• By Kevin E. Noonan

    FDALate last week, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration released its latest Guidance for Industry relating to the biosimilar application process set forth in the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BCPCIA).  This Guidance, entitled Nonproprietary Naming of Biological Products, extends to both reference biologic drug products and their biosimilar counterparts.  The basis for this naming regime, and its extension to both types of biologic drugs, reflects the agency's rationale for providing a naming convention in the first place and is based on FDA's dual responsibilities to protect the public and at the same time facilitate availability of biosimilar drugs according to Congress's intentions in passing the BPCIA.

    In a nutshell, FDA sets forth a regime for a nonproprietary name that is the combination of a core name (equivalent to a generic name for small molecule drugs) combined with a four-letter suffix to designate its source.  The suffix (both the requirement that each biologic drug have one and the "nonsense" ("devoid of any meaning") nature of it) has been the source of much of the criticism of the naming scheme since the agency published a proposed rule in the Federal Register of August 28, 2015 (80 Fed. Reg. 52224) ("Designation of Official Names and Proper Names for Certain Biological Products").  The Guidance provides its rationale for the proposed rule, stating that the naming scheme, which is required "for each originator biological product, related biological product, and biosimilar product," will "facilitate pharmacovigilance" (for all categories of biologic drugs), by permitting a specific biologic dug product to be tracked from its source particularly in instances where other means of doing so are not readily available.  Also, these names would permit accurate source identification by patients, healthcare providers and payors (one of the features that biosimilar advocates fear might lead to discrimination).  For the agency, using source suffixes also provides a means to "minimize inadvertent substitution" (especially when such biosimilar products, like all current biosimilar products have not been determined to be interchangeable; FDA will develop a naming convention based on the same principles for interchangeable biosimilar products but "is continuing to consider the appropriate format of the suffix for these products").  The benefits envisioned by FDA should be to "(1) encourage routine use of designated suffixes in ordering, prescribing, dispensing, recordkeeping, and pharmacovigilance practices and (2) avoid inaccurate perceptions of the safety and effectiveness of biological products based on their licensure pathway" according to the Guidance.

    One aspect of the Guidance is that the naming convention will be used for all biologic drug products, both newly licensed as well as previously licensed drugs.  For previously licensed biologic drugs (all of which are innovator-produced "reference biologic drug products") the revised proper (nonproprietary) name would comprise the original name as the core name and have a new distinguishing suffix configured consistent with the Guidance.  While the process for implementing this "renaming" of previously licensed biologic drugs is ongoing, FDA will assign distinguishing suffixes to "a limited group" of these drugs as well as accepting submissions (presumably by the drug sponsor) for supplementing approved drug labels with new nonproprietary names include a proposed suffix.  The names will be required for all "biological products licensed under the PHS Act, such as therapeutic protein products, vaccines, allergenic products, and blood derivatives, and [will] not include certain biological products that also meet the definition of a device in section 201(h) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 321(h)), such as in vitro reagents (e.g., antibody to hepatitis B surface antigen, blood grouping reagents, hepatitis C virus encoded antigen) and blood donor screening tests (e.g., HIV and hepatitis C)."

    Returning to the agency's rationale for the proposed naming convention, the Guidance states that it anticipates "a growing number of biological products" to be entering the marketplace.  The nonproprietary name (in contrast with the proprietary (brand) name, "reflects certain scientific characteristics of the product, such as chemical structure and pharmacological properties" and, inter alia, "helps health care providers identify the product's drug substance and distinguish biological products from one another."  The proposed naming scheme was developed based on comments solicited by the agency from the public (as found in "Federal Register, 'Approval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products; Public Hearing; Request for Comments' (75 FR 61497, October 5, 2010); 'Draft Guidances Relating to the Development of Biosimilar Products; Public Hearing; Request for Comments' (77 FR 12853, March 2, 2012); [and] 'Nonproprietary Naming of Biological Products; Draft Guidance for Industry; Availability' (80 FR 52296, August 28, 2015)").  The Guidance specifically recites that the naming convention is intended to "maximize the success of biosimilar products and interchangeable products and to help ensure the safety of patients receiving biological products licensed under the PHS Act."

    The Guidance sets forth the "main considerations" used by the agency in arriving at the naming scheme.  These include "enhancing biological product pharmacovigilance"; "ensuring safe use of biological products"; and "advancing appropriate practices and perceptions regarding biological products."  With regard to pharmacovigilance, the Guidance acknowledges that despite agency efforts to "rigorously assess[]" for biologic (and other) drugs for safety and efficacy, issues can arise post-approval that create a need for the agency to be able to "track adverse events to a specific manufacturer" (or even specific lots or manufacturing sites) in a surveillance system that exists throughout the product's lifecycle.  If the source of a biologic product can be readily identified, remedial action can be taken effectively and not implicate products "for which no problem exists."  Such surveillance systems can be active or passive, and can use identifiers including "proprietary name, proper name, manufacturer, national drug code (NDC) number, lot number, and billing codes."  Unfortunately, many systems have "limited ability" to track products by manufacturer, according to the Guidance, and some identifiers are not recorded routinely (for example, in patient and billing records).  The proposed naming convention is intended to "provide another critical tool for accurately identifying and facilitating pharmacovigilance for originator biological products, related biological products, and biosimilar products."

    With regard to safety, the Guidance states that inadvertent substitution is a particular risk for biological products due to their complexity and "unique safety concerns related to immunogenicity."  Inadvertent substitution, particularly wherein patients could receive reference biologic drug product and biosimilar versions thereof serendipitously, raises the specter of unapproved interchangeability, which the agency wishes to avoid until such time as it sets out the scope of what constitutes biosimilar drugs that can be considered interchangeable with the reference biologic drug product.  There is also the risk of different versions of a biologic drug or biosimilar versions thereof to be approved for different indications, and the naming convention is believed to be helpful in ensuring that a drug be administered for just those indications for which it has been approved.  There is the further risk that poorly informed healthcare providers or their patients might assume that a biosimilar drug having the same nonproprietary name as the reference biologic drug product had been approved as being interchangeable.  This risk is mitigated not only by using distinguishable names but by providing in such names a ready distinction in the Purple Book (Purple Book: Lists of Licensed Biological Products With Reference Product Exclusivity and Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations).

    Finally, the Guidance believes that by requiring routine use of a nonproprietary names comprising source-identifying suffix in "ordering, prescribing, dispensing, recordkeeping, and pharmacovigilance practices" it will provide "a consistent, readily available and recognizable mechanism" for patients and healthcare providers to correctly identify the products (and their source) being administered.  FDA also appreciates that by requiring both newly approved biosimilar drugs and previously approved reference biologic drug products to use the naming convention, "inaccurate perceptions" of the safety and efficacy of biosimilar drugs, compared with reference biologic drug products, can be avoided.

    In practice, FDA intends to use the core name of a previously approved originator biologic drug for both the reference biologic drug product and all biosimilar versions.  Source will be identified by a four-letter suffix otherwise "devoid of meaning."  This naming scheme will indicate the relationship between the products (the core name) and identify source by the suffix.  The agency also notes that having the distinguishing code as a suffix (instead of a prefix) will facilitate grouping the drugs together in electronic databases and thus help healthcare providers to locate their alternatives.  Applicants for biologic drug products pending approval should propose to FDA up to 10 suffixes from which the agency could choose (and also submit any "supporting analyses" that could influence the agency's decision on the suffix to be used); current BLA holders for approved drugs and biosimilar applicants should do the same.  Guidelines for suffix selection according to the Guidance should have the following characteristics:

    The proposed suffix should:

    • Be unique
    • Be devoid of meaning
    • Be four lowercase letters of which at least three are distinct
    • Be nonproprietary
    • Be attached to the core name with a hyphen
    • Be free of legal barriers that would restrict its usage

    The proposed suffix should not:

    • Be false or misleading, such as by making misrepresentations with respect to safety or efficacy
    • Include numerals and other symbols aside from the hyphen attaching the suffix to the core name
    • Include abbreviations commonly used in clinical practice in a manner that may lead the suffix to be misinterpreted as another element on the prescription or order
    • Contain or suggest any drug substance name or core name
    • Look similar to or be capable of being mistaken for the name of a currently marketed product (e.g., should not increase the risk of confusion or medical errors with the product and/or other products in the clinical setting)
    • Look similar to or otherwise connote the name of the license holder
    • Be too similar to any other FDA-designated nonproprietary name suffix

    The Guidance ends with the following statement of FDA policies regarding naming:

    The final determination on the acceptability of a proposed suffix is based on FDA's review of all information and analyses described in this guidance, along with any information submitted by the sponsor.

    FDA will evaluate proposed suffixes against the factors described in this section and may consider other factors if they impact the utility of the suffix in meeting the goals of the naming convention articulated in this guidance.  Upon completion of the Agency's evaluation, FDA will notify applicants if a proposed suffix is acceptable or if all of the proposed suffixes are determined to be unacceptable.  If all of the proposed suffixes are determined to be unacceptable, applicants may submit additional proposed suffixes for FDA's consideration.  If an applicant does not submit a suffix that FDA finds acceptable or does not propose suffix candidates within an appropriate time frame to allow sufficient time for FDA review, FDA may elect to assign a four-letter suffix for inclusion in the proper name designated in the license at the time FDA approves the application.

    And like all such Guidances, it contains an express disclaimer:

    This guidance represents the current thinking of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) on this topic.  It does not establish any rights for any person and is not binding on FDA or the public.  You can use an alternative approach if it satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations.  To discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA office responsible for this guidance as listed on the title page.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    USPTO SealA great deal of angst has been generated by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's decision, in Ex parte Itagaki and Nishihara, regarding the panel's application of Section 101 (sua sponte as a new ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)) that claims to a magnetic resonance imaging machine do not recite patent-eligible subject matter.  While this decision does illustrate the difficulties that can be occasioned by trying to apply the Supreme Court's subject matter eligibility jurisprudence (extending beyond Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. and Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International to reach Bilski v. Kappos, Parker v Flook, Gottschalk v. Benson and even Funk Bros v. Kalo Inoculant), a review of the cases cited in the decision in support of its conclusion indicate that the fault does not lie with the Board.

    An analysis must start with the claim (for at least that rubric of patent law remains true for now):

    1.  A magnetic resonance imaging apparatus comprising:
        an image acquisition unit configured to divide an imaging region of an object to be examined into a plurality of stations of respective station positions, and acquire a plurality of images having different image types for each station, while moving a table on which the object is mounted, station by station;
        a display control unit configured to display the plurality of images in a predetermined display format; and
        a classification processing unit configured to classify the plurality of images by image types and station position, based on imaging condition including imaging parameters,
        wherein the display control unit displays the plurality of images by image types in spatial order of station positions, based on the classification result by the classification processing unit.

    The claims came to the Board after final rejection on the grounds of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over a combination of references, which rejection applicants overcame with their arguments before the Board rebutting the Examiner's reasoning in arriving at an obviousness determination.

    The Board then instituted its own new ground of rejection under § 101 by applying the Mayo/Alice test to the claims.  For the first prong of the test, whether the claims were "directed to" a judicial exception, the Board identified the limitation that a classification processing unit configured to classify the plurality of images by image types and station position, based on imaging condition including imaging parameters, was directed to "classification," a "building block of human ingenuity" according to the Board.  As such, this portion of the claim (at least) was directed to an abstract idea and thus satisfied the first prong of the Mayo/Alice test.

    Next the Board applied the second prong, to search for "'an inventive concept'—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself,'" citing the Mayo opinion.  Here, as has frequently happened in other cases, the Board parsed through the other limitations, finding them to be broadly recited as being "configured" to perform certain steps or functions of a method without "structural" limitations; the fact that these limitations were per se "structurally limited" by their recitation (to "an image acquisition unit, a display control unit, [and] a classification processing unit") was not enough for the Board, which the Board found to be generic.  According to the decision, the claim is directed to "a typical multi-station MRI" wherein "[a]ny multi-station MRI available at the time the application was filed would have satisfied this."  And of course the specification, which is written to broadly encompass within the claims conventional MRI apparatuses supports this interpretation (further being interpreted under the PTO's "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard).  As the Court did in Alice, the Board determined that "the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.  Stating an abstract idea 'while adding the words 'apply if'' is not enough for patent eligibility."

    The Board recognized that the claimed MRI apparatus was not entirely conventional, insofar as it comprised the "classification processing unit."  But even here the generic manner in which this element was described and claimed "does little to patentably transform the classification abstract idea" particularly because the classification step of the method practiced using the apparatus "could be performed mentally or manually."

    It is the citation of myriad Federal Circuit precedent that informs the opinion that it is not the Board or this particular panel that is at fault for what seems to be an outré extension of subject matter eligibility practice to an apparatus claim.  For example, the panel cites CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011), for support, which case cited Parker v. Flook for the principle that "a recitation of practical application for an abstract idea is insufficient to transform an abstract idea into an inventive concept."  In the CyberSource case, decided prior to the Mayo/Alice paradigm under the Court's reasoning in Bilski v. Kappos (and hence illustrating how far back in the Court's consideration of subject matter eligibility the concepts set forth in Mayo and Alice arose) the claims at issue were a method claim for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet, and a claim to a computer-readable medium containing programming instructions to put the method into effect (i.e., a so-called "Beauregard" claim from In re Beauregard).  After finding the method claim to fail the "machine-or-transformation" test as well as the more general test that methods that could be performed mentally were not patent eligible, the Court then went on to find the Beauregard claim to the unpatentable method similarly outside the proper scope of patent eligibility.  Prefiguring Justice Breyer's imprecations in Mayo against the "clever draftsman," the Court said that:

    Regardless of what statutory category ("process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," 35 U.S.C. § 101) a claim's language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.  Here, it is clear that the invention underlying both claims 2 and 3 is a method for detecting credit card fraud, not a manufacture for storing computer-readable information.

    And the CyberSource Court relied upon In re Abele, where the Federal Circuit had earlier considered an apparatus claim to be a method claim for Section 101 purposes, "[d]ue to its 'broad' and 'functionally defined' nature (in that case because the claims were drafted in "means-plus-function" format under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6th paragraph).

    Thus, it can be seen that the Board has extended the objection raised against computer-related inventions, wherein "merely" having method steps (that can be performed mentally) performed by a computer is not enough to render Beauregard claims to patent eligibility, as those concepts have taken root and come to flower in more recent cases (see DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No. 2015-1180, 2016 WL 6440387, *10 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2016)).

    One evident defect in the Board's application of the Mayo/Alice test (which is a defect in the test itself and shared by district courts and the Federal Circuit) is dissecting the claims into their component limitations and then paying no more than lip service to the Court's admonition from Diamond v. Diehr that claims must be construed as a whole.  Another is the application of categorical standards of ineligibility, where the way an invention is categorized is enough to invalidate it.  The Board is bound to follow relevant legal precedent (although it might be good to see the Office use its expertise as an administrative agency to find inventions patentable rather than the other way around).  But this decision should not be so easily dismissed by castigating it as the PTAB run amok; rather it seems to be the legally logical result of Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases that should be corrected, either by the Court or Congress.  American innovators deserve nothing less.

  • By Andrew Williams

    Supreme Court Building #2On Friday, the Supreme Court granted both petitions for writs of certiorari and consolidated the Sandoz v. Amgen (No. 15-1039) and Amgen v. Sandoz (No. 15-1195) appeals.  Sandoz had petitioned the Court on February 16, 2016 for a writ of certiorari to review one of the issues decided by the Federal Circuit's July 21, 2015 opinion, specifically:

    Whether notice of commercial marketing given before FDA approval can be effective and whether, in any event, treating Section 262(l)(8)(A) as a stand-alone requirement and creating an injunctive remedy that delays all biosimilars by 180 days after approval is improper.

    Amgen filed a brief in opposition on March 21, but at the same time filed a conditional cross-petition asking the Court for a writ of certiorari to review a second question in the event it granted the Sandoz Petition.  As Amgen put it, both questions related to the "patent-resolution scheme of the BPCIA."  Specifically, the question posed in Amgen's conditional cross-petition was:

    Is an Applicant required by 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) to provide the Sponsor with a copy of its biologics license application and related manufacturing information, which the statute says the Applicant "shall provide," and, where an Applicant fails to provide that required information, is the Sponsor's sole recourse to commence a declaratory-judgment action under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) and/or a patent-infringement action under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii)?

    The grant of certiorari in this case on both questions was not necessarily a surprise move, because as we reported last month, the Solicitor General recommended that the Court do so.  It is possible, however, that the Court took this case because its resolution will not necessarily follow partisan lines.  Before the incoming President has an opportunity to appoint someone to fill Justice Scalia's seat (a nominee whose confirmation may be further delayed in the Senate by opposition from the Democrats), every case the Supreme Court hears faces a potential 4-4 split.  Correspondingly, any decision rendered before the Court is constituted with nine members may come under increased scrutiny.  While the potential for lower biosimilar drug products is certain to be of interest to the general public, the nuances of the interpretation of a statute that intersects FDA and patent law is not likely to engender diametrically opposed views across party lines.  In some ways, therefore, the Court may be playing it safe by taking this case now.

    With that said, it is difficult to foresee how the Court will resolve the case.  Unlike most cases in which the Court reviews decisions by the Federal Circuit (which are generally reversed), this case has four potential outcomes:  the Court could affirm or deny the entirety of the Federal Circuit's decision, or it could affirm one holdings and deny the other.  What is clear is that we could see resolution of this case by the end of the current term in June.  One needs only look to the schedule of the Cuozzo v. Lee case for comparison — certiorari was granted in that case almost exactly a year ago, and the decision was handed down last June.  Patent Docs will continue to monitor this case and provide updates as necessary.

  • CalendarJanuary 18, 2017 – "Top Patent Law Stories of 2016" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    January 19, 2017 – "Evidence of Prior Art at the PTAB: Rigorous Proof, Or Else" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    January 19, 2017 – "Preparing for Pharma PGRs: Lessons for Patent Owners From PGR Denials — Leveraging Successful IPR Arguments, Strengthening Patent Applications to Survive PGR Petitions" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST)

    January 25, 2017 – "Functional Patent Claims After Williamson: Understanding the Benefits and Risks for Your University's Patent Portfolio" (Technology Transfer Tactics) – 1:00 to 2:00 pm (Eastern)

    January 26, 2017 – "Leveraging Latest Patent Decisions, Navigating New Complexities, Cases to Watch in 2017 — Key Lessons on Patent Eligibility, Deference on Appeal, Venue, Estoppel, Continuation Patent Applications, and More" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST)

    February 22, 2017 – "Patent-Eligibility Update: Abstract Ideas in the Federal Circuit and USPTO" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    ***Patent Docs is a media partner of this conference or CLE

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be offering the next webinar in its Patent Quality Chat webinar series from 12:00 to 1:00 pm (ET) on January 19, 2017.  Sandie Spyrou, Supervisor, Office of Patent Quality Assurance, and Mary Beth Jones, Supervisor, Office of Patent Quality Assurance, will discuss "Rationale Statements in 35 U.S.C. 103 Rejections."

    Instructions for viewing the webinar can be found here.

    Additional information regarding the Patent Quality Chat webinar series can be found on the USPTO's Patent Quality Chat webpage.

  • By David Brown* —

    The final decision of the Court of Appeal in the Lyrica® litigation was handed down on 13 October 2016.  This litigation, relating to the painkiller pregabalin marketed by Warner-Lambert for the treatment of pain under the name Lyrica®, has been keenly followed as the first detailed analysis of infringement of "second medical use" patents by generically available medicines.  In Europe, generically available medicines can be marketed without an explicit statement of potential uses that are still under patent protection ("skinny" labelling).  The use of pregabalin to treat pain is currently protected by a Warner-Lamber patent, and Actavis's drug, Lecaent®, is marketed with labelling that does not refer to pain.

    The Court of Appeal decided that the patent was invalid on the technical ground that "pain" was not a single disease and so the claim was not adequately supported by the relatively limited data in the patent, relating only to peripheral neuropathic pain.  Furthermore, the Court held that Warner-Lambert had not requested appropriate conditional amendment of the patent early enough, and therefore could not maintain the patent in the limited scope of peripheral neuropathic pain.  In these findings, the Court upheld the decision of the Patents Court, handed down on 10 September 2015.

    As a result of the invalidity of the patent, Lecaent® was found to be not an infringing product.  The Court of Appeal, however, also provided detailed obiter comments on the circumstances in which a "second medical use" patent may in principle be infringed by a generically available medicine marketed with skinny labelling.  The Court stated (paragraph 216):

    "… it is only essential [for infringement] that the [generic] manufacturer is able to foresee that there will be intentional use [of the generic product] for the new medical indication.  Intentional use is to be distinguished from use where the drug is prescribed for a different indication and, without it in any sense being the intention of the treatment, a pain condition is in fact treated."

    This "foreseeability" test is a factual test.  If intentional use for the in-patent condition is foreseeable, then it is incumbent on the generic manufacturer to take all reasonable steps to mitigate the risk, taking into account the ways in which the intentional use by the patient might be facilitated (e.g., prescribing practices of doctors; national dispensing guidelines to pharmacists; individual dispensing practices of pharmacists).  The Court stated (paragraphs 207 and 208):

    "… [W]hat is sufficient to negative the existence of intention?  In my judgment the absence of the patented condition from the label cannot conceivably be sufficient to negative the intention.  Mr Speck [counsel for Actavis] recognised that there could be objective factual circumstances where the absence of a label identifying the patented indication did not negative intention, for example a manufacturer who proposes to sell far more of the drug than the market for the non-patented indication could bear.

    Viewed in this way I think the answer becomes clear.  The intention will be negatived where the manufacturer has taken all reasonable steps within his power to prevent the consequences occurring.  In such circumstances his true objective is a lawful one, and one would be entitled to say that the foreseen consequences were not intended, but were an unintended incident of his otherwise lawful activity."

    This important decision establishes that the burden is largely on the generic manufacturers to mitigate the risks of their products being intentionally taken by patients for an in-patent treatment.

    The extent to which the prescribing practices of doctors, National Health Service dispensing guidelines to pharmacists and the individual dispensing practices of pharmacists will need to be refined to assist the generic manufacturers in this endeavour will no doubt be explored in the future, as the healthcare system in the UK adapts to this new guidance from the Court of Appeal.

    Importantly also, the decision establishes a relatively patentee-friendly regime for the UK enforcement of second medical use patents.  As discussed in the decision (paragraphs 190 to 201),a range of approaches is found in Europe, with the German courts taking the view that a generic manufacturer will not infringe unless it positively recites the patented use on its packaging.

    We understand that permission to appeal to the Supreme Court is being sought.

    Warner-Lambert Company, LLC v Generics (UK) Ltd & Others [2016] EWCA Civ 1006

    Mr. Brown is a Partner with Haseltine Lake LLP.

    This article was reprinted with permission from Haseltine Lake LLP.  The article was originally published in the 21 November 2016 issue of Haseltine Lake's Chemistry and Life Sciences Newsletter.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    FDAOn December 29, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration released its latest Guidance for Industry relating to the biosimilar application process set forth in the Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BCPCIA).  This Guidance, entitled Clinical Pharmacology Data to Support a Demonstration of Biosimilarity to a Reference Product, is directed to products for which "pharmacokinetic (PK) and pharmacodynamic (PD) data are needed to support a demonstration of biosimilarity" (presumably all biosmilar products).  The rubrics set forth in this Guidance are intended to be relevant for establishing that there are no "clinically meaningful differences" between the biosimilar and the reference biologic drug product.  In particular, the Guidance is to be used to "address residual uncertainties" after comparative analytical data is acquired, and for providing direction and the need for additional clinical studies, as well as adding to the "totality of the evidence" in favor of biosimilarity and "extrapolation of data" regarding additional indications.

    While acknowledging that the extent and types of clinical pharmacological data required will depend on each particular biosimilar, the Guidance provides "critical considerations" for using such studies to support a determination of biosimilarity.  These are summarized as "three key concepts": "a PK and PD response assessment, an evaluation of residual uncertainty, and assumptions about analytical quality and similarity," which are especially relevant to biosimilarity determinations.

    According to the Guidance, pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamics studies "should" include exposure and, preferably, exposure-response data (although the Guidance recognizes that informative exposure-response data may be difficult to obtain in view of the complexity and heterogeneneity of biological products).  For pharmacodynamics (PD) studies, a single biomarker is preferred although a composite of more than one biomarker can be used (indeed, the Guidance states that "[u]sing broader panels of PD biomarkers (e.g., by conducting a protein or mRNA microarray analysis) that capture multiple pharmacological effects of the product can be of additional value."  There are five characteristics set forth in the Guidance that should be considered when choosing a PD-relevant biomarker:

    • The time of onset of change in the PD biomarker relative to dosing and its return to baseline with discontinuation of dosing;
    • The dynamic range of the PD biomarker over the exposure range to the biological product;
    • The sensitivity of the PD biomarker to differences between the proposed biosimilar product and the reference product;
    • The relevance of the PD biomarker to the mechanism of action of the drug (to the extent that the mechanism of action is known for the reference product); and
    • The analytical validity of the PD biomarker assay.

    Even when there are no identified biomarkers that meet these criteria, the Guidance encourages applicants to use PD biomarkers "that achieve a large dynamic range over the concentration range in the PK evaluation because these PD biomarkers represent potential orthogonal tests that can support similarity."  And in the absence of sufficiently sensitive PD markers, the Guidance asserts that "derived" PK markers can be used to provide the "primary basis" for evaluating biosimilarity with PD markers being used to augment this data.

    The Guidance specifically reasserts the FDA's fundamental policy decision to base approval of biosimilars vel non on the totality of the circumstances, using "a risk-based approach" that includes all relevant data (enumerated as "data from the structural and functional characterizations, nonclinical evaluations, clinical PK and PD studies, clinical immunogenicity testing and an investigation of clinical safety, and, when appropriate, clinical effectiveness").  The protocol FDA has adopted is to require such information in a "stepwise" approach, wherein at each step the agency reviews the amount of residual uncertainty that exists on the question of biosimilarity and fashions what is required to resolve such uncertainty.

    While being directed to PD and PK studies the Guidance also reiterates the importance of "extensive and robust comparative structural and functional studies" using "available state-of-the-art" assays for evaluating a variety of physical and biochemical parameters (such as molecular weight, post-translational modifications, heterogeneity, impurity profiles, and others).  FDA requires the biosimilar applicant to identify the "type, nature, and extent" of any differences with the reference biologic drug product.  The Guidance notes the utility of using a "meaningful fingerprint-like analysis algorithm in this regard, specifying that by "fingerprint-like" is meant "[i]ntegrated, multi-parameter approaches that are extremely sensitive in identifying analytical differences."  The Guidance also identifies four categories of analytical results:

    • Insufficient analytical similarity (wherein further development is not recommended);
    • Analytical similarity with residual uncertainty (requiring additional studies (such as PD or PK studies));
    • Tentative analytical similarity (which may require "targeted and selective animal and/or clinical studies); and
    • Fingerprint-like analytical similarity (which may still require targeted and selective animal and/or clinical studies).

    With regard to specifics of PD and PK study requirements, this Guidance references an earlier one, Bioanalytical Method Validation, and also sets forth both general and specific recommendations.  For PK studies, the Guidance recommends that the selected assay be chosen in view of "a thorough understanding of the mechanism of action" or the structural elements understood to be "critical" for biological activity, and ones that produce concentration data with which the biosmilar and reference product sponsor can be compared.  For PD studies, the Guidance recommends (in addition to choosing the "most suitable" assays) that the sponsor give the agency a rationale for its assay choice and relevance of the assay to biological activity.  The Guidance then sets forth specific considerations for ligand binding assays, concentration and activity assays, and PD assays.

    Turning to safety and immunogenicity considerations, the Guidance specifically recites instances where neutralizing antibodies or immune-related toxicity reduces or loses PD efficacy, wherein such data should be disclosed to the agency and perhaps supplemented where appropriate, and should include "relevant patient populations that are not immunocompromised."  The measurements performed on the biosimilar should be chosen using "[p]ublicly available information on the safety and immunogenicity profile of the reference product."  For specifics on immunogenicity assay development the Guidance references a separate Guidance, Immunogenicity Assessment for Therapeutic Protein Products.

    This Guidance repeats FDA's prior encouragement for biosimilar applicants to consult with the agency, here for developing its plan for clinical pharmacological evaluation of the biosimilar product.  The Guidance sets forth "[c]ritical topics" what should be discussed with FDA, including specifics on crossover and parallel study designs, which the Guidance characterizes as having "particular relevance."  With regard to crossover study design the Guidance states that "a single-dose, randomized, crossover study is generally preferred" for PK similarity assessments.  The Guidance recommends such studies for products having a half-life shorter than 5 days, or a rapid PD response (i.e., related to "the time of onset, maximal effect, and disappearance in conjunction with drug exposure"), and a low incidence of immunogenicity.  Conversely, a multiple-dose design is recommended for PD similarity assessments.  In either case, the Guidance recommends that "time course of appearance and disappearance of immunogenicity and its relation to the washout period should be considered."  Parallel design studies, according to the Guidance, are more appropriate for the many biologic drug products having a long half-life that are capable of eliciting an immune response.  In any case, the biosimilar applicant should also submit equivalent data on the U.S-licensed reference product.  Non-U.S. licensed reference products can also be used for this comparison, provided that the requirements of PHS Act section 351(k)(2)(A) are met and the biosimilar sponsor provides sufficient evidence to "scientifically justify the scientific relevance of these comparative data to an assessment of biosimilarity and establish an acceptable bridge to the U.S.-licensed reference product."

    The Guidance also discusses the patient population, which preferably comprises healthy individuals if the biosimilar can be safely administered to them.  With regard to population demographics, the Guidance recommends selection of such a population what would be "most likely to provide a sensitive measure of differences between the proposed biosimilar product and the reference product" with evidence of which population was selected on this basis.  And of course the total number of patients should be sufficient to provide "adequate statistical power" for PK and PD assessments.  Similarly, dose selection should be chosen the be the most sensitive dose for identifying differences between the biosimilar product and the reference product biologic drug (which may be the approved dose for the reference product), and the route of administration should be the same route as used for the biologic drug reference product (and if there is more than one approved route then the one "most sensitive for detecting clinically meaningful difference" should be chosen").

    With regard to PK measures, the Guidance specifically states:

    All PK measures should be obtained for both the proposed biosimilar product and the reference product.  The sponsor should obtain measures of peak concentration (Cmax) and total area under the curve (AUC) in a relevant biological fluid.  For single-dose studies, AUC should be calculated as the area under the biological product concentration-time curve from time zero to time infinity (AUC0-), where AUC0-= AUC0-t + Ct/kel (or Ct (concentration at the last measurable timepoint) divided by kel (elimination rate constant)) is calculated based on an appropriate method.  Cmax should be determined from the data without interpolation.  For intravenous studies, AUC0- will be considered the primary endpoint.  For subcutaneous studies, Cmax and AUC will be considered coprimary study endpoints.  For multiple dose studies, the measurement of total exposure should be the area under the concentration-time profile from time zero to the end of the dosing interval at steady-state (AUC0-tau), and is considered the primary endpoint.  Both the concentration prior to the next dose during multiple dosing (Ctrough ss) and Cmax are considered secondary endpoints.  Population PK data will not provide an adequate assessment for PK similarity.

    For PK measurements, the Guidance recognizes that sometimes "clinical PK and PD data that demonstrate similar exposure and response between a proposed biosimilar product and the reference product can be sufficient to completely assess whether there are clinically meaningful differences between products" (not taking into consideration the need for separate assessment of immunogenicity).  But in instances where this data is not sufficient to establish biosimilarity, the Guidance states that the human PD data can be used to lead to a more "targeted" approach for developing further clinical comparison studies.  And "sampling strategies" for both PD and PK measurements should be optimized for each, because "the PD-time profile might not mirror the PK-time profile."

    For making statistical comparisons of PK and PD results between the biosimilar and reference products, the Guidance recommends a "similarity assessment" that relies on "(1) a criterion to allow the comparison, (2) a confidence interval for the criterion, and (3) an acceptable limit for the biosimilarity assessment."  Applicants should use an "average equivalence" approach (further described in FDA Guidance entitled Statistical Approaches to Establishing Bioequivalence) for comparing AUC and Cmax measurements, based on a "two one-sided test procedure that involves calculation of the 90% confidence interval for the ratio of logarithmically transformed averages of the measurements of reference product and biosimilar drugs."

    Finally, the Guidance contains a discussion of "simulation tools" for PK/PD study design, wherein these tools are used to select inter alia optimally informative doses for evaluating PD similarity.  However, in such cases the biosimilar applicant should chose informative dosages (on the "steep" part of the dose-response curve) and provide reference to publicly available information for such curves or propose a small-scale study to generate this information, particularly with regard to the 50% maximal response for the biologic drug.

    The Guidance ends by stating that:

    Clinical pharmacology studies play a critical role in the development of biosimilar products.  These studies are part of a stepwise process for demonstrating biosimilarity between a proposed biosimilar product and the reference product.  These studies may support a demonstration that there are no clinically meaningful differences between the products.  These studies may address residual uncertainties that remain after the analytical evaluation, may add to the totality of the evidence supporting a demonstration of biosimilarity, and may also support a selective and targeted approach to the design of any recommended subsequent clinical studies to support a demonstration of biosimilarity.

    And like all such Guidances, it contains an express disclaimer:

    This guidance represents the current thinking of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) on this topic.  It does not establish any rights for any person and is not binding on FDA or the public.  You can use an alternative approach if it satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations.  To discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA office responsible for this guidance as listed on the title page.

  • By Michael Borella

    The Supreme Court's 2014 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l decision requires the application of a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter.  One must first determine whether the claim at hand is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further determine whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But generic computer implementation of an otherwise abstract process does not qualify as "significantly more."  A goal of this test is to prevent one from patenting judicial exclusions, and thereby preempting others from using these basic scientific tools.

    Nonetheless, there has been significant confusion in the Federal Circuit, the district courts, and the USPTO about how to properly apply this test.  For instance, the Justices did not define what they meant by an "abstract idea," nor did they clearly set forth how to determine whether a claimed invention encompasses significantly more than an abstract idea or any other exclusion.  This has led to consternation amongst patentees wondering whether their inventions are protectable and whether their patents are valid. Defendants in infringement actions might view Alice as yet another line of attack, but an uncertain one at best.

    Recently, three district courts have considered whether litigating patents ultimately invalidated by Alice rises to the level of "exceptional" under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and therefore the prevailing party would be awarded attorneys' fees.  In Garfum.com Corp. v. Reflections by Ruth (covered last month on Patent Docs), the District Court for the District of New Jersey reversed course upon a request for reconsideration by the patentee, and decided not to award fees due to the changing landscape of § 101.  Here, we discuss two further cases, one of which resulted in the awarding of fees, the other not.

    Gust v. Alphacap Ventures

    District Court for the Southern District of New YorkIn Gust v. Alphacap Ventures, plaintiff Alphacap, a non-practicing entity, determined that its patents were "not worth pursuing," yet engaged in infringement litigation against Gust for 18 months.  The Alphacap patents were directed to "methods of managing information related to financing and equity and debt financing, and that provide related data collection templates."  As described by the District Court of the Southern District of New York, these patents covered computer implemented methods for startup companies to find multiple investors — otherwise known as "crowdfunding."

    An exemplary claim, from U.S. Patent No. 7,848,976, recites:

    A method of managing resource consumer information, comprising the steps of:
        a system of one or more machines providing to a resource provider, a first set of one or more resource-provider-input-regions within a user interface, where processing input received in the first set of one or more resource-provider-input-regions, causes the system to define requirements of, and to name, at least one profile group;
        the system providing to the resource provider, a second set of one or more resource-provider-input-regions within a user interface, where processing input received in the second set of one or more resource-provider-input-regions causes the system to define a data collection template of fields for a semi-homogenous profile of desired resource consumer information according to requirements of a selected profile group, data collection templates of fields of different semi-homogeneous profiles need not be uniform for all semi-homogeneous profiles;
        the system providing to at least one user, by a computer, a telephone or a Personal Digital Assistant, one or more user fields within a user interface in which the user may input information into the user fields;
        storing the information as a semi-homogenous profile record in an electronic database system;
        the system providing the resource provider, by a computer, a third set of one or more resource-provider-input-regions within a user interface where processing input received in the third set of one or more resource-provider-input-regions causes the system to associate the profile record with the selected profile group; and
        the system providing to at least one authorized party, one or more authorized-party-input regions within a user interface, where processing input received in the one or more authorized-party-input regions causes the system to access information stored in the system and associated with a selected profile group.

    Approximately seven months after the Alice decision came down, Alphacap sued ten entities in the Eastern District of Texas.  Within a few months, nine settled, each for $50,000 or less.  Only Gust fought back.

    After some back-and-forth between the parties regarding settlement, Alphacap offered "a walkaway deal whereby AlphaCap would dismiss its claims with prejudice and the parties would go their separate ways."  Gust declined, insisting that Alphacap assign the asserted patents to Gust.  Later Gust indicated that it would consent to dismissal of the case under the conditions that either the assignment take place or Alphacap agreed to pay Gust's attorneys' fees.  Gust also set forth detailed reasoning for why it believed that the patents were invalid under § 101.  After this offer was rejected, Gust filed a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of New York, contending that the Alphacap patents were not infringed and invalid, in addition to numerous other allegations against Alphacap.  Eventually, the Texas case was transferred to New York and the two actions were consolidated.

    After some wrangling between the parties, the Court ordered Alphacap's claims against Gust dismissed under a covenant that would prevent Alphacap from suing Gust in the future.  The remaining issue was Gust's request for attorneys' fees and costs, totaling approximately $621,000.

    35 U.S.C. § 285 states that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."  According to the Supreme Court in Octane Fitness v. ICON Health and Fitness, an exceptional case is "one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated."  To make this determination, district courts are to use a totality-of-circumstances analysis, through which exceptionality may be established by a preponderance of the evidence.  Notably, "it is the substantive strength of the party's litigating position that is relevant to an exceptional case determination, not the correctness or eventual success of that position."

    Applying the test, the Court found this case to be exceptional.  According to the Court, the Alice decision "gave AlphaCap clear notice that the AlphaCap Patents could not survive scrutiny under 35 U.S.C. § 101," and that "no litigant could have a reasonable expectation of success on the merits in AlphaCap's patent infringement lawsuit against Gust."

    To that point, the Court found that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of crowdfunding.  In an earlier case in the same district court, it had been held that "crowdfunding is squarely about patronage — a concept that is beyond question of ancient lineage . . . and incontestably similar to other fundamental economic concepts, and to other types of organizing human activity, both of which have been found to be abstract ideas by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit."  According the Court, the Alphacap patents only recited steps "for storing and organizing investment data that could all be performed by humans without a computer."  Distinguishing the Alphacap claims from those found eligible in Enfish v. Microsoft, the Court wrote the Alphacap claims "do not purport to enhance the speed or otherwise improve upon the well-known data collection and classification functions of the computer . . . [w]hile the claimed method purports to accelerate the process of collecting, classifying, and storing user information, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather than the patented method itself."

    Further, the Court found that the claims do not contain an innovative concept that lifts them above being categorized as abstract.  The Court found that all additional aspects of the claims beyond those fundamental to crowdsourcing were generic computer hardware or software elements, thus rendering the claims unable to meet the requirements of § 101.

    Additionally, the Court concluded that Alphacap's motivation in pursing the lawsuit was inappropriate.  In the Court's view,  Alphacap's goal "was not to secure a reasonable royalty for infringement of a valid patent, but rather to extract a nuisance settlement from Gust on the theory that Gust would rather pay an unjustified albeit minimal license fee than bear the costs of the threatened expensive litigation in a distant venue."  As evidence to this motivation, the Court pointed to the small settlements extracted by Alphacap from the other nine defendants.

    The Court also determined that "an award of attorneys' fees in this case will deter any future frivolous lawsuits asserting infringement of the AlphaCap Patents against corporations that host crowdfunding platforms."  Particularly, the Court viewed the litigation as a predatory strategy on the part of Alphacap, targeting entities unable or unwilling to defend themselves against a frivolous lawsuit.

    Putting these factors together, the Court found that the totality-of-circumstances weighed in favor of awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Gust.  In an unusual twist, the Court also granted an award of attorneys' fees against Alphacap's counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  That provision states:

    Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

    Such an award should only be granted "when there is a finding of conduct constituting or akin to bad faith."  Bad faith entails "actions . . . so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay."

    The Court noted that Alphacap's attorneys must have known of the Alice decision, but chose to file the infringement cases anyway, seeking "quick settlements of relatively modest amounts from every major firm in the internet crowdfunding arena."  The fact that the attorneys stated that the patents were "not worth litigating," then offered to dismiss the case supported this reasoning.  Nonetheless, the case continued on for months, resulting in Gust having to engage in expensive discovery procedures.  The Court wrote, "AlphaCap's counsel's decision to proceed with the litigation for as long as it did, and to make it expensive for Gust to defend against the litigation, reflects counsel's tactical and bad faith motivation."

    As a result, Gust was awarded over $508,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, jointly and severally against Alphacap and its counsel.

    O2 Media v. Narrative Science

    District Court for the Northern District of IllinoisIn a much shorter opinion, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a § 285 motion in O2 Media, LLC v. Narrative Science Inc.  O2 Media brought an action for infringement of three business method patents against Narrative Science.  The latter filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which was granted.  In granting the motion, the Court concluded that the patents were invalid under Alice.  Narrative Science requested attorneys' fees.

    The Court denied the request, stating that the lawsuit was not objectively baseless.  Notably, "O2 Media presented five potential innovative concepts that might save the validity of the patents even if they were otherwise abstract under Alice."  While none of these won the day for O2 Media, the Court observed that "Alice did not require the plaintiff to give up any hope of enforcing patents previously granted by the Patent Office pursuant to its standard procedures."

    Narrative Science contended that O2 Media had an improper motive in bringing the action because "it requested $1.25 million in licensing fees."  However, "[t]he mere fact that the plaintiff placed a large valuation on its patents, however, does not mean that it was attempting to troll for settlements or otherwise improperly extract value from Narrative Science."

    Narrative Science also took the position that O2 Media's failure to pursue an appeal was an indication that its case was exceptionally weak.  The Court disagreed, however, finding that "the fact that O2 Media accepted this Court's ruling without attempting to impose frivolous costs with further motions suggests that its conduct was reasonable."

    Summing things up, the Court stated "O2 Media owned a presumptively valid patent.  It sought to enforce that patent.  It lost.  The only thing exceptional about this course of conduct is that O2 Media stopped fighting sooner than it had to."  Accordingly, attorneys' fees were denied.

    Analysis

    Gust provides a chilling scenario for both patentees wishing to enforce their portfolio, and their counsel.  It is likely that Alphacap's litigation behavior drove the award of attorneys' fees.  Given the vague nature of the Alice test and the significant recent changes in the § 101 analysis (due to Enfish as well as other Federal Circuit cases), good faith litigation even with a shaky eligibility position is not necessarily "exceptional."  Indeed, one could argue that Alice renders the litigation position of all software and business method patents on infirm ground.  Nonetheless, using the courts' time and resources to extract shotgun nuisance settlements is properly viewed with disfavor.  Gust serves as a warning to plaintiffs and counsel that good faith remains a critical norm in litigation, even if the law at hand is less than crystal clear.

  • By Andrew Williams

    Federal Circuit SealCan any petitioner appeal a Board's final written decision from an inter partes review or post grant review proceeding?  Contrary to the language of 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) which permits any party "who is dissatisfied with" the Board's decision to appeal the case to the Federal Circuit, most practitioners believed that the Federal Circuit's decision in Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research dictated that Article III standing was still a requirement for IPRs and PGRs.  However, the Court left a potential loophole in the Consumer Watchdog case when it acknowledged that it was not deciding "whether, under other circumstances, the preclusive effect of the estoppel provisions could constitute an injury in fact."  In the IPR context, 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) prevents a petitioner from requesting or maintaining any proceeding before the Office or asserting in a civil action or before the ITC the invalidity of any claim on a ground that the petitioner "raised or reasonably could have raised," if the claim was subject to a final written decision (subject, of course, to the interpretation of this statute by the Federal Circuit).  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit earlier today decided that standing is still required for a petitioner to appeal an adverse final written decision from the Board.  Moreover, in Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., the Court did not find any distinction in the estoppel effects of the two different proceedings, because the petitioner/appellant was "not engaged in any activity that would give rise to a possible infringement suit."

    The Federal Circuit recognized in the Phigenix opinion that since its inception nearly thirty-five years ago, it has never "established the legal standard for demonstrating standing in an appeal from a final agency action."  The three elements that make up the standing requirement are "(1) [that the party has] suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [party], (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."  Phigenix (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)).  However, when Congress provides a party with a procedural right to appeal an administrative decision, the immediacy and redressability requirements may be relaxed.  See Phigenix, FN 2 and Consumer Watchdog.  Nevertheless, the obligation to establish an injury in fact remains firm.  See id.

    In order to demonstrate standing to appeal a decision from final agency action, the Federal Circuit addressed three considerations.  First, the appellant has the burden of production to establish standing, not unlike a party that moves for summary judgement in district court.  Second, the appellant must use evidence "to the extent necessary to explain and substantiate its entitlement to judicial review."  Sometimes standing can be self-evident, such as when the appellant is an object of the action.  Otherwise, it must submit "'arguments and any affidavits or other evidence," which can be record evidence from the agency action or any additional evidence submitted to the Court.  Finally, an appellant must produce this evidence at the first appropriate time, which can either by "in response to a motion to dismiss or in the opening brief."

    In the present case, the patent holder was ImmunoGen, Inc., and the patent at issue was U.S. Patent No. 8,337,856, which relates generally to huMab4D5 ANTI-ErbB2 antibody-maytansinoid conjugates.  ImmunoGen had licensed the '856 patent to Genentech Inc. because it purportedly covers the use of the drug Kadcyla®.  Phigenix is a third-party for-profit "research company that focuses 'on the use of novel molecular therapeutics' designed to fight cancer."  It had developed a patent portfolio that included U.S. Patent No. 8,080,534, which Phigenix alleged covers Genentech's activities related to Kadcyla.  In fact, a case is currently pending in the Northern District of California in which Phigenix has asserted the '534 patent against Genentech.  Phigenix claimed that it filed the current IPR petition "[t]o further its commercialization efforts with respect to its patent portfolio."  The PTAB subsequently found the claims nonobvious, thereby prompting this appeal.

    The Court first applied the operative standards that it had identified to the question of Phigenix's standing.  In doing so, the Federal Circuit noted that Phigenix was not asserting that it faced a risk of infringing the patent, that it was a potential licensee of the patent, or that it would otherwise take any action that implicated the patent.  Instead, Phigenix was contending that it had suffered "actual economic injury" because the mere existence of the patent increased competition between itself and ImmunoGen, which Phigenix alleged was a cognizable Article III injury.  Specifically, it alleged that at least of portion of the licensing revenue that ImmunoGen was enjoying would inure to Phigenix if the patent were invalidated.

    Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit found that Phigenix had failed to substantiate these assertions with evidence.  These arguments were not developed at the PTAB, so there was no record evidence that Phigenix could cite.  Instead, it resorted to submitting at least one declaration and a "non-record" document.  The problem was that the declaration did not set out the requisite supporting facts, but instead included conclusions of law.  In addition, the other document, an attorney letter sent to ImmunoGen, merely stated that Phigenix "believed" that it had a strong portfolio, and that it "believed" the '856 patent was invalid.  The conclusory statements found in the declaration and the letter regarding a hypothetical licensing injury were insufficient to establish injury in fact.  "However, there is simply no allegation here that Phigenix has ever licensed the '534 patent to anyone, much less that it licensed the '534 patent to entities that have obtained licenses to the ImmunoGen '856 patent."

    So what can practitioners take away from this case?  First, if you are a third-party petitioner that unsuccessfully challenged a patent before the PTAB, and you intend to rely on economic injury in fact to establish standing, you will need to present concrete evidence providing facts of that harm.  Fortunately for such a petitioner, it's clear that you don't need to establish the necessary record during the IPR itself.  Even though the presented evidence didn't succeed in this case, the Federal Circuit sanctioned the use of declarations and other evidence presented for the first time before the Court.  This is good news, of course, because the ability to establish a record before the Board is severely limited, especially with the page and word count limits.  Moreover, such evidence would unlikely be relevant to the assertions made in the petition.

    Finally, from a policy point of view, this case could severely undermine the participation of parties unrelated to the challenged patents in IPR proceedings.  Of course, biotech and pharmaceutical interest groups would like to see a "standing" requirement added to the IPR petitions themselves.  But, without a change to the statute, anybody is still able to file a petition against any patent (provided they are not subject to the one-year time bar).  Nevertheless, public interest groups, hedge funds, and operating companies without a cognizable injury will be unable to appeal an adverse decision.  This is perhaps sufficient to deter at least some petitioners.  With the prospect of no redress from a Board's decision, these parties may simply find that it is not worth the expense.  On the other hand, this concern is only realized when the petitioner loses.  With the levels of claim invalidation at the PTAB still high, this case probably won't deter as many petitioners as patent owners would like.

    Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Dyk, Wallcah, and Hughes
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Wallach

  • By Donald Zuhn –-

    FireworksAfter reflecting upon the events of the past twelve months, Patent Docs presents its tenth annual list of top patent stories.  For 2016, we identified twenty stories that were covered on Patent Docs last year that we believe had (or are likely to have) a significant impact on patent practitioners and applicants.  In previous posts, we counted down stories #20 to #16, stories #15 to #11, and stories #10 to #6, and today we count down the top five stories of 2016.  As with our other lists (2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007), links to our coverage of these stories (as well as a few links to articles on related topics) have been provided in case you missed the articles the first time around or wish to go back and have another look.  As always, we love to hear from Patent Docs readers, so if you think we left something off the list or disagree with anything we included, please let us know.  In addition, we will be offering a live webinar on the "Top Patent Law Stories of 2016" on January 18, 2017 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  Details regarding the webinar, which will focus on a handful of the most important stories on this year's list, can be found here.


    5.  Federal Circuit Finds That Continuation Filed on Same Day Parent Issues Satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 120

    Last year, a pair of District Court decisions, including the decision by the District Court for the District of Delaware in Immersion Corp. v. HTC Corp., came in at #16 on our list of Top Stories for 2015.  In June, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court that Immersion Corporation's U.S. Patent No. 7,148,875 was not "filed before the patenting" of U.S. Patent No. 6,429,846 within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 120, because the '875 patent application was filed on the same day that the '846 patent issued.  In an opinion by Judge Taranto, joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Linn, the Federal Circuit noted that the question is "whether . . . the continuing application has to be filed at least one day before the earlier application is patented, or whether an application may be 'filed before the patenting' of the earlier application when both legal acts, filing and patenting, occur on the same day" (emphasis in original).  The panel also noted that "same-day continuations have been approved by a consistent, clearly articulated agency practice going back at least half a century, which has plausibly engendered large-scale reliance and which reflects the agency's procedural authority to define when the legal acts of 'filing' and 'patenting' will be deemed to occur, relative to each other, during a day."

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Immersion Corp. v. HTC Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2016)," June 26, 2016


    4.  USPTO Issues More Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance

    Last spring, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued the May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update, which provides further guidance for determining subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The May Update discusses a memorandum on subject matter eligibility determinations that was issued to the patent examining corps, and provides additional life sciences examples that are intended to assist examiners in making eligibility determinations, an updated index of eligibility examples, and an updated list of court decisions (Supreme Court and Federal Circuit) addressing subject matter eligibility.  Among the six additional life sciences examples (which brings the total number of examples for all technologies to 33) is an example (29) that includes seven claims directed to the detection of a hypothetical protein, JUL-1, and the diagnosis and/or treatment of a hypothetical autoimmune disease, julitis.  Exemplary claims 2-6 of Example 29 are directed to method of diagnosing julitis, or diagnosing and treating julitis, in a patient.  Whether the latest update to the USPTO's subject matter eligibility guidance will prove to be helpful to applicants has yet to be determined.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "USPTO Charting the Way for Subject Matter Eligibility," November 23, 2016
    • "USPTO to Hold Roundtables on Subject Matter Eligibility," November 6, 2016
    • "USPTO Issues Memorandum on Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions," November 2, 2016
    • "USPTO Releases Memorandum on Subject Matter Eligibility," July 18, 2016
    • "Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance — Example on Screening for Gene Alterations," June 9, 2016
    • "The Recent PTO Guidance on Subject Matter Eligibility: Lessons," May 25, 2016
    • "Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance — Example on Diagnosing and Treating Julitis," May 12, 2016
    • "USPTO Issues Update to Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance," May 9, 2016
    • "Was the Deck Stacked? Federal Circuit Refuses to Rule on Scope of USPTO Patent Guidance," April 7, 2016


    3.  Supreme Court Finds: (1) USPTO Properly Applies BRI Standard to Construe Claims in IPRs, and (2) Decision to Institute IPR Is Not Subject to Judicial Review

    In June, in its first pronouncement regarding the post-grant review proceedings established under the America Invents Act, the Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's positions on two of the law's provisions regarding inter partes review were correct.  First, the Court held unanimously that the USPTO properly applied the "broadest reasonable interpretation" standard for claim construction for IPRs.  Second, six members of the Court also agreed that the statute mandated that the decision to institute an IPR was not subject to judicial review.  Justice Breyer authored the decision of the Court, with Justice Thomas authoring a concurring opinion to voice his continued displeasure with judicial deference to administrative agencies under Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat'l Defense Council, Inc.  On the second question Justice Alito penned a dissent, which was joined by Justice Sotomayor.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee (2016) — Question 2 — PTAB Shenanigans and Reviewability," June 20, 2016
    • "Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC v. Lee (2016)," June 20, 2016
    • "Of Patent Trolls and Hot Dog Stands — The Supreme Court Oral Argument in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee," April 25, 2016
    • "Supreme Court Preview — Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee — Question 2," March 9, 2016
    • "Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee," January 18, 2016


    2.  Continuing Fallout from Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l — Courts and PTAB Find Patent Eligibility in Some Cases

    It has become abundantly clear that the Supreme Court's 2014 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank decision has significantly changed the patent-eligibility landscape for business methods and some types of software inventions.  For instance, in 2015, approximately 70% of all patents challenged under Alice in district courts were invalidated, while the monthly 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection rates for USPTO Technical Centers 3620, 3680, and 3690 were over 85% for most of the year.  These sobering statistics are due to the two-prong subject matter eligibility test set forth in Alice.  Particularly, one must first determine whether the claim at hand is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further determine whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception.  But generic computer implementation of an otherwise abstract process does not qualify as "significantly more."  Notably, the abstract idea exclusion has been heavily employed against the aforementioned business method and software inventions.  However, in four separate opinions issued by the Federal Circuit last year — Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC; McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc.; and Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc. — the Court surprised some in the patent community by finding challenged claims to be patent eligible.  These decisions may provide some light at the end of the tunnel for applicants who have struggled to protect business method and software inventions since Alice.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Garfum.com Corp. v. Reflections by Ruth (D.N.J. 2016)," December 26, 2016
    • "Verint Systems Inc. v. Red Box Recorders Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 2016)," December 13, 2016
    • "Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016)," November 27, 2016
    • "USPTO Charting the Way for Subject Matter Eligibility," November 23, 2016
    • "Location-Based Online Gaming Patents Found to be Directed to Patentable Subject Matter," November 7, 2016
    • "USPTO Issues Memorandum on Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions," November 2, 2016
    • "Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp. — Judge Mayer on the First Amendment" October 24, 2016
    • "Perdiemco, LLC. v. Industrack LLC (E.D. Tex. 2016)," October 20, 2016
    • "Recent Software Case Gives Important Lessons for Biotech," October 17, 2016
    • "September Was a Good Month for Patent Eligibility in the District Courts," October 16, 2016
    • "Iron Gate Security, Inc. v. Lowe's Companies, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2016),"September 21, 2016
    • "Zak v. Facebook, Inc. (E.D. Mich. 2016)," September 19, 2016
    • "McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016)," September 13, 2016
    • "Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (E.D. Tex. 2016)," August 30, 2016
    • "Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. J. Crew Group, Inc. (E.D. Tex. 2016)," August 29, 2016
    • "Of Technical Tools and Problems: Going Beyond the Two-Prong Alice Test," August 21, 2016
    • "BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC (Fed. Cir. 2016)," June 27, 2016
    • "Femto-Sec Tech, Inc. v. Lensar, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2016)," June 15, 2016
    • "USPTO Issues Memorandum Regarding Enfish and TLI," May 26, 2016
    • "Section 101 and the Growing Alice Backlash," May 15, 2016
    • "Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2016)," May 12, 2016
    • "Avago Technologies General IP (Singapore) Pte Ltd. v. Asustek Computer, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016)," May 3, 2016
    • "Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Smartflash LLC (PTAB 2016)," April 19, 2016
    • "Global Cash Access, Inc. v. NRT Technology Corp. (D. Nev. 2016)," April 12, 2016
    • "Treehouse Avatar LLC v. Valve Corp. (D.C. Del. 2016)," April 4, 2016
    • "Gonzalez v. Infostream Group, Inc. (E.D. Tex. 2016)," February 22, 2016
    • "NRT Technology Corp. v. Everi Payments, Inc. (PTAB 2016)," February 2, 2016
    • "Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp. (E.D. Tex. 2016)," January 14, 2016
    • "Motio, Inc. v. BSP Software LLC (E.D. Tex. 2016)," January 11, 2016


    1.  Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Sequenom

    Last year, the story coming in at #1 on our list of Top Stories for 2015 was the Federal Circuit's decision in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., in which the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity that the claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 were patent ineligible.  Although the Federal Circuit appreciated that the inventors had found cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) in maternal plasma or serum "that other researchers had previously discarded as medical waste," the panel stated that "[a]pplying a combination of known laboratory techniques to their discovery," the inventors "implemented a method for detecting the small fraction of paternally inherited cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum to determine fetal characteristics, such as gender."  In affirming the District Court decision, the opinion concluded that "[t]he method . . . begins and ends with a natural phenomenon," and "[t]hus, the claims are directed to matter that is naturally occurring."  Judge Linn noted in his concurring opinion that he joined the majority "only because [he is] bound by the sweeping language of the test set out in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc."  Sequenom responded to the decision by filing a petition for rehearing en banc, which the Federal Circuit denied.  In March, Sequenom filed a petition for certiorari for Supreme Court review of the Federal Circuit's decision, advising the Court that it "should take this opportunity to provide the guidance the Federal Circuit is openly seeking, and avoid a result neither it nor Congress could have intended."  In response to Sequenom's petition for certiorari, a total of twenty-two amicus briefs were filed encouraging the Court to grant certiorari.  However, in June, the Supreme Court surprised many in the the patent community by issuing an order denying certiorari in the case.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Sequenom v. Ariosa," June 27, 2016
    • "Amicus Briefs in Support of Sequenom's Petition for Certiorari: Dr. Chakrabarty, A Scientist's View," June 19, 2016
    • "Amicus Briefs in Support of Sequenom's Petition for Certiorari: Eli Lilly and Company et al.," June 16, 2016
    • "Amici Support Certiorari in Sequenom v. Ariosa," May 2, 2016
    • "Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C. (Fed. Cir. 2016)," April 10, 2016
    • "Coalition for 21st Century Medicine Comments on Expected Ariosa Cert Petition," April 3, 2016
    • "Sequenom Petitions for Certiorari," March 21, 2016