• USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Intellectual Property Attaché Program will be offering a series of IP Attaché Roundtables from August 15 to 18, 2022.  Each roundtable will be held from 12:00 pm to 1:30 pm CT.  The USPTO IP attachés will discuss the following topics:

    • A sample of international posts
    • Their day-to-day roles
    • Benefits of an IP attaché career
    • Their individual career paths

    The roundtables will be moderated by USPTO Texas Regional Director Hope Shimabuku.  The IP attachés scheduled to attend represent the following regions:

    • Brazil
    • China – Guangzhou
    • Europe
    • India
    • Mexico
    • United Arab Emirates

    The roundtables will be directed to the following audiences:

    • August 15 –- trade organizations
    • August 16 –- law schools (law students and staff)
    • August 17 –- tech transfer, licensing, and commercialization groups
    • August 18 –- bar associations

    Those interested in registering for one of the roundtables, can do so here (trade organizations), here (law schools), here (tech transfer), or here (bar associations).

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Innovative Programs for Diversifying the Patent Bar" on August 16, 2022 from 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm (ET).  Michelle Bugbee of Eastman Chemical Company; Braxton K. Davis of the National Council on Patent Practicum; Ayana Marshall of Harrity & Harrity, LLP; and Tim Wilson of the Patent Quality Education & Training Foundation will discuss their innovative and collaborative programs for diversifying the patent bar and how attendees can get involved to be part of the solution.

    There is no registration fee for the webinar.  However, those interested in attending the webinar should register here.

  • As promised in our earlier post (see "Professor Sarnoff Provides His Perspective on Tillis Bill"), here we turn to Professor Joshua Sarnoff's thoughts on the portions of Senator Thom Tillis' (R-NC) bill regarding diagnostic method patents.  Those thoughts were presented in abbreviated form in the earlier post because we did not have the space the discussion deserved.  Here they are in full, followed by Kevin Noonan's response.

    Professor Sarnoff:  Kevin posits that Mayo (and implicitly Myriad) have adversely affected innovation in diagnostic methods.  Perhaps Kevin is right in regard to venture and other capital investments in developing such methods (but see below that such investment has not been diminished in regard to diagnostics).  But the data shown below tell a different story in regard to whether the restrictions on eligibility have been bad for innovation, at least in the diagnostics space.

    To make the point, I quote from the submission of the Association for Molecular Pathology (a trade association for diagnostics developers) on the 2021 PTO Jurisprudence Study request for comments, explaining why innovation and access have expanded, not contracted, for diagnostic tests post-Myriad and Mayo.  This is the only natural experiment that has been conducted in recent memory, so simply stating that investment has declined is not a meaningful response to the argument that innovation has nevertheless increased.  Hopefully, Kevin can respond with actual data to show that the AMP is wrong; if not, hopefully he will revise his views and accept that Myriad and Mayo should be preserved (at least for diagnostics).

    AMP strongly supports the Supreme Court decisions in Mayo Collaborative Services Inc. v. Prometheus Laboratories Inc. (Mayo), Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (Myriad), Inc., and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International (Alice).  As professionals developing, validating, and performing laboratory tests, we see no evidence that these court decisions have had a "dramatic negative impact on investment, research, and innovation" as it relates to molecular laboratory testing.  We present the following information to demonstrate that due to the protection afforded by these cases, the field of molecular diagnostics is innovating, growing, and thriving.

    In 2001, a survey of 122 clinical laboratory professionals performing genetic testing demonstrated that most felt the patent environment was negatively impacting the cost, access, and development of genetic tests.  Ninety-one respondents said that their laboratories needed to obtain a license to use a patented method, device, or reagent.  A quarter of the respondents had stopped performing a test altogether because of a patent or license.  Moreover, fifty-three percent (53%) of respondents decided not to develop a new clinical genetic test because of a patent or license.  In a thorough assessment by the U.S Department of Health and Human Services Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) in 2010, the Committee recognized the burden associated with negotiating numerous licenses and how the cost of these endeavors may render a clinically valuable test unworthy of financial investment.  As scientific understanding of genetics and genomics has increased over time, so has an appreciation of the polygenic (involving more than one gene) nature of disease.  In 2021, the prospect of negotiating numerous licenses for multiple genes threatens standard medical practices that have evolved since Mayo, Myriad, and Alice.

    Today, in a post-Mayo, Myriad, and Alice world, we are fortunate to have an environment where molecular professionals are not restricted by the existence of gene patents when developing and employing clinical laboratory tests in their practice.  We implore you consider these experiences and case studies . . . .

    CGP, WES, and WGS are made possible because information about thousands of genes and the role of various segments of genetic sequences in human health and disease can be incorporated into a single test.  Prior to Mayo, Myriad, and Alice, this was not possible as it would have required a laboratory to obtain a license for every gene patent that existed or to exclude potentially clinically relevant genes from the analysis.  Instead of promoting an environment for growth and innovation, patents on genetic information would have siloed testing and inhibited patient access to more comprehensive testing options.  In fact, since these court decisions, there has been increasing support by researchers and genetic testing laboratories to share and provide open access to information on genetic variants . . . .

    The necessity for molecular professionals to operate, innovate, and developed testing for patients in an environment free of considerations related to the patent-status of SARS-CoV2 and COVID-19 disease are crystalized when considering the necessity of frequent shifts in testing strategy due to external challenges experienced repeatedly since February 2020.  AMP members have been on the frontlines of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic by developing and providing molecular-based diagnostics for patients across the United States.  We surveyed our membership multiple times over the course of 2020 and collected over 250 responses from molecular laboratory professionals to understand their successes and hurdles when developing and providing the crucial and timely diagnostic services that patients needed during the COVID-19 pandemic.  In August and April of 2020, respondents reported that supply chain interruptions were having a significant impact on their work — in August, over 90% reported that interruptions delayed and/or decreased testing.  Similar responses across all laboratory types indicated that additional resources were needed to implement and/or maintain testing, with commercially-available testing kits and platform-specific laboratory consumables identified as the most needed items.  To overcome testing supply shortages and maintain their testing capacity, molecular professionals deployed multiple testing methodologies, i.e. they built redundancy in test protocols within their laboratories in order to switch to a different testing platform when a shortage compromised use of another one.  Many used more than three methods, which were often a combination of both commercially available testing kits and laboratory developed testing procedures that they designed and validated in their own laboratories.  Our findings indicated that testing diversity continues to play an important role in the public health emergency to meet the clinical need.  If laboratories and manufacturers needed to navigate multiple patent and licensing arrangements related to SARS-CoV-2 RNA sequence with each assay adjustment or introduction, the observed testing response would not have been possible.

    Kevin Noonan's response:  Before turning to the contrary data, a few points are important.  Everyone's opinion is necessarily informed by their experience, and it is not surprising that doctors believe that their mission to save lives is paramount.  Fortunately, this does not extend to burglarizing pharmacies to get drugs for patients that cannot afford them, but there comes from many doctors a whiff of "white coat immunity" when making their arguments, particularly where patents are concerned.

    Also, there are the considerations that companies like Myriad can do a more consistent job in providing reliable diagnostic information than "home brew" testing done by physicians, who after all are trained and thus much better at making differential diagnoses and giving appropriate treatments than they are at performing controlled diagnostic assays.  Which is why most diagnostic tests are performed by big companies like LabCorp and Quest Diagnostics rather than in university hospitals and clinics (and even in the latter case the tests are typically performed using test kits produced and sold by such companies).

    Finally in this regard, the effect of the Mayo/Myriad/Alice trio of Supreme Court opinions has been that these companies now have the type of free rein all companies used to have regarding university-based research (including associated teaching hospitals) prior to enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.  As a consequence, companies who licensed university technologies became easy prey to the biotechnology equivalent of "efficient infringers" and were subject to the expected consequences.  The poster child for these consequences is of course Sequenom, which lost so much of its value after its foundational patents for detecting cell-free fetal DNA in maternal blood were invalidated that it was acquired by LabCorp.

    And I think it more productive to leave the COVID experience to another time, it being a black unicorn, once-in-a-century event that makes it less productive for understanding events in more normal times.

    The countervailing evidence to the arguments made by AMP quoted by Professor Sarnoff is enumerated below.

    Appropriately we begin with a law review article by David O. Taylor, Associate Professor of Law at the SMU Dedman School of Law (D.O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, Cardozo Law Review 41: 2022-104 (2020).  In his article, Professor Taylor reviews recent Supreme Court case law on subject matter eligibility and its negative effects in cases like Ariosa v. Sequenom.  The Professor presents three principal findings regarding the effects of these cases on investment:

    First, "the investors who responded to the survey overwhelmingly believe patent eligibility is an important consideration when their firms decide whether to invest in companies developing technology.  Indeed, overall, 74% of the investors agreed that patent eligibility is an important consideration in firm decisions whether to invest in companies developing technology; only 14% disagreed.  Likewise, investors reported that reduced patent eligibility for a technology makes it less likely that their firm will invest in companies developing that technology.  For example, overall 62% of the investors agreed that their firms were less likely to invest in a company developing technology if patent eligibility makes patents unavailable, while only 20% disagreed."

    Second, "reduced patent eligibility correlates with particular investment behaviors in particular industries.  Investors overwhelmingly indicated, for example, that the elimination of patents would either not impact their firms' decisions whether to invest in companies or only slightly decrease investments in companies developing technology in the construction (89%), software and Internet (80%), transportation (84%), energy (79%), and computer and electronic hardware (72%) industries.  But investors, by contrast, overwhelmingly indicated that the elimination of patents would either somewhat decrease or strongly decrease their firms' investments in the biotechnology (77%), medical device (79%), and pharmaceutical industries (73%).  Thus, according to these investors, on average each industry would see reduced investment, but the impact on particular industries would be different.  And the life sciences industries are the ones most negatively affected."

    Third, "[a]lmost 40% of the investors who knew about at least one of the Court's eligibility cases indicated that the Court's decisions had somewhat negative or very negative effects on their firms' existing investments, while only about 15% of these investors reported somewhat positive or very positive effects.  On a going-forward basis, moreover, almost 33% of the investors who knew about at least one of the Court's eligibility cases indicated that these cases affected their firms' decisions whether to invest in companies developing technology.  These investors reported primarily decreased investments, but also shifting of investments between industries.  In particular they identified shifting of investments out of the biotechnology, medical device, pharmaceutical, and software and Internet industries."

    Fourth, "investors familiar with the Supreme Court's eligibility cases indicated different changes in firm investment behavior as compared to investors without this familiarity [albeit these data were garnered with regard to software and the Internet and are presented here for completeness]."

    The article provides copious amounts of evidence for these conclusions that are of course outside the limits of this post.  But the Professor's conclusion is as succinct as it is depressing:

    In the meantime, the major takeaway is clear:  The Supreme Court's "drastic and far-reaching experiment in patent eligibility standards" has likely resulted in lost investment in the life sciences that has delayed or altogether prevented the development of medicines and medical procedures.

    A law student Note, having perhaps a little less gravitas, is in agreement.  In "The Impact of Uncertainty Regarding Patent Eligible Subject Matter for Investment in U.S. Medical Diagnostic Technologies Matter for Investment in U.S. Medical Diagnostic Technologies," Washington and Lee Law Review 79: 397-451, A. Sasha Lee focuses on the uncertainty the Supreme Court's Mayo/Myriad/Alice quarto (including Bilski for good measure) has engendered and the harm it has and will cause.  Ms. Lee characterizes her Note as "an empirical study of venture capital investment in disease diagnostic technologies before and after Bilski and Mayo."  The Abstract sets forth her conclusions:

    This Note presents five key implications related to its central finding.  First, the data supports the recent calls to Congress for reform of § 101.  Second, it complements other key research regarding investment behavior following Mayo and Alice.  Third, the data raises the question whether remaining innovation in the diagnostics space will be enough to support the precision medicine movement.  Fourth, underinvestment in diagnostics and the discovery of disease biomarkers may lead to underinvestment in treatments.  Lastly, this Note's findings suggest that at least some venture capital firms employ greater caution when determining whether to invest in a company developing (or aiming to develop) diagnostics, which may spur hesitancy to form such companies in the first place.

    The focus of these scholars is investment, which the AMP says is not important for developing diagnostic methods.  Perhaps, but perhaps only for well-established large diagnostics companies encouraged and enabled by academic research no longer protectable by patent and precluded by culture and ethics from being kept as trade secrets.  But it is good to remember that:

    For better or worse, we live in a world that Myriad made.  In 1997, genetic diagnosis of cancer risk was in its infancy; traditional genetic linkage analysis had been successfully performed for diseases like Huntington's disease and other rare genetic diseases.  While some academic researchers had identified genes involved in cancer, these were typically loss-of-function mutations in several (~5-6) genes.  BRCA gene analysis was different, because it predicted with ~90% certainty that an affected woman would develop breast or ovarian cancer.  These biological consequences suggested radical prophylactic methods for prevention, each of which involved medical and personal costs.

    Myriad was thus in the position of having to convince doctors that their test was beneficial and was sufficiently predictive to justify both the diagnosis and the treatment.  It also required that Myriad establish a network of genetic counselors capable of interpreting the genetic information and counseling affected women (and in the context of there being the "variations on unknown significance" that occurred at much higher frequency then than it does 16 years later).  And it required Myriad to lobby governments and private payers that the cost of Myriad's test was justified by the lower medical costs of prevention (which were not inconsiderable) than treatment of breast or ovarian cancer (because the personal costs were not the payers' problem and the alleviation of which not their perceived responsibility).

    Myriad asserts that it spent about half a billion dollars to establish its business including all these ancillary costs on top of the scientific and technology costs.  Myriad did not spend this money due to altruism; like it or not, basing a society on the principle of "from each according to her abilities, to each according to her needs" was tried, famously, in the Twentieth Century with disastrous results.  But if we turn the clock back and let major medical centers in New York, and Boston, and San Francisco, and New Haven, and Bethesda develop BRCA testing, is there any hope or realistic expectation that women in Appalachia, or Oklahoma, or rural communities throughput the country would have had better, or even equivalent access to such testing?

    See "Why Does Myriad Think It Can Win BRCA Gene Lawsuits?"

    Turning to innovation instead of investment, and some of the arguments made in favor of the status quo of diminished eligibility thereupon, it would be good to consider these data:

    • A 2002 study undertaken by the German government, to determine whether patents on DNA molecules impeded entry into particular fields of research in which isolated DNAs had been patented found that DNA patents created no such barriers to entry.  The great majority of those interviewed across the entire surveyed group clearly favored the so-called "absolute product patent protection" of genes.  Strauss et al., "Genetic Inventions and Patent Law: An Empirical Survey of Selected German R & D Institutions," Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law (2002).  Similarly, in 2002, the OECD Working Party on Biotechnology Report (OECD Report), despite documenting a number of specific concerns held by researchers, failed to substantiate fears that growth in the number and complexity of biotechnology patents is preventing access to inventions for research purposes.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence and Policies (2002), 12–15.

    • A 2005 survey of academic researchers conducted by Walsh, Cho, and Cohen concluded that "patenting does not seem to limit research activity significantly, particularly among those doing basic research," with only 1% of their random sample of 398 academic respondents reporting a project delay of more than a month due to patents on knowledge inputs necessary for their research, and none reporting abandoning of a research project due to the existence of patents.  John P. Walsh et al., Final Report to the National Academy of Sciences' Committee Intellectual Property Rights in Genomic and Protein-Related Inventions: Patents, Material Transfers and Access to Research Inputs in Biomedical Research (Sept. 20, 2005).

    • In 2006, David Adelman and Kathryn DeAngelis published a detailed study of over 52,000 biotechnology patents granted in the U.S. between January 1990 and December 2004.  In the words of the two authors, their study described "the general trends in biotechnology patenting including patent counts, patent-ownership patterns, and the distribution of biotechnology patents across distinct areas of research and development."  They concluded:  "This analysis finds few tangible signs of patent thickets that define the anticommons" (Adelman and DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate).

    • A 2006 report by the National Research Council found the "number of projects abandoned or delayed as a result of difficulties in technology access is reported to be small, as is the number of occasions in which investigators revise their protocols to avoid intellectual property issues or in which they pay high costs to obtain intellectual property."  Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and Proteomic Research: Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health at 134 (2006).

    • Another 2006 study (Caulfield, Cook-Deegan, Kieff and Walsh, Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, Nat. Biotechnol. 2006 Sep; 24(9): 1091, surveyed the current scholarship and concluded based upon existing conditions that policy recommendations for patent reform surrounding genetic patents have largely been driven by a small number of high-profile incidents and controversies and that these anecdotes do not accurately reflect the larger realities surrounding patenting in biotechnology.  Regarding the oft-stated fears of a developing anticommons logjam, Caulfield et al. concluded that the effects predicted by the anticommons problem are not borne out by the available data.

    • A 2009 Canadian report on researcher perspectives on commercialization and patenting of genomic research similarly found that there is little evidence that the progress of research itself is in fact being seriously hindered or that gene patents are being aggressively enforced.  CJ Murdoch et al., "Commercialization, Patenting and Genomics: Researcher Perspectives," Genome Medicine 1:22 (2009).

    • The FTC subsequently concluded that concerns that patenting upstream technology, or "research tools," would actually obstruct commercialization of new products and hinder follow-on innovation in biotechnology "has yet to materialize."  Emerging Health Care Issues: Follow-on Federal Trade Commission report on follow-on biologics, June 2009, at 32.

    • Of some 40,000 DNA-related patents, only six have been litigated in the diagnostic testing area.  "Property rights: The granting of patents on human genes has so far not been the disaster it was predicted to be."  458 Nature 386 (2009).

    • In a 2010 series of case studies on the impact of DNA patents on genetic research, diagnostic test development, and patient access to genetic testing services published as a special supplement in Genetics in Medicine (vol. 12 (4), April 2010), the authors, despite identifying several particularized concerns about licensing practices relating to some individual gene patents, found little systemic negative impact of gene patents on genetic research, test development, patient utilization, and pricing of testing services.

    • An exhaustive 2019 study by Sampat and Williams concludes that human DNA patents do not appear to have hindered follow-on innovation, while on the other hand trade secrecy protection of human genetic sequences induced measurable declines in follow-on scientific research and product development.  The authors write that "this pattern of evidence suggests that changes to patent policy must carefully consider what strategies that firms will use to protect their discoveries in the absence of patents, and that an understanding of the relative costs and benefits of patent protection compared to [the alternative option of trade secrecy] is needed in order to evaluate the welfare effects of patent policy changes."  B. Sampat and H. Williams, "How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome," American Economic Review 2019, 109(1): 203–36.

    The facts seem to bear out that while some (particularly doctors) have raised possibilities that potential negative effects on innovation might arise due to patenting, these seem not to exist when scrutinized outside the biases carried by those discerning these possible negative outcomes.

    It is clear this debate will be on-going, as this bill advances (although it is likely not to get to the House floor in the time remaining in this Congress).  But the effort to bring some clarity and certainty to subject matter eligibility is one that is both worthwhile and necessary and can be expected to continue.

    Hat tip to everyone who provided some of the evidence set forth in this post, and thanks to Professor Sarnoff.

  • Patent Docs has always ascribed to the notion that respectful debate is good for most issues, and with the adage that if you are dumb, it's best to surround yourself with smart people and if you are smart surround yourself with smart people who disagree with you.  In that spirit we give our readers the thoughts of Professor Joshua Sarnoff on our recent post discussing Senator Thom Tillis' bill for reforming 35 U.S.C. § 101 (see "Senator Tillis' Patent Eligibility Reform Proposal: A Biopharma Perspective").

    A brief response to Kevin Noonan's "Senator Tillis' Patent Eligibility Reform Proposal: A Biopharma Perspective"

    By Joshua Sarnoff —
    DePaul University

    image from law.depaul.eduProfessor Sarnoff:  Kevin and I disagree with two assertions he makes his blog post, and in the underlying premise of his argument I believe the evidence argues against a fundamental assumption.

    The first of these is that Myriad decision was limited to claims to products as they occur in nature.  Kevin states that:  "There are several subsections in proposed revised Section 101 that specifically and frankly address not only the concerns of the biopharma patent community but also its critics and discontents.  The frankest example is Subsection (b)(1)(C), which codifies the Court's decision in Myriad that human genes in nature are not patent eligible per se.  Subsection (b)(1)(D) further codifies the extension of this principle that has arisen in practice, that any naturally occurring product is ineligible as it occurs in nature.  The genesis of this distinction, and one that the proposal attempts to constrain, is that 'mere' isolation of a natural product may not be (although in practice often has been found not to be) patent eligible."

    I agree with the last emphasized sentence but disagree with the preceding emphasized sentence.  In my view, Myriad held that isolated genetic sequences (without some further, and insufficiently specified requisite changes) are not eligible, despite the fact that isolated genetic sequences do not occur in nature.  Justice Thomas stated that "In this case, by contrast, Myriad did not create anything.  To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention . . . .  Nor are Myriad's claims saved by the fact that isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a non-naturally occurring molecule."  Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591, 593 (2013).

    In my view there is a question of whether the Myriad precedent is limited to human genes, and until SCOTUS takes a case on claims to things derived from natural products again we won't know.  But Myriad was clear that for human genes "mere" isolation from natural conditions, even with chemical changes resulting therefrom, is not enough for eligibility.  Proposed Tillis Bill subsections 101(b)(1)(C) & (D) would exclude from eligibility only "[a]n unmodified human gene, as that gene exists in the body" and "[a]n unmodified natural material, as that material exists in nature."  Proposed subsection 101(b)(2)(B) makes ever clearer that mere isolation now would provide eligibility (if not necessarily patentability):  ''(B) HUMAN GENES AND NATURAL MATERIALS.—For the purposes of subparagraphs (C) and (D) of paragraph (1), a human gene or natural material that is isolated, purified, enriched, or otherwise altered by human activity, or that is otherwise employed in a useful invention or discovery, shall not be considered to be unmodified."

    Hence, the Myriad precedent goes well beyond what Kevin suggests (as least as to genes), and it is precisely that precedent that the Tillis Bill would overturn.  And it is precisely why "the American Civil Liberties Union . . . a vocal critic of Senator Tillis' attempts to remedy patent eligibility issues . . . [has argued that] 'mere' isolation is not enough to confer patent eligibility."

    Kevin Noonan's response:  My understanding of the Myriad precedent differs somewhat from Professor Sarnoff's.  Justice Thomas was clear that the decision was based on the fact that mere isolation was not enough, because doing so changed the gene in no patent-relevant way.  Complementary DNA (cDNA) was different, and the Court was careful not to address instances where genes were altered (changed nucleotides, etc.).  Professor Sarnoff reads the bill differently than I do, to the extent that taken together the provisions indicate to me that on the one hand genes are sui generis in this regard, and on the other any natural product existing as it does in nature is not patent eligible.  Section (b)(2)(B) as I read it requires something more than what was proscribed by the Myriad decision and makes explicit what should be the case presently.  For example, should an inventor isolate a genomic DNA sequence and insert it into a recombinant expression construct and thereby permit production of the encoded protein, the basis for Justice Thomas' distinction — that "mere" isolation is not enough — no longer holds, because such a construct does not occur in nature and evokes a change consistent with the rationale in Diamond v Chakrabarty (which the Court did not overturn in its Myriad decision):

    Judged in this light, respondent's micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter.  His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter — a product of human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, character [and] use."  Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 121 U. S. 615 (1887).  The point is underscored dramatically by comparison of the invention here with that in Funk.  There, the patentee had discovered that there existed in nature certain species of root nodule bacteria which did not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other.  He used that discovery to produce a mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants.  . . .  Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature, and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.

    I will concede that the language could be interpreted as Professor Sarnoff does, but that would (in my view) require ignoring the context.

    Professor Sarnoff's reply:  I agree with Kevin that the Myriad decision treated cDNA differently, by adopting a simple "novelty" standard rather than the "markedly different" standard it applied to isolated DNA.

    Professor Sarnoff:  Second, in my view nothing in these subsections actually "address[es] . . . the . . . concerns of the . . . critics" of the biopharma patent community, although it would codify a much more restrictive concept of the limits of patent eligibility.  In fact, those "critics" have been directly opposed to overturning both the Myriad and Mayo decisions.  And for good reason (as discussed next).  So in my opinion the Tillis Bill does not "giv[e] something to everyone."  I don't consider this to be a "compromise," but only something less than a total repudiation of any and all eligibility limits while still eliminating any meaningful limits.  No doubt, Kevin and many in the "biopharma patent community" think that is a good idea.  But as I see it many in the "biopharma community," including "critics" of the subset of that community that are the "biopharma patent community," think that expanding eligibility in this was and is a very bad idea.

    Kevin Noonan's response:  The reason I used the taxol example is that it strikes at the heart of why eligibility law needs clarification.  DNA is, to be frank, a very 20th Century concern, particularly human genes.  But there are countless numbers of natural products that can be made into drugs and other important compounds as a consequence of their being "mere" isolated.  In my view, the rather loose language in Myriad has led to the concept that anything that can be "merely" isolated should be ineligible.  The proposed statute addresses this problem without rendering human genes patent eligible as I understand the language taken as a whole to mean.

    Professor Sarnoff's reply:  Again, I agree that this is the intent of the bill (except that the language would also render eligible merely isolated human genes, and I believe that was also the intent).  As to whether that is a good idea, we will just have to beg to differ.

    Professor Sarnoff:  As Kevin notes, "[w]ith regard to diagnostic method claims reconsideration under proposed Section 101 is less directly addressed; indeed, changes in the definition of 'process' carries much of the water supporting such claims.  But the provisions of Subsection (c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii) are important because they would proscribe the habit, used by district courts and affirmed by the Federal Circuit . . . of parsing claims into their component parts and then cherrypicking claim elements to arrive at a Mayo/Alice-sanctioned ineligibility conclusion . . . .

    But as with semiconductors and artificial intelligence, there may be a window for convincing other Members that the current eligibility regime is inimical to innovation in the biopharmaceutical arts and that foreign competitors will be all too willing to step into the breach to charge American consumers whatever the traffic will bear for diagnostic methods and therapeutic drugs produced abroad."

    Thus, Kevin posits that Mayo (and implicitly Myriad) have adversely affected innovation in diagnostic methods.  Perhaps Kevin is right in regard to venture and other capital investments in developing such methods (but see the evidence below that such investment has not been diminished in regard to diagnostics).  But my understanding of the data is inconsistent with Kevin's position that restrictions on eligibility have been bad for innovation, at least in the diagnostics space.  To make the point, I quote from the submission of the Association for Molecular Pathology (a trade association for diagnostics developers, which is also part of the "biopharma . . . community") on the 2021 PTO Jurisprudence Study request for comments, see https://www.regulations.gov/comment/PTO-P-2021-0032-0066, explaining why innovation and access have expanded, not contracted, for diagnostic tests post-Myriad and Mayo.  (Additional analysis of the innovation effects can be found in the testimony of molecular geneticist Dr. Sean George of Invitae Corporation on the prior draft legislation from Senator Tillis, see https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/george-testimony.)  This is the only significant natural experiment that has been conducted in recent memory on U.S. eligibility, so simply stating that investment has declined is not a meaningful response to the argument that innovation has nevertheless increased.  Hopefully, Kevin can respond with actual data to show that the AMP is wrong; if not, hopefully he will revise his views and accept that Myriad and Mayo should be preserved (at least for diagnostics).

    Kevin Noonan's response:  To be fair this section of Professor Sarnoff's submission is too detailed and too important for a quick response in this post.  AMP's contentions can be found on the record linked above.  It does not surprise me that AMP would think diagnostics innovation has improved but there would appear to be two costs.  The first is access:  while I am sure that in the rarefied precincts in Boston, New York, Chicago, etc., the existence of teaching hospitals has had the effect AMP asserts.  But I'm not so sure the same is true in Appalachia, the Four Corners area of the Southwest, or other, particularly rural parts of the country.  Second, as noted in my post "The ACLU, Working for the Man," the prime beneficiaries of the Mayo/Myriad decision has been the big diagnostics companies, who can take advantage of academic research for free.  This was the situation forty-plus years ago that was the impetus for the Bayh-Dole Act, which has provided a return on investment (of time, effort, and intellect) expended by university researchers.

    Professor Sarnoff's reply:  Here we are getting to truly meaningful discussions, with evidence.  I'll look forward to Kevin's analysis of the AMP's (and possibly to Dr. George's) conclusions, and to any other data that he can supply (particularly if it is industry-wide) on innovation effects of Myriad and Mayo.  Thanks as always for engaging, Kevin.  It is truly my pleasure to do so.

    Patent Docs thanks Professor Sarnoff for his thoughts and comments on Senator Tillis' bill.  The AMP's position, and comments regarding it, will be the subject of a later post.

  • The IP Law Section of the California Lawyers Association will be presenting a virtual conference on Tuesday August 30th entitled "The Patent Office Comes to California."  The program will run from 8:15 am until 5:15 pm PDT.  Sessions will include:

    • The Interplay Between EPO Proceedings, The Unitary Patent, and the Unified Patent Court
    • Tips and Tricks For Successfully Prosecuting Before the EPO — An Inside Perspective
    • Hot Button Issues in the BioPharma Industry
    • Tips and Strategies for Winning at the PTAB
    • Patent Eligible Subject Matter — Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?
    • Artificial Intelligence in Life Sciences Patent Applications — Perspectives on the JPO's Approach

    There will also be a keynote address from Steven Koziol, Acting Director of the Silicon Valley Regional Office.

    The cost of the conference is $175 for IP Section members, $275 for non-members, and $175 for members of the judiciary Academia, NLS members, and law students. Registration information can be obtained by e-mail to ProgramRegistrations@calawyers.org and parties can register here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    USPTO SealOn July 18th, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board scheduled back-to-back oral hearings interferences between ToolGen Inc. (Senior Party) and Junior Party The Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and The President and Fellows of Harvard College (collectively, "Broad," Interference No. 106,126) and Junior Party The Regents of the University of California, University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, "CVC," Interference No. 106,127).  In the '126 Interference, the hearing will commence at 1:00 pm EDT on August 18th, and for the '127 interference, the hearing will start at 3:00 pm EDT that day.  The hearings will be conducted by telephone.

    Interested members of the public may be granted access by request sent to PTABHearings@uspto.gov at least five business days prior to the hearing date.

    The issues to be discussed can be found on the PTAB website and in several prior Patent Docs posts.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Senate FloorSenator Thom Tillis (R-NC) introduced S. 4734, entitled "A Bill to amend Title 35, U.S. Code, to address matters relating to patent subject matter eligibility, and for other purposes" last night, as was discussed in an earlier Patent Docs post (see "Senator Tillis Proposes Patent Eligibility Reform (Again)").  Even a cursory read of the bill reveals that portions of it have been specifically crafted to address issues that have arisen in the inferior courts' applications of the Supreme Court's recent subject matter eligibility jurisprudence (particularly, and chronologically, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l), that have made patenting diagnostic methods and natural products difficult or impossible (see, e.g., "Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services — The Dissents").  This post addresses the Senator's attempt to remedy the current situation by legislation.

    The Bill contains the following provisions, amending and adding certain definitions to Section 100 and entirely revamping Section 101:

    § 100. Definitions

                                                                *  *  *              

    (b) The term "process" means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, includes a use, application, or method of manufacture of a known or naturally-occurring process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.

                                                                *  *  *

    (k) The term 'useful' means, with respect to an invention or discovery, that the invention or discovery has a specific and practical utility from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention or discovery pertains.

    § 101. Patent eligibility

    (a) IN GENERAL.—Whoever invents or discovers any useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject only to the exclusions in section (b) and to the further conditions and requirements of this title.

    (b) ELIGIBILITY EXCLUSIONS.—

    (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), a person may not obtain a patent for any of the following, if claimed as such:

    (A) A mathematical formula, apart from a useful invention or discovery.

    (B) A process that—

    (i) is a non-technological economic, financial, business, social, cultural, or artistic process;

    (ii) is a mental process performed solely in the human mind; or

    (iii) occurs in nature wholly independent of, and prior to, any human activity.

    (C) An unmodified human gene, as that gene exists in the human body.

    (D) An unmodified natural material, as that material exists in nature.

    (2) CONDITIONS.—

    (A) CERTAIN PROCESSES.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(B)(i), a person may obtain a patent for a claimed invention that is a process described in such provision if that process is embodied in a machine or manufacture, unless that machine or manufacture is recited in a patent claim without integrating, beyond merely storing and executing, the steps of the process that the machine or manufacture perform.

    (B) HUMAN GENES AND NATURAL MATERIALS.—For the purposes of subparagraphs (C) and (D) of paragraph (1), a human gene or natural material that is isolated, purified, enriched, or otherwise altered by human activity, or that is otherwise employed in a useful invention or discovery, shall not be considered to be unmodified.

    (c) ELIGIBILITY.—

    (1) IN GENERAL.—In determining whether, under this section, a claimed invention is eligible for a patent, eligibility shall be determined—

    (A) by considering the claimed invention as a whole and without discounting or disregarding any claim element; and

    (B) without regard to—

    (i) the manner in which the claimed invention was made;

    (ii) whether a claim element is known, conventional, routine, or naturally occurring;

    (iii) the state of the applicable art, as of the date on which the claimed invention is invented; or

    (iv) any other consideration in section 102, 103, or 112.

    (2) INFRINGEMENT ACTION.—

    (A) IN GENERAL.—In an action brought for infringement under this title, the court, at any time, may determine whether an invention or discovery that is a subject of the action is eligible for a patent under this section, including on motion of a party when there are no genuine issues of material fact.

    (B) LIMITED DISCOVERY.—With respect to a determination described in subparagraph (A), the court may consider limited discovery relevant only to the eligibility described in that subparagraph before ruling on a motion described in that subparagraph.

    (where the italicized language in the bill is directed to concerns raised by the biopharma patenting community).

    The effect of the amendments to Section 100 would be to expressly include use of a naturally occurring process (for example, a biological process of cause and effect) within the definition of a "process" that can be patent eligible, wherein the mere fact that the process is naturally occurring would not by itself make the process per se ineligible.  New subsection (k) defines "usefulness" by cabining it to utilities that are "specific" and "practical" as understood by the person of ordinary skill in the art.  The advantage of these definitions is akin to restricting obviousness in Section 103 to what was known in the prior art by the ordinarily skilled artisan, and in so doing remove the subjectiveness that can (and has) crept into such determinations when made by judges rather those in the art that understand the technology at issue.

    There are several subsections in proposed revised Section 101 that specifically and frankly address not only the concerns of the biopharma patent community but also its critics and discontents.  The frankest example is Subsection (b)(1)(C), which codifies the Court's decision in Myriad that human genes in nature are not patent eligible per se.  Subsection (b)(1)(D) further codifies the extension of this principle that has arisen in practice, that any naturally occurring product is ineligible as it occurs in nature.  The genesis of this distinction, and one that the proposal attempts to constrain, is that "mere" isolation of a natural product may not be (although in practice often has been found not to be) patent eligible.  These concessions are realistic, insofar as the American Civil Liberties Union was a vocal critic of Senator Tillis' attempts to remedy patent eligibility issues in 2019 (the ACLU appears to be gearing up its opposition again; see "ACLU Opposes Legislation to Enable Patents on Human Genes," which is equally frank (and wrong) in its position that "mere" isolation is not enough to confer patent eligibility).

    But the Bill also contains several provisions that are directly aimed at limiting the harm that the current eligibility regime has effected on the biopharma industry.  Regarding natural products, Subsection (b)(2)(B) limits the scope of Subsections (b)(1)(C) and (D) by defining as patent eligible human genes or natural material "that is isolated, purified, enriched, or otherwise altered by human activity."  This language is consistent with the provisions of the Supreme Court's Myriad decision that rendered cDNA patent eligible because it did not occur in nature and was the product of "the hand of man," distinctions also consistent with Diamond v. Chakrabarty, a decision the Court expressly did not overturn in Myriad.  The bill expands this distinction in favor of patent eligibility to include all natural products, not just cDNA, and in addition to being consistent with Myriad is consistent with traditional patent eligibility standards that have had changes effected in kind by isolation (e.g., wherein active compounds present in small amounts naturally have been changed to be effective drugs, additives, sweeteners, etc. by the process of their isolation).  Under the current eligibility regime, excluding isolated compositions of such compounds based solely on their isolation negates the inventive contribution that produced them.  For example, while it may be true that taxol, a product of the yew tree, inherently has anticancer activity against inter alia breast cancer, deciding that therapeutically effective amounts of isolated taxol are not patent eligible on that basis requires that the fact that trees don't get cancer be disregarded (and the human inventive activity identifying this anticancer activity also be disregarded).  Under Senator Tillis' proposed legislation there is ample opportunity in the other sections of the Patent Act (Section 102, 103, and 112) to preclude patentability outside the black-and-white strictures of patent eligibility under Section 101 as it now exists.

    With regard to diagnostic method claims reconsideration under proposed Section 101 is less directly addressed; indeed, changes in the definition of "process" carries much of the water supporting such claims.  But the provisions of Subsection (c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii) are important because they would proscribe the habit, used by district courts and affirmed by the Federal Circuit (see, e.g., "Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2015)"; "Is It Time for Federal Circuit to Rethink Its Subject Matter Eligibility Jurisprudence?") of parsing claims into their component parts and then cherry-picking claim elements to arrive at a Mayo/Alice-sanctioned ineligibility conclusion.  Subsection (c)(1)(A) requires that the claims be considered "as a whole," consistent with Diamond v. Diehr (1981) (another Supreme Court decision not overturned, here in Mayo) and Subsection (c)(1)(B)(ii) which disengages from the eligibility calculus the "known, conventional, [and] routine" and adds "or naturally occurring" considerations that have been used to find claims ineligible without considering the claims as a whole.  This is particularly important in cases where courts have looked at the existence inter alia of a detection method in the prior art without assessing whether it was "known, conventional, [and] routine" to apply that method to detect the biomarker or other biological product (such as cell free DNA in Ariosa v Sequenom) recited in the claim (it was not, because the marker or correlation with specific disease was not appreciated in the prior art).  Statutory prohibitions against such analytical sloth are necessary to prevent subject matter eligibility to swallow all of patent law, which the Supreme Court has itself counseled against.

    Prospects for passage of Senator Tillis' bill are uncertain; it will be noted that, not surprisingly, Senator Leahy is not a co-sponsor, while he was a co-sponsor of another bill proposed by Senator Tillis (S. 4704, A bill to require the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a report regarding ways to improve the patent examination process at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and for other purposes).  This is not unexpected, in view of Senator Leahy's predilection to align himself with those who espouse the rhetorical idea that "bad patents" are exacting a rent or drain on American innovation (without any actual evidence for the proposition; see, Mossoff, "Unreliable Data Have Infected the Policy debates over Drug Patents," Policy Memo, Hudson Institute, January 2022).  Politics is the art of the possible, and the political headwinds are certainly blowing against any legislation that would bolster patent protection for pharmaceuticals.  But as with semiconductors and artificial intelligence, there may be a window for convincing other Members that the current eligibility regime is inimical to innovation in the biopharmaceutical arts and that foreign competitors will be all too willing to step into the breach to charge American consumers whatever the traffic will bear for diagnostic methods and therapeutic drugs produced abroad.  Whether that is enough remains to be seen, but Senator Tillis has provided a beachhead for attempting to stem the tide against patent protection for these important technologies.

  • By Michael Borella

    Tillis  ThomRepublican Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina has released a new proposal to reform the text of 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The Senator's last effort in doing so died on the vine in 2019, purportedly due to stakeholders being too far apart in their visions of what patent eligibility should be all about.

    But with growing concern regarding China possibly eclipsing the U.S. in R&D of emerging technologies, there is a renewed impetus to fix at least some of the ambiguities introduced by the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.  Those decisions, which came down in 2014 and 2012, respectively, led to the current state of affairs in which diagnostic methods are effectively unpatentable and software patents can be invalidated based on fuzzy, conclusory reasoning.

    The Proposal

    § 101. Patent eligibility

    (a) IN GENERAL.—Whoever invents or discovers any useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject only to the exclusions in section (b) and to the further conditions and requirements of this title.

    (b) ELIGIBILITY EXCLUSIONS.—

    (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), a person may not obtain a patent for any of the following, if claimed as such:

    (A) A mathematical formula, apart from a useful invention or discovery.

    (B) A process that—

    (i) is a non-technological economic, financial, business, social, cultural, or artistic process;

    (ii) is a mental process performed solely in the human mind; or

    (iii) occurs in nature wholly independent of, and prior to, any human activity.

    (C) An unmodified human gene, as that gene exists in the human body.

    (D) An unmodified natural material, as that material exists in nature.

    (2) CONDITIONS.—

    (A) CERTAIN PROCESSES.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(B)(i), a person may obtain a patent for a claimed invention that is a process described in such provision if that process is embodied in a machine or manufacture, unless that machine or manufacture is recited in a patent claim without integrating, beyond merely storing and executing, the steps of the process that the machine or manufacture perform.

    (B) HUMAN GENES AND NATURAL MATERIALS.—For the purposes of subparagraphs (C) and (D) of paragraph (1), a human gene or natural material that is isolated, purified, enriched, or otherwise altered by human activity, or that is otherwise employed in a useful invention or discovery, shall not be considered to be unmodified.

    (c) ELIGIBILITY.—

    (1) IN GENERAL.—In determining whether, under this section, a claimed invention is eligible for a patent, eligibility shall be determined—

    (A) by considering the claimed invention as a whole and without discounting or disregarding any claim element; and

    (B) without regard to—

    (i) the manner in which the claimed invention was made;

    (ii) whether a claim element is known, conventional, routine, or naturally occurring;

    (iii) the state of the applicable art, as of the date on which the claimed invention is invented; or

    (iv) any other consideration in section 102, 103, or 112.

    (2) INFRINGEMENT ACTION.—

    (A) IN GENERAL.—In an action brought for infringement under this title, the court, at any time, may determine whether an invention or discovery that is a subject of the action is eligible for a patent under this section, including on motion of a party when there are no genuine issues of material fact.

    (B) LIMITED DISCOVERY.—With respect to a determination described in subparagraph (A), the court may consider limited discovery relevant only to the eligibility described in that subparagraph before ruling on a motion described in that subparagraph.

    This text is a mouthful, having over an order of magnitude more words than the 36 of the current section.  So let's break it down.

    The Exclusions

    Section (b)(1) states that mathematical formulas, mental processes, and naturally occurring processes are not eligible for patenting.  But there are limits the scope of these exclusions.  Specifically, mathematical formulas that are an element of a useful invention or discovery presumably would not doom the entire invention.  Likewise, mental processes as notions of abstract thought are not patentable, but a mental process implemented on a computer ostensibly could qualify.  Similarly, naturally occurring processes outside of the human experience are not patentable while human-made processes involving some aspects of natural processes could also qualify.

    Along the same lines, unmodified natural material and unmodified human genes are not patent eligible, though such material "that is isolated, purified, enriched, or otherwise altered by human activity, or that is otherwise employed in a useful invention or discovery" could qualify.  This provision appears to codify and expand upon the holding of Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.

    But things get sticky in Section (b)(i)(B)(i), which states that a "non-technological economic, financial, business, social, cultural, or artistic process" would also be an exclusion.  The problem with this language is that these terms are not defined and potentially quite broad.  Alice, as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, provides an exception for "methods of organizing human activity."  This current exclusion is a gotcha for patentees.  As someone who has spent too many hours arguing with patent examiners over whether inventions implemented solely on computers are "organizing human activity," I can only imagine how the courts and the USPTO might misuse the exclusion of Section (b)(i)(B)(i).

    Moreover, Section (b)(2)(A) does little to rein in the scope of this exclusion.  The language "if that process is embodied in a machine or manufacture, unless that machine or manufacture is recited in a patent claim without integrating, beyond merely storing and executing, the steps of the process that the machine or manufacture perform" suggests that a machine or manufacture must "integrate" the process . . . into what exactly?  The proposal is silent.

    Eligibility Procedure

    Section (c)(1) addresses what should and should not be considered while carrying out the eligibility inquiry.  Notably, one must take into account "the claimed invention as a whole and without discounting or disregarding any claim element."  This is a welcome provision, as there is a long track record of judges and patent examiners conveniently ignoring claim elements on their way to declaring claims ineligible.

    Further, one must not consider "whether a claim element is known, conventional, routine, or naturally occurring . . . the state of the applicable art, as of the date on which the claimed invention is invented [or] any other consideration in section 102, 103, or 112."  This is also a welcome provision, as it overrules the problematic prong two of Alice while bringing back the more logical pre-Mayo separation between §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112 of the statute.

    One point is unclear, however, in that Section (c)(1)(B)(ii) tells us that eligibility shall be determined without regard to whether a claim element is naturally occurring.  On the other hand, Section (b)(1)(D), excludes naturally occurring inventions from patentability.  One possible interpretation of these sections is that individual claim elements being naturally occurring does not impact the eligibility analysis unless the entire invention (i.e., all elements) is naturally occurring.

    Litigation

    Section (c)(2) codifies the "quick kill" under § 101 (the main reason why some parties will tell you that Alice is just fine) by stating that a court "at any time, may determine whether an invention or discovery that is a subject of the action is eligible for a patent under this section."  Thus, invalidation of patents during the pleading stage would still be possible, but only "when there are no genuine issues of material fact."  To this latter point, "the court may consider limited discovery relevant only to the eligibility" of the claims when ruling on such a motion.

    Conclusion

    In sum, Senator Tillis' proposed revisions to § 101 seem to be two steps forward and one step back.  It is an attempt to find a middle ground between varying stakeholder concerns by overruling some aspects of the Supreme Court's recent eligibility jurisprudence and codifying other aspects.  It is unlikely that any one stakeholder will be entirely satisfied with this proposal, but as a starting point we could do much worse.

    The main substantive problem with the proposal is use of unclear terminology and a lack of recognition of how broadly courts and the USPTO have viewed the exclusions to patent eligibility in the past (and how the courts have expanded the exclusions over the years since Alice).  If these issues could be buttoned up, this legislation has the potential to be a modest course correction for American innovation.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    A little over two years ago, U.S. District Court Judge Manish Shah sitting in the Northern District of Illinois held that AbbVie did not violate Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by amassing a large number (132) of patents to protect its best-selling drug, Humira® (adalimumab) (see "An Analysis of a Failed Biosimilar Antitrust Class Action").  Yesterday, in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. AbbVie Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the complaint in a unanimous verdict that took the Court sixteen months to hand down.

    To recap, the issue arose in a class action lawsuit against AbbVie and AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd. by consumer groups, drug wholesalers, and unions (including the City of Baltimore, Miami Police Department insurance trust fund, and a Minnesota-based employee welfare benefits plan for workers in the pipe trade industries), as well as corresponding state law causes of action for Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia.  The basis of the complaint was AbbVie's actions in seeking and obtaining additional patents when the patent on the adalimumab molecule itself (U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382) was set to expire on December 31, 2016.  AbbVie filed 247 patent applications, resulting in 132 patents, and this behavior was sufficiently anticompetitive, plaintiffs argued, that it rose to the level of an antitrust violation under the Sherman Act.

    The District Court discerned the following allegations in the class action Plaintiffs' complaint:

    • that AbbVie "cornered the market" on Humira (and other, unnamed biosimilar drugs) by "anticompetitive conduct";

    • that AbbVie obtained and asserted patents "to gain the power it needed to elbow its competitors" out of the Humira market;

    • that AbbVie then entered into agreements with those competitors "to keep their competing drugs off the market" (and then, paradoxically, "gave those competitors permission to market their drugs in Europe"; unremarked is that AbbVie gave those same competitors permission to enter the U.S. market a few years thereafter, without having to face those dastardly and profuse patents).

    The District Court dismissed the complaint under the rationale that:

    Plaintiffs say that AbbVie's plan to extend its power over Humira amounts to a scheme to violate federal and state antitrust laws.  But what plaintiffs describe is not an antitrust violation.  AbbVie has exploited advantages conferred on it through lawful practices and to the extent this has kept prices high for Humira, existing antitrust doctrine does not prohibit it.  Much of AbbVie's petitioning was protected by the Noerr Pennington doctrine, and plaintiffs' theory of antitrust injury is too speculative.

    The District Court agreed with AbbVie that "there is nothing illegal about amassing a broad portfolio of legitimate patents" under Sherman Act § 2 and, to the extent that some of these patents may turn out to be improvidently granted, "the Noerr–Pennington doctrine immunizes them from liability."  Regarding the Section 1 allegations, the District Court agreed with Defendants that these settlement agreements don't violate the Sherman Act because "they[] allow AbbVie's competitors to enter the market before the expiration of AbbVie's patents, do not involve any reverse payments from AbbVie (the patentee) to Amgen, Samsung Bioepis, and Sandoz (the alleged infringers), and only divvy up the market in ways consistent with AbbVie's patent rights."  And while the District Court agreed that even if a single one of AbbVie's patents are not invalid and infringed that would have been sufficient to keep the biosimilar applicants from marketing Humira biosimilars until that patent expired (a date that would have been very much later than January 2023), for Plaintiffs' antitrust allegations to create liability against Defendants, Plaintiffs would need to show that AbbVie had obtained each and every one of its patents "unlawfully," which the Court found was unlikely, as a "but-for" cause of Plaintiffs' alleged injury.

    The 7th Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook joined by Judge Wood and Judge Kirsch.  The opinion begins with a litany of precedent that the parties did not rely on (for AbbVie, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) on jurisdictional grounds, and for plaintiffs, Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) for inequitable conduct or "fraud on the Patent Office").  But the heart of the Court's opinion can be found in almost its first legally substantive sentence, where the Court asks plainly "what's wrong with having lots of patents"?  And further, the Court states that "[t]he patent laws do not set a cap on the number of patents any one person can hold—in general, or pertaining to a single subject," citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999).  Tellingly the opinion goes on to note that "[t]ech companies such as Cisco, Qualcomm, Intel, Microsoft, and Apple have much larger portfolios of patents" and "Thomas Edison alone held 1,093 U.S. patents."  Finally in this regard the Court notes that the Federal Trade Commission tried, and failed, to establish antitrust liability against Qualcomm based on the sheer number of patents that company had amassed.  FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).

    The Court recognizes the distinction between valid and invalid patents, but notes that Plaintiffs did not allege that they will invalidate all 132 of AbbVie's patents.  Nor was the Court persuaded by the fact that "the 132 patents can be traced to continuation applications from 20 root patents" (which "seem neither here not there" to the panel).  As for the argument that these patents are "weak" the Court says this "leaves us cold" because a weak patent is just one having limited scope not one that is "illegitimate."  Those arguments are appropriate in proceedings like inter partes review the opinion states, for which the Patent Trial and Appeal Board have found more consistently that challengers have failed (13 instances) to satisfy the statutory requirements for challenge than it has found a challenged patent invalid (3) (and noting that in still other instances AbbVie has prevailed before the Board).

    The Court also recognizes the disjointed nature of Plaintiffs' argument that, while eschewing Walker Process-based allegations maintained its Section 2 challenge merely because AbbVie obtained the (presumptively) valid patents and asserted them against competitors.  While the law recognizes that "objectively baseless petitions" to the government can be an antitrust violation, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993), like the District Court the panel noted that AbbVie had a "batting average" of .534 for patent procurement (a 53.4% allowance rate), which "cannot be called baseless."  But without this ground "[t]rying to conjure liability out of successful petitions for governmental aid in blocking competition runs into the Noerr-Pennington doctrine according to the opinion, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  Other grounds for finding antitrust liability (unsuccessful petitioning that increases competitors' costs, such as filing frivolous lawsuits, citing BE&K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002)) did not exist under the circumstances before the Court (although the panel recognized there may be ways for AbbVie to assert their patents that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would not protect).

    Turning to the Section 1-based allegations arising from the settlement agreements, the opinion first notes that those settlement agreements permitted biosimilar entry much earlier than the expiration date of at least some of AbbVie's patents.  The Court views these agreements as "compromises" and the agreements do not violate the Sherman Act under Supreme Court precedent in favor of settlements in litigation.  But the opinion states that the basis of one such possible antitrust violation, falling under the Court's FTC. v. Actavis decision, cannot arise here because there is no exclusivity period for the first biosimilar filer as there was in Actavis for the first ANDA filer.  "The payors do not contend that there is anything fishy or anticompetitive about the settlements allowing entry in 2023 without any payment from AbbVie to the potential entrants," the opinion asserts, and acknowledges Plaintiffs' argument that the differential entry date of Humira biosimilars in Europe (2018) and the U.S. (2023) could produce a similar "reverse-payment deal" here.  Neither the District Court nor this panel were persuaded because there was no "pay-for-delay" ("0+0=0") in these settlements.  There were also factual distinctions between the settling parties and the legal and regulatory conditions in the European countries that were contrary to Plaintiffs' arguments that somehow somewhere someone had or could make money they should not have been able to make under these agreements.  And to the extent Plaintiffs' argument sounded in the economic theory of "opportunity costs" the panel understood the Supreme Court's Actavis decision to have "considered, and rejected, the argument that an opportunity cost is the same as a reverse-payment settlement."

    The District Court characterized Plaintiffs' arguments as "a new kind of antitrust claim" that "brings together a disparate set of aggressive but mostly protected actions to allege a scheme to harm competition and maintain high prices."  Attorneys making novel legal theories of course is how the law progresses.  Indeed, the current Chair of the Federal Trade Commission became something of an enfant terrible based on her law review article on antitrust in the technological age (Khan, Lina M. (January 2017), "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox", Yale Law Journal, 126 (3): 710–805).  But a risk of some legal theories arises when they are outcome oriented to the extent that they ignore traditional legal principles in search of the desired outcome.  (The dissent by Chief Justice Roberts in Actavis is illustrative of the dangers attendant thereupon.)  And the mantra of the undesirability if not illegality per se of so-called patent thickets for blockbuster drugs can appear politically expedient but is not supported by the facts, as shown inter alia by Mossoff, Unreliable Data Have Infected the Policy debates over Drug Patents, Policy Memo, Hudson Institute, January 2022.  For now, this latest flight of legal fancy has crashed on the rocks of antitrust jurisprudence reality but it would be imprudent not to expect other attempts prompted by patent protection of blockbuster drugs (and their related costs) to arise.

  • By Michael Borella

    Federal Circuit SealBad law often gives rise to creative legal arguments.  But the application of such creative lawyering is necessarily bounded by ethical rules and notions of fair dealing.  Patent eligibility, in its current incarnation, has been argued to be bad law by many.  The current judicial interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is at best vague and at worst a subjective inquiry in which the proclivities of the reviewer (whether patent examiner, administrative judge, or federal judge) often matter as much or more than the claims under review.  Such a situation is inexcusable, but still does not give a party license to engage in monkey business.

    Case in point, Realtime asserted six patents against Netflix in the District of Delaware.  Netflix responded by filing seven petitions for inter partes review (IPR) of these patents, and moving to dismiss four of the patents from the Delaware proceeding on grounds of ineligibility under § 101.  All seven IPRs were instituted and a magistrate judge in Delaware recommended that Neflix's motion be granted.

    But before the District Court judge could rule on the magistrate judge's eligibility report, Realtime voluntarily dismissed the Delaware case.  The next day, Realtime filed suit in the Central District of California asserting all six patents against Netflix again.  Realtime did this "despite having previously informed the Delaware court that transferring the Delaware action across the country to the Northern District of California would be inconvenient and an unfair burden on Realtime."  The California court had previously found some of Reatime's claims to be patent-eligible.

    Netflix moved to transfer the new assertions back to Delaware and also requested attorney's fees for the California and Delaware cases, as well as the IPRs.  Again, Realtime voluntarily dismissed the case before the California judge had a chance to rule on the transfer.  Nonetheless, the judge had seen enough and awarded attorney's fees to Netflix for the California cases based on equitable considerations.  The judge did not, however, award attorney's fees for the Delaware cases or the IPRs.  Both parties cross-appealed to the Federal Circuit.

    On review, that Court quickly concluded that the California court "reasonably found Realtime's conduct in the California actions 'improper,' 'exceptional,' and 'totally unjustified.'"  Given that the Delaware court was likely to rule against Realtime on the § 101 motions and that the California court was a more favorable forum for such issues, the Court found that "Realtime undoubtedly realized that by refiling in California, it could effectively erase the Delaware magistrate judge's fulsome and compelling patent-ineligibility analysis and findings."

    The Court was further convinced by Realtime's behavior when it "resisted transfer back to the forum it originally chose."  Thus it affirmed the California court's finding that Realtime engaged in "impermissible forum shopping."

    Combined, this was enough for the Federal Circuit to agree that Realtime acted in bad faith and that these acts were "sanctionable under a court's inherent power in view of the Ninth Circuit's standard."  Accordingly, "the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees pursuant to its inherent equitable powers."

    Moving on to Netflix's request for attorney's fees from the Delaware proceeding and the IPRs, the Federal Circuit agreed with the California court that there was no evidence of bad faith in the initial filing of the Delaware action.  Further, institution of the IPRs was insufficient to make Realtime's ongoing litigation efforts futile.  Thus, the Federal Circuit declined to reverse the California court with respect to the Delaware action and the IPR.

    In sum, patent-eligibility is a mess.  But that still does not give one a second bite at the apple or support taking contrary positions at different points in litigation.  There is no reset button to press after an adverse ruling, just the appeals process.  Realtime should have known better and it paid the price.

    Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC v. Netflix, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2022)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Reyna, and Chen
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Chen; opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part by Circuit Judge Reyna