• CalendarAugust 20,
    2013 – Licensing
    Self-Replicating Technologies after Monsanto
    (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    August 21, 2013 – Inducement to Infringe in Hatch-Waxman Litigation: Lessons from Commil USA v. Cisco Systems and Bayer Schering v. Lupin for Pharma
    Patents
    (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August
    22, 2013 – What are the Implications of CLS
    Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp
    . on Computer-Implemented Inventions?
    (McDonnell
    Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 to 11:15 am (CT)

    August 29, 2013 – AIA Impact on Section 102 and Prior Art:
    Navigating the Expanded Scope of Prior
    Art and the AIA Exceptions
    (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm
    (EDT)

    September 15-17, 2013 – 41st IPO Annual Meeting (Intellectual
    Property Owners Association) – Boston, MA

    September 16, 2013 – The European Unitary Patent:
    Strategic Considerations for a New Era
    (McDonnell
    Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP & Nederlandsch Octrooibureau) – Chicago, IL

    September 17-18, 2013 – FDA Boot Camp*** (American Conference
    Institute) – Boston, MA

    September 18, 2013 – Conflicts in Patent Prosecution: Avoiding the
    Ethical Pitfalls Minimizing Risks of Malpractice Liability and Ethics Sanctions
    (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    September 23-24, 2013 – International Congress on
    Paragraph IV Litigation
    *** (Momentum) – New York, NY

    September 26, 2013 – Supreme Court IP Review (IIT Chicago-Kent
    College of Law) – Chicago, IL

    October 1, 2013 – 2013 Intellectual Property
    Continuing Legal Education Seminar
    (DuPont and the Widener
    University School of Law) – Wilmington, DE

    October
    3-4, 2013 – Paragraph IV Disputes*** (American Conference
    Institute) – Chicago, IL

    October 15-17, 2013 – Business of
    Biosimilars
    *** (Institute for
    International Research) – Boston, MA

    November 17-20, 2013 – Creating and Leveraging Intellectual Property in Developing Countries: A Power Tool for Social and
    Economic Growth
    *** (Companies and IP Commission and National
    IP Management Office of South Africa) – Durban, South Africa

    ***Patent Docs is a media partner of this conference or CLE

  • IPO #2The
    Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled
    "Licensing
    Self-Replicating Technologies after Monsanto" on August 20,
    2013 beginning at 2:00 pm (ET).  A panel
    consisting of Christopher Jeffers of Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, LLP;
    Konstantina Katcheves of the Lonza
    Group; and Erich Veitenheimer of Cooley
    LLP will explore the tension between the U.S. Supreme Court's Quanta
    decision, which bolstered the exhaustion doctrine, and Federal Circuit
    jurisprudence since Mallinckrodt, which has authorized complex licenses
    that allow patentees to accomplish their business objectives without exhausting
    their patent rights.  The panel will also
    discuss the relevant case law, including Monsanto
    v. Bowman
    , and explore how patent owners of self-replicating biological
    inventions can legitimately craft their license provisions to draw a line
    between authorized and infringing activity.

    The
    registration fee for the webinar is $120 (government and academic rates are
    available upon request).  Those
    interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • CLIPDCThe Companies and IP Commission (CIPC) and National
    IP Management Office (NIPMO) of South Africa will be co-sponsoring a conference
    on "Creating and Leveraging Intellectual Property in Developing Countries: A Power Tool for Social and
    Economic Growth" on November 17-20, 2013 in Durban, South Africa.  The conference follows on from the successful
    meeting of the BRICS Heads of Patent Offices in Durban in May 2013, and comes
    at an important time — not just in the progress of South Africa, but
    throughout all of Africa, as well as the BRICS nations, as the countries work
    to shape the future of IP.

    Highlights of the conference include:

    • An opening Ministerial Round Table on "The
    Strategic Use of IP in Emerging Economies," featuring two Ministers in the
    cabinet of President Jacob Zuma: Rob Davies, Minister of Trade and Industry, Republic
    of South Africa, and Derek Hanekom, Minister of Science and Technology

    • Representatives of the BRICS Head of IP Offices
    will discuss "The Effect of the National Patent System on the Perceived
    Investment Value of a Patent."

    • In addition to senior officials from the South
    African government, the conference will be attended by international key
    government, organization, industrial and academic leaders from Africa and other
    BRICS countries, as well as the U.S. and Europe, to form a fertile environment
    for discussion, networking, and relationships.

    Additional information regarding the conference can
    be found here or at the conference website.

    Patent Docs is a media partner of the conference on Creating and Leveraging Intellectual Property in Developing Countries.

  • Boston SkylineThe Institute for
    International Research (IIR) will be holding its 14th Annual Business of
    Biosimilars conference from October 15-17, 2013 in Boston, MA.  The conference will allow attendees to:

    • Navigate the EMEA
    approval pathway for monoclonal antibodies
    • Conduct
    structural and PK/PD comparability assessments
    • Overcome the
    science and complexity of indication extrapolation
    • Define the role
    of higher order structure in fingerprinting
    • Analyze current
    biosimilar market trends and future challenges

    In particular,
    IIR's faculty will offer presentations on the following topics:

    Workshop Day —
    October 15:

    • Understanding the
    Nuts and Bolts of Biosimilar Regulatory Requirements

    Main Conference Day
    One — October 16:

    • Competition and
    the Biosimilar Landscape
    • Biosimilar Market
    Reality Check Panel — Analyzing the Current Market Trends and Future
    Challenges for Biosimilar Success
    • The Importance of
    Analytical and Biologic Characterization to Tailor Clinical Development
    • Examining The
    Approval Path For A Biosimilar Monoclonal Antibody and Lessons of Liaising with
    the EMEA
    • Biosimilar
    Commercial Strategies and What We Have Learned from the EU Experience
    • Current
    Requirements for Biosimilar Approval in Emerging Markets and Defined Regulatory
    Pathways

    Point-Counterpoint Talks: Biosimilar Policy-Making: Is it Based in Science, Law
    or the Profit Motive?

    Main Conference Day
    Two — October 17:

    • Developing a
    Stepwise Approach for Biosimilars to Lower the Risk of Clinical Differences
    • Defining the Role
    of Higher Order Structure in Fingerprinting in Biosimilar Development and
    Benefits for Matching a Reference Products Fingerprint
    • Considerations
    for Biosimilar Clinical Development Plans that Meet Agency Expectations
    • Gaining Access to
    a Reference Biologic Products to Begin Clinical Trials
    • Tailoring a
    Manufacturing Process Based Upon Comparability to an Originator Product
    • The Landscape of
    Biosimilar Strategic Partnerships
    • Examining the
    Lessons Learned, Opportunities and Models of Biosimilar Partnerships

    The agenda for the
    conference can be found here.  A complete brochure for this conference,
    including an agenda, list of speakers, descriptions of the scheduled
    presentations, and registration information can be downloaded here.

    IIRThe registration
    fee for this conference is $2,295 (conference only) or $2,695 (conference and half
    day workshop).  Those registering before September
    13, 2013 will receive a $300 discount. 
    Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here.

    Patent Docs is a media partner of the Business of Biosimilars conference.

  • By
    Andrew Williams

    MedtronicAs
    we previously reported, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Medtronic
    Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp.
    case, where the sole issue on appeal is
    whether the burden of proof shifts in a declaratory judgment action brought by
    a licensee under Medlmmune, such that the licensee has the burden to
    prove that its products do not infringe the patent.  The Federal Circuit had decided this issue in
    the affirmative, thereby requiring Medtronic as the licensee to establish
    non-infringement of the licensed patents.  As we suggested, it can be presumed that the Supreme Court disagreed
    with this decision (because it agreed to hear the case), so the burden will
    likely shift back to the patentee to prove infringement in the MedImmune context.

    Department of Justice (DOJ) SealThe
    United States filed an Amicus Curiae brief on August 2, 2013, taking just this position — that the burden of proving
    infringement should never shift from the patent holder.  Most of the arguments made by the Solicitor
    General, however, do not adequately take into account the unique nature of this
    particular type of declaratory judgment jurisdiction created by the Supreme
    Court's MedImmune decision.  The brief does, however, highlight a few
    flaws in the Federal Circuit's reasoning.  In any event, it is always worthwhile to consider any brief submitted by
    the Solicitor General of the United States.

    The
    first argument presented in the brief was that "the burden of proving
    patent infringement generally rests with the patent holder."  This is no different, however, than the
    Federal Circuit acknowledged in the case below.  Unfortunately, the Solicitor General's brief did not take into account
    the procedural uniqueness of MedImmune
    declaratory judgment actions.  Instead,
    it cited to several Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases that predate the MedImmune case for the proposition that "the
    burden to prove infringement never shifts . . . ."  Imhaeuser
    v. Buerk
    , 101 U.S. 647, 662 (1880).  The
    brief also noted that this is the first time since the enactment of the
    Declaratory Jurisdiction Act that an "accused infringer" has had the
    burden of proving non-infringement.  But
    the use of the term "accused infringer" in the brief highlights the appropriateness
    of this argument in this context — the declaratory-judgment plaintiff is a
    licensee, and therefore is not necessarily being accused of infringing.  Rather, the licensee has entered into an
    agreement by which it has a right to practice the patented technology.  Therefore, even though it cannot be presumed
    that the declaratory-judgment plaintiff has conceded infringement because of
    the existence of a license, the fact that
    Medimmune
    creates a unique situation must be acknowledged.

    To
    highlight this problem, the Solicitor General takes the position that if a
    declaratory-judgment plaintiff must prove non-infringement, it would need "to
    identify and negate every conceivable theory on which the product could
    infringe."  This appears to be an
    exaggeration.  In fact, in order for a
    licensee to have a good-faith basis to file a Medimmune-type non-infringement action, it should have at least one
    reason why its product does not infringe. 
    And, this single reason may be enough to satisfy the burden of proof,
    even if the patent holder presents contrary (but not as persuasive) evidence.  The idea that the declaratory-judgment
    plaintiff would have to anticipate and respond to every potential theory of
    infringement, regardless of how unlikely, cannot be correct.

    The
    second argument in the brief filed by the United States was that "[t]he
    declaratory-judgment posture does not require shifting the burden of proof
    otherwise associated with the parties' underlying substantive dispute."  With this argument, the Solicitor General
    appears to be saying that there is no reason under the rationale for declaratory-judgment
    jurisdiction to support a switching of burdens. 
    To support this proposition, the brief points out that the Supreme Court
    has repeatedly said that the operation of the declaratory judgment act was only
    procedural in nature — it allowed the establishment of jurisdiction in cases
    where it might not have existed previously.  Instead, the reasoning went, if the rule established below stands, the
    purpose behind this act will be disserved.  This is because the act was supposed to establish a mechanism by which
    the patent enforcement suit could be resolved without subjecting the
    declaratory-judgment plaintiff to potential liability.  By changing the burden of proof, the Solicitor
    General pointed out, it would change the fundamental nature of that patent
    enforcement suit.  Correspondingly, it
    would change the procedural nature of the Act.

    The
    third argument made in the Solicitor General's brief was that "[t]he
    existence of a license does not shift the burden of proving patent infringement
    from a patent holder to its licensee."  The fact that the parties entered into a license agreement does not
    alter the analysis for determining whether the product in question falls within
    the scope of the patent.  Instead, the
    agreement only precludes the patent holder from obtaining damages or an
    injunction.

    The
    brief pointed out that the Federal Circuit was incorrect when it said that the
    licensee was the only party that was seeking the aid of the Court.  In other words, the licensee was not the only
    party seeking to "disturb the status quo."  The Solicitor General noted that Medtronic
    was paying money into escrow, which the patent holder would only receive if it
    was successful defending against the action. 
    Therefore, the argument goes, the patent holder also stood to benefit
    from the resolution of this case.  The
    potential flaw in that argument is that it was the license itself in that case
    which required the escrow payments and such payment are not inherent to such
    license agreements.  Therefore, to create
    a rule that took this into account would not necessarily be applicable in all
    situations.

    The
    Solicitor General was correct, however, in that the status quo had already been
    disturbed.  The device in question in
    this case was after-arising, meaning it did not exist at the time the parties
    entered into the agreement.  Instead, the
    patent holder had to affirmatively state that this new product fell within the
    scope of the patents, and therefore within the scope of the agreement.  This was a disruption of the then-current
    status quo under the license.  It is
    reasonable, therefore, to view Medtronic's efforts in bringing the suit as an
    attempt to return the state of the parties to the status quo.

    Probably
    one of the better arguments made by the Solicitor General centered on the
    chilling effect that this decision might have on a licensee that wishes to
    bring such an action.  The Supreme Court
    established MedImmune declaratory
    judgment actions to make it easier for licensees to challenge the licensed patents.  If the Federal Circuit's burden shifting were
    to stand, licensees might think twice before taking advantage of this process.  Therefore, the United States appears to be hoping
    that the same policy concern that prompted the Court to decide MedImmune in the first place will
    convince the Court to reverse the Federal Circuit's Medtronic decision.

  • By
    Kevin E. Noonan

    SequenomThe
    Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a District Court decision denying a
    preliminary injunction to patentee Sequenom over the claims of U.S. Patent No.
    6,258,540.  While the Court rendered its decision
    based on traditional principles of claim construction and the lower court's
    balancing of the equitable factors considered for granting preliminary
    injunctions in patent cases, the decision also bears consideration in view of
    the panel's mention of whether the claims at issue were patent eligible under
    the Supreme Court's recent AMP v. Myriad
    Genetics
    decision.

    The
    claims of the '540 patent (owned by Isis Innovation Limited and exclusively
    licensed to Sequenom) are directed towards detecting paternal DNA sequences
    derived from a fetus in maternal circulation from a pregnant woman.  Claim 1 is representative:

    A method for detecting a paternally
    inherited nucleic acid
    of fetal origin performed on a maternal serum or
    plasma sample from a pregnant female, which method comprises
        amplifying a paternally inherited
    nucleic acid
    from the serum or plasma sample and
        detecting the presence of a paternally
    inherited nucleic acid
    of fetal origin in the sample.

    (emphasis
    in the opinion).  Sequenom's commercial
    product (and Aria's) is directed to diagnosing trisomy disorders (Down's,
    Edwards and Patau) in the fetus by detecting these disorders from "non-nucleated
    free-floating fetal DNA (cffDNA) in maternal blood.  This test is much less invasive than
    traditional amniocentesis (and poses no risk to the developing child, unlike
    amniocentesis) and avoids the necessity of isolating the "rare nucleated
    [fetal] cells" that can be found in maternal blood.  Fortuitously, it appears that women bearing a
    trisomy-affected child have more cffDNA in their blood than women bearing an
    unaffected child.  As the result of these
    biological phenomena the test is not only safer but also more reliable in
    providing a diagnosis.

    Ariosa DiagnosticsAria
    (now, Ariosa) Diagnostics filed a declaratory judgment action that its genetic
    test, termed "Harmony," did not infringe Sequenom's claims, and
    Sequenom counterclaimed for patent infringement and asked for a preliminary
    injunction, which the District Court denied.

    The
    Federal Circuit opinion, by Chief Judge Rader, joined by Judges Dyk and Reyna,
    begins with the standard for appealing denial of a preliminary injunction:  not
    only that at least one of the District Court's factual finding was clearly
    erroneous, but that the court abused its discretion in denying the injunction,
    citing Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed.
    Cir. 1994).  While the parties disagreed
    over the extent to which claim construction is determinative in the preliminary
    injunction context (the opinion invites a comparison between Chamberlain
    Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp.
    , 516 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Int'l
    Cmty. Materials v. Ricoh Co.
    , 108 F.3d 316, 318-19 (Fed. Cir. 1997)), here "the
    court need not reach out to comment on those alternative approaches to the
    question" because "[e]ven under the ostensibly more relaxed standard,
    the district court erred in its claim construction" and "[a]s a
    consequence, the district court erred in finding a substantial question of
    noninfringement."  In this regard
    the panel reviewed construction of the terms "paternally inherited nucleic
    acid" and "amplifying" in the claims.  With regard to the term "paternally
    inherited nucleic acid," the District Court held the term to mean "DNA
    sequence known [in advance] to be received only from the father which is not
    possessed by the mother."  (Note
    that while the District Court did not include the bracketed [in advance] in its
    claim construction order it is undisputed that it must be known "in
    advance" that the sequence is derived from the father and not the mother
    for the test to be diagnostic.)  Thus,
    for infringement to arise the user must know the father's genotype, and this
    requirement renders the District Court's claim construction incorrect according
    to the panel.

    The
    reason for this determination by the Court is that this requirement is not part
    of the plain meaning of the term "paternally
    inherited nucleic acid," nor is it supported by the specification; indeed, the panel opinion asserts that this
    interpretation is based on a single sentence from the '540 patent
    specification:  the "method according to the invention can be applied to
    the detection of any paternally-inherited sequences which are not
    possessed by the mother."  The opinion does not find this sentence to be
    limiting but rather an expansive statement "reflect[ing] the broad meaning
    of 'paternally inherited nucleic acid' that is found in the claims — a meaning
    which does not limit them to those known in advance to have come from the
    father."  In the panel's opinion the
    term encompasses any paternal characteristics
    by comparison to maternal characteristics (emphasis in opinion), not a
    limitation only to those paternal nucleic acids identified in advance.

    The
    Court also found that this construction was not consistent with other portions
    of the specification, particularly the examples.  For instance, Example 3 expressly recites a
    prior determination of the mother's RhD negative status but is silent as to a
    similar determination of the father's RhD gene; although this example detects
    the RhD gene allele inherited by the fetus from the father there is no teaching
    that the father's RhD gene was known in advance.  Thus, even if the claims were limited to what
    was expressly disclosed in the examples (an outcome the panel specifically
    points out is not the claim construction standard), Example 3 illustrates
    embodiments of the invention falling outside the District Court's construction
    of the term.

    Regarding
    the prosecution file history, the Court also found no support for limiting the "paternally
    inherited nucleic acid" term to paternal DNA known in advance.  The panel assessed three incidents asserted
    in support of the District Court's construction.  First, the claims were amended to recite the "paternally
    inherited nucleic acid limitation" during prosecution to secure an
    allowance, but the Court found that this portion of the prosecution history
    does not require prior knowledge of the paternally inherited sequence.  Second, during prosecution of a related
    continuation application Isis argued that the claims should not be limited to
    paternally inherited nucleic acids, citing instances where DNA distinct for the
    fetus (such as due to "spontaneous" or "chance" changes or
    mutations or other fetus-specific differences between fetal and maternal
    nucleic acids.  However the Court did not
    find these arguments to "approach the clear and unequivocal statement
    needed before prosecution history can operate to extinguish subject matter
    otherwise within the claims."  Third, with regard to those continuation application claims, the examiner
    asserted that the specification did not enable detection of chromosome 21 "caused
    by maternal inheritance or genetic mutation," but the panel found these statements to be
    too ambiguous to support Ariosa's arguments or the District Court's claim
    construction (as well as being directed to an issue, enablement, not considered
    by the District Court).

    Because
    the District Court erred in imposing this limitation on the claims, the Federal
    Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding that Ariosa had raised a
    substantial question of noninfringement precluding grant of a preliminary
    injunction to Sequenom.

    Regarding
    the term "amplifying," the District Court construed the term to mean "increasing
    the concentration of a paternally inherited nucleic acid relative to the other
    DNA in the sample."  Under this
    construction, only paternally derived DNA would be amplified, not the fetal DNA as
    a whole.  This was error, according to
    the Federal Circuit, because the plain meaning of the claims require that
    paternally derived nucleic acid is amplified "without any mention of an
    effect on the quantity of other nucleic acid" and thus the claims would be
    infringed "whether, or not, other nucleic acid is amplified."  The specification is contrary to the District Court's construction, according to the panel, citing passages from the
    specification that distinguish between "amplification" and "enrichment"
    of paternally inherited nucleic acid.  The
    panel concluded that "the specification does not support, but instead
    points away from the district court's claim construction, which already is at
    odds with the plain language of the claim."  And the prosecution file history is no less
    availing:  the examiner's statements cited to support the District Court's
    construction of the "amplifying" term are directly related to enrichment
    rather than amplification according to the panel because "[t]he examiner
    could not have been objecting to lack of support for amplification, because
    amplification was described through traditional PCR and other methods."  As with its erroneous construction of the "paternally
    inherited nucleic acid" term, the Federal Circuit found that the District Court had incorrectly construed the "amplifying" term and thus erred
    in concluding that Ariosa had raised a substantial question of noninfringement.

    Finally,
    the District Court had found that there was "a substantial question over
    whether the subject matter of the asserted claims was to eligible subject
    matter."  Noting the intervening
    decision by the Supreme Court in the Myriad
    case, the panel's remand instructs the District Court to consider the subject
    matter eligibility question.  However:

    To be clear, this court
    offers no opinion as to whether there is or is not a substantial question
    regarding the subject matter eligibility of the asserted claims.  This court
    merely concludes that in light of Myriad and the different claim
    construction, this court would benefit from the district court's initial and
    further consideration.  On remand, the district court may once again consider
    this issue, as well as whether there is a substantial question of validity of
    the asserted claims under other defenses raised by Ariosa but not reached
    previously by the district court.

    To
    be equally clear, the claims of the '540 patent do not claim isolated
    paternally inherited nucleic acid per se and thus should fall outside the ambit
    of the Supreme Court's Myriad
    decision.  The question that will need to
    be addressed is whether these claims recite diagnostic method claims that
    remain patent eligible under the Court's Mayo
    v. Prometheus Labs.
    decision, both a different question and one for which it
    is much harder to predict an outcome.

    The
    Court also provided "additional guidance" to the District Court with
    regard to its application of the other equitable factors (irreparable harm,
    balance of the hardships and the public interest) should the lower court find
    in Sequenom's favor on the "likelihood of succeeding on the merits"
    prong of the preliminary injunction test.  Concerning the "irreparable harm" prong, the District Court
    found that "price and market erosion would occur," these being
    factors that can be used to support a preliminary injunction (for example,
    under Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930
    (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  The District Court
    cited four reasons why Sequenom's showing of harm was not sufficient to satisfy
    this prong of the test.  First, the Court
    found that the market and price erosion were not "irreparable"
    because Sequenom's superior product (if it turned out to be so) would recover
    the market and receive damages for any infringement.  The panel found this to be an assumption
    rather than a fact and said that "[i]n the face of that kind of universal
    assumption, patents would lose their character as an exclusive right as
    articulated by the Constitution and become at best a judicially imposed and
    monitored compulsory license."  Second, the Court found that Sequenom's expert witness had not
    demonstrated the "degree" of price and market erosion adequately,
    because he had not considered other, potentially rival tests.  In addition to the contingent and speculative
    nature of this assessment, the panel noted that the "'fact that other
    infringers may be in the marketplace does not negate irreparable harm,"' citing
    Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
    2005).  Next, the District Court found
    that granting a preliminary injunction "would put Ariosa out of business."  While such a showing can be a factor (see
    Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568, 1570 (Fed.
    Cir. 1993)) it does not control the "balance of the hardships" prong
    of the standard, citing Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek
    Sys.,
    132 F.3d 701, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  The panel indicated that the District Court will need to educe evidence
    of the balance of the hardships (i.e., on Sequenom if the injunction is
    denied as well as Ariosa if it is granted) to properly establish where the
    balance of the hardships lies.  Finally,
    the Court noted that at least some of the grounds used by the District Court in
    finding in favor of Ariosa on the public interest prong was that Ariosa
    marketed its Harmony test to both "high- and low-risk women"
    (approximately 3.5 million) while Sequenom made its test available only to
    high-risk women (e.g., over 35 years
    of age and amounting to about 750,000 women).  The panel noted that more recently "an expert organization had
    warned that cffDNA tests should not, yet, be used in low-risk women. Am. Coll.
    of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Comm. on Genetics, Noninvasive Prenatal
    Testing for Fetal Aneuploidy
    , Op. No. 545 (Dec. 2012).  This report raises questions that the panel
    should consider when rendering its decision on Sequenom's preliminary
    injunction motion on remand.

    Aria
    Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.
    (Fed. Cir. 2013)

    Panel:
    Chief Judge Rader and Circuit Judges Dyk and Reyna
    Opinion
    by Chief Judge Rader

  • By Josh Rich

    Espinel, VictoriaThe
    first United States Intellectual Enforcement Property Coordinator ("IPEC"),
    Victoria Espinel (at right), has stepped down after four years in the position.  During her tenure, Ms. Espinel worked to
    strengthen enforcement of intellectual property rights in the United States, at
    its borders, and overseas.  Howard
    Shelanski, the recently confirmed administrator of the Office of Information
    and Regulatory Affairs for the White House, will serve as the acting IPEC; IPEC
    chief of staff Alex Niejelow will help handle policy issues.

    The
    position of IPEC was created by the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
    Intellectual Property (PRO-IP) Act of 2008.  Under the PRO-IP Act, the IPEC is charged with developing the Joint
    Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement and serves as a principal
    advisor to, and spokesperson for, the President on intellectual property
    issues.  The IPEC is also charged with
    assisting the US Trade Representative in intellectual property negotiations
    with other countries and enforcing foreign obligations under trade
    agreements.  Finally, the IPEC
    coordinates the issuance of intellectual property policy guidance to various
    governmental authorities.

    Ms.
    Espinel was the first person appointed to the position of IPEC.  Prior to her appointment, she had worked in
    private law firms, governmental positions, and academia.  After graduating from law school, she worked
    as an associate at the law firms of Covington & Burling and Sidley Austin
    and served as an advisor for an investment company.  She then joined the Office
    of the US Trade Representative as the senior counsel for intellectual property
    issues in
    2001.  In 2005, she became the first
    Assistant US Trade Representative for Intellectual Property and Innovation at
    the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and, in that position, created the
    office of Intellectual Property and Innovation at the Office of the US Trade Representative.  Then, from 2007 to her appointment as IPEC in
    2009, she was a visiting professor at the George Mason School of Law,
    specializing in intellectual property and international trade.

    While
    serving as IPEC, Ms. Espinel oversaw the preparation and issuance of the first
    two Joint Strategic Plans on Intellectual Property Enforcement, the most recent
    one issued in June 2013.  She coordinated
    the preparation and launch of the Administration's Strategy on Mitigating the
    Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets and has helped facilitate the implementation of the
    America Invents Act, including by facilitating intragovernmental policy advice (see "Obama Administration Solicits Public Help in Preventing Foreign Trade Secret Theft").  And as the controversy over the Stop Online
    Piracy Act grew, she helped defuse concerns by writing a blog post indicating
    that "[a]ny effort to combat online piracy must guard against the risk of
    online censorship of lawful activity and must not inhibit innovation by our
    dynamic businesses large and small." 
    All in all, she will be credited for strengthening the enforcement of
    intellectual property rights over the past four years, especially through
    copyright, trade secret, and anti-counterfeiting laws and enforcement efforts.

    Mr.
    Shelanski joined the White House last month from the Bureau of Economics at the
    Federal Trade Commission.  In his primary
    position, he is charged with reviewing all of the Obama Administration's
    potential regulations.  Like Ms. Espinel,
    he has also worked as a law professor (at the University of California,
    Berkeley and the Georgetown University Law Center).  Unlike Ms. Espinel, his focus has been on antitrust,
    regulation, and telecommunications policy. 
    Mr. Niejelow, who will be assisting him on policy issues, has been in
    the position of chief of staff for one year and was previously counselor and special assistant to the
    Commissioner of US Customs and Border Protection.

    Ms. Espinel's departure leaves the office of the
    IPEC in need of both experience and focus. 
    She recently solicited comments from the public on potential legislative
    improvements to the enforcement of trade secrets in the US; the IPEC's office
    is supposed to promptly propose steps to take in response to those
    comments.  Further, Mr. Shelanski's
    divided attention will limit his ability to lead in facilitating
    intragovernmental cooperation in the enforcement of intellectual property
    rights.  Accordingly, in order to maintain
    the Obama Administration's momentum in protecting and enforcing intellectual
    property rights, and to prevent the importation of counterfeit goods, it will
    be important for a permanent replacement to be nominated quickly.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Leo PharmaThe Federal Circuit's jurisprudence
    regarding obviousness as determined by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
    continues its post-KSR development in Leo
    Pharmaceutical Products, Ltd. v. Rea
    , which involves an obviousness
    determination by the Office in an inter
    partes
    reexamination.  The Court reversed the Office's obviousness rejection
    as a matter of law as not being supported by the facts and for the Office's
    failure to construe certain claims terms according to their broadest reasonable
    meaning (ironic, in view of the Office's penchant to take that claim
    construction rubric to extreme and unreasonable lengths).

    The case involved U.S. Patent No.
    6,753,013 owned by Leo Pharmaceutical Products that covers its Taclonex®
    ointment product.  The product comprises
    a combination of a corticosteroid and vitamin D or a vitamin D analog, used to
    treat psoriasis and other skin ailments.  The prior art taught that these two drugs could be used to treat psoriasis
    but prescribed individual topical application of the drugs at different times
    (such as one in the morning and the other at night), a regimen that raised
    patient compliance issues.  The basis of
    Leo's invention was its discovery that that corticosteroids (that are stable at
    a pH of about 4) and vitamin D or analogs (that are stable at a pH of about 8)
    could be combined in stable, single formulation.  Leo's formulation combined the two drug
    compounds with polyoxypropylene 15 stearyl ether (POP-15-SE), which was found
    to provide conditions where both drug compounds were chemically stable.

    Claim 1 of the '013 patent is
    representative of Leo's claims at issue (emphasis added):

    1.  A pharmaceutical composition for dermal use, said composition
    comprising:
        a first pharmacologically active component
    A consisting of at least one vitamin D analogue
    selected from the group
    consisting of seocalcitol, calcipotriol, calcitriol, tacalcitol, maxacalcitol,
    paricalcitol, falecalcitriol, 1α,24S-dihydroxy-vitamin
    D2, 1(S),3(R)-dihydroxy-20(R)-[((3-(2-hydroxy-2-
    propyl)-phenyl)-methoxy)-methyl]-9,10-seco- pregna-5(Z),7(E),10(19)-triene and
    mixtures thereof; and
        a second pharmacologically active component
    B consisting of at least one corticosteroid
    , wherein the difference between
    the maximum stability pH of said first component A and the maximum stability pH
    of said second component B is at least 1; and
        at least one solvent component C selected
    from the group consisting of:
            (i) compounds of the general formula
    R3(OCH2C(R1)H)xOR2 (I) wherein
    x is in the range of 2-60, R1 in each of the x units is CH3, R2 is straight
    chain or branched C1-20 alkyl or benzoyl, and R3 is H or phenylcarbonyloxy;
            (ii) straight or branched C2-4-alkyl
    esters of straight or branched C10-18-alkanoic or -alkenoic acids;
            (iii) propyleneglycol diesters with
    C8-14-alkanoic
    acids; and
            (iv) branched primary C18-24 alkanols,

    wherein said pharmaceutical
    composition is storage stable and non-aqueous.

    The limitation that the pharmaceutical
    composition was "storage stable and non-aqueous" was entered into the
    claim during the reexamination, and the Board construed "storage stable"
    to mean "non-aqueous."

    Using this claim construction, the
    Board found Leo's claims obvious over three references:

    • U.S. Patent No. 4,083,974
    (the Turi reference), which was filed in
    1977 and taught pharmaceutical compositions comprising a steroid contained
    within a solvent, POP-15-SE" (falling within the ambit of the excipients
    in Leo's claims) but did not teach the combination with vitamin D.  This reference also expressly disclosed that the
    formulations in the '974 patent did not contain "water, gels, or alcohols,"
    and the benefits of using POP-15-SE to be that it "reduces exposure of
    tissue to chemical compounds and reduces manufacturing costs."  There was no
    disclosure regarding stability issues with a combination of corticosteroids and
    vitamin D (which combinations were not disclosed) or for treating psoriasis.

    • U.S. Patent No. 4,610,978 (the
    Dikstein reference), which was filed in 1984 and taught topical preparations ("including
    creams, ointments, and lotions") of the combination of a vitamin D analog
    and a corticosteroid for treating psoriasis.  These formulations used water-based solvents including almond oil or
    polypropylene glycol, and disclosed no recognition of storage stability
    problems with these formulations.

    • PCT WO 94/13353 (the Serup
    reference), which was filed in 1994 and taught formulations ("creams,
    ointments, pastes, or gels") comprising a vitamin D analog and a steroid
    formulated under aqueous conditions that included almond oil, propylene glycol
    or alcohols.  The reference noted
    benefits of using vitamin D analogs to treat skin atrophy, which was recognized
    as a side effect of steroid treatment.  There was no disclosure of storage stability issues with these
    combinations in this reference.

    The PTO applied the '974 patent as
    the primary reference, which taught the use of POP-15-SE formulated
    corticosteroids, combined with either the Dikstein or Serup references that
    taught the vitamin D/corticosteroid combination.  According to the Board, the skilled artisan
    would have been motivated to combine these teachings because they were directed
    to compositions comprising corticosteroids and vitamin D, and the advantages of
    adding vitamin D to corticosteroids for treating psoriasis was disclosed and
    known in the art.  According to the
    Board, any "invention" by the inventors involved merely "picking
    and choosing" ingredients from a list of known ingredients and this was
    obvious.  Turning to the distinction regarding stability introduced by amendment
    during the reexamination, the Board found that evidence about stability was disclosed
    in the '974 patent, which taught the skilled person to avoid aqueous components.  Finally, the Office rejected asserted Leo's objective
    indicia of non-obviousness.  The
    purported unexpected results that corticosteroids and vitamin D could be
    combined was not surprising in view of '974 patent which taught formulations
    comprising the component (POP-15-SE) that rendered the drug compounds
    stable.  That the art did not teach
    stability as a reason to use POP-15-SE didn't matter, "the Board
    nonetheless conclud[ing] that 'the reason for utilizing the solvent does not
    have to be the same reason [the solvent] was employed by the inventors'" (citing KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419– 20 (2007)).  The Board also found that the compositions "ability
    to resist degradation" (not, as noted by the Federal Circuit a recited
    claim term) was enough to find that "that the composition is stable, i.e.,
    not changing or fluctuating because it doesn't significantly
    degrade."  The
    Board found support for its definition of stability in one example in the '013
    specification relating to a stability study performed on the claimed
    formulation.

    The Federal Circuit reversed, in an
    opinion by Chief Judge Rader, joined by Judges O'Malley and Reyna.  The Court found fault with the Board's claim
    construction related to the term "storage stable":

    At the outset, the Board's construction
    of "storage stable" is impermissibly narrow because example two is just one
    disclosure of an accelerated stability test.  Under its accepted and customary
    meaning, "storage stable" would include a composition that maintains
    its stability during its shelf life for its intended use as an approved
    pharmaceutical product for sale and home use by ordinary customers.  . . .  The
    Board erred by narrowing the definition of "storage stable" to something far
    short of its broadest reasonable meaning.  The plain meaning of "storage stable"
    is broader than the disclosure in example two.

    This error was enough for the Court
    to reverse the obviousness determination (although the opinion expressly
    declines to independently construe the term), but went on to overturn the Board's
    obviousness rejection.

    The Court's opinion found fault with
    the Board's application of the facts to the claims in its obviousness
    assessment, and its disregard for the objective indicia of
    non-obviousness.  Substantively, the
    Court disagreed with the Board because the claims were "not simply a
    combination of elements found in the prior art" because "[t]he
    inventors of the '013 patent recognized and solved a problem with the storage
    stability of certain formulations — a problem that the prior art did not
    recognize and a problem that was not solved for over a decade."  This recognition of the problem to be solved
    can be sufficient to be the invention
    ("As an initial matter, an invention can often be the recognition of a
    problem itself," citing Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc.,
    381 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).  In this case, "the prior art either discouraged combining vitamin D
    analogs and corticosteroids in a single formulation, or attempted the
    combination without recognizing or solving the storage stability problems associated
    with the combination" in the Court's opinion.  Moreover, "several medical research
    articles published as early as 1995 discourag[ed] the combination of a vitamin
    D analog with a corticosteroid because of the stability problems of vitamin D
    analogs at lower pHs," and "[t]hese articles taught away from mixing topical vitamin
    D formulations with other drugs."  While the prior art taught that it would be "only
    natural" for vitamin D to be combined with other drugs for treating
    psoriasis, the prior art "warned that vitamin D should not be combined
    with other drugs requiring a low pH (e.g., corticosteroids)."  The Court found that neither the Dikstein nor
    Serup references recognized, disclosed, or addressed the stability problems that
    arose using the formulations disclosed in those references that were identified
    by patentee, which disclosure included experimental evidence that the prior art
    references taught combinations that were not stable under storage conditions.  Because the prior art did not appreciate the stability
    issues, it provided "no reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to
    attempt to improve upon either [the formulations disclosed in] Dikstein or
    Serup using [the teachings of the] Turi [reference]."

    The primary deficiency noted by the
    Court is that "[t]he ordinary artisan would first have needed to recognize
    the problem, i.e., that the formulations disclosed in Dikstein and Serup were
    not storage stable."  This would
    take "several months [of] storage stability test[ing]" to establish,
    and "[o]nly after recognizing the existence of the problem would an
    artisan then turn to the prior art and attempt to develop a new
    formulation for storage stability" (emphasis in opinion).  That isn't what happened; as noted by the
    Court, recognition of the problem was not achieved "within months" of
    the Dikstein or Serup references (which the Court says would be expected "[i]f
    these discoveries and advances were routine and relatively easy"), but
    instead took "more than a decade."  In view of this evidence, it was apparent to the Court that what the
    Board viewed as a straightforward combination of the cited references was
    instead a "hindsight-guided combination of elements."

    The Court found that the record did
    not support the Board's obviousness determination, based on the facts used by
    the Board to support its position.  For
    example, the Board "found motivation to combine Dikstein or Serup with
    Turi because one of ordinary skill would have used vitamin D to solve the
    well-known side effects of steroid treatment."  In the Court's view this was hindsight,
    because "Turi was publicly available in the prior art for twenty-two years
    before the '013 patent was filed, yet there is no evidence that anyone sought
    to improve Turi with vitamin D."  "[E]ven when Serup published the
    well-known side effects of steroid-induced atrophy in 1994, no one — including
    Serup — sought to improve Turi by adding vitamin D to Turi's corticosteroid
    composition," according to the opinion, even when Serup "targeted the
    precise side effects that the Board believed would have motivated the addition
    of a vitamin D analog to Turi's corticosteroid composition"; even Serup "did not seek to improve Turi
    by adding vitamin D."  This
    conclusion was further supported by evidence that the Turi reference taught
    away from the combination formulations disclosed in the Serup and Dikstein
    references, i.e., the aqueous formulations (which included water and propylene
    glycol) those references disclose.

    With regard to the disclosure in the
    prior art of "broad and general disclosures" of additives ("e.g.,
    diluents, buffers, thickeners, lubricants") and composition forms ("e.g.,
    liniments, lotions, applicants, oil-in-water or water-in-oil emulsions such as
    creams, ointments, pastes, or gels"), "the Board reasoned that an
    artisan would have been able to 'mak[e] choices about what ingredients to
    include, and which to exclude' in formulating a composition with a vitamin
    D analog and steroid."  "To the
    contrary," according to the Court, "the breadth of these choices and
    the numerous combinations indicate that these disclosures would not have
    rendered the claimed invention obvious to try" citing See Rolls-Royce
    PLC v. United Techs. Corp.
    , 603 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

    The Court also did not find that
    combining the '974 Turi patent with the Dikstein patent or Serup application
    rendered the invention obvious to try:

    "[W]here the prior art, at best gives
    only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how
    to achieve it, relying on an obvious-to-try theory to support an obviousness
    finding is impermissible," said the Court, citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride
    Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation
    , 676 F.3d 1063, 1073 (Fed. Cir.
    2012).  [Further, the opinion asserts that] "KSR did not create a presumption that all
    experimentation in fields where there is already a background of useful
    knowledge is 'obvious to try,' without considering the nature of the science or
    technology," citing Abbot Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341,
    1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

    The passage of time between public
    availability of the cited reference was also evidence for invention not being
    obvious to try, according to the opinion:  "The length of the intervening
    time between the publication dates of the prior art and the claimed invention
    can also qualify as an objective indicator of nonobviousness," said the
    Court, citing Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361,
    1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2000):

    The elapsed time between the prior art and the '013 patent's filing date evinces that the '013 patent's claimed invention was not obvious to try.  Indeed this considerable time lapse suggests instead that the Board only traverses the obstacles to this inventive enterprise with a resort to hindsight.  It took over a decade — after Dikstein's disclosure of the benefits of combining vitamin D and corticosteroid treatments into one formulation — for Dikstein's formulations to be tested for storage stability.  And, until the advancement made by the inventors of the '013 patent, no one had proposed a new formulation that would be storage stable.

    Moreover, because the
    "problem was not known, the possible approaches to solving the problem
    were not known or finite, and the solution was not predictable.  Therefore, the
    claimed invention would not have been obvious to try to one of ordinary skill
    in the art.  Indeed ordinary artisans
    would not have thought to try at all because they would not have recognized the
    problem."  In addition, the Court
    found there could have been no reasonable expectation of success in combining
    the cited art, because in the absence of "clues pointing to the most
    promising combinations, an artisan could have spent years experimenting without
    success."

    The opinion distinguished any
    reading of the Supreme Court's KSR opinion to the contrary, stating that the
    law "recognizes an important distinction between combining known options
    into 'a finite number of identified, predictable solutions,' KSR, 550
    U.S. at 421, and "'merely throwing metaphorical darts at a board' in hopes
    of arriving at a successful result," Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at
    1071 (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1359).

    Turning to the objective indicia,
    the Court found that the Board erred in not considering evidence propounded by
    patentee, citing its Cyclobenzaprine decision for the principal that "consideration of the
    objective indicia is part of the whole obviousness analysis, not just an
    after-thought."  The objective
    indicia "play a critical role in the obviousness analysis" and are "not
    just a cumulative or confirmatory part of the obviousness calculus but
    constitute[] independent evidence of nonobviousness," citing Ortho-McNeil
    Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.
    , 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The objective indicia "can be the most probative evidence of
    nonobviousness in the record, and enables the court to avert the trap of
    hindsight," citing Crocs, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1310
    (Fed. Cir. 2010).

    Here, the patentee had asserted unexpected results
    over two of the cited prior art references (which had significant degradation), commercial
    success, and long-felt but unfulfilled need in the art.  The Board rejected patentee's assertion of
    unexpected results, on the grounds that the results obtained by Leo were not
    unexpected in view of the disclosure of corticosteroid/vitamin D combinations
    in the Dikstein and Serup references.  The Court disagreed, and found "'extensive
    experimental evidence"" of unexpected results, including experimental
    evidence reproducing the formulations disclosed in the Dikstein and Serup
    references that demonstrated "significant degradation of the vitamin D
    analog and corticosteroid."  These
    results of instability were even found (for the corticosteroid) when the Serup
    formulation was "improved" by the addition of POP-15-SE (i.e., the
    combination resulting from the Board's combination of the references).

    The Court cited Leo's evidence
    for commercial success as being convincing for overcoming obviousness, based in
    part on FDA approval (which the opinion states is "not determinative"
    but can be "relevant" evidence of non-obviousness, citing Knoll
    Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc.
    , 367 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
    2004)), as well as evidence of long-felt but unmet need.  In this regard, the length of time
    intervening between the dates the various prior art references became available
    to the public is relevant evidence according to the Court, because "the
    researchers were aware of the benefits of using both vitamin D and
    corticosteroids in the treatment of psoriasis as early as 1986" but "it
    was not until the '013 patent's filing in 2000 — twenty-two years after
    Turi and fourteen years after Dikstein — that the solution to the long
    felt but unsolved need for a combined treatment of vitamin D and corticosteroid
    was created."  This amount of time "speaks
    volumes to the nonobviousness" of these claims.

    The Court credited the objective
    indicia strongly:

    Here, the objective indicia — taken in
    sum — are the most "probative evidence of nonobviousness . . . enabl[ing] the
    court to avert the trap of hindsight."  Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1310.  Viewed through the lens of the objective indicia, as opposed to the hindsight
    lens used by the Board, the '013 patent would not have been not obvious over
    Turi in combination with Dikstein or Serup.

    This regard for the objective
    indicia is in stark contrast to instances, such as the PharmaStem case shortly after the Supreme Court's KSR decision, where the objective
    indicia were disregarded in view of "strong" evidence of
    obviousness.  While this is just one
    panel opinion, it is possible that the pendulum has begun to swing back towards
    a more expansive view of non-obviousness after a more rigid application of the
    doctrine immediately post-KSR.

    Leo Pharmaceutical Products, Ltd. v.
    Rea
    (Fed. Cir. 2013)

    Panel: Chief Judge Rader and Circuit
    Judges O'Malley and Reyna
    Opinion by Chief Judge Rader

  • By Donald Zuhn

    Genome LibertyIn a paper published in
    March in the journal Genome Medicine,
    Dr. Jeffrey Rosenfeld of the University of Medicine & Dentistry of New
    Jersey and Dr. Christopher Mason of Cornell University contended that due to
    the non-specificity of sequence uniqueness across the genome and the broad
    scope of claims to nucleotide sequences, the Supreme Court and Congress should
    limit the patenting of existing nucleotide sequences ("Pervasive sequence patents cover the entire human genome,"
    Genome Medicine 5:27 (2013)). 
    Their paper was discussed in this space shortly after publication (see "Genome Medicine Article Calls for Limits on Patenting of Existing
    Nucleotide Sequences
    " and "Revisiting Genome Medicine Article on 'Pervasive Sequence Patents' That
    'Cover the Entire Human Genome'
    "),
    and was followed by a response from Dr. Mason (see "Dr. Chris Mason Responds to Blog Posts on Genome Medicine
    Article
    "),
    and then our discussion of the paper and Dr. Mason's response to our coverage concluded
    with two further posts (see "A
    Primer on Claim Construction — Comments on Dr. Mason's Response
    " and
    "A Response to Dr. Mason's "Rebuttal" to Criticisms of His
    Genomics Medicine Article
    ").  Last week, the co-authors of the paper
    announced that they had started a company, Genome Liberty, Inc., to determine the
    medications a person should take and the medications a person should avoid
    based upon that person's DNA.

    In
    an e-mail distributed last week, Dr. Rosenfeld noted that the co-authors "are
    extremely proud that there are no longer patents on human genes and that researchers
    can sequence any gene without the risk of litigation."  With respect to the type of analyses that
    their company will perform, Dr. Rosenfeld provided two examples:  first, assaying for individuals who convert
    codeine to morphine in their livers too quickly, leading to an overdose of
    morphine (citing Kelly et al., 2012,
    "More Codeine Fatalities After Tonsillectomy in North American Children"
    Pediatrics 129(5): e1343-47),
    and second, testing for a condition known as Factor V Leiden where people who
    are given estrogen, either as birth control or as hormone replacement, can have
    severe blood clots.  In a follow-up
    e-mail distributed earlier today, Dr. Rosenfeld indicated that "[f]or a large percentage
    of medications, there are DNA markers indicating whether [such medications]
    should be used or avoided, but doctors do not routinely perform these tests."

    In
    statement released by the co-authors, they note that their company
    "will democratize the human genome and give people direct access to their own
    genetic information — which can have an immediate impact on their health and
    well being," adding that the Supreme Court's decision in AMP v. Myriad Genetics "opened an
    era of genomic liberty, allowing people to look at the DNA for all of their
    genes — which had been hidden behind patent walls for companies that had a
    monopoly on such testing."  The
    release states that the company will "begin offering immediate,
    personalized genetic testing to the public that can be directly ordered by
    patients," while suggesting that "the results should used in concert with
    your doctor."  The company's
    founders explain that:

    Genome Liberty, with the Supreme Court's
    blessing, ushers in a new paradigm of personalized medicine, which complements
    the traditional health care model.  Previously,
    individuals had to rely on their doctors to understand their health and to make
    proper medical decisions for them.  Recently,
    people are becoming more involved in their own health care, in a phenomenon
    called "participatory medicine." 
    Various organizations, including patientslikeme.com and the Society for
    Participatory Medicine, have been leading the charge in this field to overcome
    inherent weaknesses in our medical system. 
    Many people have found that drugs do not work for them, and they have
    formed patient groups to attempt to help each other.  And, as scientists and doctors have found the
    molecular basis for disease and drug response, it has become increasingly clear
    that a "one-size-fits-all" framework for medicine is not in the best
    interest of each patient.

    According
    to the release, Genome Liberty will be examining genetic markers associated
    with drug response for "hundreds of frequently prescribed drugs,"
    including codeine, Plavix, Nexium, Prilosec, Zocor, Dilantin, Coumadin,
    Haloperidol, Abilify, and Celexa, and that the test will cost $99.

    In
    an effort to secure funding for their new company, the co-authors have
    initiated a crowd-funding campaign on
    the website RocketHub.  As of August 12,
    40 funders had committed $8,285 towards a goal of $100,000 to be raised by September
    5.  The company's RocketHub page includes
    the following video discussing the AMP v.
    Myriad Genetics
    decision and the company's plans:

     

  • By Sherri Oslick

    Gavel About Court Report:  Each week we will report briefly on recently filed biotech and pharma cases.

    Exela Pharma
    Sciences, LLC v. EKR Therapeutics, LLC et al.

    5:13-cv-00111;
    filed August 8, 2013 in the Western District of North Carolina

    • Plaintiff: 
    Exela Pharma Sciences, LLC
    • Defendants: 
    EKR Therapeutics, LLC; Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc.; Cornerstone BioPharma,
    Inc.

    Declaratory
    judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 7,659,290 ("Methods
    of Preparing Pre-Mixed, Ready-to-Use Pharmaceutical Compositions," issued
    February 9, 2010) based on Exela's filing of a supplemental NDA (under §
    505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act) to manufacture a generic version
    of EKR's Cardene® I.V. Premixed Injection (nicardipine hydrochloride premixed
    injection for intravenous administration, used for the short-term treatment of
    hypertension when oral therapy is not feasible or not desirable).  View the complaint here.


    Pfizer Inc.
    et al. v. Wockhardt Bio AG et al.

    1:13-cv-01387;
    filed August 2, 2013 in the District Court of Delaware

    • Plaintiffs: 
    Pfizer Inc.; UCB Pharma GmbH
    • Defendants: 
    Wockhardt Bio AG; Wockhardt USA LLC

    Infringement
    of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,858,650 ("Stable Salts of Novel Derivatives of
    3,3-Diphenylpropylamines," issued February 22, 2005), 7,384,980 ("Derivatives
    of 3,3-Diphenylpropylamines," issued June 10, 2008), 7,855,230 (same
    title, issued December 21, 2010), 7,985,772 (same title, issued July 26, 2011),
    and 8,338,478 (same title, issued December 25, 2012) following a Paragraph IV
    certification as part of Wockhardt's filing of an ANDA to manufacture a generic
    version of Pfizer's Toviaz® (fesoterodine fumarate, used to treat the symptoms
    of overactive bladder).  View the
    complaint here.


    Novartis
    Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Hospira, Inc.

    2:13-cv-04669;
    filed August 2, 2013 in the District Court of New Jersey

    Infringement
    of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,932,241 ("Pharmaceutical Products Comprising
    Bisphosphonates," issued April 26, 2011) and 8,324,189 ("Use of
    Zolendronate for the Manufacture of a Medicament for the Treatment of Bone
    Metabolism Diseases," issued December 4, 2012) following a Paragraph IV
    certification as part of Hospira's filing of an ANDA and an NDA (under §
    505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act) 
    to manufacture a generic versions of Novartis' Zometa® (zoledronic acid,
    used for the prevention of skeletal-related complications associated with
    cancer).  View the complaint here.


    Repros
    Therapeutics Inc. v. Fisch

    4:13-cv-02266;
    filed August 2, 2013 in the Southern District of Texas

    Declaratory
    judgment of ownership and inventorship for U.S. Patent Nos. 7,173,064 ("Methods
    and Compositions with Trans-Clomiphene for Treating Wasting and Lipodystrophy,"
    issued February 6, 2007), 7,368,480 ("Methods and Compositions with
    Trans-Clomiphene), 7,737,185 (same title, issued June 15, 2010) and 7,759,360 ("Methods
    and Materials for the Treatment of Testosterone Deficiency in Men," issued
    July 20, 2010), relating to Repros' pipeline drug Androxal®(trans-isomer of clomiphene
    citrate, to be used for the treatment of male secondary hypogonadism).  View the complaint here.