• Continuation Application Filed on Same Day Parent Issues Satisfies § 120 Requirement That Continuation Be Filed Before the Patenting of Parent

    By Donald Zuhn

    Federal Circuit SealLast week, in Immersion Corp. v. HTC Corp., the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court for the District of Delaware that U.S. Patent No. 7,148,875 ("the '875 patent"), assigned to Immersion Corp. ("Immersion"), was not "filed before the patenting" of Immersion's U.S. Patent No. 6,429,846 ("the '846 patent") within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 120, because the '875 patent application was filed on the same day that the '846 patent issued.

    Because Immersion asserted neither the '875 patent nor the '846 patent against HTC Corp. and HTC America, Inc. ("HTC"), a brief review of the relationship of the '875 and '846 patents to the asserted patents would be helpful.  On January 19, 2000, Immersion filed U.S. Application No. 09/487,737 ("the '737 application"), which issued as the '846 patent on August 6, 2002.  On the same day that the '846 patent issued, Immersion filed U.S. Application No. 10/213,940 ("the '940 application"), which claims the benefit of the '737 application and five earlier-filed applications, and which eventually issued as the '875 patent.  Immersion subsequently filed three continuation applications that issued as U.S. Patent Nos. 8,031,181 ("the '181 patent"); 7,982,720 ("the '720 patent"); and 8,059,105 ("the '105 patent").  The '720, '181, and '105 patents claim the benefit of the '940 application through one of two later-filed continuation applications.

    In 2012, Immersion filed suit against HTC for infringement of the '720, '181, and '105 patents.  HTC moved for summary judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) in view of Immersion's International Publication No. WO 2001/54109, which published on July 26, 2001, and which corresponds to International Application No. PCT/US01/01486, which claims the benefit of and has a written description that is materially identical to the '737 application.  In moving for summary judgment, HTC alleged that the '720, '181, and '105 patents were not entitled to the benefit of the '737 application's filing date because the '940 application was not "filed before the patenting" of the '846 patent within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 120, and therefore, that WO 2001/54109 disclosed the subject matter of the asserted claims more than a year before the effective filing date of the asserted patents.

    The relevant portion of § 120 states that:

    An application for patent for an invention [adequately] disclosed . . . in an application previously filed in the United States . . . shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the first application . . . [emphasis added].

    In an opinion by Judge Taranto, joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Linn, the Federal Circuit notes that the question is "whether . . . the continuing application has to be filed at least one day before the earlier application is patented, or whether an application may be 'filed before the patenting' of the earlier application when both legal acts, filing and patenting, occur on the same day" (emphasis in original).  Reversing the District Court's determination of invalidity, the panel adopts the latter position, pointing out that while "[t]he statutory language [of § 120] does not compel, though it certainly could support, adoption of a day as the unit of time for deciding if filing is 'before' patenting[,] . . . history is decisive in permitting the same-day-continuation result, under which, using units of time of less than a day, a 'filing' is deemed to occur before 'patenting.'"  In support of its decision, the panel notes that the Supreme Court approved same-day continuations in 1863 and that the 1952 Patent Act, which first introduced § 120, codified existing continuation practices.  The panel also notes that:

    [S]ame-day continuations have been approved by a consistent, clearly articulated agency practice going back at least half a century, which has plausibly engendered large-scale reliance and which reflects the agency's procedural authority to define when the legal acts of "filing" and "patenting" will be deemed to occur, relative to each other, during a day.

    The panel explains that the language of § 120 "does not by its terms answer the question whether a later-filed application can claim the same filing date as an earlier-filed application when the later one is filed on the day of the earlier one's patenting" because "that language does not say that the unit of time is a day, as opposed to some smaller unit."  HTC's argument was based on a construction of § 120 that depends on "date-level granularity" – i.e., that in determining whether a continuation application has been filed before the patenting of a parent, the "before" measurement must be made in units no smaller than a day.  However, as the panel points out, HTC's construction — asserting that "'[b]efore' a statutory deadline means before that date, not on or before that date" (emphasis in original) — is "at best question-begging, where the statutory language, as with the phrase at issue here, does not actually speak in terms of days or dates."

    Looking beyond the relevant language of § 120, the panel notes that the day-as-unit meaning put forth by HTC "might . . . be the most natural one to adopt—the one that would fit best with the statute as a whole—if the statute were new and without history."  And that history, the panel states "is so weighty as to be determinative."  That history begins with the Supreme Court's decision in Godfrey v. Eames, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 317 (1864), which the panel indicates established the basis for same-day continuations for priority-date purposes long before Congress enacted § 120.  In Godfrey, the Court held that an application filed on the same day as an earlier-filed application was withdrawn and the earlier-filed application were "to be considered as parts of the same transaction, and both as constituting one continuous application, within the meaning of the law," and therefore, that the later-filed application was entitled to the priority date of the earlier-filed application.

    The opinion notes that other federal courts and the Patent Office followed Godfrey's rule in the decades following the Supreme Court's decision.  The opinion also notes that "[n]one of the legislative history or contemporaneous commentary [for § 120] indicates an intent to alter Godfrey's long-established result approving same-day continuations for priority-date purposes," and further, that every edition of the MPEP since 1961 has "specifically notified the public of the agency practice concerning same-day filing and patenting: 'If the first application issues as a patent, it is sufficient for the second application to be copending with it if the second application is filed on the same day or before the patenting of the first application" (emphasis in opinion).  In further support of its construction, the panel points out that "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that a 'longstanding administrative construction,' at least one on which reliance has been placed, provides a powerful reason for interpreting a statute to support the construction," citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457–58 (1978).

    The opinion concludes that:

    [T]he repeated, consistent pre-1952 and post-1952 judicial and agency interpretations, in this area of evident public reliance, provide a powerful reason to read section 120 to preserve, not upset, the established position.  And the conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Congress has done nothing to disapprove of this clearly articulated position despite having amended section 120 several times since its first enactment in 1952.

    With respect to the Patent Office's same-day-continuation policy, the Office's position is "essentially [a] procedural one establishing when the agency will consider an input into its process (the legal act of 'filing') and an output of its process (the legal act of 'patenting') to occur relative to each other—neither one being a precisely identifiable self-defining physical act, but a legally defined event."  As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court, and remanded the case.

    Immersion Corp. v. HTC Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2016)
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Linn and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Taranto

  • CalendarJune 29, 2016 – "Arrival of a New Privilege and a Review of Potential Waivers of Privilege in Business Contexts" (American Intellectual Property Law Association) – 12:30 – 2:00 pm (Eastern)

    June 30, 2016 – "Goodbye to Seagate: Willfulness and Enhanced Damages After Halo" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    June 30, 2016 – Biotechnology/chemical/pharmaceutical (BCP) customer partnership (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – Alexandria, VA

    June 30, 2016 – "Ethics in Intellectual Property" (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago New Programming Committee) – Chicago, IL

    July 6-8, 2016 - Fundamentals of Patent Prosecution 2016: A Boot Camp for Claim Drafting & Amendment Writing (Practising Law Institute) – San Francisco, CA

    July 7, 2016 – "Cuozzo v. Lee: Implications for Post-Grant Review Following New Supreme Court Ruling" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    July 7, 2016 – "Unitary Patent & Unified Patent Court 2016" (Premier Cercle) – Munich, Germany

    July 12, 2016 – "Conflicts in Patent Prosecution: Avoiding the Ethical Pitfalls — Minimizing Risks of Malpractice Liability and Ethics Sanctions" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    July 13, 2016 – "Understanding and Applying the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016" (Technology Transfer Tactics) – 1:00 to 2:00 pm (Eastern)

    July 26, 2016 – "Pharma and Chemical Patent Applications: Meeting Written Description Requirement — Demonstrating Evidence of Possession of the Invention, Navigating the Guidelines, Maintaining Chain of Priority" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT)

    August 4-5, 2016 - Advanced Patent Law Seminar (Chisum Patent Academy) – Seattle, WA

    August 8-9, 2016 - Advanced Patent Law Seminar (Chisum Patent Academy) – Seattle, WA

    ***Patent Docs is a media partner of this conference or CLE

  • Technology Transfer Tactics will be offering a webinar on "Understanding and Applying the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016" on July 13, 2016 from 1:00 to 2:00 pm (Eastern).  Andrew M. Howard of Shore, Chan, DePumpo, LLC will look at the provisions of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), and how universities can best apply the DTSA to protect their valuable IP.  The webinar will cover the following topics:

    • Legislative history and purpose of the DTSA
    • What is a "trade secret" under the DTSA?
    • What constitutes "misappropriation" under the DTSA?
    • Can you obtain a seizure of trade secrets, an injunction, and/or damages?
    • How does the DTSA affect different university constituents, including faculty, students, technology transfer offices, incubated companies, and joint ventures/sponsors?
    • What outreach and education is needed to ensure faculty and others involved in research commercialization don't inadvertently weaken trade secret protection?
    • How to protect trade secrets when key faculty and staff exit
    • Differences between the DTSA and UTSA
    • Procedural aspects of the DTSA
        – Statute of Limitations, jurisdiction, and territorial reach

    The registration fee for the webinar is $197.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

    Technology Transfer Tactics

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar/teleconference entitled "Conflicts in Patent Prosecution: Avoiding the Ethical Pitfalls — Minimizing Risks of Malpractice Liability and Ethics Sanctions" on July 12, 2016 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Jacob R. Osborn of Goodwin Procter and Dr. Sandra P. Thompson of Slater Hersey & Lieberman will provide guidance to IP counsel on the conflicts issues that often arise in patent prosecutions, and outline best practices to identify and address the risks — and to minimize conflicts that can lead to malpractice liability and ethical violations.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What policies and practices should counsel have in place to identify potential conflicts in patent prosecutions?
    • What steps can patent prosecutors take to minimize the risk of subject matter conflicts?
    • How should patent counsel respond after identifying conflicts?

    The registration fee for the webinar is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • AIPLA #1The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) will be offering a webinar entitled "Arrival of a New Privilege and a Review of Potential Waivers of Privilege in Business Contexts" on June 29, 2016 from 12:30 – 2:00 pm (Eastern).  John A. Bauer of Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo, PC, and Henrik D. Parker of BakerHostetler will highlight two key areas:

    1.  Potential waiver pitfalls in business transactions. How much information is too much?  Should a buyer/licensee/funder ask to review privileged documents related to the prosecution of the target's patents?  Can the two sides to a deal share privileged information without the privilege being lost?  Does the answer depend on whether or not a deal is consummated or what district is involved?

    2.  How the recent case of In Re: Queen’s University at Kingston, PARTEQ Research and Development Innovations has re-shaped the landscape of privilege when patent agents are involved.

    The registration fee for the program is $145 (AIPLA member rate) or $195 (non-member rate).  Those interested in registering for the program, can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar/teleconference entitled "Cuozzo v. Lee: Implications for Post-Grant Review Following New Supreme Court Ruling" on July 7, 2016 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EDT).  Erika H. Arner, M. Paul Barker, Thomas L. Irving, and James D. Stein of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner will examine the Supreme Court's decision in the Cuozzo v. Lee case and will discuss the implications of that decision for post-grant proceedings and patent validity.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • The standard of review for patent validity in IPR proceedings before the PTAB;
    • The appealability of the Board's decision whether to institute an IPR proceeding; and
    • Implications of the Cuozzo decision for post-grant proceedings.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Premier CerclePremier Cercle will be offering a program entitled "Unitary Patent & Unified Patent Court 2016" on July 7, 2016 at the European Patent Office in Munich, Germany.  The Program will offer sessions on the following topics:

    • UP & UPC Latest Updates from EPO Select Committee and UPC Preparatory Committee
    • Rules of Procedures and Material Law. How to get Consistency between the Divisions?
    • Keynote Address by Margot Fröhlinger, Principal Director Unitary Patent, European and International Legal Affairs, European Patent Office
    • UP&UPC: An International Perspective
    • Tailoring New IP Strategies for Your Business

    An agenda for the program, including detailed descriptions of sessions and list of speakers, can be found here.

    The registration fee for the program is EUR 499.00.  Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Goodbye to Seagate: Willfulness and Enhanced Damages After Halo" on June 30, 2016 from 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET).  David Caine of Arnold & Porter, Steven Cherny of Kirkland & Ellis, and Mark Davies of Orrick will discuss litigation strategy going forward, and other questions, such as whether companies should reevaluate policies regarding opinions of counsel on non-infringement during product development.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • Equitable Assignor Estoppel Doctrine Expanded by Federal Circuit

    By Kevin E. Noonan

    Federal Circuit SealArcane aspects of the law are frequently analogized as constituting "traps for the unwary," and patent law seems to have more than its share of minutiae that fall within that characterization.  The equitable principle of assignor estoppel is one example of such minutiae, and it recently became even easier to entrap the unwary with the Federal Circuit's decision in MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.

    The case involved U.S. Patent Nos. 6,536,054 ("'054 patent"), 6,536,055 ("'055 patent"), and 6,353,942 ("'942 patent") directed to repairing vacuum toilets used in commercial aircraft.  The details of the substantive portions of the case, including claim construction and summary judgment of non-infringement, were unremarkable.  But the District Court granted summary judgment that the claims of the three patents-in-suit were not invalid not on substantive grounds but on the basis that defendant B/E was estopped from challenging validity based on assignor estoppel.

    The factual predicate for the District Court's decision is as follows.  One of the named inventors, Mark Pondelick, assigned his rights to his employer who in turn assigned its rights to MAG.  Thereafter, Mr. Pondelick was employed by B/E and there was evidence adduced at trial that he was hired as part of B/E's efforts to market a product to compete with MAG.  This evidence was sufficient for the District Court to apply the assignor estoppel doctrine in granting summary judgment in favor of MAG.

    The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judges Mayer and Reyna.  The opinion relies upon Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1988) for the principle that the assignor or his privity is estopped from challenging the validity of the assigned patent.  The showing of privity, that is, extending the estoppel from the inventor to another party in privity with the inventor, is (like the doctrine itself) dependent on the equities.  The Court recited these considerations, taken from its Shamrock Techs., Inc. v. Med. Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1990) decision, as follows:

    If an inventor assigns his invention to his employer company A and leaves to join company B, whether company B is in privity and thus bound by the doctrine will depend on the equities dictated by the relationship between the inventor and company B in light of the act of infringement.  The closer that relationship, the more the equities will favor applying the doctrine to company B.

    The factors relied upon by the District Court (that formed the basis for the Federal Circuit's affirmance) were also taken from the Court's Shamrock Technologies decision and included:

    (1) the assignor's leadership role at the new employer;
    (2) the assignor's ownership stake in the defendant company;
    (3) whether the defendant company changed course from manufacturing non-infringing goods to infringing activity after the inventor was hired;
    (4) the assignor's role in the infringing activities;
    (5) whether the inventor was hired to start the infringing operations;
    (6) whether the decision to manufacture the infringing product was made partly by the inventor;
    (7) whether the defendant company began manufacturing the accused product shortly after hiring the assignor; and
    (8) whether the inventor was in charge of the infringing operation[.]

    Here, the District Court found that B/E benefited from Mr. Pondelick's knowledge of the claimed invention in developing the accused infringing product and indeed that B/E hired him specifically to develop that product.  Mr. Pondelick was B/E's Director of Engineering and later Vice President and General Manager of the company division that made the product.  B/E argued that Mr. Pondelick joined the company only after it had made the decision to develop the accused infringing toilet and that he was hired in an effort to avoid infringement.  In addition, unlike the precedent relied upon by the District Court, Mr. Pondelick did not have any more than a "negligible" financial interest in B/E.

    The Federal Circuit held that, in view of all these factors it could not conclude that the District Court erred, particularly insofar as B/E had "'availed itself of [Mr. Pondelick's] knowledge and assistance' to conduct the alleged infringement," citing  Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

    While this decision, like all decisions in equity, is fact-specific and particular to the parties involved and their conduct, the decision does suggest that the Federal Circuit will permit district courts to spread a wide net in discerning assignor estoppel whenever the assigning inventor is employed by the accused infringer and the infringer has made use of the inventor's particular knowledge in designing the accused infringing article.  This suggests that parties should scrutinize prospective employees' backgrounds carefully; the very expertise that may make someone an attractive hire may make it less likely that a company will ever be able to challenge the validity of any patent with which the employee has been involved.

    MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. v. B/E Aerospace, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016)
    Panel:  Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Mayer and Reyna
    Opinion by Chief Judge Prost

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Senate SealLast week, co-sponsors Senators Leahy (D-VT), Grassley (R-IA), Klobucher (D-MN), and Lee (R-UT) introduced a bill (S. 3056), entitled the "Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2016" or the "CREATES Act of 2016".  According to Senator Grassley:

    [C]oncerns have been raised that some brand-name companies are misusing an FDA program, known as the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy, to thwart that process by preventing the sale of samples of their product and refusing to allow generic competitors to participate in their Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy protocol.  These tactics result in blocking generic drug approval and keeping drug prices high for consumers.  The Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (CREATES) Act addresses this anticompetitive behavior by giving generic companies an opportunity to obtain relief in a timely fashion rather than through lengthy antitrust litigation.

    The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee, a sub-committee of which has already held a hearing on the subject matter the bill was introduced to address.

    After an introductory section, the bill provides in Section 2 "Findings."  In addition to encomiums to the effectiveness of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-417; 98 Stat. 1585) and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (Subtitle A of title VII of Public Law 111-148; 124 Stat. 804), the bill asserts that "developers of generic drugs and biosimilar biological products [] must be able to obtain quantities of the reference listed drug or biological product with which the generic drug or biosimilar biological product is intended to compete [] for purposes of supporting an application for approval by the Food and Drug Administration."  Moreover, the Findings state that, for those drugs subject to a "risk evaluation and mitigation strategy" or REMS, or a REMS with elements to assure safe use ("REMS with ETASU"), the FDA requires the branded/innovator and the generic/biosimilar to have "a single, shared system of elements [pursuant to (21 U.S.C. 355-1)] to assure safe use and supporting agreements, or secure a variance therefrom"

    The problem, according to the bill's cosponsors, is that "certain license holders (i.e., branded drug and biologics companies) are preventing generic product developers from obtaining quantities of the covered product necessary for the generic product developer to support an application for approval by the Food and Drug Administration, including testing to show bioequivalence, biosimilarity, or interchangeability to the covered product, in some instances based on the justification that the covered product is subject to a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy with elements to assure safe use."  And, according to the Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) at FDA, "some manufacturers of covered products have used REMS and distribution restrictions adopted by the manufacturer on their own behalf as reasons to not sell quantities of a covered product to generic product developers, causing barriers and delays in getting generic products on the market."  The FTC has voiced similar concerns, and the Findings also allege that "certain license holders are impeding the prompt negotiation and development on commercially reasonable terms of a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use, which may be necessary for the generic product developer to gain approval for its drug or licensing for its biological product."  While the antitrust laws provide one avenue for addressing this problem (insofar as it exists; the bill contains allegations but no examples of specific anticompetitive behavior), the bill contains the statement that it would be better to have "a more tailored legal pathway" which this bill is intended to provide.  (In this regard, the drafters have included a provision later in the text of the bill that the causes of action and remedies provided by the bill are not intended to foreclose access to such antitrust remedies under appropriate circumstances (Sec. 3(d)(2)).

    Section 3 of the bill, entitled "ACTIONS FOR DELAYS OF GENERIC DRUGS AND BIOSIMILAR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS," is directed to "covered products" (defined as "any drug approved under subsection (b) or (j) of section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) or biological product licensed under subsection (a) or (k) of section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262)") or combination thereof, or device or drug marketed for use thereof.  The bill expressly excludes from its ambit any drug or biological product "that the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] has determined to be currently in shortage and that appears on the drug shortage list in effect under [] 21 U.S.C. 356e" provided that the shortage has not been in effect for more than 6 months.  The bill then sets forth a new cause of action ("Civil Action") under Sec. 3(b)(1)(A):

    An eligible product developer [a generic drugmaker or biosimilar applicant] may bring a civil action against the license holder for a covered product [i.e., the generic or biosimilar drug] seeking relief under this paragraph in an appropriate district court of the United States alleging that the license holder has declined to provide sufficient quantities of the covered product to the eligible product developer on commercially reasonable, market-based terms.

    The elements to be proven, by a preponderance of the evidence (Sec. 3(b)(1)(B)), are:

    "(I) that —
        (aa) the covered product is not subject to a REMS with ETASU; or
        (bb) if the covered product is subject to a REMS with ETASU–
            (AA) the eligible product developer has obtained a covered product authorization from the Secretary in accordance with clause (ii); and
            (BB) the eligible product developer has provided a copy of the covered product authorization to the license holder;
    (II) that, as of the date on which the civil action is filed, the product developer has not obtained sufficient quantities of the covered product on commercially reasonable, market-based terms;
    (III) that the eligible product developer has requested to purchase sufficient quantities of the covered product from the license holder; and
    (IV) that the license holder has not delivered to the eligible product developer sufficient quantities of the covered product on commercially reasonable, market-based terms–
        (aa) for a covered product that is not subject to a REMS with ETASU, by the date that is 31 days after the date on which the license holder received the request for the covered product; and
        (bb) for a covered product that is subject to a REMS with ETASU, by 31 days after the later of–
            (AA) the date on which the license holder received the request for the covered product; or
            (BB) the date on which the license holder received a copy of the covered product authorization issued by the Secretary in accordance with clause (ii).

    The bill also permits an eligible product developer to submit a written request (Sec. 3(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I)) to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to obtain sufficient quantities of a covered product, which request shall be granted by the Secretary "not later than 90 days after the request [] is received for a product subject to a REMS with ETASU."  The sample of covered product will be sufficient to perform testing with or without human clinical trials as necessary.  The license holder (NDA or BLA) will be absolved of any violation of the REMS for the covered products if the product is supplied under the Secretary's authorization.  (Sec. 3(b)(1)(B)(ii)(III)).

    The bill further contains, as an affirmative defense (Sec. 3(b)(1)(C)) to the cause of action created by the Act, provisions that absolve the NDA or BLA holder from liability where neither the license holder or any of its "agents, wholesalers, or distributors was engaged in the manufacturing or commercial marketing of the covered product"; and that none of the license holder or any of its "agents, wholesalers, or distributors otherwise had access to inventory of the covered product to supply to the eligible product developer on commercially reasonable, market-based terms.''  Alternatively, it will be an affirmative defense if the license holder or its "agents, distributors, or wholesalers" sells the product, without restrictions "explicit or implicit" against selling to an eligible product developer, and an eligible product developer could purchase the covered product "in sufficient quantities on commercially reasonable, market-based terms from the agents, distributors, or wholesalers of the license holder."

    The bill also contains (Sec. 3(b)(1)(D)(i)) the following remedies for the eligible product developer:  an order from the Secretary that the license holder must provide the eligible product developer with "sufficient quantities of the covered product on commercially reasonable, market-based terms" without delay; an award of attorneys' fees and costs; and a monetary award "sufficient to deter the license holder from failing to provide other eligible product developers with sufficient quantities of a covered product on commercially reasonable, market-based terms," provided that the license holder either delayed in providing the covered product "without a legitimate business justification" or the license holder failed to comply with an order by the Secretary under the statute.  The amount of the monetary award is capped (Sec. 3(b)(1)(D)(ii)) at the revenue the license holder earned on the covered product (in its entirety) during a period beginning 31 days after the date the license holder received the request for the product or, for a product covered by a REMS with ETASU, 31 days after the later of when the license holder received the request or the Secretary's authorization order.  The statutory term for calculating the maximum extent of the monetary award ends on the date the license holder provides the sufficient amount of the covered product.  Thus, the bill provides incentives for the license holder to provide the sufficient quantities either upon request by the eligible product developer or as soon thereafter as possible.

    In addition, the bill has provisions (Sec. 3(b)(2) et seq.) relating to failure of the license holder and the eligible product developer to reach agreement on "a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use with respect to the covered product" or where the license holder has refused to permit the eligible product developer to "join a previously approved system of elements to assure safe use with respect to that product."  In order to prevail the eligible product developer must show that she has sought approval of a drug under Section 505(b)(2) or (j) or Section 351(k) referencing a covered product subject to a "REMS with ETASU that requires a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use with respect to the covered product"; that at least 120 days have elapsed from the date on which the eligible product developer "first initiated an attempt to reach an agreement with the license holder that would allow the product developer to participate in a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use"; and the license holder and eligible product developer have not reached agreement.  Recovery is also dependent on the Secretary not waiving the requirement that the covered product be part of "a single, shared system."  As in other parts of the statute, the remedy is an order from the Secretary to the license holder to "enter into a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use with the eligible product developer on commercially reasonable terms" or that the eligible product developer "join a previously approved system of elements to assure safe use with respect to the covered product on commercially reasonable terms."  Recovery is also allowed if the Secretary waives the requirement.  The remedies contained in the bill (Sec. 3(b)(2)(C)) include attorneys' fees and costs, as well as a monetary amount "sufficient to deter the license holder from failing to reach agreements that would allow other eligible product developers to participate in a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use on commercially reasonable terms."  These remedies are available only upon a showing by the eligible product developer, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the license holder, not having any legitimate business justification, delayed entry of the eligible product developer into the "single, shared system of elements to assure safe use with respect to the covered product," or delayed securing a waiver from the Secretary, or failed to comply with the Secretary's order pursuant to the provisions of the bill.  This portion of the bill (Sec. 3(b)(2)(C)(ii)) also contains maximums the eligible product developer can be awarded, which comprise no more than entirety of the revenue the license holder makes on the product from a time that is 121 days "after the date on which the product developer first initiated an attempt to reach an agreement with the license holder that would allow the product developer to participate in a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use with respect to the covered product" and ending on the date "on which the eligible product developer and license holder reached an agreement that would allow the product developer to participate in a single, shared system of elements to assure safe use with respect to the covered product."  The final provisions of the bill (Sec. 3(c)) include a limitation on liability for the license holder, wherein "[a] license holder shall not be liable for any claim arising out of the failure of an eligible product developer to follow adequate safeguards to assure safe use of the covered product during development or testing activities described in this section, including transportation, handling, use, or disposal of the covered product by the eligible product developer."

    Again according to Senator Grassley, the bill is supported by "consumer groups, generic drug manufacturers, antitrust experts, physicians, pharmacists, hospitals, insurers and other groups that advocate for lower-cost drugs, including:  the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, AARP, the National Coalition on Healthcare, Consumers Union, Families USA, the Center on Medicare Advocacy, Public Citizen, the American College of Physicians, the American Hospital Association, the Healthcare Supply Chain Association, the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, Express Scripts, Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, the Premier Healthcare Alliance, the AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Teachers, the Public Sector Healthcare Roundtable and the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust.  With the exception of the GPhA these are all patient, consumer, or physicians' groups, all of which have a personal, economic and vested interest in getting generic or biosimilar drugs to market, without necessarily being overly concerned with the realities of producing any of these drugs or getting them to market (much less the commercial considerations involved).  The Senators are doing what our system expects them to do, listen to their constituents.  And while it is not impossible that sometimes it may look like branded and biologics companies are being obstructionist against their generic or biosimilar counterparts it is not always so, and Congress has the responsibility to ensure the litigation and sanctions envisioned by the statute are necessary to forestall any unnecessary delay that may occur (and are not excused by the express provisions of the bill).  In view of the impending summer recess, followed by the Presidential and Congressional elections, it is unlikely that this bill will make it to the President's desk before November.  But it is certainly a bellwether for what we can expect from the 115th Congress when it convenes early next year.