• IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Privity at the PTAB since RPX" on November 29, 2018 from 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET).  Gasper LaRosa of Jones Day, Brian Murphy of Haug Partners LLP, and Dorothy Whelan, Fish & Richardson, PC will analyze the case law, and the resulting changes in PTAB practice, since the Federal Circuit's decision in Applications in Internet Time (AIT) v. RPX, which found that the PTAB took an "impermissibly shallow" look at evidence presented by the patent owner about the relationship between the petitioner and another party.  The panel will analyze and discuss:

    • The eventual boundaries of the "clear beneficiary" test for determining real-parties-in-interest, including whether joint defense groups will be impacted;
    • The PTAB's new approach to granting discovery before institution, and how this offers patent owners a not-to-be-missed opportunity; and
    • The PTAB's recent flexibility in sometimes allowing a petitioner to choose between naming additional RPIs to win institution or risking non-institution by contesting the need to do so.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Conflicts in Patent Prosecution: Avoiding the Ethical Pitfalls — Minimizing Risks of Malpractice Liability and Ethics Sanctions" on December 4, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  David C. Hricik of Taylor English Duma, Amy E. Richardson of Harris Wiltshire & Grannis, and Sandra P. Thompson of Finlayson Toffer Roosevelt & Lilly will guide IP counsel on the conflicts issues that often arise in patent prosecutions, and will outline best practices to identify and address the risks—and to minimize conflicts that can lead to malpractice liability and ethical violations.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What policies and practices should counsel have in place to identify potential conflicts in patent prosecutions?
    • What steps can patent prosecutors take to minimize the risk of subject matter conflicts?
    • How should patent counsel respond after identifying conflicts?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Washington College of LawAs part of its ongoing Supreme Court series, the American University Washington College of Law Program on Information Justice & Intellectual Property will be hosting a post-argument discussion on the Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. case beginning at 4:00 pm (Eastern) on December 4, 2018 at the American University Washington College of Law in Washington, DC.

    Additional information about the post-argument discussion, including registration/CLE information, can be found here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Apportioning Patent Damages: Analysis, Calculations for Multi-Component Products, Impact of Claim Scope — Implications of Apportionment for Patent Drafting, Licensing and Enforcement" on December 6, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  Timothy P. McAnulty and Jeffrey C. Totten of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner will guide patent counsel on apportionment of patent damages, review how the courts have treated the issue of damages apportionment, discuss the damages analysis as well as calculating damages for multi-component products, and also consider how apportionment is affected by claim scope and the impact on patent drafting, licensing and enforcement.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • How does the claim scope impact apportionment?
    • How can counsel draft patent claims to maximize the value of the invention?
    • What litigation strategies can companies and their counsel employ to improve their damages analysis?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Patent Eligibility Post-Alice: Navigating the Nuances, Guidance From the Federal Circuit, the PTAB, and the USPTO" on December 11, 2018 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  Michael L. Kiklis of Bass Berry & Sims and Stephen G. Kunin of Maier & Maier will examine recent decisions applying the Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank on patent eligibility, and discuss the guidance from these opinions and offer best practices for addressing patent eligibility issues.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • How are the courts applying the framework for patent eligibility created in Alice Corp.?
    • How can patent litigation defendants take advantage of the guidance for §101 challenges?
    • What are best practices for patent counsel to demonstrate patent eligibility?
    • How can patent counsel address subject eligibility rejections made by patent examiners?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $297.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • ThanksgivingThe authors and contributors of Patent Docs wish their readers and families a Happy Thanksgiving.  Publication of Patent Docs will resume on November 23rd.

  • What is a Printed Publication for Prior Art Purposes?

    By Joseph Herndon

    Federal Circuit SealPatent owner Acceleration Bay, LLC ("Acceleration") appealed the final written decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board holding unpatentable claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,829,634; 6,701,344; and 6,714,966.  Activision Blizzard, Inc., Electronic Arts Inc., Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 2k Sports, Inc., and Rockstar Games, Inc. (collectively, "Blizzard") cross-appealed portions of the Board's decisions holding that the Lin article is not a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), among other issues.

    Here, we look at the determination of features in a "preamble" as being limitations of the claim, as well as, requirements of an article being considered a printed publication for prior art purposes.

    The patents at issue are directed to a broadcast technique in which a broadcast channel overlays a point-to-point communications network.  The communications network consists of a graph of point-to-point connections between host computers or "nodes," through which the broadcast channel is implemented.

    Blizzard filed six inter partes review ("IPR") petitions—two for each of the '344, '966, and '634 patents—based principally on two different prior art references:  one set of IPRs challenged claims based on the Shoubridge article alone or combined with a prior art book Direct-Play ("Shoubridge IPRs"), and another set of IPRs challenged claims based on the Lin article alone or combined with DirectPlay ("Lin IPRs").

    The Board instituted an IPR on each petition, on many of the grounds and claims raised, and rendered six final decisions.  In the Shoubridge IPRs, the Board determined many claims to be unpatentable, and in the Lin IPRs, the Board concluded that Lin is not a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and thus determined Blizzard failed to show the challenged claims are unpatentable over Lin.

    Shoubridge IPRs

    Acceleration appealed portions of the Board's decisions in the Shoubridge IPRs.  Claim 1 of the '966 patent is representative of the claim construction disputes in Acceleration's appeal (emphases added):

    1.  A computer network for providing an information delivery service for a plurality of participants, each participant having connections to at least three neighbor participants, wherein an originating participant sends data to the other participants by sending the data through each of its connections to its neighbor participants and wherein each participant sends data that it receives from a neighbor participant to its other neighbor participants, further wherein the network is m-regular, where m is the exact number of neighbor participants of each participant and further wherein the number of participants is at least two greater than m thus resulting in a non-complete graph.

    Claim 1 of the '344 patent is very similar and begins "1. A computer network for providing a game environment for a plurality of participants, …".

    Acceleration argued that the terms "game environment" and "information delivery service," appearing in the '344 and '966 patents, respectively, should have been given patentable weight despite appearing in the preambles because they provide structure for the remainder of the claims.  Acceleration alternatively argues that these terms appear in the body of the claims because there is no transition phrase denoting a preamble.

    Regarding the latter argument, the Federal Circuit responded that Acceleration's poor claim drafting will not be an excuse for it to infuse confusion into its claim scope, and simply concluded that "game environment" and "information delivery service" are part of the preamble of the claims.

    The Federal Circuit noted that there is no beneficial purpose to be served by failing to include a transition word in a claim to clearly delineate the claim's preamble from the body, and it "caution[ed] patentees against doing so."

    Then, because the terms at issue appear in preambles, it must be determined whether the terms are limitations.  General case law indicates that a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.

    The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the claim terms "game environment" and "information delivery service" are non-limiting because they merely describe intended uses for what is otherwise a structurally complete invention.  They do not impart any structure into or serve as antecedents for the claims at issue.  Instead, they simply provide an intended use for what is otherwise a claim for a network.

    Lin IPRs

    Blizzard cross-appealed many portions of the Board's decisions in the Lin IPRs, and here we only discuss the issue of whether Lin is a printed publication under § 102(a).

    Whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication under § 102 is a legal conclusion based on underlying fact findings.  One such fact question is public accessibility.  Because there are many ways in which a reference may be disseminated to the interested public, public accessibility has been called the touchstone in determining whether a reference constitutes a printed publication.

    Case law has indicated that a reference is considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.

    The Board found that Lin was not publicly accessible before the critical date.

    Based on the testimony of Glenn Little, a Systems Administrator at the Computer Science and Engineering ("CSE") department of the University of California, San Diego ("UCSD"), the Board found that Lin had been uploaded to the CSE Technical Reports Library's website as of November 23, 1999, which is not challenged on appeal.  As the Board explained, according to Mr. Little, "the CSE department regularly maintains electronic technical reports and records concerning those reports, and a staff member assigns a unique identifier to each report based on the year it was uploaded and the relative order it was uploaded in comparison to other papers."

    The Board then noted that public accessibility requires more than technical accessibility.  Because there was no evidence that Lin was disseminated to the public, the Board focused on whether an interested skilled artisan, using reasonable diligence, would have found Lin on the CSE Technical Reports Library website.  The Board found that despite some indexing and search functionality on the website, Lin was not publicly accessible.  It found the website allowed a user to view a list of technical reports indexed only by author or year and that there was no evidence as to how many reports were in the Library's database in 1999.  The Board determined that at best, Blizzard's evidence suggests that an artisan might have located Lin by skimming through potentially hundreds of titles in the same year, with most containing unrelated subject matter, or by viewing all titles in the database listed by author, when the authors were not particularly well known.  The Board also found the website's advanced search form to be deficient.  It found that while the advanced search form appeared to allow a user to search keywords for author, title, and abstract fields, evidence demonstrated that functionality was not reliable.  In sum, the Board determined that Blizzard had not shown sufficiently that the UCSD CSE Technical Reports Library was searchable or indexed in a meaningful way so that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have located Lin.  The Board, therefore, concluded Lin is not a printed publication under § 102(a).

    The Federal Circuit found no error in the Board's reasoning.  Namely, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supports the Board's findings that Lin was not publicly accessible, including that Lin was not indexed in a meaningful way and that the website's advanced search form was deficient.  Mr. Little testified he does not know how the search works or how keywords are generated, that he never searched for Lin using the advanced search form, and that it was not the CSE department's practice to verify the advanced search capability for title and abstract when a new article was uploaded.  Mr. Little also admitted it was possible the search function did not work.

    Acceleration also presented evidence that a recent advanced search for keywords in the title and abstract of Lin failed to produce any results.

    Blizzard argued these results are unauthenticated hearsay and are based on searches conducted years after the critical date, but Mr. Little testified that as to the website, "[i]t's pretty much the same, actually, between [1999] and now.  We're running the same software."  The Federal Circuit found no reason to discount the Board's weighing of the evidence.  Substantial evidence was thus found to support the Board's finding that there was insufficient evidence of record to support a finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art in 1999 could have located Lin using the CSE Library website's search function.

    The Federal Circuit thus distinguished a similar case:  In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In Lister, a reasonably diligent researcher with access to a database that permits the searching of titles by keyword would be able to attempt several searches using a variety of keyword combinations, and thus, the manuscript at issue was publicly accessible as of the date it was included in databases that permitted keyword searching of titles.

    The Federal Circuit noted that unlike in Lister, here the record supports the Board's finding that the CSE Library website's advanced search function did not successfully permit keyword searching of titles, a key feature in Lister.  The Board's fact finding that, with available reports indexed only by author or year, Lin was not meaningfully indexed, was found to be supported by substantial evidence.

    Blizzard argued that because Lin was indexed by title for a given year, author name, and unique sequence number, that was sufficient for public accessibility.  But, the Federal Circuit stated that the test for public accessibility is not "has the reference been indexed?"  Where indexing is concerned, whether online or in tangible media, the ultimate question has been whether the reference was available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.

    Here, the Board found that although Lin was indexed by author and year, it was not meaningfully indexed such that an interested artisan exercising reasonable diligence would have found it, which is a proper consideration under the Federal Circuit precedent.  As such, the Federal Circuit found that Lin was not a printed publication under § 102.

    Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Moore and Reyna
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Moore

  • By Donald Zuhn –-

    Federal Circuit SealLast month, in FWP IP ApS v. Biogen MA, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Patent Trial and Appeal Board granting Biogen's motion that FWP's U.S. Application No. 11/576,871 did not provide an adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for claims directed to a method for treating multiple sclerosis.  The MS treatment at dispute involves administering a specific daily dosage (480 mg) of fumarates, specifically dimethyl fumarate (DMF) and/or monomethyl fumarate (MMF), to a subject.

    The appeal arose from an interference proceeding involving the above method for treating multiple sclerosis.  U.S. Patent No. 8,399,514, owned by Biogen, describes and claims such a method.  The '871 application, which was assigned to FWP by original Appellant Forward Pharma A/S after the appeal was docketed, discloses controlled release compositions of fumarates.  In the interference proceeding, Forward argued that the '871 application describes the treatment method in dispute.  Although the Board determined that the '871 application had an earlier priority date than the '514 patent, it granted Biogen's motion that the MS treatment method Forward sought to claim was not supported by an adequate written description.

    The '871 application is a U.S. national phase filing of a PCT application that was filed on October 7, 2005, and which claims priority to a Danish patent application filed on October 8, 2004.  The '514 patent claims priority to a U.S. provisional patent application filed on February 8, 2007.  During prosecution of the '871 application, Forward cancelled all pending claims and added claims that closely tracked the claims that issued in the '514 patent.  The Board declared an interference between the '871 application and '514 patent, designating Forward as the senior party with a constructive reduction to practice date of October 8, 2004.

    Finding that the focus of the '871 application was on "controlled release fumarate compositions" and that "general teaching of applicability of the fumarates to [the] treatment of a variety of possible disease or conditions and the teaching of a broad range of possible dosages would not have conveyed possession or description of the specific treatment of MS that [Forward] now claims," the Board granted Biogen's motion that the claims of the '871 application were not supported by an adequate written description.  The Board pointed to claim 69 of the '871 application as representative:

    69.  A method of treating a subject in need of treatment for multiple sclerosis comprising
        (a) a therapeutically effective amount of dimethyl fumarate and
        (b) one or more pharmaceutically acceptable excipients, wherein the therapeutically effective amount of dimethyl fumarate is about 480 mg per day.

    Looking to claim 69, the Board distilled the claimed treatment method at issue into three limitations: (1) an MS treatment, (2) by oral administration of a therapeutically effective amount of DMF and/or MMF, at (3) a dosage of 480 mg per day.  With respect to the first limitation, the Board determined that the '871 application lists over twenty diseases and conditions, that MS is not identified as a disease or condition of particular interest, and that the application instead focuses on psoriasis and conditions associated with psoriasis.  Regarding the third limitation, the Board determined that while the 480 mg/day dosage is expressly mentioned in the specification, there "is no discussion that would guide one skilled in the art to treat MS with a therapeutically effective dose of 480 mg/day, or any other therapeutically effective dose within the ranges disclosed."

    The Board also rejected Forward's arguments based on Snitzer v. Etzel, 465 F.2d 899 (CCPA 1972); Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006); and Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  The Board determined that unlike the invention in Snitzer, Forward's case required the selection and combination of claim elements from more than a single limited list, and that unlike Falkner and Streck, the '871 application did not provide the blaze marks necessary to guide a skilled artisan to the claimed invention.  The Board concluded that even though each required claim element is mentioned separately in the '871 application, the specification did not disclose the claimed invention in a manner that adequately describes the claimed MS treatment to a skilled artisan, and therefore, that the claims of the '871 application failed to meet the written description requirement.

    On appeal, Forward argued that the interference count was disclosed in an up-scale table in the '871 application, which Forward argued (1) discloses a 480 mg/day dosage, (2) is reasonably directed at using DMF to treat the listed conditions, and (3) is linked to the treatment of MS.  The up-scale table describes scaling up the daily dosage level of fumerates over a nine-week period, with the 480 mg/day dosage occurring during week seven, and is designed to minimize the side-effects of ingesting fumarates by increasing the dose gradually over time to allow the patient to acclimate.  The Federal Circuit, however, stated that it was not persuaded by Forward's argument, and agreed with the Board that "the '871 application does not disclose the now-claimed MS treatment as a unified whole."

    With respect to the 480 mg/day dosage, the Federal Circuit noted that this dosage is an interim dosage, and that Forward failed to present persuasive evidence as to why a skilled artisan would have understood the week seven interim dosage to be therapeutically effective.  The Court also noted that Biogen's expert testified that because MS is a chronic disease, a skilled artisan would not have viewed a one week, interim dosage in the middle of a nine week up-scale schedule as an adequate treatment dosage, let alone one for a particular disease such as MS.

    In affirming the Board's decision, the Federal Circuit stated that "[g]iven the brief references to MS and the lack of recognition of 480 mg/day as a therapeutically effective daily dosage, we agree with the Board’s finding that there 'is no discussion [in the '871 application] that would guide one skilled in the art to treat MS with a therapeutically effective dose of 480 mg/day. . . .'"  The Court was also unpersuaded by Forward's attempt to use the prior art to supply the link between the therapeutically effective dose of 480 mg/day and MS, noting that "even if we allow Forward to rely on the prior art for establishing a prior, known link between MS and fumarates, the prior art does not teach the key limitation of the count: the 480 mg daily dosage."

    The Federal Circuit also rejected Forward's argument that the original claims of the '871 application adequately describe the MS treatment that it was seeking to claim.  According to the Court, "Forward's argument is premised on piecing together elements of several of the claims."  In rejecting this argument, the Court explained that:

    Th[e original] claims are mainly directed to controlled release compositions of numerous fumarates and pharmaceutically acceptable salts.  Some claims recited numerous possible dosing schedules (claims 30–32) and dosages (claims 33–38).  And others replicate the laundry list of diseases and conditions enumerated in the specification (claims 44 and 45).  This large number of disease conditions, dosages, dosing schedules, active ingredients, pharmaceutical formulations for controlled release, and combinations thereof covered by the original claims detracts from Forward's argument that it possessed and invented the now-claimed, specific MS treatment.  . . .  Rather, what the scale of the claims demonstrate is that Forward possessed, as of the 2004 critical date, a mere wish for obtaining some type of fumarate formulation to treat any one of a number of diseases and conditions, one of which was MS, using almost any possible daily dosage.

    Finding that "the '871 application does not disclose 480 mg of fumarates per day as a therapeutically effective dose for treating MS," the Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the MS treatment Forward sought to claim was not supported by an adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112.  The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Board's decision.

    FWP IP ApS v. Biogen MA, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Nonprecedential disposition
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Wallach and Chen
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Chen

  • By Michael Borella

    Federal Circuit SealAncora sued HTC in the Western District of Washington alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,411,941.  HTC moved to dismiss the case, contending that the claims of the patent were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The District Court granted HTC's motion.  Ancora appealed to the Federal Circuit.

    The '941 patent is directed to mechanisms for preventing a computer from running unlicensed software.  While using license keys to control software was well-known at the time of the patent's earliest priority date (1998), the patent purports to do so in a rather unusual fashion (for that time).

    Particularly, a key that uniquely identifies the computer that the software is installed upon is stored in read-only memory (ROM) of the computer's basic input / output system (BIOS).  Thus, the key cannot be modified, removed, or hacked by users or applications without significant effort.  Further, a record that is associated with the licensed software contains the names of the software, its vendor, and a number of licenses thereof.  The record is stored in volatile BIOS memory, encrypted by the key.  The software contains an unencrypted copy of the license record.

    When the software is run, it is loaded into main memory, obtains a copy of the key, and performs encryption of its copy of the license record.  If this matches the encrypted license record stored in the BIOS, the program is permitted to continue executing.  Otherwise, the program is considered "unlicensed" and is either halted or run with reduced functionality.

    This technique is different from how software licensing was previously enforced.  Software-based licensing required storing licensing information on the computer's main non-volatile storage device (e.g., a hard drive).  But this device was easily accessed and susceptible to hacking.  Hardware-based licensing required use of a pluggable dongle, which was poorly suited to software that was downloaded rather than sold in stores.

    Further, BIOS memory was typically used to store low-level bootstrapping code that assisted startup of the hardware and initiation of the operating system, not license verification data.  Thus, the use of BIOS is unusual.

    Claim 1 of the '941 patent was considered representative.  It recites:

    1.  A method of restricting software operation within a license for use with a computer including an erasable, non-volatile memory area of a BIOS of the computer, and a volatile memory area; the method comprising the steps of:
        selecting a program residing in the volatile memory,
        using an agent to set up a verification structure in the erasable, non-volatile memory of the BIOS, the verification structure accommodating data that includes at least one license record,
        verifying the program using at least the verification structure from the erasable non-volatile memory of the BIOS, and
        acting on the program according to the verification.

    In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But generic computer implementation of an otherwise abstract process does not qualify as "significantly more," nor will elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.

    The District Court viewed the claim as focused on "the abstract concept of selecting a program, verifying whether the program is licensed, and acting on the program according to the verification."  The District Court was led to this conclusion because of the claim's breadth and that it did not recite "how usage of the BIOS to store the verification structure leads to an improvement in computer security."  With part one of Alice complete, the District Court found the claim lacking under part two as well, writing: "specifying that the BIOS be used to house the verification structure [calls for nothing more than] storing data in the memory of a computer component that generally stores data."  Since the District Court found the claim abstract and without an inventive concept, it entered judgment in favor of HTC.

    On appeal, the Federal Circuit rapidly answered the patent-eligibility question in the positive.  Relying on recent precedent, such as Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat System, Inc., the Court stated that "[i]mproving security—here, against a computer's unauthorized use of a program—can be a non-abstract computer-functionality improvement if done by a specific technique that departs from earlier approaches to solve a specific computer problem."

    The Court went on to disagree with the District Court, noting that the claim does recite storing the verification structure in a section of BIOS with certain beneficial characteristics, which was asserted to be an unexpected technique at the time of invention.  Thus, in the view of the Federal Circuit, the claim does not recite a mere desired outcome, but how to achieve this outcome.  Further, the claim addressed a technological problem associated with computers — software license verification — rather than a business, mathematical, or financial problem.

    Oddly, while still considering the claim under the first part of Alice, the Court made an analogy to BASCOM Global Internet Services v. AT&T Mobility.  The latter case stands for the principle that an unconventional combination of well-known additional elements can make a claim patent-eligible under part two of the test.  The Court seemed to do so in order to support its conclusion that the claim was directed to a technical improvement in computer functionality.

    With claim 1 found to be non-abstract, the Court did not need to explicitly move on to part two.  Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court, and found that the '941 patent met the requirements of § 101.

    Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. HTC America, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018)
    Panel:  Circuit Judges Dyk, Wallach, and Taranto
    Opinion by Ciurcuit Judge Taranto

  • CalendarNovember 20, 2018 – "Lessons From PTAB Full or Partial Denials to Avoid Institution of an IPR or Avoid a Denial" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST)

    November 27, 2018 – "Patent Claim and Specification Drafting and Prosecution — Avoiding Traps That Lead to Royalty Free Licensing of Patented Technology" (Strafford) – 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST)

    November 28, 2018 – "Ch-Ch-Changes: Updates to the PTAB's Patent Trial Practice Guide for AIA Proceedings" (Federal Circuit Bar Association PTAB/TTAB Committee) – 3:00 pm to 4:00 pm (EST)

    December 3, 2018 – "Phillips Construction in PTAB Trials: Strategies for Petitioners and Patent Owners" (Federal Circuit Bar Association PTAB/TTAB Committee) – 3:00 pm to 4:00 pm (EST)