood pressure drug, Tarka, after a federal jury found Glenmark liable for infringement.  In October 2007, Glenmark notified Abbott and Sanofi that it had filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA to make a generic drug containing trandolapril and verapamil hydrochloride, the active ingredients in Tarka.  Sanofi and Abbott responded by filing the current lawsuit in December 2007, alleging that Glenmark was planning to infringe U.S. Patent No. 5,721,244, which covers Tarka (see "Court Report," December 16, 2007).  In June 2010, Sanofi and Abbott failed to block Glenmark's launch of its generic version of Tarka after their motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order was denied (see "Biotech/Pharma Docket," June 10, 2010).  Glenmark subsequently launched its generic Tarka at-risk in June.  In July, the plaintiffs succeeded in getting sanctions against Glenmark on the grounds that the generic-drug company had destroyed evidence relevant to the likely litigation that would follow the filing of its ANDA.

    Glenmark Pharmaceuticals On January 14, the jury handed down its verdict in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, confirming the validity of the Sanofi-owned and Abbott-licensed '244 patent.  Glenmark has been ordered to pay Abbott $16 million in damages, out of which about $15.2 million were awarded by the jury for lost profits and the balance for higher prices that Abbott could have charged had Glenmark not infringed the '244 patent.  Glenmark is expected to appeal.


    Mylan Settles with Pfizer in Lipitor and Caduet Patent Suits

    Pfizer Pfizer has entered into a deal with Mylan that permits the generic producer to sell versions of the cholesterol drug Lipitor and the combination blood pressure/cholesterol treatment Caduet.  Pfizer first filed suit against Mylan in June 2009, accusing Mylan of infringing U.S. Patent Nos. 5,969,156; 6,087,511; and 6,274,440, covering Lipitor, by filing its ANDA (see "Court Report," June 22, 2009.  The asserted patents, owned by Pfizer subsidiary Warner-Lambert, expire in July 2016, and Lipitor was granted a further period of exclusivity until January 2017.  In February 2010, Pfizer sued Mylan for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,455,574 over Mylan's attempt to make a generic version of Caduet (see "Court Report," February 8, 2010).

    Mylan #1 On January 25, in separate press releases covering the Lipitor and Caduet settlements, Mylan announced that it had entered into agreements with Pfizer that will resolve both infringement cases.  Under the terms of the Caduet settlement, Mylan can begin marketing and selling a generic version of Caduet on November 30, 2011.  The terms of the Lipitor settlement remain confidential.  Both settlement agreements are subject to review by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.


    Sanofi-Aventis Uroxatral Patent Found Valid and Infringed by Apotex

    Sanofi-Aventis_small Apotex was found to infringe the patent covering Sanofi-Aventis' prostate drug Uroxatral after a District Court judge followed his earlier ruling upholding the validity of the patent.  Sanofi brought an infringement suit against Apotex, Mylan, Aurobindo, Torrent, and others in 2007 following the generics' ANDA filings, alleging that each defendant's generic alfuzosin hydrochloride infringed U.S. Patent No. 4,661,491 (see "Court Report," October 14, 2007).  After the actions were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, Sanofi and Apotex stayed their claims.  Apotex agreed in October 2009 that if a judgment was entered in favor of Sanofi and against any defendant, the stay would be lifted and a similar judgment would be entered against it.  However, Apotex also indicated in the October 2009 stipulation that it could appeal any judgment siding with Sanofi.  Mylan attempted to invalidate Sanofi's patent by asserting that the '491 patent was obvious in view of three pieces of prior art.  In May, Judge Sleet issued an opinion upholding the patent, disagreeing with the defendant's argument that the patent was invalid due to obviousness (see "Biotech/Pharma Docket," May 27, 2010).  The District Court in August upheld the validity of the asserted claims of the patent-in-suit, found that Mylan's proposed generic infringed the '491 patent, and enjoined Mylan from making and selling the generic in the U.S. until after the patent's expiration.

    Apotex #1 On January 11, Judge Gregory Sleet signed off on a stipulation to enter judgment against Apotex, holding that the defendant's proposed product violated the patent and blocked the effective date of its ANDA until after the expiration of the patent-in-suit.  Sanofi proposed the stipulation to Apotex in December, based on Judge Sleet's earlier ruling against Mylan.  Judge Sleet's judgment can be found here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Speaking of Oakland, Gertrude Stein famously said "There is no there, there."  The quote comes to mind when reading much of the academic literature on patenting genes and diagnostic method claims, which continues to follow the pattern of "there could be a problem, there should be a problem, in the future there might be a problem, so the fact that there is no evidence that there is a problem is irrelevant to my theory about the best way to solve the problem."

    Van Overwalle The latest example of this genre is by Geertui Van Overwalle (at right), from the Centre for Intellectual Property Rights, University of Leuven, Belgium, in an article in Science entitled "Turning Patent Swords into Shares."  The article sets forth the "usual suspects" of premises:  claims that "genes are difficult to design around," and that patents could hamper research and development, clinical access and availability of high-quality tests."  This portion of the article raises the first (of many) red flags in its citations:  the threat to "clinical access and availability of high-quality tests" is supported by no citation (representing the problem that "should exist"), and the statement that "genes are difficult to design around" is supported by a citation that reads (in very small type at the end of the article) "[i]n some empirical studies, a negative impact of patents could not be found (citing Walsh et al., 2005, "Science and Law: View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers," Science 309: 2002-03)" — really, there are several such studies, all with the same message.  In other words, despite the empirical evidence that there is no current problem, the Professor postulates that there is, and then devises ways to address the non-existent problem.  This portion of the article also cites the SACGHS report, another example of an attempt to identify and address a problem that proved elusive at best.

    The article similarly cites the possibility of a "patent thicket" caused by gene and diagnostic method patenting, but then supports the argument with the now thoroughly discredited (except in academia) "tragedy of the anticommons" idea (see "The Tragedy of a Bad Idea").  The article even admits that the problem does not exist:

    Empirical data do not yet confirm existence of a patent thicket in genetics at large . . . .  However, thicket problems in genetic diagnostics could grow with shifts (i) from monogenetic to multifactorial testing (multiplex diagnostics) and (ii) toward diagnostics based on genome-wide association studies driven by the high-throughput of single nucleotide polymorphism platforms and next-generation sequencing possibilities.

    And then:

    Although not an illustrative example of this phenomenon, the Myriad decision has invigorated concerns about potential negative effects of a dense and dispersed patent landscape.

    Cover Having arrived at this description of the problem, Professor Van Overwalle proposes solutions, most taking as their starting point practices prevalent in Europe.  These include compulsory licensing, as has been instituted in France, Belgium, and Switzerland (despite the fact that "they have not yet been put to work"; but, the Professor informs us, "they may have an indirect, preventive effect on unduly restrictive licensing behavior by patent owners").  Another possibility is the exercise of "march-in" rights by the National Institutes of Health under provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act (35 U.S.C. §§ 200-213).  Also mentioned is a "diagnostic use" exemption, as proposed in the SACGHS report.

    The Professor does recognize that a ban on gene patents could be as detrimental to "development of drugs and therapies" as it could be beneficial to "upstream" research, although there is no evidence that gene patents have affected such "upstream," non-commercial research at all, and ample evidence that basic research is unaffected by patents on genes (see "The Fantastical Economics of the Gene Patenting Debate").  Nevertheless, the article proposes that gene patents be limited only for those uses appreciated at the time the patent application was filed.  While seemingly a "reasonable" compromise, in reality such a restriction would result merely in prophetic disclosure on the one hand, and would (paradoxically) make it easier to obtain patent rights on newly discovered applications or uses of a claimed gene sequence — such as a diagnostic method relating change or mutations in the gene to disease or the propensity for disease.  Of course, this is not much different from the current situation, and in addition it is unlikely that patent claims for genes (which are overwhelmingly limited to isolated, full-length copies thereof) are infringed or even necessary to practice such diagnostic methods (patented or otherwise).

    Turning to less coercive possibilities, the Professor proposes patent pools or clearinghouses, using as examples the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) for copyright and MPEG LA, the latter group organized to promote distribution of gene sequences in such a manner.  Unfortunately, the article cannot stay true to the concept that such an arrangement can be voluntary, and thus posits that the government may need to force such collaborations.

    There certainly exists the possibility that any or even many of the possible problems identified in this and other academic articles could one day exist.  Of course, it is equally (if not more) likely that gene patents will have expired before the technology advances to a point where a patent thicket would have developed.  The history of the past thirty years reflects that possibility:  from an initial glacial pace of gene patenting (due in part to the focused effort to isolate particular genes that encode therapeutically useful molecules, and in part to the need for development of biotechnology) to the flood of genetic sequence unleashed by the Human Genome Project and it commercial counterparts.  It is certainly the case that success in deciphering the relationship between disease and genetic markers thereof has proceeded much more slowly than expected, and it is unlikely that the pace will quicken in the near term.  But patents — i.e., exclusive rights — to genes will expire more or less "all at once" in about 2020, being twenty years from the end of the HGP and about 20 years (or more) from the filing date of most gene patents from that time.  Thus, just when the potential for a patent thicket might become relevant (if we are lucky enough that robust genetic markers for disease have been so rapidly developed), the thicket will disappear.

    There is a greater potential for diagnostic method patents to raise the kinds of issues referenced in the article, but the complexity of ascertaining these types of genetic relationships, and the potential for these relationships to remain undisclosed if diagnostic methods are unprotected by patenting, is likely to result in a public calculus that trades the relatively short period of exclusivity to the patentee for the economic incentives needed to develop commercial embodiments of these tests.  Perhaps the most frightening prospect set forth in Professor Van Overwalle's article is that diagnostic method patents would be unenforceable against "clinicians using their own 'homemade' gene-based tests."  To the extent that such tests are compared with tests by companies like Myriad, which has never had a reported false positive, it seems that women would be better served having researchers do research (clinical or otherwise) and commercial clinical labs perform such clinical tests.  For diagnoses as important as the propensity to develop cancer, patients deserve no less.

    Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of such articles, however, is the tendency for policymakers and even courts (who are not immune to the blandishments of academic "research") to base their decisions on the persistent argument that there is an existing problem that needs a solution.  Darwin said that "[f]alse facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they often endure long; but false views, if supported by some evidence, do little harm, for every one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their falseness."  The non-existent problem becomes the unquestioned premise, and as any student of elementary logic can tell you, a syllogism is only as strong as its premises.  Thus can well-intentioned leaders promulgate policies that have harmful unintended consequences, all in the service of solving a problem that simply does not exist.

  • By Sherri Oslick —

    Gavel About Court Report:  Each week we will report briefly on recently filed biotech and pharma cases.

    Human Genome Sciences Inc. v. Genentech Inc. et al.
    1:11-cv-00082; filed January 25, 2011 in the District Court of Delaware

    • Plaintiff:  Human Genome Sciences Inc.
    • Defendants:  Genentech Inc.; City of Hope

    Declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability of U.S. Patent No. 6,331,415 ("Methods of Immunoglobulins, Vectors, and Transformed Host Cells for Use Therein," issued December 18, 2001) based on HGS's manufacture and sale of its Benlysta® product (belimumab, under development for the treatment of seropositive patients with systemic lupus erythematosus).  View the complaint here.


    Warner Chilcott Co. LLC et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.

    1:11-cv-00081; filed January 24, 2011 in the District Court of Delaware

    • Plaintiffs:  Warner Chilcott Co. LLC; Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.
    • Defendant:  Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.

    Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,718,634 ("Method of Treatment Using Bisphosphonic Acid," issued May 18, 2010), licensed to Warner Chilcott, following a Paragraph IV certification as part of Teva's filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic version of Warner Chilcott's Once-a-Month Actonel® (risedronate sodium, used to treat and prevent postmenopausal osteoporosis).  View the complaint here.


    Orion Corp. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.

    1:11-cv-00078; filed January 24, 2011 in the District Court of Delaware

    Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,446,194 ("Pharmacologically active catechol derivatives," issued August 29, 1995) following a Paragraph IV certification as part of Mylan's filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic version of Orion's Comtan® (entacapone, used in the treatment of Parkinson's Disease).  View the complaint here.


    Daiichi Sankyo Inc. et al. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al.

    1:11-cv-00074; filed January 21, 2011 in the District Court of Delaware

    • Plaintiffs:  Daiichi Sankyo Inc.; Genzyme Corp.
    • Defendants:  Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Watson Pharma Inc.; Watson Laboratories Inc. (NV)

    Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,693,675 ("Alkylated Amine Polymers," issued December 2, 1997) following a Paragraph IV certification as part of Watson's filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic version of plaintiffs' Welchol® (colesevelam hydrochloride, used to treat primary hyperlipidemia and type 2 diabetes mellitus).  View the complaint here.


    Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Zydus Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

    1:11-cv-10110; filed January 21, 2011 in the District Court of Massachusetts

    • Plaintiffs:  Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.
    • Defendants:  Zydus Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

    Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,576,665 ("Encapsulated Calcium Acetate Caplet and a Method for Inhibiting Gastrointestinal Phosphorous Absorption," issued June 10, 2003) following a Paragraph IV certification as part of Zydus' filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic version of Fresenius' PhosLo® GelCaps (calcium acetate, used to treat renal failure).  View the complaint here.

  • Calendar

    January 31 – February 1, 2011 – Medical Device Patent Litigation*** (American Conference Institute) – New York, NY

    February 9-10, 2011 – BioPharma IP Innovations Summit (Strategic Solutions Network) – Miami, FL

    February 16-17, 2011 – Life Sciences Collaborative Agreements and Acquisitions*** (American Conference Institute) – New York, NY

    February 16-17, 2011 – Biotech & Pharmaceutical Patenting (IBC Legal) – Munich, Germany

    March 16-17, 2011 – FDA Boot Camp*** (American Conference Institute) – New York, NY

    ***Patent Docs is a media partner of this conference or CLE

  • Munich, Germany IBC Legal will be holding its 19th annual Biotech & Pharmaceutical Patenting conference on February 16-17, 2011 in Munich, Germany.  IBC Legal faculty will help attendees:

    • Analyze the evolving biotech & pharmaceutical market landscape and what this means for a holistic patent strategy;
    • Maximize the chance of a successful patent filing for new scientific processes;
    • Optimize patent life cycles and extend market dominance;
    • Examine landmark appeal and litigation decisions and analyze the implications for future patent cases; and
    • Hear in depth insights on the legal procedures in key European, U.S., Asian, and Brazilian jurisdictions.

    Brochure In particular, IBC Legal faculty will offer presentations on the following topics:

    • Examining how the Commission is assessing antitrust issues since the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry;
    • Patent filing: Maximizing your chances of success;
    • Assessing progress towards establishing patent highways;
    • German Patent and Trademark Office's approach to biopatents;
    • Emerging opportunities for IP management in Guernsey & other offshore IP jurisdictions;
    • Examining current issues relating to plant biotech and breeding;
    • Strategies for maximizing patent life cycles;
    • Patent strategies in the new biosimilars world;
    • Stem cell patenting;
    • Personalized medicine: Patenting genes and theranostics;
    • Obviousness and inventive step in the U.S. & Europe;
    • Evaluating the pros and cons of different European legal systems to maximize your chances of successful patent litigation in each region;
    • Examining patent litigation in the U.S.;
    • Brazil patent landscape;
    • Latin America patent landscape;
    • Decoding patent information from Japan, China, Taiwan and Korea;
    • Examining how sufficiency is being addressed in Europe;
    • Assessing how well functional claims stand up to scrutiny;
    • Examining recent case law around supplementary protection certificates; and
    • Using second medical use claims to extend patent life cycles.

    A complete brochure for this conference, including an agenda, detailed descriptions of conference sessions, list of speakers, and registration form can be obtained here.

    IBC Legal The registration fee for the conference is £1,783.81.  Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here, by calling +44 (0)20 7017 5503, or by faxing a registration form to +44 (0)20 7017 4746.