• Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Section 112 Issues in IPR Proceedings: Using Section 112 as a Sword or a Shield — Addressing Section 112 Issues in IPR Petitions, Establishing Priority or Earlier Critical Date of Asserted Reference, and More" on February 14, 2019 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  Jonathan R. Bowser of Unified Patents and Roger H. Lee of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney will provide guidance on Section 112 issues that arise during an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, address the PTAB's response to assertions that claims do not comply with § 112, discuss related claim construction issues, and offer best practices for handling § 112 issues in IPRs.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • How has the PTAB responded to assertions made by IPR petitioners that claims do not comply with Section 112?
    • What must patent owners show to establish priority to an earlier application or antedate an asserted reference?
    • What must IPR petitioners show to meet the claim construction requirements for means-plus-function claims under Section 112(f)/sixth paragraph?
    • How does the PTAB weigh prior determinations concerning priority made during prosecution or a patent challenged in an IPR?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $347.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Biotech Patents and Section 101 Rejections: Meeting Patent Eligibility Requirements — Leveraging Recent Decisions and USPTO Guidance to Overcome Rejections" on February 12, 2019 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  Amanda K. Murphy, Steven P. O'Connor, Sanya Sukduang, and Sara A. Leiman of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner will guide patent counsel for overcoming § 101 rejections for biotech patents, review recent case law and USPTO guidance on § 101 patent eligibility, and offer strategies to address § 101 rejections.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • The impact of the Mayo, Myriad, and Ariosa decisions on recent USPTO and Federal Circuit decisions addressing § 101 rejections for biotech and other technological patents
    • Problems with the USPTO guidance documents and examiner training
    • Potential strategies to overcome § 101 rejection
    • Robust patent specification and claim drafting tips

    The registration fee for the webcast is $347.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Conducting and Analyzing Prior Art Searches — Strategies for Validity, Patentability, Infringement, FTO and State-of-the-Art Searches" on February 27, 2019 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  Thomas L. Irving and Christopher C. Johns of Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner, Kim Jordahl of KSJLaw, and Stephanie Curcio of Legalicity will guide patent counsel on structuring and conducting prior art searches, discuss reporting of search results and offer best practices for analyzing prior art searches to maximize patent protection.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What are the critical considerations when determining what, when and where to search?
    • What are the critical components of an effective search strategy, analytical process and follow-up steps to ensure a successful patent application?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $347.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • Strafford #1Strafford will be offering a webinar entitled "Infringement of IP Rights in Augmented and Virtual Reality — Protecting and Monitoring Trademarks, Right of Publicity, Copyrights" on February 21, 2019 from 1:00 to 2:30 pm (EST).  J Alexia Bedat of Klaris Law, Kimberly Culp of Carr McClellan, and James G. Gatto of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton will guide counsel on intellectual property infringement issues that arise in augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR); discuss steps that IP owners can take to monitor and police use of their marks, copyrights, and images; and discuss what game developers, creators, and owners can do to mitigate the risk of infringing on real-world IP rights.  The webinar will review the following issues:

    • What monitoring programs should real-world IP owners and counsel put in place to protect IP rights from being infringed in AR and VR?
    • What other steps can IP owners take to prevent infringement of their IP rights in AR and VR?
    • What are the hurdles to protecting IP in augmented and virtual worlds?

    The registration fee for the webcast is $347.  Those interested in registering for the webinar, can do so here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealThe Federal Circuit has on several occasions taken the opportunity to address (and in doing so, flesh out) the requirements for Article III standing to appeal an adverse determination in a post-grant review proceeding (post-grant review, inter partes review, and covered business method patent review) against a Petitioner (loss of patent claims typically provides sufficient injury for a Patent Owner to have standing).  See, for example, Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation; Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc.; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V.; and most recently, Amerigen Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. UCB Pharma GmbH.  But the Court has not had a clearer factual basis for deciding that a failed Petitioner did not have standing under Article III than in Momenta Pharmaceuticals v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, decided today.

    The case involved a inter partes review (IPR) brought by Momenta against all claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,476,239 having claims reciting "specific fluid formulations of the protein molecule CTLA4Ig (cytotoxic T-lymphocyte associated protein 4 immunoglobulin)."  These formulations were used to treat, inter alia, rheumatoid arthritis, having the generic name abatacept and sold by BMS as Orencia®.  The PTAB instituted but sustained the patentability of all claims.  This appeal followed.

    However, certain additional facts outside the basis for the PTAB's decision were relevant to the decision reached by the panel.  While not needing to establish standing to petition for IPR, Momenta at that time was pursuing research for the development of a biosimilar version of Orencia®.  However, during the course of the IPR trial, Momenta's biosimilar candidate failed clinical testing and was withdrawn by Momenta from FDA review.  BMS moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that these actions deprived Momenta of standing, insofar as there was no prospect of injury if Momenta was not pursuing its biosimilar.  The Court heard argument on the motion as well as the merits and retired to confer.

    While conferring, Momenta brought two other facts to the Court's attention.  First, on October 18, 2018 (after oral argument), Momenta filed a Letter to the Court (permitted under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j)) along with a press release, informing the Court that Momenta had "has initiated discussions with its collaboration partner, Mylan, to exit its participation in the development of its other five biosimilar programs including M834, a proposed biosimilar to ORENCIA® . . . ."  This prompted the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause (on October 23rd) why the Court should not dismiss the appeal.  Ten days later Momenta responded that:

    As of today, the companies continue to be jointly responsible under that agreement for product development and for sharing the costs of that development, which are substantial.  And because of BMS's patent and the Board's decision upholding it, Momenta and its partner Mylan still face the same fork in the road about the commercial formulation for their biosimilar product—they must decide whether to proceed with the current formulation or switch to a more expensive and potentially less commercially viable option.  That decision and the costs associated with it still turn on the outcome of this appeal.

    Momenta's response was supported by a declaration from its Chief Business Officer that the parties had not reached a decision whether to terminate the Orencia® biosimilar development program.  In addition, Momenta asserted its "economic interest" in any Orencia® biosimilar that might be developed by Mylan, which included "potential right to royalties."  A little more than a month later, on December 10th, Momenta filed another letter with the Court, informing the panel of a Preliminary Prospectus Supplement and Form 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission four days before, which notified the SEC and prospective investors that:

    We have elected to terminate our collaboration agreement with Mylan with respect to the development of . . . M834, a proposed biosimilar to ORENCIA® . . . .  On November 19, 2018, we delivered a formal notice of this partial termination to Mylan, as provided in the collaboration agreement.

    Momenta made no response to BMS's further argument that the appeal was mooted by these developments, nor did the company withdraw its appeal.

    Judge Newman rendered the Court's decision, joined by Judges Dyk and Chen.  Calling the "constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies" the most fundamental principle defining the judiciary's proper role, citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997), the opinion addressed Momenta's argument that the requirement for standing for judicial review of agency decisions was "relaxed" relative to district court litigation.  These requirements are that an appellant must have "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)).  The panel recognized that some relaxation has been recognized, for example in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) and Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "[p]arties that initiate the [Inter Partes Review] proceeding need not have a concrete stake in the outcome; indeed, they may lack constitutional standing" in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016).

    But that relaxation does not extend to the requirement of "injury in fact," which is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute, citing Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009).  The basis for this "hard floor, according to the opinion, is that without it courts would be reduced to writing advisory opinions.  Congress does not have the power to do so by statute, as recognized in Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found. and Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).  Under the facts as they had developed, Momenta was unable to show "'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'" as required under the Supreme Court's Lujan decision.

    Momenta's alternative argument, that the estoppel provisions of IPR proceedings under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e), were similarly unavailing in the face of evidence that Momenta was not longer engaging in activity that could lead to infringement liability.  The argument that Momenta might be injured "at some future time" if Mylan developed an Orencia® biosimilar from the sale of which Momenta would be entitled to royalties was too attenuated to provide injury-in-fact, the opinion citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013), that a plaintiff "cannot rely on speculation about the unfettered choices made by independent actors" not before the court.  Momenta's position was contrary to several Federal Circuit decisions on standing for appealing PTAB decisions, including Consumer Watchdog, Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., and RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, No. 17–2346, ECF 39 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 2018).  In cases where lacking a product on the market was not enough to preclude Article III standing, the petitioner had "concrete plans for future activity that creates a substantial risk of future infringement," JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1220–21 (Fed. Cir. 2018), or the parties were "direct competitors and were in commercial dispute" and the petitioners faced "a significant risk of patent infringement in their demonstration plant that was entering into operation," E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  None of these facts were present here.

    And while recognizing that "[s]tanding and mootness may not be coextensive in all cases," none of the exceptions ("when the issue has avoided review and is likely to be repeated, or when the defendant voluntarily ceased the challenged activity and the plaintiff seeks to preserve its win") applied here.  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot.

    Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Dyk, and Chen
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Newman

  • By Donald Zuhn –-

    CoverLast week, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office released its FY 2018 Performance and Accountability Report.  In describing the USPTO's strategic and performance-planning framework, the 2018 Report notes that the Office issued its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan in 2014, and that the Plan "demonstrates the progress made to date by building on the tangible successes of recent years with a focus on achieving the USPTO's vision as a global IP leader by:

    • Establishing progress toward optimal pendency and quality levels for both patents and trademarks that will enable the USPTO to operate efficiently and effectively within the expectations of the IP community;
    • Administering effectively the provisions of the AIA;
    • Continuing to transform the USPTO with next-generation technology and services;
    • Maintaining a strong and diverse leadership team, agile management structure, and a diverse and engaged cadre of employees in achieving the agency's mission and vision;
    • Continuing to work with other government agencies, Congress, and the USPTO's global partners to establish IP systems that benefit innovation, create jobs, and lead to strong economies around the world; and
    • Recruiting and retaining the highest quality employees to accomplish the agency's important work."

    The 2018 Report specifies ten key performance outcome measures for which the Office has developed annual performance targets.  According to the Report, the Office exceeded its annual performance targets for nine of the ten performance measures.  Two of the ten measures fall within the Office's first strategic goal, which concerns optimizing patent quality and timeliness.  In particular, average first action pendency was 15.8 months (higher than the 15.4-month target, but lower than the 16.3-month average first action pendency of FY 2017), and average total pendency was 23.8 months (lower than the 25.0-month target and lower than the 24.2-month average total pendency of FY 2017).

    Table 3 of the Report provides data for the patent-related performance targets for FY 2014 to FY 2018 (click on any table to expand):

    Table 3_Strategic Goals
    The Report also notes that the number of applications filed decreased from 650,350 in FY 2017 to 643,349 in FY 2018, which constituted a 1.1% decrease in filings (see Table 1 below).  This followed a very slight decrease in application filings in FY 2017 and a 5.2% increase in application filings in FY 2016.

    Table 1_Patent Examining Activities
    The Report also indicates that while the Office accepted more than 600,000 patent applications for the sixth straight year and topped 500,000 applications for the ninth consecutive year (see Table 2 below), it was able to reduce the number of applications awaiting action from 569,088 in FY 2017 to 542,446 in FY 2018 (see Table 3 below).  The total number of pending applications also decreased from 1,082,661 in FY 2017 to 1,071,395 in FY 2018.  It was the Office's fourth consecutive reduction in number of applications awaiting action, but first drop in total number of pending applications since the Office's streak of consecutive reductions in total number of pending applications was snapped at five in FY 2017.

    Table 2_Applications Filed
    Table 3_Applications Pending
    After increasing from 304,568 utility patent issuances in FY 2016 to 315,366 in FY 2017, patent issuances once again dropped in FY 2018, falling to 306,909 (see Table 6 below).

    Table 6_Patents Issued
    As noted above, the results for first action and total pendency were mixed, with first action pendency coming in above the Office's target, and total pendency coming in below the Office's target (see Tables 4 and 5 below).  And as usual, the goals for the current fiscal year present even tougher challenges:  for first action pendency, the annual performance target drops from 15.4 months for FY 2018 (which the Office failed to meet) to 14.5 months for FY 2019, and for total pendency, the annual performance target drops from 25.0 months in FY 2018 (which the Office met) to 23.8 months in FY 2019.

    Table 4_Pendency
    Table 5_Pendency
    When comparing pendency statistics by Technology Center, Tech Center 2600 (communications) produced the best average first action pendency (11.0 months), with Tech Center 1600 (biotechnology and organic chemistry) following in second (12.5 months), and Tech Center 2100 (computer architecture, software, and information security) produced the worst average first action pendency (19.4 months) (see Table 4 below).  As for total average pendency, Tech Center 2600 also produced the best total average pendency (19.9 months), with Tech Center 2800 (semiconductor, electrical, optical systems, and components) following in second (21.6 months), and Tech Center 3700 (mechanical engineering, manufacturing, and products) and Tech Center 2100 (computer architecture, software, and information security) producing the worst total average pendency (28.4 months).

    Table 4_Technology Center

    For additional information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "USPTO Releases Performance and Accountability Report for FY 2016," February 6, 2017
    • "USPTO Issues Performance and Accountability Report for FY 2015," March 3, 2016
    • "USPTO Issues Performance and Accountability Report for FY 2014," April 7, 2015
    • "USPTO Releases Performance and Accountability Report for FY 2013," January 9, 2014
    • "USPTO Releases Performance and Accountability Report for FY 2012," November 28, 2012
    • "USPTO Releases Performance and Accountability Report for FY 2011," November 30, 2011
    • "USPTO Releases 2010 Performance and Accountability Report," November 17, 2010
    • "USPTO Announces 'Highest Performance Levels in Agency's History' in 2008," November 18, 2008
    • "USPTO Announces 'Record Breaking' 2007 Performance," November 15, 2007
    • "Patent Office Announces Record-Breaking Year," December 27, 2006

  • By Charlotte Teall —

    UK Supreme CourtThe long-awaited UK Supreme Court decision concerning Warner-Lambert's Lyrica® patent was handed down in December.  In summary, the Supreme Court dismissed Warner-Lambert's appeal and upheld that the patent did not sufficiently disclose the claimed medical uses, i.e., all pain including peripheral and neuropathic pain.  They also found that the claims were not even sufficient in respect of neuropathic pain in dependent claim 3.  They also found that even if the claims had been found valid, they would not have been infringed by Actavis and Mylan's activities, and that the post-trial amendment to try to limit the claims to the treatment of peripheral neuropathic pain was an abuse of process.

    The Supreme Court is known for being pro-patentee, but this decision was a departure from that and appears, at first glance, to set the bar higher for medical use claims.  This decision provides important guidance on the role of plausibility in the test for sufficiency and how infringement of European Swiss-type claims (the old medical use claim format) is assessed in the UK.

    Background

    Claim 1 of the patent is directed towards pregabalin for the treatment of pain using a European Swiss-type claim.  Dependent claim 3 was limited to the treatment of neuropathic pain.

    It was known that neuropathic pain can be categorised into peripheral and central neuropathic pain.  The patent only exemplified the use of pregabalin in a rat model, which the Court of Appeal viewed only to be linked to peripheral neuropathic pain.  It was later confirmed (after the filing date) that pregabalin is effective in treating both peripheral and central neuropathic pain.  Actavis manufactures Lecaent, a pregabalin generic and brought proceedings for revocation along with Mylan in the UK.

    Warner-Lambert then brought UK infringement proceedings against Actavis later that year.  The High Court at first instance ruled that claims 1 and 3 were insufficient, and even if valid, were not infringed.  The Court of Appeal upheld these findings and also found that a post-trial amendment filed by Warner-Lambert after the High Court decision to limit the claim 3 to the treatment of peripheral neuropathic pain was an abuse of process.

    The role of plausibility in the test for sufficiency

    Sufficiency requires that the patent discloses the invention clearly and completely enough for it to be performed by the skilled person — essentially, in return for a patent the patentee needs to give a full public disclosure of their invention.  The case law has developed over the years to categorise sufficiency into two main types:

    1.  Enablement — the patent must enable the skilled person to carry out the invention.  This aspect of sufficiency was recently dealt with by the UK Court of Appeal in Regeneron v Kymab where they found that the patent was enabled and sufficiently disclosed despite the methods provided in the application being unworkable at the time of the invention.  The Court of Appeal afforded the skilled person with considerable time and expertise to find a workable method in that case.  Thus, an unworkable method is not an immediate bar to patentability in respect of the enablement aspect of sufficiency.

    2.  Entire scope — the patent must also enable the skilled person to work the invention across its entire scope without an undue burden.  It must also be plausible to a skilled person for the data provided in the application, that the invention would work across its entire scope, e.g., in the case of a broad medical use claim to a class of diseases, if the drug's mechanism of action is applicable to that broad class of diseases.  The Warner-Lambert case dealt with this aspect of sufficiency.

    In recent years, the EPO has raised an increasing number of plausibility objections to the claims concerning this second aspect of sufficiency with some decisions seemingly raising the threshold for plausibility (e.g., the Dasatinib decision – T0488/16).

    In the Warner-Lambert case, the Court of Appeal found that it was implausible that pregabalin would be effective at treating any type of pain (claim 1) or central neuropathic pain (in respect of claim 3) based on the data in the application showing a mouse model of inflammatory pain.  The treatment of peripheral neuropathic pain was found plausible because there was a sufficient unifying mechanistic link between inflammatory pain and peripheral neuropathic pain because both types of pain have a central sensitisation component.  The Court noted that while the data was not predictive, it at least rendered its efficacy in treating that type of claim as plausible.

    The Supreme Court paid close attention to the EPO Board of Appeal decision T609/02 (Salk Institute) and held by a slim majority that the disclosure supported claims so far as they extend to inflammatory pain but not to any kind of neuropathic pain.  Interestingly, dependent claim 2 was directed to the treatment of inflammatory pain, but does not appear to have been asserted.  In T609/02, the EPO Board of Appeal held that the specification must disclose the suitability of the drug for the claimed therapeutic application.  Clinical trials were not deemed necessary but a mere assertion of efficacy was not enough.  In vitro data that provides a direct link to the disease in question is also sufficient.

    Warner-Lambert argued that it is necessary to disclose reasons why the claimed effect is plausible only when the skilled person reading the patent would be sceptical about it in the absence of such a disclosure (so-called negative plausibility).  Lord Sumption in the Supreme Court disagreed because it would mean that if nothing was known either for or against the claimed therapeutic effect, no disclosure need be made in support of it.  Thus, the specification must disclose some reason for supposing that the implied assertion of efficacy in the claim is true (so-called positive plausibility).  However, not all the Supreme Court judges agreed with this approach.

    On the aspect of plausibility across the whole scope of the claim, Lord Sumption in the Supreme Court viewed that where a feature of a claim is an assertion of therapeutic efficacy for a given condition, a monopoly is being claimed for the process of manufacturing the compound for the treatment of that condition.  This does not mean that it must work for all patients suffering from that condition, or work on every occasion when it is applied by way of treatment.  But, it does mean that where the condition identified embraces a number of different pathologies, and the claim is construed as asserting efficacy of the product for each of them, the assertion must be plausible in relation to them all.  While this appears a straightforward test, it has difficulties particularly for diseases having potentially many distinct (and as yet potentially unknown) underlying mechanisms of pathology.

    It is important to note that the Warner Lambert case involved a second medical use claim and the Supreme Court appeared to restrict the plausibility test to second medical use claims.  Thus, it remains to be seen how a first medical use claim might fare before the Supreme Court.

    In assessing the plausibility of the Warner-Lambert claims, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal that the specification sufficiently disclosed the use of pregabalin for the treatment of peripheral neuropathic pain.  Thus, while the Court of Appeal had found that the use of pregabalin for the treatment of peripheral neuropathic pain (but not central neuropathic pain) was sufficiently disclosed, the Supreme Court disagreed and found that the use of pregabalin for any type (peripheral or central) of neuropathic pain was not sufficiently disclosed.

    The Supreme Court reasoned that the rat models used to obtain the data provided in the specification were only relevant to inflammatory pain.  Inflammatory pain is an immune-pathology resulting from an activation and dysregulation of the immune system, whereas neuropathic pain occurs following dysfunction or injury of nerve fibres and is characterised by the lack of conversion of nociceptive stimuli into electrical impulses, which can be caused by an altered sensitivity of the peripheral and central nervous system or by damage of the peripheral nerve tissue.

    The patentee argued that peripheral neuropathic pain and inflammation are unified by "central sensitisation", which is the process by which chronic pain signals in the periphery (from inflammatory or neurological causes) sensitize the CNS to pain, leading to pain hypersensitivity.  Thus, the data in the application using models of inflammatory pain was relevant to peripheral neuropathic pain via this unifying principle.

    However, the Lord Sumption argued that just because central sensitisation may be involved in both peripheral neuropathic pain and inflammatory pain, does not prove that they have a common metabolic mechanism.  Lord Sumption further reasoned that the specification must disclose some reason for supposing that the implied assertion of efficacy in the claim is true.  They reasoned that the specification said nothing about neuropathic pain of any kind.  Also, the specification did not refer to central sensitisation as a mechanism of action of the drug, so there was nothing to suggest, even as a hypothesis, that pregabalin works with peripheral neuropathic pain by blocking central sensitisation.  Also, while the specification provided mouse models that could be used to test for efficacy of the drug in peripheral neuropathic pain, it did not directly suggest doing so.

    This test seems to go beyond that applied by the EPO in requiring there to be an explicit disclosure of a mechanism of action of a claimed therapeutic effect that is predictive across the claim scope.  The EPO would likely view that if it was known that the mouse models in the specification could be used to test for efficacy of the drug in peripheral neuropathic pain, then the therapeutic effect is derivable from the specification and sufficiently disclosed.  The patentee should, however, be careful about any claim amendment to a disease category for which there is little mention in the specification.

    It is also worth noting that Lord Hodge and Lord Mance also of the Supreme Court disagreed with the approach taken by Lord Sumption, viewing it as imposing too high a threshold and imposing a burden on the patentee which the EPO Board of Appeal case law does not justify.  Therefore, despite the negative decision, the test for sufficiency in the UK appears far from settled since it is difficult to reconcile the differing views of the Judges in the Supreme Court.

    Abuse of process

    The Supreme Court also agreed with the lower courts that Warner-Lambert's post-trial amendment limiting claim 3 to peripheral neuropathic pain was an abuse of process.  Therefore, it is important that any claim amendments are put forward as early in the proceedings as possible to avoid them being disallowed for an abuse of process.  In any case, it is unlikely that this amendment would have saved their case in this instance in view of the Supreme Court's position on sufficiency.

    Infringement of Swiss-type claims

    The action for infringement was brought on the basis of claim 1 and 3.  The Court of Appeal found these claims to both lack sufficiency, but Lord Justice Floyd still considered the issue of infringement in obiter, particularly the proper interpretation of Swiss-form medical use claims.  Lord Justice Floyd particularly provided a clear test by which infringement of Swiss-type claims by a generic could be assessed.  The court should assess whether the alleged infringer knew or could foresee that at least some of the prescriptions written generically for the claimed drug for the claimed indication would in fact be fulfilled with the generic.  The absence of the claimed indication from the label ("skinny label") could not "conceivably be sufficient to negative the intention" and so would result in infringement.  Instead, where the manufacturer has "taken all reasonable steps within his power to prevent the consequences occurring", this would be sufficient to negative the intention and not result in infringement.

    Warner-Lambert also appealed this point to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court dismissed by majority Warner-Lambert's appeal on this point.  Particularly, Lord Sumption, together with Lord Reed, Lord Hodge and Lord Briggs, found that if claims 1 and 3 had been valid, they would not have been infringed, but differed in their reasons.  Lord Sumption and Lord Reed agreed that the intention of the alleged infringer is irrelevant and that the sole criterion of infringement is whether the product as it emerges from the manufacturing process, including any labelling or accompanying leaflet, is presented as suitable for the uses which enjoy patent protection.  Lord Hodge and Lord Briggs preferred the view of Mr Justice Arnold at first instance that the test is whether the alleged infringer subjectively intended to target the patent-protected market.

    Therefore, the Court of Appeal's test was not followed.  As with the issue of sufficiency, despite the negative decision, the test for infringement of Swiss-type medial use claims in the UK appears far from settled since it is difficult to reconcile the differing views of the Judges in the Supreme Court.

    Summary

    In summary, Warner-Lambert's patent claims 1 and 3 were found invalid for lack of sufficiency, and even if they were valid, were found not infringed.  This is despite pregabalin being confirmed to be effective in treating both central and peripheral neuropathic pain, and becoming a blockbuster drug.

    It will remain to be seen in future case law how the UK-IPO and UK Courts interpret and follow this decision.  Since the Judges in the Supreme Court could not reach agreement on the test for sufficiency and infringement in respect of Swiss-type claims, this will not be an easy job.  However, it does mean that there is scope for arguing that the test of Lord Sumption, particularly in respect of sufficiency is too strict and not in line with EPO Board of Appeal case law.

    This article was reprinted with permission from Forresters.

  • By Donald Zuhn –-

    Federal Circuit SealLast week, in In re Ikeda Food Research Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirming the Examiner's rejection in an ex parte reexamination of claims 22 and 23 of U.S. Application No. 12/851,668 for obviousness.  On appeal before the Board, the challenged claims were found obvious in view of three references:  European Patent Application Publication No. 0 094 161 ("Senior") and U.S. Patent Nos. 6,656,702 ("Yugawa A") and 6,059,946 ("Yugawa B").

    Claim 22 of the '668 application recites (with emphasis in the opinion):

    A biosensor for measuring glucose, comprising:
        an electrode system comprising an action electrode and a counter electrode; and
        an enzymatic reaction layer in contact with the action electrode and/or the counter electrode, the enzymatic reaction layer comprising an electron acceptor and a soluble [f]lavin compound-binding glucose dehydrogenase, which has enzymatic activity to glucose comprising catalyzing a reaction for oxidizing glucose in the presence of the electron acceptor,
        wherein enzymatic activity to maltose in the enzymatic reaction layer is 5% or less relative to the enzymatic activity to glucose;
        wherein the biosensor can quantify glucose concentrations ranging from 4.5 mM to 30 mM.

    According to the opinion:

    The '668 application purports to improve upon the prior art by claiming use of, inter alia, a specific enzyme: a "flavin"-dependent GDH ("FAD-GDH") designated as Enzyme Commission ("E.C.") 1.1.99.10, whose "relative reactivity" (or "substrate specificity"), was found to exhibit "high activity" on glucose, and "low activity" on the seventeen other substrates tested, including maltose.

    In the ex parte reexamination of the '668 application, the Examiner rejected claims 22 and 23 in view of the combination of Senior, which discloses a qualitative procedure for determining blood glucose concentration using a FAD-GDH enzyme derived from a strain of A. orzyae, which like the FAD-GDH enzyme described in the '668 application (which was isolated from a different microorganism) is designated E.C. 1.1.99.10, and Yugawa A and B, which disclose a biosensor.  (The opinion explains that E.C. numbers, which are promulgated by the Enzyme Commission, provide a common classification scheme for enzymes based on the chemical reactions they catalyze, and notes that "Ikeda's counsel does not dispute that enzymes with the same E.C. number have the same substrate specificity 'for purposes of this appeal.'")

    The Board affirmed the Examiner's rejection, determining that even though Senior did not expressly disclose the low-maltose activity limitation of claim 22 of the '668 application, the enzyme preparation disclosed in Senior inherently contains the same enzymatic specificity for glucose relative to maltose as the challenged claims in the '668 application.  More particularly, the Board concluded that it was reasonable to infer the FAD-GDH enzymes disclosed in Senior and the '668 application have the same low substrate specificity for glucose relative to maltose because both Senior and the '668 application classify the FAD-GDH enzymes in their enzyme preparations as E.C. 1.1.99.10.

    On appeal before the Federal Circuit, Ikeda argued that the Board erred by relying upon inherency to supply the necessary low-maltose activity claim element in making its obviousness determination, by improperly shifting the evidentiary burden to Ikeda, and by discounting the objective indicia of nonobviousness, specifically that of a long-felt need.  With respect to its first argument, Ikeda contended that because Senior's enzyme preparation was contaminated with about 7,000 times more protein than the '668 application's preparation, those impurities caused Senior's preparation to "differ[] vastly" from the '668 application's preparation in how it reacts with maltose.  The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed with Ikeda's argument, finding that "[s]ubstantial evidence supports the PTAB's conclusion that Senior's FAD-GDH enzyme preparation inherently discloses the Challenged Claims' low-maltose activity limitation."  In particular, the opinion states that "[a]lthough Senior does not directly address glucose specificity or maltose, Senior's FAD-GDH enzyme, prepared from 'A[.] oryzae,' has the same 'E.C. 1.1.99.10' classification number as the '668 application's FAD-GDH enzyme, even though each FAD-GDH enzyme is produced from a different microorganism, i.e., from 'A. Terreus'" [citations omitted].  The opinion concludes that "it was reasonable for the PTAB to conclude that both Senior and the '668 application characterize their microbe-derived preparations as having identical enzymatic activity, which necessarily includes having the same substrate specificity" (emphasis in opinion), adding that:

    The PTAB had a reasonable basis to conclude that because Senior discloses the use of the FAD-GDH enzyme described in the '668 application, classified under E.C. 1.1.99.10, the claimed low "5% or less" activity against maltose relative to glucose in the reaction layer is inherently disclosed in Senior's enzyme preparation.

    The Federal Circuit also rejected the argument that the Board improperly shifted the evidentiary burden to Ikeda, citing In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (CCPA 1997), for the proposition that "the fairness of shifting the burden 'is evidenced by the [US]PTO's inability to manufacture products or to obtain and compare prior art products.'"  The Court therefore concluded that "we see no reason to call into question the PTAB's finding 'that the 'possible presence of contaminants' in Senior's enzyme preparation [does not] render the claimed biosensor non-obvious.'"

    Finally, with respect to Ikeda's argument that the Board discounted the objective indicia of nonobviousness, especially that of a long-felt need, the Federal Circuit disagreed that the Board erred by not crediting Ikeda's evidence of long-felt need for a GDH enzyme with no separate cofactor.  The Court noted that because claim 22 employs the transitional phrase "comprising" in its preamble, the claim "does not exclude biosensors that employ a cofactor" (emphasis in opinion).  Therefore, because claims 22 and 23 encompass biosensors that use cofactors, "it follows that they do not satisfy Ikeda's alleged need for dehydrogenase-based glucose sensors that do not rely on a cofactor."  Rejecting all of Ikeda's arguments, the Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.

    In re Ikeda Food Research Co. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Nonprecedential disposition
    Panel: Circuit Judges Wallach, Taranto, and Hughes
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Wallach

  • The following article was reprinted with permission from Sargent & Krahn.

    ChileRecently, the Chilean Government submitted to Congress a Law Bill modifying the Industrial Property Law, the National Institute of Industrial Property Law as well as minor modifications to the Criminal Procedure Law.

    The Proposed Bill intends to update the corresponding legislation of trademarks, patents, industrial designs and drawings, trade secrets, geographical indications and appellations of origin, among other matters.

    The Bill is currently before Congress and it is expected to be approved in a relatively expedient manner.

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    The most relevant amendments and changes proposed by this Bill are the following:

    1.  Trademarks:
    •
    Non-use and genericide trademark cancelation action.
    •
    Three dimensional and scent trademarks will be allowed.
    •
    Limitation to the rights conferred to trademark holders when said trademarks are names, pseudonyms or geographical locations.
    •
    Commercial and industrial establishment trademarks will now be registered in classes 35 and 40 respectively.
    •
    Graphic representation of trademarks will not be required for registration.
    •
    Set of comprehensive regulation of collective and certification trademarks.
    •
    Enhances the description of trademark counterfeit.

    2.  Patents:
    • Allows for provisional patent applications.
    •
    New exceptions to patent holder's exclusive rights.
    •
    Patent ownership action.
    •
    Modifications to Term Adjustment and Term Extensions.

    3.  Others:
    •
    Trade secret definition now mirrors that of the TRIPS agreement.
    •
    Allows for the National Institute of Industrial Property (INAPI) to become a party in proceedings before higher Courts.
    •
    Industrial design and drawing deposit system as well as extending their validity term.
    •
    Modifies regulation for geographical indications and appellations of origin.

    I.  TRADEMARKS

        1.  Non-use and genericide cancelation actions:

    If the Bill is approved as proposed then trademarks in Chile will be subject to non-use cancelation actions for the first time.  The grounds for this action will be if the trademark has not been used in a real and effective manner within the national territory within five years of the registration date or if the use was suspended for 5 years.  The transition rule establishes that for trademarks registered prior to the enactment of the law; the use requirement will start upon its renewal.

    Additionally, the Bill establishes the cancelation of a trademark if the holder has provoked or allowed for said trademark to become the usual designation of the product or service it distinguishes (genericide).  The trademark holder can prevent this from occurring by using the corresponding indications that it is a registered trademark on the products or services.

    These cancelations do not operate ex officio and must be filed by a third party.  Also, a third party will be able to a file non-use cancelation action when filing a defense writ against a third party opposition.

        2.  Three dimensional trademarks and scent trademarks:

    The Bill allows for three dimensional and scent trademarks.

        3.  Limitation to the rights conferred to trademark holders:

    Trademark holders cannot exclude a person from using their name or pseudonym or that of their predecessors in commerce, unless said name, pseudonym or that of their predecessor induces consumers into error or confusion.

    The Bill also establishes that trademarks that include geographical names or expressions related to the genre, nature, origin, nationality, weight, quality, value, or other descriptive expressions cannot prevent the use of said expressions when they are used to identify or inform consumers precisely about said genre, nature, origin, nationality, weight, quality, value, etc, unless they induce consumers into error or confusion.

        4.  Commercial and industrial establishment trademarks will now be registered in classes 35 and 40 respectively:

    The Bill establishes amendments that eliminate the Chilean categories of trademarks to distinguish commercial and industrial establishments.  Current trademarks that distinguish commercial establishments will have to be renewed in class 35 while trademarks that distinguish industrial establishments will have to be renewed in class 40.  This will simplify the registration and will reduce the official fees that currently apply for the registration and renewal of the referred trademarks.

        5.  Graphic representation of trademarks will not be required for registration:

    In line with the TRIPS agreement the Bill eliminates the requirement of graphic representation for registration and states that trademarks that cannot be represented in the registration must allow the authorities and the public to clearly and precisely determine the protection granted to the holders.

        6.  Set of comprehensive regulation of Collective and Certification trademarks:

    The current regulation for these trademarks has proven to be deficient and the Bill thus introduces a new definition of certification trademarks and that the holders of said trademarks must authorize its use to anybody whose products or services comply with the conditions set out in the certifications trademarks by-laws.  Additionally, the Bill clarifies its authority to object the By-Laws of collective and certifications trademarks.

        7.  Enhances the description of trademark counterfeit:

    The Bill establishes sanctions against trademark counterfeits (they were previously regulated in the criminal code in a somewhat erratic manner), elevating the monetary fines in comparison with normal criminal trademark infringement cases as well as not requiring that the infringer act with "willful intent".  Additionally, in the case that a trademark counterfeit is proven, the plaintiff will have the option to request a lump sum of damages to be determined by the judge and that cannot be higher than around 140.000 USD.

    II.  PATENTS

        1.  Provisional patent application:

    The Bill will allow for the possibility of filing a provisional patent application without complying with the filing of all the required documents before INAPI.  The provisional application does have to pay the corresponding government filing fees and will be in place for 12 months, at which time the applicant must file all the corresponding documents (claims, specifications, drawings, technical sheet).  The provisional patent will have to include a written document in Spanish or English that describes the invention in a clear and complete manner in such a way that it allows for an expert to reproduce the invention.  The priority date of the final application will be the date of the provisional application.

        2.  Reduction of the deadline to request the reinstatement of a patent application:

    The Bill reduces the deadline to request a reinstatement of a patent application from 120 working days to 60 working days.

        3.  New exceptions to patent exclusivity rights: The Bill establish five new exceptions to a patents exclusivity rights and they are the following:

    • Private and non-commercial acts.
    • Research exception.
    • Preparation of medicines under medical prescription for individual cases.
    • The use, on board of ships of other countries, of means constituting the object of the patent in the hull of the ship, in the machines, rigs, apparatus and other accessories, when said ships temporarily or accidentally enter the waters of Chilean territory, with the reservation that said means are used exclusively for the needs of the ship.
    • The use of means constituting the subject matter of the patent in the construction or operation of air or land locomotion apparatus of other countries or of accessories to such apparatus, when these temporarily or accidentally enter Chilean territory.

        4.  Ownership action:

    The Bill allows for the legitimate inventor to request the assignment of a patent and the corresponding damages from the non-legitimate patent holder.  This action has to be filed within five years from the registration date and will follow the procedural rules of a summary trial before a civil judge.  This amendment solves a current problem in Chile which is that the legitimate inventor only has the ability to file a cancelation action (and thus eventually end up canceling the corresponding patent).

        5.  Modifications to Term Adjustment and Term Extensions:

    The Bill reduces the deadline to file for a term adjustment and a term extension request from 6 months to sixty working days.  Additionally, the Bill establishes a 5 year cap on the amount of time that can be adjusted or extended by the Industrial Property Court.  The Bill also defines that when the Examiner accepts the appointment is when the examination is requested in order to trigger the option to request a term adjustment after only three years of prosecution from said date.

        6.  Inventions in service:

    The Bill establishes that inventions in service cases will be of the competence of ordinary justice courts and the summary procedure will be applied.

        7.  Prior filing date and raise in government fees:

    The Bill will allow to file a patent application even if the corresponding government fees have not been paid.  The applicant will have to proceed with this payment within 30 days or the application will be declared abandoned.

    Additionally, the Bill establishes that if a patent application dossier exceeds 50 pages, the corresponding government fee will be raised by approximately 100 USD for every additional 20 pages.

    The Bill also allows that the applicant of a patent, industrial design, utility model, choose the government fee payment deadline for the second half of the corresponding privilege, permitting the payment on an annual basis after the first 5 or 10 year fractions have lapsed.

    III.  INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS AND DRAWINGS

        1.  Deposit System and abbreviated procedures:

    This amendment resembles the European Design system and allows for the applicant of an industrial design or drawing to request an abbreviated deposit procedure for the application.  This procedure eliminates the Substantive Examination Reports, but the holder will have to request said Report if he wants to file criminal infringement actions.

        2.  Extension of the validity term of industrial designs and drawings:

    The Bill extends the duration of the validity term of industrial designs and drawings to 15 years (currently 10 years).

    IV.  TRADE SECRETS

        1.  Trade secret definition now mirrors that of the TRIPS agreement:

    The Bill establishes amendments to the current definition of a trade secret and expands the concept thus bringing it in line with the definition of the TRIPS agreements

    V.  GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND APPELATIONS OF ORIGIN

        1.  Definitions:

    The Bill modifies the definition of geographical indications as well as that of appellations of origin.  In the case of geographical indications, it allows for this recognition to exist if at least one of the stages of protection or manufacture of the product is executed in the corresponding country, region or locality.  In the case of the appellations of origin, it allows for the recognition to be granted if some of the raw materials come from other geographical territories complying with certain specific additional requirements.

        2.  New non-registration grounds:

    Three new non-registration grounds for geographical indications and appellations of origin are included, and they are:

    • Graphic, phonetic and conceptual similarities that may cause consumer confusion with a previously applied for or registered distinctive sign.
    •
    Graphic, phonetic or conceptual similarities that can cause confusion with a non-registered distinctive sign that is being used in a real and effective manner within the national territory for the same or related goods.
    • That constitute the complete or partial reproduction, imitation, or translation of a trademark, appellation of origin, or geographical indication that is well known in Chile in the corresponding consuming public, as long as said use will cause consumer confusion.

        3.  Cancelation action:

    The Bill allows for a cancelation action to be filed when the product is no longer manufactured in the protected zone or when the product no longer complies with the conditions that allowed for its recognition. There is no statute of limitation for these actions.

    VI.  OTHERS

        1.  Manner of serving resolutions by INAPI to the parties:

    The Bill introduces modifications regarding the manner in which certain resolutions of INAPI are served to the interested parties.  For example, oppositions will be served to the applicant in an electronic manner (as well as office actions if there was an opposition).

        2.  Modification of the deadline to pay government rights and renewals:

    The Bill introduces an amendment that the government fees for the second half of the validity term can either be paid upfront in total or on an annual basis.  Additionally, the Bill establishes that the government fees for a trademark renewal must be paid together with the filing of the renewal request as well as allowing a trademark to be renewed within six months of the end of its validity term (currently 30 days).

        3.  INAPI becoming a party to procedures triggered by recourses filed against their decisions:

    INAPI will be able to become a party in recourses filed against their decisions, i.e., before the Industrial Property Court and eventually the Supreme Court.

  • By Donald Zuhn –-

    Federal Circuit SealLast June, the Supreme Court determined that $93.4 million in lost foreign profits awarded to WesternGeco L.L.C. for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) was a permissible domestic application of 35 U.S.C. § 284, and the Court therefore reversed the Federal Circuit's reversal of the award of lost profits damages and remanded the case (see "WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp. (2018)").  Earlier this month, the Federal Circuit decided, given the intervening invalidation of four of the five asserted patent claims by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Patent Trial and Appeal Board, to remand the case back to the District Court for further proceedings on the lost profits award.

    The dispute between the parties began when WesternGeco filed suit against ION Geophysical Corp. for infringement of claims 18, 19, and 23 of U.S. Patent No. 7,293,520; claim 15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,162,967; claim 15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,080,607; and claim 14 of U.S. Patent No. 6,691,038.  The patents relate to marine seismic surveys for discovering oil and gas deposits beneath the ocean floor.  Both WesternGeco and ION manufacture devices for steering streamers in marine seismic surveys; WesternGeco does not sell its device, but uses it to perform surveys abroad, and ION does not perform surveys, but sells its device to customers who perform surveys abroad.  At trial, ION was found to have infringed the asserted claims under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(f)(1) and (2), and WesternGeco was awarded a reasonable royalty of $12.5 million and lost profits of $93.4 million.  The lost profits damages were based on the loss of ten surveys abroad, which WesternGeco argued it would have won but for ION's sales to WesternGeco's competitors.

    On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the lost profits award as being based on an unauthorized extraterritorial application of the patent laws.  WesternGeco petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted, and the Court vacated the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).  On remand, the Federal Circuit again reversed the lost profits award, vacated the District Court's denial of enhanced damages, and remanded to the District Court for further consideration in light of Halo.  On remand, the District Court awarded WesternGeco $5 million in enhanced damages.  The parties then stipulated to the reasonable royalty amount, which ION paid, and agreed not to appeal the enhanced damages award, but did not stipulate to the lost profits award.  WesternGeco again petitioned for certiorari, requesting review of the Federal Circuit's decision on lost profits.  The Supreme Court again granted the petition, reversed the Federal Circuit's decision on lost profits, and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit.

    In a parallel proceeding before the PTAB, the Board determined that four of the six asserted patent claims (i.e., all but claim 23 of the '520 patent and claim 14 of the '038 patent) we unpatentable.  While the case above was pending in the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit separately affirmed the PTAB's decision.  Of the two remaining claims, it is uncontested that only claim 23 of the '520 patent can support WesternGeco's lost profits award.

    On remand from the Supreme Court again, ION challenged the fully paid and satisfied reasonable royalty award as well as the lost profits award based on the PTAB's subsequent invalidation of four of the six asserted patent claims.  With respect to the reasonable royalty award, ION argued that the calculation of the reasonable royalty would be affected by the invalidation of claims and sought a new trial, citing Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013), as holding that a judgment cannot be final for purposes of intervening patent invalidations if any part of the litigation remains pending, and that the lost profits award was still being litigated.  In rejecting ION's challenge to the reasonable royalty award, the Federal Circuit disagreed with ION's interpretation of Fresenius, noting instead that "Fresenius made clear that it does not allow reopening of a satisfied and unappealable final judgment."  In particular, the Federal Circuit pointed out that "ION and WesternGeco entered into a compromise agreement resolving all of the issues in the case except for the lost profits award," and that "ION cannot now reopen the agreed and fully paid unappealable final judgment on the reasonable royalty based on the subsequent invalidation of a subset of asserted patent claims."

    With respect to the lost profits award, ION first argued that the District Court erred when it denied ION's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the theory that WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits because ION and WesternGeco are not "direct competitors" (since ION only sells devices and WesternGeco only sells surveys).  The Federal Circuit, however, was not persuaded by ION's argument, noting that "WesternGeco's and ION's devices competed by performing the same types of functions for surveys," and that "there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to conclude that the products did compete."

    ION also argued that the lost profits award could not be sustained because of the intervening invalidation of four of the five asserted claims supporting the award.  The Federal Circuit noted that the jury found all of the asserted claims to be infringed and made a single lost profits award, but that the jury instructions and verdict form did not instruct the jury to award damages based separately on infringement of each of the asserted claims.  The Federal Circuit also noted that WesternGeco did not cite to any specific testimony that infringement of claim 23 of the '520 patent was necessary to perform the ten surveys that WesternGeco had contended it lost.  The Federal Circuit indicated that to sustain the lost profits award, the record must establish that there was no dispute that the technology covered by claim 23 of the '520 patent, independent of the technology covered by the invalidated claims, was required to perform the surveys at issue.  Pointing out that the District Court was in a better position to consider the issue in the first instance, the Federal Circuit remanded to the District Court to determine whether a new trial on lost profit damages is required, stating that "[t]he district court may deny a new trial on lost profits if, but only if, it concludes that WesternGeco established at trial with undisputed evidence that '520 patent claim 23 covers technology necessary to perform the surveys upon which the lost profits award is based."

    The Federal Circuit concluded by reinstating sections I, II, and IV of its decision in WesternGeco I and sections I and II of its decision in WesternGeco II, determining that those sections were not affected by either the initial vacatur and remand from the Supreme Court or the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in WesternGeco III, and affirming-in-part, vacating-in-part, and remanding.

    WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Dyk, Wallach, and Hughes
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Dyk