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  • Conference & CLE Calendar

    CalendarDecember 12, 2017 – "Capitalizing on Changes in Patent Law" (Practising Law Institute) – 1:00 to 2:00 pm (Eastern)

    December 12, 2017 – "Written Description in the Life Sciences after Amgen v. Sanofi" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    December 13, 2017 – "Nuts & Bolts of the Federal Circuit's Rules" (Federal Circuit Bar Association) – 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm (EST)

    December 21, 2017 – "Drafting and Prosecuting Patent Applications to Withstand PTAB Scrutiny — Building Reasonable Claim Construction to Avoid Unpatentability and Using Declarations to Survive Post-Grant Proceedings" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST)

    January 17, 2018 – "Top Patent Law Stories of 2017" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    March 5-6, 2018 – Advanced Patent Law Seminar (Chisum Patent Academy) – Houston, TX

    March 8-9, 2018 – Advanced Patent Law Seminar (Chisum Patent Academy) – Cincinnati, OH

    ***Patent Docs is a media partner of this conference or CLE

  • Webinar on Top Patent Law Stories of 2017

    MBHB Logo 2McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP will be offering a live webinar on the "Top Patent Law Stories of 2017" on January 17, 2018 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  Since 2007, the Patent Docs weblog has presented an annual, end-of-the-year review of the top stories in patent law.  In this presentation, Patent Docs co-authors Donald Zuhn, Kevin Noonan, and Michael Borella will take a look back at the top patent stories of 2017, many of which will likely impact patent applicants and practitioners in the coming year.

    While there is no fee to participate, attendees must register in advance.  Those wishing to register can do so here.  CLE credit is pending for the states of California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.

  • Chisum Patent Academy Patent Law Seminar

    The Chisum Patent Academy will be offering the next sessions of its Advanced Patent Law Seminar on March 5-6, 2018 in Houston, TX and March 8-9, 2018 in Cincinnati, OH.  The seminar is co-taught by Donald Chisum, author of the treatise Chisum on Patents (LexisNexis), and Janice Mueller, who was a tenured full Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law from 2004-2011.  The registration fee is $1,600 for the Houston seminar, and $1,500 for the Cincinnati seminar; a maximum of ten registrations will be accepted for the seminar.  Those interested in registering for either seminar can do so here.  Additional information regarding the Houston seminar can be obtained here, and information regarding the Cincinnati seminar can be found here, or those interested in attending either seminar can obtain additional information by e-mailing info@chisum.com.

    Chisum Patent Academy

  • Webcast on Drafting and Prosecuting Patent Applications to Withstand PTAB Scrutiny

    Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webcast entitled "Drafting and Prosecuting Patent Applications to Withstand PTAB Scrutiny — Building Reasonable Claim Construction to Avoid Unpatentability and Using Declarations to Survive Post-Grant Proceedings" on December 21, 2017 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  Thomas L. Irving, Anthony M. Gutowski, and John M. Mulcahy of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner will provide guidance to patent counsel for drafting and prosecuting U.S. patent applications to achieve the broadest claim interpretations that avoid unpatentability and provide a basis for proving infringement, and offer best practices to solidify novelty, non-obviousness, enablement, and written description positions, both for litigation and PTAB AIA post-grant proceedings.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • How can practitioners draft and prosecute patent applications and claims to minimize the threat and/or efficacy of a third-party’s post-grant challenges?
    • How can patent owners obtain broad claims to keep competitors at bay while countering attempts to render those broad claims unpatentable under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard before the PTAB?
    • How can practitioners introduce strong grounds for patentability under §§ 102, 103 and 112 in the specification and prosecution history in the hopes that IPRs and PGRs are either denied or otherwise ineffective against the challenged instituted claims?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2017) — One Last Dance . . .

    By Andrew Williams —

    AmgenLast June, in Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the Supreme Court handed down its interpretation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act ("BPCIA") for the approval of biosimilar drugs.  As we reported at the time, the Court held that the 180-day notice-of-commercial-marketing provision of the statute may be provided either before or after receiving FDA approval.  In addition, with respect to the so-called "Patent Dance," the Supreme Court held that a reference product sponsor ("RPS") cannot seek enforcement of the aBLA disclosure provision in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) by injunction under federal law.  This ruling all but made the Patent Dance optional for biosimilar applicants.  Nevertheless, the Court left open a tiny ray of hope for patent owners by reversing and remanding the question whether the disclosure provision of the BPCIA was enforceable under state law.  In a decision that came out earlier today, the Federal Circuit extinguished any hope.  First, the Federal Circuit reasoned that it has discretion to address the preemption issue, and that it should exercise that discretion, notwithstanding the fact that the issue had not yet been addressed on the merits.  Second, it held that the BPCIA's comprehensive framework demonstrates the intent of Congress that federal law would exclusively occupy the field of biosimilar patent litigation.  And finally, the Federal Circuit held that any remedy provided for under state law would conflict with the careful balance struck by Congress in establishing the BPCIA.  As a result, the Court affirmed the District Court's initial dismissal of Amgen's state law claims.

    Sandoz #1We provide this background possibly for the last time — this case stemmed from the aBLA filing by Sandoz pursuant to the BPCIA to market a biosimilar version of Amgen's NEUPOGEN® (filgrastrim) biologic drug product.  In the interim, the FDA approved the biosimilar known as ZarxioTM in March of 2015, and Sandoz (a Novartis company) has been selling the drug in the U.S. since September 3, 2015.  However, despite availing itself of the BPCIA-abbreviated pathway for FDA approval, Sandoz refused to participate in the patent resolution component (the disclosure and information exchange provisions, also known affectionately as the "patent dance"), alleging that it was not a mandatory component.  Amgen responded by filing suit in the Northern District of California, requesting in part a preliminary injunction to prevent Sandoz from entering the market.  United States District Judge Seeborg of the Northern District of California denied Amgen's motion, the Federal Circuit (in a seriously fractured decision) essentially affirmed, and the case was taken up by the Supreme Court.  In ruling as indicated above, the Supreme Court noted that the previous Federal Circuit decision that interpreted California's unfair competition law to not provide a remedy was based on an incorrect interpretation of federal law.  With regard to whether Sandoz's failure to disclose its application and manufacturing information was "unlawful" under California's unfair competition law, the Supreme Court declined to resolve that dispute because it was not a question of federal law.  The Federal Circuit, therefore, erred in attempting to answer the state-law question by referring to the BPCIA alone (according to the Supreme Court).  Therefore, the Federal Circuit was charged with determining "whether California law would treat noncompliance with §262(l)(2)(A) as 'unlawful.'"

    If the answer is yes, then the court should proceed to determine whether the BPCIA pre-empts any additional remedy available under state law for an applicant's failure to comply with §262(l)(2)(A) (and whether Sandoz has forfeited any pre-emption defense, see 794 F. 3d, at 1360, n. 5).  The court is also of course free to address the pre-emption question first by assuming that a remedy under state law exists.

    Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. (2017).

    Waiver

    The Court first addressed the question whether Sandoz had waived the preemption defense.  Sandoz has raised preemption as a defense in its answer, although it had not yet been addressed by the District Court or the Federal Circuit.  As "'a general rule . . . a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.'"  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)).  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit had previously articulated reasons to exercise discretion to address issues anyway.  Relevant to this case is when the issue presents significant questions of general impact or of great public concern, specifically here "whether state law claims may play a role in enforcing compliance with § 262(l)(2)(A)."  Moreover, because Sandoz had preserved its ability to assert preemption by including it as a defense in its answer, it could have raised it on remand, thereby lessening (or eliminating) any prejudice to Amgen.  Finally, the preemption issue had been fully briefed.  Of course, it didn't hurt the analysis that the Supreme Court had also directed the Federal Circuit to consider the issue on remand.

    Field Preemption

    The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2), provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . ."  Preemption can either be by express preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption."  The BPCIA did not expressly preempt state law, so the Federal Circuit addressed the other two forms.

    Field preemption occurs when Congress intended the Federal Government to exclusively occupy a particular field.  There is, however, a presumption against preemption in a field in which states have historically legislated.  The Federal Circuit easily found no presumption against preemption for biosimilar patent litigation.  The Court then noted that patents are 'inherently federal in character' and that the FDA has exclusive authority to license biosimilars.  Moreover, the Court noted that the BPCIA is "comprehensive" and "'provide[s] a full set of standards governing' the exchange of information in biosimilar patent litigation, 'including the punishment for noncompliance.'"  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012)).  Such a comprehensive and calibrated scheme makes the inference that Congress left no room for the States reasonable.  Finally, the Court noted that the relief Amgen was seeking from California law was not provided for by the BPCIA.  For example, Amgen was seeking an injunction that the Supreme Court made clear was unavailable under Federal law.  "This conflict in available remedies between federal and state law 'underscore[s] the reason for field preemption.'"  Id.

    Conflict Preemption

    If state law conflicts with federal law, it can also be preempted.  This "occurs 'where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  The Federal Circuit found that Amgen's state law claims "clash" with the BPCIA, and that the differences in available and sought-after remedies supports the conclusion that the state law claims are preempted.  The Court reasoned that Congress acted intentionally when it did not provide for injunctive relief, and that if Amgen were able to seek such a remedy under state law, it "'would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress.'"  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 405-06).  As the Court ultimately concluded on the issue:  "the preemption analysis here demonstrates that Amgen's state law claims conflict with the BPCIA and intrude upon a field, biosimilar patent litigation, that Congress reserved for the federal government."

    So will this be the last "Amgen v. Sandoz" case in this family?  The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Amgen's unfair competition and conversion claims because they were preempted on both field and conflict grounds.  Correspondingly, the case was not remanded back to the District Court.  Therefore, unless a petition for either panel rehearing or rehearing en banc is granted, or the Supreme Court grants another petition for cert., it is very possible that we have just seen the last dance of Amgen v. Sandoz.

  • More on Venue — Plexxikon v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2017)

    By Kevin E. Noonan –

    District Court for the Northern District of CaliforniaThe sequel to the original summer blockbuster movie, Jaws, had as a tagline "Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the water."  This sentiment can describe much of U.S. patent law over the last decade and a half, between the ill-fated USPTO "claims and continuation" rules, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, and the Supreme Court's various forays into numerous areas of the law.  The latest head-turner, the question of proper patent venue, has suffered the double whammy of changes enacted by Congress and the Supreme Court's interpretation of them (particularly in overturning the Federal Circuit's interpretation which had been in effect for decades).  The Federal Circuit has provided some limited guidance (see "In re Micron Technology, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2017)" and "In re Cray Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2017)") and these decisions have provided some illustrative district court decisions showing how these lower courts have understood and adopted whatever rubrics their judicial superiors have enunciated (see "More Views on Venue — Federal Circuit Addresses In re Micron Fallout").

    The latest head-turning wrinkle in the venue question comes from a decision denying Defendant's venue-related motions by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., U.S. District Court Judge for the Northern District of California, in Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.  Defendant put two venue-related motions before the District Court:  a motion to dismiss (or in the alternative transfer) under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 and a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).  Citing the Supreme Court's decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017), the District Court's opinion acknowledges that venue is proper either "in the judicial district where the defendant resides," i.e., its state of incorporation (in this case, Delaware) or "where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business."  Noting that for a motion to dismiss a Court must accept a plaintiff's allegations of infringement, the Court applies the "three general requirements" enunciated by the Federal Circuit in In re Cray:  1) that the defendant must have a physical place of business in the district (a "physical, geographical location in the district from which the business of the defendant is carried out"); 2) that it must be a "regular and established" place of business (that "operates in a steady, uniform, orderly, and methodical manner"); and 3) that "it must be the place of the defendant," i.e., where a defendant has an "establish[ed] or ratif[ied] place of business."

    Applying these requirements, the Court found that venue was properly in the Northern District of California.  While the facts underlying the Court's decision were straightforward, where the Court reached new ground was in the relationship between Defendant's "regular and established place of business" and the alleged acts of infringement.  It was undisputed that Defendant "'leases and operates two adjacent facilities in San Carlos,' California — a manufacturing facility and a research facility," but Defendant argued that there must be a nexus between the actions forming the basis for the complaint and the facts supporting proper venue.  The Court disagreed, finding that the plain meaning of the statute contained no such nexus requirement.  If followed by other district courts, this interpretation of the venue requirements could again expand the scope of judicial districts that support venue, particularly for large corporations having more than one business unit or divisions selling disparate products — wherever their commercial activities occur may be sufficient for finding proper venue even if the commercial activities have no relationship to the alleged infringing activities.

    With regard to transfer on convenience grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, the Court found that the relative inconvenience of California or Delaware was equal for Defendant and Plaintiff and that the deference due plaintiff on choice of forum favored denying the transfer motion (being generally given "great weight").  Also relevant to the Court's decision was that "the technology at issue was designed and developed" in the California district, providing a "significant connection" to the forum.  Finally, in this case the Court also considered the congestion in the Delaware court (where two of the four district court judgeships were vacant), something appropriate due to these "unique circumstances" (and not simply because, inter alia, the District of Delaware's docket was particularly heavy).

  • More Views on Venue — Federal Circuit Addresses In re Micron Fallout

    By Andrew Williams —

    Federal Circuit SealLast Spring, the Supreme Court in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC held that the word "resides" in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), "refers only to the State of incorporation" of the alleged infringer.  Last month, the Federal Circuit in In re Micron concluded that TC Heartland changed the controlling law and, as such, defendants that did not raise it at the appropriate time did not waive the venue defense based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) and (h)(1)(A).  However, as we reported at the time, the Court also concluded that the waiver rule found in the Federal Rules is not the only basis on which a district court might reject a venue defense.  In so ruling, the Federal Circuit was clear that it was not seeking "to define the channels in which discretion must be exercised," and that "[a]ny legal conclusions about the boundaries of discretion must await particular district court explanations under the Dietz framework for how discretion is being exercised in particular settings."  Dietz v. Bouldin, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016), had provided that a district court's inherent powers are governed by the control necessarily vested to manage the affairs of the court "to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."  The Federal Circuit, therefore, granted Micron's petition for Writ of Mandamus, but it did not order dismissal of transfer for lack of venue.  Instead, it "remanded for the court to consider any such properly raised non-Rule 12(h)(1)(A) arguments that Micron has forfeited its venue defense, and if there is no such sound arguments, to consider the merits of venue under § 1400(b)."

    On November 15, 2017, the same day In re Micron was decided, the Federal Circuit granted one additional petition for Writ of Mandamus, and denied two others.  Further, on November 22, 2017 the Court denied two additional petitions, and denied a final petition on November 27, 2017.  For some reason, however, these cases did not appear on the Federal Circuit's Opinions and Orders page until December 1, 2017.  The five cases in which the petitions were denied had all been similarly postured:  a defendant had filed a petition for Writ of Mandamus directing the district court to either grant a motion to transfer, to dismiss the case for improper venue, or to address arguments why venue was improper.  The specifics of each case are summarized in the following table:

    Table
    The Federal Circuit in these cases reiterated the holding from In re Micron that failure to present the venue objection earlier did not constitute waiver within the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) and (h)(1).  However, the Court denied these petitions because they deemed "the proper course here for petitioners [was] to first move the district court for reconsideration of its order denying the motion to dismiss."  The Court also provided that "[a]ny new petition for mandamus from the district court's ruling on reconsideration will be considered on its own merits."  The only significant difference in any of these five cases was that in the In re Flopam Inc. case, the petitioners also moved to stay the district court proceedings pending consideration of the petition.  This motion to stay was denied as moot, although the Court did note that "the Fifth Circuit has noted that matters of venue should take 'top priority in the handling of this case by the . . . District Court.'"

    The only petition for writ of mandamus that was granted was in a case in which a district court had already transferred a case.  On November 15, 2017, a Federal Circuit panel consisting of Judges Taranto, Chen, and Hughes granted the petition to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in In re Cutsforth, Inc.  The petition stemmed from a case filed in May 2012, although the case had been stayed until September 2016 pending inter partes review of the asserted patents.  In this case, after the Supreme Court issued its TC Heartland decision, the District Court agreed with defendants that the venue objection had not been previously available.  Correspondingly, because "the law of venue exists for the convenience of defendants, not plaintiffs, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), prejudice to the plaintiff is not a relevant consideration," the Court transferred the case to the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Cutsforth petitioned the Federal Circuit to vacate the transfer order "because the district court erred in its analysis of whether the venue defense was waived."  The Federal Circuit pointed out that "[i]n light of In re Micron, the district court in the present case here clearly erred in not considering non-Rule 12 bases for waiver raised by Cutsforth," and as a result, Mandamus relief was "appropriate to direct the court to reconsider its decision in light of In re Micron."

    It remains to be seen what the various district courts will do with these instructions from the Federal Circuit.  It will be interesting to see how the lower courts handle these cases that are returned, or handle the motions for reconsideration that are certainly forthcoming.  We will continue to monitor these cases, as well as others that address the fallout of the TC Heartland decision, and we will provide updates as they are warranted. 

  • Suppes v. Katti (Fed. Cir. 2017)

    By Donald Zuhn —

    Federal Circuit SealEarlier this fall, the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissing a complaint filed by Galen J. Suppes for lack of jurisdiction.  In dismissing Mr. Suppes' complaint, the Federal Circuit concluded that neither the Constitution nor the Patent Act preclude or preempt the types of contract that Mr. Suppes had entered into with his former employer.

    Mr. Suppes had been employed as a professor of chemical engineering at the University of Missouri.  When hired by the University, Mr. Suppes had entered into an employment agreement that specified, in part, that the University of Missouri "shall have ownership and control of any Invention or Plant Variety developed in the course of the Employee's service to the University."

    During his employment, Mr. Suppes became upset when the University of Missouri declined to file patent applications for certain of his ideas, while simultaneously prohibiting him from filing his own patent applications, and in those instances where he had filed his own applications, requiring him to assign those applications to the University.  Mr. Suppes' dissatisfaction with the University's actions led him to file suit against the University, seeking declaratory judgment that the University had (1) violated his Tenth Amendment rights by exercising power reserved by the Constitution to the States or the people, (2) violated Article I of the Constitution and his Fourteenth Amendment rights in that the University had "stifled the progress of science by selectively enforcing punitive action against the Plaintiff," and (3) violated his Fifth Amendment rights by requiring him to assign inventions he created and patent applications he filed without just compensation.  Mr. Suppes also sought the removal of ongoing Missouri state law cases to the District Court and sought damages of up to $7.5 million.

    The District Court dismissed Mr. Suppes' complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  With respect to the first count, the District Court cited New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1992), for the principle that the Tenth Amendment acts solely as a restraint on the power of Congress, and thus is inapplicable to the University of Missouri.  With respect to the second count, the District Court cited Regents of University of New Mexico v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the explicit contemplation of assignment by the inventor in 35 U.S.C. § 261 allowed for such contracts), and rejected Mr. Suppes' contention that the Constitution bars an inventor from contractually assigning his rights to an invention.  With respect to the third count, the District Court determined that because contracts that require assignment of patent rights are not presumptively invalid due to the Constitution or federal law, the requirement of assignment to the University was not a taking without just compensation.  As for the fourth and fifth counts, the District Court determined that seizing jurisdiction of a state law case or entertaining a claim for damages without a supporting federal cause of action were both beyond the Court's power.

    On appeal, the Federal Circuit first determined that the appeal presented the issue of whether 35 U.S.C. § 261 preempts assignment contracts which allow for the assignment of inventions prior to any effort to seek a patent on those inventions.  Because this issue was actually disputed, substantial to the resolution of Mr. Suppes' appeal, and capable of narrow resolution without the disruption of Mr. Suppes' state law claims and suits, the Federal Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction over the appeal.

    The Federal Circuit framed the dispute as follows:

    Mr. Suppes appears to make three main arguments: (1) that the Constitution, either alone or in conjunction with federal patent law, reserves the rights of inventions for which patents are not yet sought to the inventors; (2) that the Constitution's grant of authority to create patents "for a limited time" serves as a limit on the amount of time for which the University can maintain rights to his inventions; and (3) that a contract which allows an assignee of inventions to decline to patent those inventions violates the Constitution by failing to "promote the Progress of Science."  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

    With regard to the first argument, the opinion noted that "[w]e have previously held in New Mexico that while it is true that, under Section 261, patents vest in the inventor by operation of law, contracts assigning interests in patents are not preempted by Section 261," and explained that "[i]t is similarly the case that a contract assigning an interest in a patent not yet filed is not preempted by Section 261, because such a contract would be endorsed by Section 261 once the patent application is filed, and Section 261 otherwise says nothing about the matter."  With regard to the second argument, the opinion noted that "the Constitution's limitation of patent rights to 'a limited time' refers to the allocation of rights vis-à-vis the inventor and the public," and explained that "[t]his principle has nothing whatsoever to do with the allocation of rights between inventors and patent assignees."  Finally, with regard to the third argument, the opinion noted that "[t]he determination of whether a statute prohibiting the assignment of 'inventive thoughts' would promote the Progress of Science is therefore, at least initially, allocated to Congress by the Constitution," and explained that "[t]o the extent that Mr. Suppes is arguing that the contract is void as a matter of public policy, that is once again a matter of state contract law."  In view of the above, the panel determined that there was no federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the Constitution or the Patent Act, and therefore affirmed the District Court's determination to dismiss Mr. Suppes' complaint.

    Suppes v. Katti (Fed. Cir. 2017)
    Nonprecedential disposition
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Wallach, and Chen
    Per Curiam Opinion

  • Conference & CLE Calendar

    CalendarDecember 12, 2017 – "Capitalizing on Changes in Patent Law" (Practising Law Institute) – 1:00 to 2:00 pm (Eastern)

    December 12, 2017 – "Written Description in the Life Sciences after Amgen v. Sanofi" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    December 13, 2017 – "Nuts & Bolts of the Federal Circuit's Rules" (Federal Circuit Bar Association) – 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm (EST)

    ***Patent Docs is a media partner of this conference or CLE

  • IPO Webinar on Written Description in the Life Sciences

    IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Written Description in the Life Sciences after Amgen v. Sanofi" on December 12, 2017 from 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET).  Jane Love of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Duane Marks of Eli Lilly & Company, and Irena Royzman of Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP will discuss:

    • What is now needed by way of written description to create a valid patent on an antibody? The entire DNA sequence? Just the CDRs?  The entire 3D structure?
    • How does Amgen v. Sanofi clarify the law beyond earlier cases such as AbbVie v. Janssen and Ariad v. Lilly?
    •     How will pharma litigation change after Amgen v. Sanofi, and how will it affect specific pending cases including challenges on Amgen's Embrel®?

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.