• By Donald Zuhn –-

    USPTO SealIn a Notification published in the Federal Register earlier this month (83 Fed. Reg. 55102), the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced the implementation of an interim procedure for patentees to request recalculation of Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) determinations for alleged errors due to the Office's failure to recognize that an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) was accompanied by a safe harbor statement.  The Office also announced the provision of a new form for applicants to use when making a safe harbor statement.

    The interim procedure and new form address an issue with the computer program that the Office uses to make initial PTA determinations, which currently does not recognize when an applicant has filed an IDS concurrently with a safe harbor statement.  According to the Notification, the interim procedure will remain in effect until the Office can update the PTA computer program and provide notice to the public that the computer program has been updated.

    Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(d), an IDS that is not accompanied by a safe harbor statement will result in a reduction of PTA if the IDS is filed after a Notice of Allowance or after an initial reply by the applicant, is filed as a preliminary paper or paper after a decision by the Board or Federal court that requires the USPTO to issue a supplemental Office action, or constitutes the sole submission for a Request for Continued Examination after a Notice of Allowance has been mailed.  According to the Notification, a proper safe harbor statement under 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(d):

    [M]ust state that each item of information contained in the information disclosure statement: (1) Was first cited in any communication from a patent office in a counterpart foreign or international application or from the USPTO, and this communication was not received by any individual designated in 37 CFR 1.56(c) more than thirty days prior to the filing of the information disclosure statement (37 CFR 1.704(d)(1)(i)); or (2) is a communication that was issued by a patent office in a counterpart foreign or international application or by the USPTO, and this communication was not received by any individual designated in 37 CFR 1.56(c) more than thirty days prior to the filing of the information disclosure statement (37 CFR 1.704(d)(1)(ii)).

    Under the interim procedure being implemented by the Office, a request for recalculation of a PTA determination can be made by submitting a "Request for Reconsideration of Patent Term Adjustment in View of Safe Harbor Statement Under 37 CFR 1.704(d)" form (PTO/SB/134) in lieu of the request and fee set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.705(b).  The above form must be submitted within the time period set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.705(b), which may be extended under the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (any extension fees, however, will not be waived under the interim procedure).  The Notification points out that patentees will be given one opportunity to respond to any recalculation carried out under the interim procedure, and that such response must be filed within two months of the mail date of the recalculation, with no availability of extensions of time.

    In addition to the interim procedure, the Office has also created a new form for submitting an IDS with a safe harbor statement.  According to the Notification, Applicants who submit a "Patent Term Adjustment Statement under 37 CFR 1.704(d)" form (PTO/SB/133) with an IDS will be considered to be making a proper safe harbor statement, and the filing will be reflected in the file record.

    According to the Office's Notification, the interim procedure became effective on November 2, 2018.  Questions regarding the Notification can be directed to Kery A. Fries, Senior Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Administration, Office of Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy.

  • AIA Post-grant Reviews Not Precluded by Assignor Estoppel

    By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealOn Friday, the Federal Circuit handed down its decision in Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., deciding that the Board had erred in certain of its determinations regarding Arista's inter partes review challenge to certain claims of Cisco's U.S. Patent No. 7,340,597 (for reasons discussed briefly below).  More importantly, the Court affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's decision that the doctrine of assignor estoppel does not preclude institution of any of the various post-grant challenges to granted patents contained in the patent law revisions enacted under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319, §§ 321-329, and 125 Stat. 329-31 (2011)).

    The challenged claims of the '597 patent were directed to secured communications over computer networks.  Claims 1 and 29 are representative according to the Court's opinion:

    1.  An apparatus comprising:
        a communications device comprising:
            a subsystem; and
            a logging module, coupled to said subsystem, and configured to detect a change to a configuration of said subsystem of said communications device, and communicate information regarding said change to said configuration of said subsystem of said communications device.

    29.  The communications device of claim 1, wherein the logging module is configured to communicate the change to the configuration of the subsystem by broadcasting the change to the con- figuration of the subsystem.

    As explained in the opinion:

    In one embodiment, a network communications device includes a "logging module" that monitors and reports configuration changes.  ['597 patent] at col. 3 ll. 43–48, col. 6 ll. 7–10.  When the logging module detects a configuration change, it can indicate that change in various ways, for example, by way of "an indicator lamp, a message to a display, a message to another network device, broadcast message to specially-configured security devices, or other such mechanisms."  Id. at col. 7 ll. 25–30.

    In some embodiments, the logging module communicates a configuration change by "broadcast[ing] the change in the configuration of communications interface . . . to one or more security monitors on the network."  Id. at col. 7 ll. 39–41; see also id. at col. 8 ll. 52–54.  Such broadcasting occurs by way of a multicast address.  Id. at col. 11 ll. 45–50.  To monitor these broadcasts, in some embodiments, a given security monitor must "subscribe to this multicast address."  Id. at col. 11 ll. 50–51, col. 13 ll. 57–67 (describing the process of configuring a security monitor, including "subscribing to a logging module's multicast address in order to receive broadcasts from the logging module").

    The PTAB issued a Final Written Opinion invalidating claims 1, 14, 39-42, 71, 72, 84, and 85 as either being anticipated by the cited prior art or obvious.  The Board held that Arista had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 29, 63,64, 73, and 86 were invalid.

    The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded this aspect of the PTAB's decision, in an opinion by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judges Schall and Chen.  The issue before the Court in these cross-appeals hinged on the meaning of the term "broadcast" in the claims, and the panel held that neither of the competing interpretation of this term under the parties alternate claim construction was persuasive.  The Court construed the terms "broadcast" and "broadcasting" de novo, and remanded to the Board to decide whether Arista had borne their burden of establishing invalidity (on either anticipation or obviousness) "in the first instance."

    The more significant question considered by the panel was whether the Board erred in deciding that assignor estoppel did not preclude inter partes review of the challenged claims.  "Assignor estoppel prevents a party who assigns a patent to another from later challenging the validity of the assigned patent" explained the Court, citing Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and (in present circumstances, perhaps more significantly) Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924).  As explained in the opinion, the named inventor of the '597 patent was employed by Cisco and assigned all right, title, and interest in the claimed invention to Cisco as a condition of his employment.  This inventor later left Cisco and was part of the initial group that started Arista.  Cisco challenged institution of the IPR on assignor estoppel grounds but the Board instituted the IPR in the face of this challenge.  Accordingly, the first question the panel addressed was whether the decision to institute (and reject Cisco's assertion that the IPR should be barred under assignor estoppel) could be review by the Court under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), and the Federal Circuit's application of this precedent in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).  This question turned on whether the issue of assignor estoppel was "closely related" to the decision to institute (in which case institution would not be reviewable under § 314(d)).  But the opinion notes that the Supreme Court did not decide whether review was barred if the appeal "'implicate[s] constitutional questions, that depend on other less closely related statutes, or that present other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well beyond [§ 314(d)].'"

    The Federal Circuit had addressed the issue of whether assignor estoppel could bar filing of an IPR, in Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd. v. Athena Automation Ltd., 838 F.3d 1236, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016), deciding that it would not.  The panel acknowledged that the Court's intervening en banc decision in Wi-Fi One required additional analysis.  The opinion focused on the further explication in Wi-Fi One that the "closely related" language in the Supreme Court's Cuozzo opinion was "tied to" the "reasonable likelihood" determination the Board must make under § 314(a).  Under the Court's Wi-Fi One decision, the Supreme Court's Cuozzo opinion "strongly points toward unreviewability being limited to the Director's determinations closely related to the preliminary patentability determination or the exercise of discretion not to institute.'"  Relying on this reasoning (in frank rejection of the panel opinion in Husky), the panel held that "it is clear that we may review the Board's decision as to whether § 311(a) contemplates application of assignor estoppel."  This decision was bolstered, in the Court's opinion, by the question being more akin to the issue of the time-bar under § 315(b), which is "not focused on particular claims" and is "unrelated to the Director's preliminary patentability assessment or the Director's discretion not to initiate an IPR even if the threshold 'reasonable likelihood' is present."

    Turning to the merits, the panel opined that this was an issue of statutory interpretation.  The PTAB engaged in this exercise with regard to an earlier precedential decision of the Board that "§ 311(a) 'presents a clear expression of Congress's broad grant of the ability to challenge the patentability of patents through inter partes review,'" citing Athena Automation Ltd. v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Ltd., IPR2013-00290, Paper 18 at 12–13 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2013)).  The Board further supported its conclusion by noting that "Congress has not expressly provided for assignor estoppel in the IPR context, where it has in other contexts," citing Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., IPR2013-00106, Paper 40 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2013)).  Before the Court, Cisco had asserted assignor estoppel as "a well-established common-law doctrine that should be presumed to apply absent a statutory indication to the contrary."  While finding "some merit" in this argument under Supreme Court's Westinghouse precedent, the panel noted that intervening decisions (in particular, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664–66 (1969)) called the continued viability of assignor estoppel into question.  Nevertheless, "'Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles,'" citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991), but that this presumption can be rebutted where "a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident," citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).

    That is the case here, in the Court's opinion.  The panel based its decision on the language of § 311(a), which states that "a person who is not the owner of a patent" can file a petition for IPR.  This language "leaves no room for assignor estoppel in the IPR context" according to the opinion (the panel agreeing with Arista's argument in this regard) and where, as here, the statutory language is "unambiguous" the Court is obliged to "enforce it according to its terms," citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).  The panel expressly rejected Cisco's argument that not applying assignor estoppel in the IPR context was inconsistent with its availability as a defense before a district court or the International Trade Commission that could result in "forum shopping," saying that this outcome was "an intentional congressional choice":

    Such a discrepancy between forums—one that follows from the language of the respective statutes—is consistent with the overarching goals of the IPR process that extend beyond the particular parties in a given patent dispute.  See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 ("[I]nter partes review helps protect the public's 'paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.'" (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)).

    The panel also viewed this argument as being grounded in policy, which is more appropriately directed to Congress than to the Court.

    While this interpretation of the statute is consistent with (and supported by ample citation to) Supreme Court precedent and proclivities, the Court's penchant for weighing in on statutory interpretation questions involving the AIA make it certainly possible that this decision might also come under Supreme Court review.  It is less likely that the Court would disagree with the Federal Circuit's decision here but may be tempted to put its imprimatur on this aspect of the proper statutory interpretation of the AIA.

    Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel: Chief Judge prost and Circuit Judges Schall and Chen
    Opinion by Chief Judge Prost

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be offering the next webinar in its Patent Quality Chat webinar series from 12:00 to 1:00 pm (ET) on November 13, 2018.  In the latest webinar, entitled "eMod Update: Accessing EFS-Web and PAIR with USPTO.gov Accounts," Lisa Tran, Communications Manager for eCommerce, and Jeff Wong, Project Manager for EFS-Web, will discuss how to access EFS-Web and PAIR with USPTO.gov accounts, and will focus on:

    • The authentication change from using PKI certificates to using USPTO.gov accounts;
    • How to migrate your existing PKI certificate to your USPTO.gov account; and
    • The Sponsorship Tool, which allows existing registered practitioners to sponsor their support staff to work on their behalf.

    Additional information regarding this webinar, including instructions for viewing the webinar, can be found here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Navigating the Chinese Patent System: What U.S. Patent Counsel Need to Know — Protecting IP Rights in China, Leveraging Recent Amendments, Understanding Current Litigation Trends and More" on November 13, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  Rui Luo of Han Kun Law Offices, Thomas T. Moga of LeClair Ryan, and Letao Qin of Rimon will guide U.S. patent counsel and companies on Chinese patent law and what they need to know about the Chinese system; address changes to the Guidelines for Examination, current litigation trends, and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL); and offer U.S. companies and counsel best practices for increasing IP protection under the Chinese system.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • How the amendments to the Guidelines for Examination change patentability in China
    • The role of the AUCL in IP enforcement in China
    • Litigation trends in China and the advantages of using the Chinese IP system

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) AIA Trials Committee and John Marshall Law School will be offering an "AIA Trials Seminar" on November 14, 2018 from 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm (CT) at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, IL.  The seminar will consist of the following panel discussions:

    Panel 1 — The Evolving Administration of the PTAB
    Panel 2 — The Federal Circuit and the PTAB
    Panel 3 — The Way Forward

    For IPLAC members and students, the seminar is complimentary.  The registration fee for non-members is $5.  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • Federal Circuit Bar AssociationThe Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) Patent Litigation Committee will be offering a webcast entitled "Litigating § 101 Issues After Berkheimer" on November 14, 2018 from 3:00 pm to 4:30 pm (EST).  Irene Yang of Sidley Austin LLP will moderate a panel consisting of Peter Menell, Koret Professor of Law, The University of California, Berkeley School of Law; and Jared Bobrow of Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.  The panel will discuss the legal underpinnings of Berkheimer, the implications of Berkheimer for resolving § 101 issues before trial, and practices for litigating and trying § 101 issues in district court.

    The webinar is complimentary for FCBA members, $100 for government, academic, or retired practitioners, or $175 for private practitioners.  Those interested in registering for the webcast, can do so here [http://fedcirbar.org/Programs-Sponsorship/Calendar/ArticleID/1052/Litigating-%C2%A7101-Issues-After-Berkheimer-Webcast].

  • U.S. Chamber of CommerceThe U.S. Chamber of Commerce Global Innovation Policy Center (GIPC), together with IAM, will host a patent law and policy conference from 8:00 am to 6:30 pm (EST) on November 13, 2018 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington, DC.  The conference will address the impact that legal and political climates have on the patent market, with GIPC Vice President for U.S. Policy Frank Cullen leading a discussion on the future of intellectual property policy.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    One of the most powerful, visceral arguments made by the American Civil Liberties Union in Assoc. Molecular Pathol. v. Myriad Genetics, 689 F. 3d 1303 (2013), was that permitting Myriad and the University of Utah to have patent rights to isolated human DNA inhibited basic research.  Indeed, the meme that patents can interfere with free access to the "building blocks" of science and technology can be found in Supreme Court dicta from Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), to Myriad and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012).  Similarly, opponents of the Bayh-Dole Act (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212), which permits universities to patent inventions made using Federal funding, base some of their arguments on the inequity visited on the public in allowing these inventions to be protected by patent and thus (at least technically) making scientific and research use an act of infringement.

    These concerns were exacerbated by the Federal Circuit decision in Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), where the Court agreed that the practice of a patented invention by Duke University researchers was not protected by an "experimental use" exemption.  In doing so, the Court recharacterized the nature of such scientific use by universities, ostensibly based on the "commercial" nature of modern university practice:

    In short, regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.  Moreover, the profit or non-profit status of the user is not determinative.

    This decision cabined the (common law) experimental use exemption to activities akin to the Victorian practice of observing with crude microscopes rotifers in a drop of pond water as an after-dinner amusement amongst gentlemen.  The Court's reasoning was set forth as follows:

    Our precedent clearly does not immunize use that is in any way commercial in nature.  Similarly, our precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate business, regardless of commercial implications.  For example, major research universities, such as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects with arguably no commercial application whatsoever.  However, these projects unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects.  These projects also serve, for example, to increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty.

    Regardless of the practicality of these distinctions, there the law has rested ever since, and it is generally recognized that there is no effective experimental use exemption under U.S. patent law.

    There are, of course, exemptions to infringement liability in the statute; for example, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) provides:

    (1) With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity.

    where

    "medical activity" means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.

    "medical practitioner" means any natural person who is licensed by a State to provide the medical activity described in subsection (c)(1) or who is acting under the direction of such person in the performance of the medical activity.

    "body" shall mean a human body, organ or cadaver, or a nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction directly relating to the treatment of humans.

    And the exemption does not apply to activities directly related to "commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services provided in a physician's office)," and "regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Public Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act."

    Since the Madey decision there has been no traction for expanding the statutory exemption beyond the scope of § 287(c), but the Court's Madey decision itself provides a possible hint at a path forward.  In footnote 6 of the opinion, the Court states (citing footnote 3 in the District Court's opinion):

    In a footnote, the district court cites to a section from the Bayh-Dole Act to support its reasoning that the government has a license to have patents practiced on its behalf when the government contributed to the funding of such patents.  Id. at 16 n. 3 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000)).  The relevant section is set forth below.

    (c) Each funding agreement with a small business firm or nonprofit organization shall contain appropriate provisions to effectuate the following: (4) With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights, the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world․  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000).

    The district court stated that the "funding agreements for the inventions created under the ′994 and ′103 patents[-in-suit] expressly provide that the Government retained rights in those inventions."  Id.  Thus, the district court reasoned, in light of the Bayh-Dole Act, Duke's use of the patents that has been authorized by the government does not constitute patent infringement.  Finally, the district court noted that: "[a]lthough the parties have presented conflicting evidence as to the extent to which the patented devices have been used for a purpose consented to by the Government, because [Madey] has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [Duke] has commercially benefited or intends to do so with respect to the patents at issue, the uses that have been made to date with respect to both patents are, at this point, exempt from infringement liability."  Id.

    The Bayh-Dole Act itself expressly provides limits and direction on how technology patented and licensed by universities under its provisions should behave; for example, in 35 U.S.C. § 204:

    Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no small business firm or nonprofit organization which receives title to any subject invention and no assignee of any such small business firm or nonprofit organization shall grant to any person the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States unless such person agrees that any products embodying the subject invention or produced through the use of the subject invention will be manufactured substantially in the United States [subject to waiver under conditions where this proscription cannot be carried out].  (Added Pub. L. 96–517, § 6(a), Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 3023.)

    This suggests a possible avenue to enact at least a partial experimental use exemption for the members of society most impacted by even technical liability for infringement (i.e., university researchers, where the overwhelming amount of such technical infringement occurs).  Specifically, Congress could amend the Bayh-Dole Act to provide that licenses of university technologies contain, and the universities themselves be bound to grant, non-exclusive licenses to use patented technology to university researchers for non-commercial purposes:

    Any patent subject to the provisions of this title, and any license to any such patent granted to any commercial entity, shall be subject to a non-exclusive license to practice the patented invention for non-commercial research purposes by researchers of a U.S. university, non-profit organization, or other scientific research institute.

    The statute would be limited to university patents and to university or other research institutes or organizations, but it is precisely these patents and these entities purportedly most negatively affected by the present existence of technical infringement liability (and were the entities involved in Madey v. Duke).  The proposed statutory change is not intended to be a panacea, but its existence could ameliorate the angst felt by lawmakers and the judiciary (as well as policymakers and pundits) by the possible chilling effect of patenting on innovation.  Make no mistake, the evidence is scant that there has been any such chill; after all, the poster child for the effects of this behavior, the Myriad gene patents, had tens of thousands of scientific papers published from grant to invalidation by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit (see "In Defense of Patenting").  But to the extent that this is a genuine issue, actual or potential, having a statutory shield for any possible misbehavior by patentees (and their licensees) might influence policymakers to be less mindful of the rhetoric and more cognizant of the benefits of almost forty years of technology transfer under the Bayh-Dole Act.

  • Video Game Patent Found to be Patent Eligible

    By Joseph Herndon —

    District Court for the District of DelawareIn the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, Plaintiff (Blackbird) sued Defendant (Niantic) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,802,127.  Niantic filed the present motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), on the basis that the asserted patent claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

    The Court followed the two-step approach set forth by Alice to evaluate the section 101 challenge, and ultimately found the claims satisfied step 1 (leaving step 2 unnecessary), and thus, the motion was denied.

    The '127 patent is directed to a video game in which user determined location information (e.g. GPS, Google Maps, an entered address or the like) is acquired, and the determined location information of a physical location is mapped to a video game environment so that the user of the video game experiences objects from the user's physical location while playing the video game.

    The '127 patent describes an example in which if a user is playing a car racing game, he or she is able to race through the streets of his or her local neighborhood in the game.  This is achieved by first obtaining user determined location information relating to a user's location.  In a particular example, the user is able to load information relating to the user's current physical location.  This may be accomplished by taking a GPS reading of the user's current physical location and a certain radius around the user location or by the user entering an address.  Other sources of user determined location information relating to the users physical location, such as Google Maps, may also be used to acquire a set of user determined location information to be mapped into the video game.  Once acquired, the information is mapped into the game.  In this example, if the user is at a residence at 1 Sarah Lane in Maynard, MA, user determined location information relating to Sarah Lane and the town of Maynard, MA is acquired (via GPS, Google Map®, Google Earth® and the like).  The user determined location information is mapped into the video game such that the user can race around the streets of Maynard, MA.  In the game, the user can leave the residence at 1 Sarah Lane, turn onto Route 117 and race to downtown Maynard.  Upon entering the downtown area the user is able to race around the town, passing local points of interest such as Clock Tower Place, local fast food places (e.g., McDonalds®), past local stores (e.g., The Outdoor Store®) and onto Route 62.  By allowing the user to experience his or her desired location in the video game, an entirely new and entertaining form of game playing is achieved.

    Claim 1 of the '127 patent recites:

    1.  A computer-implemented method comprising:
        receiving a first position indicator representing a first current physical location for a user of a video game, wherein said first position indicator is determined at least in part by taking a global navigation satellite system reading of said first current physical location;
        obtaining image data relating to said first current physical location, said image data comprising two or more camera images of said first current physical location;
        mapping said image data into a virtual environment of said video game by displaying said image data as a video, wherein said user experiences within said virtual environment real life objects from said first current physical location, and said user simultaneously encounters within said virtual environment virtual objects that are not physically present in said first current physical location;
        receiving a second position indicator representing a second current physical location for said user as said user navigates a geographic area surrounding said first current physical location;
        saving at least said second position indicator to a memory; and
        storing at least said second position indicator in said memory when said video game is not executing.

    In the motion to dismiss, the Defendant argued that the '127 patent claims are directed to the abstract idea of "receiving, processing, and displaying or storing location information."  The Defendant analogized the asserted claims to the method claim in Concaten, Inc. v. Ameritrack Fleet Solutions, LLC, which was found invalid under § 101.  The Concaten claim provided steps for relaying weather and road data to and from snowplows, comprising: (1) "receiving" information on a snowplow's physical location, and the weather and road conditions in that area; (2) "processing" the information to provide a map and determine an instruction for the snowplow operator; and (3) "providing" the map and instruction to the operator.  The claim further required that the map be "visually displayed, by a touch screen monitor," and that specific conditions be included in the instruction.

    The Defendant argued that the '127 patent claims are directed to an abstract concept because they merely describe the idea of receiving, processing, and displaying location information in the context of a video game virtual environment using generic computer components, and are therefore, invalid for the same reasons as noted in Concaten.

    The Court, however, found that the Defendant was oversimplifying the claims.  Under the Alice framework, courts must be wary of describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims lest the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.

    The Court found the Concaten claim distinguishable from the '127 patent claims.  The Court explained that the Defendant forced the analogy by essentially reading out the '127 patent's "mapping" limitation, which requires taking camera images of a real physical space where the user is located, and integrating those images as a video into a virtual video game environment.

    The Court explained that such mapping ensures that the claimed method does not merely take steps routinely performed by humans and apply them on a computer because "mapping" as described in the claims could not be performed by humans.  Further, unlike the abstract optimization step done by unexplained "processing" step in Concaten, the mapping step here is tethered to specific instructions on which images are to be mapped (camera images from the user's physical location), where those images are to be mapped (the video game virtual environment), and how those images are to be displayed (as a video wherein the user experiences both real and virtual objects within the video game virtual environment).

    The Court noted that Defendant argued that claim 1 includes an insufficient level of detail as the claims fail to explain how the image data is displayed as a video and how the images are allegedly combined, but such an enablement argument is beyond the scope of § 101.

    The Court further rejected Defendant's arguments regarding the idea that the "wherein" clause in the mapping limitation merely described an outcome and thus was an aspirational and result-focused claim lacking specificity.  Again, the Court found that claim 1 provides specific instructions on how the mapping is done.  The Court cited McRO, and found the '127 patent claims, like the claims in McRO, to be directed to a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.  Namely, the claimed technology allegedly solves the problem in the existing art of being confined to a predetermined and merely virtual location in a video game by incorporating a user's physical location as part of the game environment.  This is done by the specific means of first taking camera images of the user's physical location, and then mapping those images as a video into the virtual game environment.

    Also, the Court found that the asserted claims, like in McRO, are directed to the creation of something physical, here, the display of camera images depicting the user's location overlaid with the virtual images from the video game for viewing by human eyes.

    As a result, the Court found that the '127 patent claims are not directed to ineligible subject matter under Alice step one, and Alice step two was not needed.  Thus, the motion to dismiss was denied.

    Here, the Court found that the claim included sufficient detail to avoid being considered a result-oriented claim.  Although the "mapping" limitation is awkwardly worded (and appears to have some antecedent basis issues), it does include descriptive or non-generic terms to avoid the abstract characterization.

    Blackbird Tech LLC v. Niantic, Inc. (D. Del. 2018)
    Memorandum Order by District Judge Andrews

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Federal Circuit Appeals and Remands to the PTAB: Recent Lessons and a Look Ahead" on November 8, 2018 from 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET).  Michael Flibbert of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP; Sheila Kadura of Dell Technologies; and John O'Quinn of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP will review case law and discuss strategies for affirming or reversing a PTAB decision.  The panel will analyze and discuss:

    • The decision to appeal
    • Trends in remands, including what kinds of procedural grounds have been raised successfully by patent owners
    • How counsel can counter arguments based on procedural oversights, including arguing harmless error
    • Emerging case law regarding standing
    • The expected impact on appeals of the PTAB's switch to the BRI claim construction standard
    • Steps in developing your appeal strategy
    • Tactical tips for briefs and oral argument

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.