• By Donald Zuhn —

    Federal Circuit SealLast week, in Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware holding the claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,808,737 to be ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  In reversing the District Court, the Federal Circuit determined that the asserted claims of the '737 patent are legally indistinguishable from the claims at issue in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.

    The '737 patent, which is owned by Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., relates to a method of using oxymorphone to treat pain in patients with impaired kidney function.  As the opinion notes, a patient's pain relief level can be impacted by the way the patient's body processes oxymorphone.  In patients with impaired kidney function (or renal impairment), waste products and drugs that are typically filtered by the kidneys can build up.  The inventor of the '737 patent studied the effect of renal impairment on the metabolism of oxymorphone and discovered that patients with moderately or severely impaired kidney function required less oxymorphone to achieve the same level of pain management achieved in patients without impaired kidney function.  Claim 1 of the '737 patent is representative (with emphasis in the opinion):

    1.  A method of treating pain in a renally impaired patient, comprising the steps of:
        a.  providing a solid oral controlled release dosage form, comprising:
            i.  about 5 mg to about 80 mg of oxymorphone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof as the sole active ingredient; and
            ii.  a controlled release matrix;
        b.  measuring a creatinine clearance rate of the patient and determining it to be
            (a) less than about 30 m[L]/min,
            (b) about 30 mL/min to about 50 mL/min,
            (c) about 51 mL/min to about 80 mL/min, or
            (d) above about 80 mL/min; and
        c.  orally administering to said patient, in dependence on which creatinine clearance rate is found, a lower dosage of the dosage form to provide pain relief;
        wherein after said administration to said patient, the average AUC of oxymorphone over a 12-hour period is less than about 21 ng•hr/mL.

    Endo and Mallinckrodt LLC filed suit against Actavis LLC, Actavis South Atlantic LLC, Actavis Pharma, Inc., Actavis Elizabeth LLC, Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc. ("Actavis") and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Barr Laboratories, Inc. ("Teva") for infringement of claims 1-6 of the '737 patent.  Actavis moved to dismiss Endo's patent infringement claims, arguing that the asserted claims were patent ineligible under § 101.  The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the District Court grant Actavis' motion.

    In that Report, the Magistrate applied the two-step analysis set forth in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), and reiterated in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  With respect to step 1 of the Alice/Mayo test, the Magistrate determined that the claims are directed to the natural law that the bioavailability of oxymorphone is increased in people with severe renal impairment.  With respect to step 2, the Magistrate determined that claim 1 consists of three steps: (1) a "providing" step; (2) a "measuring/determining" step; (3) and an "administering" step.  The Magistrate concluded that the "providing" step is similar to the administering step in Mayo because it "merely identifies the specific drug for administration"; the "measuring/determining" step, as in Mayo, "just directs one to use a well-known method to measure creatinine levels to obtain the necessary information to apply a law of nature"; and the "administering step" is indistinguishable from Mayo because it "simply limits the relevant audience to patients and prescribing physicians, who treat chronic or acute pain with oxymorphone," by "merely instruct[ing] physicians to dispense oxymorphone for the treatment of pain in a well-know[n] manner, while utilizing the natural law to manage the dosage."  The Magistrate concluded that the patent was not directed to a patent-eligible application of a natural law.  Following the Magistrate's recommendation, the District Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss.  Endo appealed the District Court's decision holding the claims of the '737 patent to be patent ineligible.

    The Federal Circuit began by noting that while the Supreme Court has established a two-step framework to determine subject matter eligibility under § 101, "[i]f the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept at step one, [the Court] need not address step two of the inquiry," citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.  The Court determined that this was the case here, explaining that the Court's analysis accordingly "focuse[d] solely on step one."  Citing Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., the opinion notes that "at step one, 'it is not enough to merely identify a patent-ineligible concept underlying the claim; we must determine whether that patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is 'directed to.''"  And in the instant case, the Court concluded that the asserted claims are not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, but rather "are directed to a patent-eligible method of using oxymorphone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof to treat pain in a renally impaired patient."

    As in the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, the Endo Court noted that the Federal Circuit held similar claims to be patent-eligible in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd., explaining that:

    The claims at issue here are legally indistinguishable from the representative claim in Vanda.  Both claims recite a method for treating a patient.  The Vanda patent claims recite the steps of carrying out a dosage regimen based on the results of genetic testing.  . . .  Here, the claims similarly recite the steps of carrying out a dosage regimen, though the steps are based on the results of kidney function testing.  Additionally, the claims in both cases require specific treatment steps.  . . .  [And therefore, l]ike the claims in Vanda, the claims here "are directed to a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome."  See Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1136.

    The panel also noted that "like the claims in Vanda, the claims here differ from those in Mayo in material respects," pointing out that "[a]lthough the representative claim in Mayo recited administering a thiopurine drug to a patient, the claim as a whole was not directed to the application of a drug to treat a particular disease."  (In a footnote, the Court also acknowledged that when the District Court held the asserted claims of the '737 patent to be ineligible, it did not have the benefit of considering the Federal Circuit's decisions in Vanda or Natural Alternatives).

    The panel next turned to Actavis' arguments that the Endo claims were similar to those at issue in Mayo and could be distinguished from the claims found to be patent eligible in Vanda.  With respect to Actavis' argument that unlike the claims in Vanda, the method steps in the Endo claims offer no "practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself," the Court disagreed, stating that "the '737 patent claims are very similar to those in Vanda and any differences in specificity are not of a sufficient degree to convince us to conclude that the claims here should be ineligible as compared to the claims in Vanda."  As for Actavis' argument that unlike the Vanda claims, the Endo claims do not require that a biological sample be obtained or assayed in any particular way to determine a patient's creatinine-clearance rate, the Court declared that "this is a distinction without a difference," since "[t]he court in Vanda reasoned that the claim was directed to 'specific patients,' without explicitly emphasizing the precise methods used to identify those specific patients."  The Court also disagreed with Actavis' argument that unlike the Vanda claims, the Endo claims "do not specify an amount or frequency of oxymorphone to be administered after patients are categorized by creatinine-clearance rate," noting that "the combination of the administering step and wherein clause claim language, taken together, . . . make the claims-at-issue as specific as those in Vanda such that the patent claims do not 'tie up the doctor’s subsequent treatment decision,'" citing Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86).  The Court therefore concluded that:

    [T]he '737 patent claims are like those in Vanda.  They are eligible because they are "directed to a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome."  . . .  Our precedent leaves no room for a different outcome.

    The opinion found further support for its decision in Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., stating that:

    We explained that "[t]he end result of the . . . claims is not simply an observation or detection of the ability of hepatocytes to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles.  Rather, the claims [were] directed to a new and useful method of preserving hepatocyte cells."  We further emphasized that "the natural ability of the subject matter to undergo the process does not make the claim 'directed to' that natural ability."  Otherwise, claims directed to actually "treating cancer with chemotherapy" or "treating headaches with aspirin" would be patent ineligible.  Just like the claims in CellzDirect, the result of the claims here is not simply an observation or detection [citations omitted].

    The Court concludes  the opinion by noting that neither Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. nor Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., compel a different outcome, pointing out that "the claims here are directed to a treatment method, not a detection method," and adding that "[t]he '737 patent does not 'start[] and end[] with a naturally occurring phenomenon.'"  Thus, the Court determined that the '737 patent claims are not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, and therefore reversed the District Court's decision finding the claims to be patent-ineligible.

    Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Panel:  Circuit Judges Wallach, Clevenger, and Stoll
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Stoll

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealHaving been instructed once again by the Supreme Court that the Federal Circuit is not special when it comes to review of district court decisions (see, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.), the Federal Circuit has increased the quantum of explanation it requires from district courts (and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board even more frequently) in reviewing questions of fact for clear error (see, e.g., Tris Pharma, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc.).  This practice results in remand back to the district court for further explication of the lower court's reasoning (followed, in at least some cases, by another appeal to the Federal Circuit).  Regardless of the strain on already-overtaxed judicial resources, this trend shows no evidence of diminishing, and the latest case having this outcome was decided earlier this month in Forest Laboratories, LLC v. Sigmapharm Laboratories, LLC.

    The case involved several ANDA applicants as Defendants*, each of whom had filed their ANDA over Forest Laboratories' antipsychotic drug Saphris, identified in the opinion as an "atypical antipsychotic containing asenapine maleate" (where asenapine is the trivial name for trans-5-chloro-2-methyl-2,3,3a,12b-tetrahydro-1H-dibenz [2,3:6,7]oxepino[4,5-c]pyrrole).  Known in the art for oral administration in a pill, this drug is administered sublingually or by buccal administration according to the specification and claims of the patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 5,763,476 ("the '476 patent").

    Asserted claims 1 and 4 of the '476 patent were set forth in the opinion as being relevant to its decision:

    1.  A pharmaceutical composition comprising as a medicinally active compound: trans-5-chloro-2-methyl-2,3,3a, 12b-tetrahydro-1H-dibenz[2,3:6,7]oxepino[4,5-c]pyrrole or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof; wherein the composition is a solid composition and disintegrates within 30 seconds in water at 37° C.

    4.  A method for treating tension, excitation, anxiety, and psychotic and schizophrenic disorders, comprising administering sublingually or buccally an effective amount of a pharmaceutical composition comprising trans-5-chloro-2-methyl-2,3,3a, 12b-tetrahydro-1H-dibenz[2,3:6,7]oxepino[4,5- c]pyrrole or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof.

    In a bench trial, the District Court held that the ANDA Defendants had not shown by clear and convincing evidence than claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9, and 10 were invalid for obviousness or failure to provide an adequate written description of the claimed invention, and that Forest had not shown that claims 4, 9, and 10 were infringed as to the Alembic and Breckenridge Defendants.

    The Federal Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment regarding invalidity and non-infringement, and remanded for reconsideration of infringement under the correct (i.e., the Federal Circuit's) claim construction, in an opinion by Judge Moore joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Dyk.  The panel first addressed the District Court's claim construction with regard to the District Court imbuing claim 1 with the limitation of sublingual and buccal routes of administration (which were expressly recited in claim 4) based on the claim 1 limitation that requires the formulation to comprise solid compositions that disintegrate within 30 seconds in water at 37° C.  The Federal Circuit found no error based on the claim construction rubric that claims must be construed in light of the specification.  Here, the '476 specification affirmatively recited that "[t]he invention relates to a sublingual or buccal pharmaceutical composition" as well as the benefits of these routes of asenapine administration.  The panel also relied on the title of the application itself ("Sublingual or Buccal Pharmaceutical Composition," citing UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., 816 F.3d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) and that the properties and advantages of the recited dissolution profile as it was related to these administration routes "strongly suggest[ed]" that this language was intended to limit the claims to formulations for sublingual or buccal administration.

    Having affirmed the District Court's claim construction, the opinion then reviewed its determination that the Defendants had not shown the claims to be invalid for obviousness.  The opinion notes that oral asenapine formulations, on the one hand, and these administration routes (for other drugs) on the other, were known in the prior art, but that there was no motivation to combine these teachings, and further that an observed reduction in cardiotoxicity was an unexpected result of the claimed formulation.  Finally, the District Court found that the claimed formulation satisfied a "long-felt need for a safe, effective, and tolerable atypical antipsychotic useful to treat schizophrenia and mania."  The District Court also considered testimony that sublingual and buccal administration routes posed more difficult compliance problems with schizophrenic patients and also require patients to refrain from drinking or swallowing until the medicine had dissolved, as evidence negating a motivation to combine.

    The Federal Circuit did not find that these factual conclusions were clear error; instead the Court opined that "[s]ummarizing testimony, however, is not a clear finding.  Our review would be aided by an express finding regarding whether compliance concerns regarding patients with swallowing difficulties would provide a motivation to combine."

    The panel also did not find clear error in the District Court rejecting Defendants' arguments that "having multiple treatment options available would provide a motivation to combine," holding that this was "a generic need for more antipsychotic treatment options [that] did not provide a motivation to combine these particular prior art elements."  Nor was there clear error in the District Court not finding support for a motivation to combine in "general suggestions in the prior art indicating a growing interest in sublingual and buccal formulations at the time of filing."  And the Federal Circuit did not disagree with the District Court's holding that the patentee (originally, inventors working for the patent assignee, Organon) had recognized and solved an unmet need, reducing cardiotoxicity caused by prior art asenapine formulations.

    While finding no basis in the District Court's opinion for concluding there was clear error, the Federal Circuit also found insufficient evidence that there was no error, based on "the district court's failure to make an express finding as to whether compliance concerns for patients with trouble swallowing would provide a motivation to combine," and accordingly remanded, presumably to obtain such express findings.

    The Federal Circuit was able to decide that the District Court's determination that there was a long-felt but unmet need in the art for the claimed formulations was not error, based on evidence that "there were a variety of existing antipsychotics, they had debilitating negative side effects, which evidence indicates are reduced in Saphris."  On the other hand, the panel held that there was insufficient evidence of unexpected results because the cardiotoxicity of asenapine formulations was not recognized at the time the invention was made and thus the capacity for the claimed formulations to reduce this side-effect could not have been unexpected for being completely unknown to the person of ordinary skill in the art (a curious conclusion but one on its face consistent with prior precedent; see, In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

    With regard to infringement of claim 4, the District Court found that generic formulations produced by the Alembic and Breckenridge Defendants did not infringe, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.  This determination was based on these Defendants claiming bipolar disorder as the indication, which the District Court found was not recited in claim 4 (which recites "tension, excitation, anxiety, and psychotic and schizophrenic disorders").  The Federal Circuit was not convinced by the District Court's construction and remanded; as construed by the panel:

    The claim language and the specification indicate that "excitation" refers to a symptom rather than a "disorder."  The use of the conjunction "and" before "psychotic and schizophrenic disorders" indicates that "psychotic and schizophrenic disorders" is a distinct item on the list, and that unlike the terms "psychotic" and "schizophrenic," the words "tension," "excitation," and "anxiety" are not describing "disorders."  This is consistent with how "excitation" is used elsewhere in the specification.  '476 patent at 5:55–58.  Moreover, experts for both parties agree that there is no such thing as an "excitation disorder," . . . further indicating the claim covers treatment of the symptom "excitation" rather than treatment of an "excitation disorder."  Although excitation may be a symptom of bipolar I disorder, the district court nevertheless carved bipolar I disorder out of its construction because it concluded that the "language of the '476 patent is directed to 'diseases' and 'disorders,' not to symptoms of such."  . . .  This misreads the plain language of the claims and specification [citations to the record omitted].

    Thus, the case returns to the District Court to develop the factual record for its non-obviousness determination with sufficient completeness for (almost assuredly) further review, as well as reconsideration of infringement by Alembic's and Breckenridge's generic formulations.  Whether the current insistence on a crystal clear record by the Federal Circuit is necessary or beneficial to its jurisprudence may be questionable, but it can be expected that district courts will quickly conform their practices (or at least how they write their opinions) to comply with the Federal Circuit's recent mandates, if only to avoid yet further backlogs in their dockets.

    * Defendants/ANDA filers:  Sigmapharm Laboratories; Hikma Pharmaceuticals, LLC; Hikma Pharmaceuticals, PLC; Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., fka West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Corp.; Breckenridge Pharmaceutical Inc.; Alembic Pharmaceuticals LTD; Alembic Global Holdings SA; Alembic Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC; Amneal Pharmaceuticals of New York LLC; and Amneal Pharmaceuticals Co. India Pvt. Ltd.

    Forest Laboratories, LLC v. Sigmapharm Laboratories, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Dyk and Moore
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Moore

  • CalendarApril 2, 2019 – 2019 Business Methods Partnership Meeting (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 10:00 am to 3:00 pm (ET) on 

    April 4, 2019 – "Standing to Appeal from the PTAB" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    April 4, 2019 – "Can My Blockchain Do That? A Discussion of Blockchain Beyond Cryptocurrency" (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago Corporate Committee and Advertising and Digital Committee) – 5:15 to 6:15 pm (CT), Chicago, IL

    April 29-30, 2019 – Paragraph IV Disputes master symposium (American Conference Institute) – New York, NY

    April 23, 2019 – "Recent Developments in Biopharma Patent Law" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP and Patent Docs) – 9:30 am to 1:30 pm, San Diego, CA (Hyatt Regency La Jolla at Aventine)

    April 24, 2019 – "Recent Developments in Biopharma Patent Law" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP and Patent Docs) – 9:30 am to 1:30 pm, Burlingame, CA (Hyatt Regency San Francisco Airport)

    May 16-17, 2019 – Advanced Summit on Life Sciences Patents (American Conference Institute) – New York, NY

  • MBHB Logo 2McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP and Patent Docs will be hosting two onsite CLE programs on "Recent Developments in Biopharma Patent Law" from 9:30 am to 1:30 pm (PT) on April 23, 2019 in San Diego, CA (Hyatt Regency La Jolla at Aventine) and on April 24, 2019 in Burlingame, CA (Hyatt Regency San Francisco Airport).  MBHB attorneys and Patent Docs authors Kevin Noonan and Donald Zuhn, and MBHB attorneys Josh Rich, Lisa Hillman, Sarah Fendrick, John Conour, Nate Chongsiriwatana, and Nicole Grimm will provide presentations on the following topics:

    • Updates on Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis
    • Patenting Repurposed Drugs
    • Antibody Patenting after Amgen v. Sanofi
    •
    The State of Biotech Patenting: Challenges
    • Maximizing Patent Term for Products Subject to Regulatory Review
    • Impact of Secondary Patents on Market Exclusivity
    • Considerations for Biotech Cannabis Patents
    • Strategies for Post-Grant Proceedings for Generics and Biosimilars

    There is no registration fee for the program.  However, because space is limited, those interested in attending the program must register by contacting Susan Hall at hall@mbhb.com.  When registering, please note at which location you plan to attend:  San Diego or Burlingame.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Standing to Appeal from the PTAB" on April 4, 2019 from 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET).  Neal Dahiya of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company; Michael Flibbert of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP; Michael Rosato of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati will also address strategies for obtaining, and opposing, appellate standing.  The panel will discuss:

    • The argument that injury from IPR estoppel in future district court litigation, after a losing challenge, is enough to create standing;
    • The theory that standing is created after an unsuccessful challenge because a patent impedes research;
    • Other strategies for making the case for and against standing;
    • The recently argued U.S. Supreme Court case of Return Mail;
    • The Court's request for the Solicitor General's views regarding the pending petition for writ of certiorari in RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC; and
    • Procedural details for appeals related to standing.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • ACIAmerican Conference Institute (ACI) will be holding its 17th Advanced Summit on Life Sciences Patents conference on May 16-17, 2019 in New York, NY.

    The conference will offer presentations on the following topics:

    • Patenting strategies for U.S. and Europe
    • What's new at the PTAB?
    • The "new" § 101 landscape in the PTO and District Courts
    • Obviousness-type double patenting
    • Printed publication standards at the PTAB
    • FTO and avoiding future infringement
    • Prolonging patent lifecycles in US, EP, and JP
    • Revisiting the Doctrine of Equivalence
    • Antibody patent review: global perspectives
    • Applying the written description requirement to antibody claims
    • Europe post-Brexit and the Unitary Patent Regime
    • The intersection between high-tech, data mining, discovery and patent protection
    • Ethics in life sciences patent prosecution

    In addition, two pre-conference workshops will be offered on May 15, 2019.  The first, entitled "Patents Around the World Working Group" will be offered from 9:00 am to 12:30 pm, and the second, entitled "Antibody Claims Drafting Master Class" will be offered from 1:30 to 5:00 pm.

    The agenda for the Paragraph IV Disputes conference can be found here.  More information regarding the workshops can be found here and here.  A complete brochure for this conference, including an agenda, detailed descriptions of conference sessions, list of speakers, and registration form can be obtained here.

    The registration fee for the conference alone is $2,095 (by April 5th) or $2,295 (by May 14th). The workshops carry an additional fee of $600 apiece.  Patent Docs readers are entitled to a 10% discount off of registration using discount code P10-999-PTD19.  Those interested in registering for the conference can do so here, by e-mailing CustomerService@AmericanConference.com, or by calling 1-888-224-2480.

    Patent Docs is a media partner of ACI's 17th Advanced Summit on Life Sciences Patents Conference.

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Corporate Committee and Advertising and Digital Committee will be presenting a program entitled "Can My Blockchain Do That? A Discussion of Blockchain Beyond Cryptocurrency" on April 4, 2019 from 5:15 to 6:15 pm (CT) at DePaul College of Law in Chicago, IL.  Bo An, Risk Management, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago will moderate a panel consisting of Sarah Duda, Assistant General Counsel, Cboe Global Markets; Ted Tian, Master Agreements Negotiator, BP America, Inc.; Mark Fields, Partner, Alsop Louie Partners; and Matthew Kelly, Managing Director and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, CME Group.  The program will provide an overview of blockchain technology, the value of developing and patenting blockchain and the impact of blockchain technology as it is currently being used, including the VAKT Consortium.

    There is no registration fee IPLAC members.  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • USPTO SealThe U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will be holding the 2019 Business Methods Partnership Meeting from 10:00 am to 3:00 pm (ET) on April 2, 2019.  The meeting is an opportunity to bring stakeholders together to share ideas, experiences, and insights and to provide a forum for an informal discussion of many topics specific to the business methods area.

    The meeting will be held in the USPTO's Alexandria, VA headquarters and its Texas Regional Office in Dallas.  WebEx access will also be available to allow individuals to participate remotely.

    Those wishing to attend the meeting can register should e-mail businessmethods@uspto.gov or contact Mathew Gart at 571-272-3955, Ilana Spar at 571-270-7537, Peter Choi at 469-295-9171, or Victoria Shumate at 313-446-4858.  Additional information regarding the customer partnership meeting can be found here.

  • Claims for Monitoring and Analyzing Suspicious Network Activity Found Patent Eligible

    By James Korenchan —

    In a precedential decision issued last week, the Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware's ruling that Plaintiff SRI International, Inc.'s ("SRI") claims related to network security are patent eligible.

    Years ago, SRI sued Defendant Cisco Systems, Inc. ("Cisco") for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,711,615 (the '615 patent) and 6,484,203 (the '203 patent), after which Cisco unsuccessfully moved for summary judgement on various issues, including patent-ineligibility of the claims and whether one of SRI's papers on its own network security tool anticipates the claims.  Cisco then appealed the final judgement of the District Court with respect to these two issues, as well as issues relating to the District Court's construction of the claim term "network traffic data," denial of JMOL of no willful infringement, and grant of enhanced damages, attorneys' fees, and ongoing royalties.  This post addresses only the issue of patent eligibility, including a notable dissenting opinion by Judge Alan David Lourie.

    The Majority Opinion

    The majority opinion focuses on claim 1 of the '615 patent, which the Court adopted as representative.  The Court stated that claim 1 of the '615 patent and claim 1 of the '203 patent are "substantially similar" with differences that are not material to any issue on appeal.  The claimed invention is generally related to network surveillance for the purposes of security in an enterprise network.  For example, this can be accomplished by looking at packets that monitor data transfers, errors, or network connections, building statistical profiles based on packet measurements, using the profiles to determine whether there is suspicious activity, and notifying various hierarchically-related network monitors of the suspicious activity.

    1.  A computer-automated method of hierarchical event monitoring and analysis within an enterprise network comprising:
        deploying a plurality of network monitors in the enterprise network; detecting, by the network monitors, suspicious network activity based on analysis of network traffic data selected from one or more of the following categories: {network packet data transfer commands, network packet data transfer errors, network packet data volume, network connection requests, network connection denials, error codes included in a network packet, network connection acknowledgements, and network packets indicative of well-known network-service protocols};
        generating, by the monitors, reports of said suspicious activity; and
        automatically receiving and integrating the reports of suspicious activity, by one or more hierarchical monitors.

    In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, the Supreme Court set forth a two-step framework for determining whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.  First, it must be decided whether a claim is directed to a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then it must be decided whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.  To transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible application, the claims must do more than simply state an abstract idea and broadly recite applying the abstract idea.

    In addressing the issue of patent eligibility, Cisco asserted that the claims are simply directed to a known business process of analyzing data from multiple sources to detect suspicious activity.  But the District Court held that the claims are "more complex" than that.  The District Court concluded that the claims recite a specific process rooted in computer technology — namely, using network monitors that each monitor and analyze specific types of network data, and integrating reports produced by those monitors — in order to solve a specific problem arising in the realm of network computing — namely, detecting hackers or other unwanted activity in a network.  The Federal Circuit agreed.  Citing Enfish, the Court affirmed that the "'focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities'—that is, providing a network defense system that monitors network traffic in real-time to automatically detect large-scale attacks."  For at least this reason, the Court agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea and are thus patent eligible.

    The Court also pointed to the specification in support of their conclusion.  For example, the specification explains that, in conventional networks, "seemingly localized triggering events can have globally disastrous effects on widely distributed systems," and purports to solve those issues by providing "a framework for the recognition of more global threats to interdomain connectivity, including coordinated attempts to infiltrate or destroy connectivity across an entire network enterprise."

    Cisco provided three main arguments for why the claims are an abstract idea, but the Court refuted each of them.  First, Cisco argued that the claims are analogous to those in Electric Power Group in that they are allegedly directed to generic steps for collecting and analyzing data.  But the Court distinguished these claims from those in Electric Power Group, instead analogizing them to those in DDR Holdings.  In particular, the Court noted that, while the Electric Power Group claims "were drawn to using computers as tools to solve a power grid problem," the claims here, like those in DDR Holdings, "prevent the normal, expected operation of a conventional computer network" — namely, by detecting and reporting on suspicious network activity, as well as by receiving and integrating the reports using one or more hierarchical network monitors.

    Cisco also argued that the claims do not improve computer functionality, per Enfish.  The Court noted how, in Alice, the Supreme Court advised that, even if a claim directed to an abstract idea uses a computer as a tool, the claim still does not pass step one muster.  Using the Supreme Court's notion as a counter to Cisco's argument, the Court stated that the claims are not automating a conventional idea on a computer, but rather recite a specific process that improves the functioning of computer networks in the realm of network security.

    Lastly, Cisco cited a variety of Federal Circuit decisions, such as Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp. and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., in asserting that the claims are so general that they involve steps that could be performed in one's mind.  But the Court disagreed yet again, noting:

    This is not the type of human activity that § 101 is meant to exclude.  Indeed, we tend to agree with SRI that the human mind is not equipped to detect suspicious activity by using network monitors and analyzing network packets as recited by the claims.

    As such, the Court concluded that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea and are thus patent eligible.  It did not conduct an analysis under step two of the Alice framework.

    Judge Lourie's Dissent

    Judge Lourie wrote a dissent that relied entirely on Electric Power Group.  Practitioners on the tech side of the fence are all too familiar with what might be perceived as an over-reliance on Electric Power Group for § 101 and might view Judge Lourie's dissent with the same skepticism as they've viewed many patent-eligibility issues.

    He first noted that the method recited in Electric Power Group recited "[a] method of detecting events on an interconnected electric power grid in real time over a wide area and automatically analyzing the events on the interconnected electric power grid," with the method comprising eight steps, including "receiving data," "detecting and analyzing events in real time," "displaying the event analysis results and diagnoses of events," "accumulating and updating measurements," and "deriving a composite indicator of reliability."  He emphasized that, despite having eight steps, the Court held that the Electric Power Group claim was an abstract idea without significantly more.  The claim involved selecting information for collection, analysis, and display, was only broadly rooted in computer technology, and, although limited to the context of power-grid monitoring, was still deemed to be patent ineligible.

    Judge Lourie stated that these claims are "hardly distinguishable' from those in Electric Power Group, do not provide enough specifics as to how its steps are performed, show no improvement to computer technology, and are thus directed to the abstract idea of monitoring network security.  In particular, he opined that:

    The claims here recite nothing more than deploying network monitors, detecting suspicious network activity, and generating and handling reports.  The detecting of the suspicious activity is based on "analysis" of traffic data, but the claims add nothing concerning specific means for doing so.  The claims only recite the moving of information.  The computer is used as a tool, and no improvement in computer technology is shown or claimed.  There is no specific technique described for improving computer network security.

    Proceeding to step two, Judge Lourie asserted that, although the claims recite different types of information and information sources, the selection of information does not provide any inventive concept, and the specification indicates that the claims only rely on generic, "customary" computer components.

    Judge Lourie was also not a fan of the majority's partial reliance on the '615 patent's specification:

    [T]he majority opinion quotes from and paraphrases language from the specification that only recites results, not means for accomplishing them.  The claims as written, however, do not recite a specific way of enabling a computer to monitor network activity.  As we noted in Electric Power Group, result-focused, functional claims that effectively cover any solution to an identified problem, like those at issue here, frequently run afoul of Alice.  (citation omitted)

    For these reasons, Judge Lourie strongly opposed the majority's ruling and would have found the claims to be patent ineligible.

    SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Panel:  Circuit Judges Lourie, O'Malley, and Stoll
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Stoll; dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Lourie

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Washington - Capitol #6On March 8th, a canonical "bipartisan of Senators" (a phrase used to signal bills that must be in the public interest because these Senators put aside business as usual to reach across the aisle) introduced S.659, entitled "The Biologic Patent Transparency Act."  These Senators (Collins, R-ME; Kaine, D-VA; Portman, R-OH; Shaheen, D-NH; Braun, R-IN; and Stabenow, D-MI) are purportedly motivated by a desire to reduce prescription drug prices (according to their websites) and have focused on differences between the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) and the Hatch Waxman Act that, in their view, reduces "transparency" to the public's detriment.  But a close look at the provisions of the bill suggest that it solves a problem that doesn't exist and instead focuses on cosmetic changes that have little chance to resolve the issues that have arisen in the implementation of the BPCIA.

    The bill provides for improvements to the so-called "Purple Book," established by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration but insufficiently utilized because listing is not tied to any penalty or disadvantage for failure to list.  The provisions of the bill (Section 2) mandate that Biologics License Applications granted under Section 351(a) of the Public Health Service Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262) or abbreviated Biologics License Applications granted under Section 351(k) of the PHSA must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services:

    [A]ny patent for which the holder of a biological product license approved under subsection (a) or (k), or a biological product application approved under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and deemed to be a license for a biological product under this section on March 23, 2020, believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted by the holder, or by a patent owner that has granted an exclusive license to the holder with respect to the biological product that is the subject of such license, if a person not licensed by the holder engaged in the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into the United States of the biological product that is the subject of such license.

    In addition, the bill would amend 35 U.S.C. § 271 to include a penalty for non-compliance with this disclosure requirement:

    (7) The owner of a patent that should have been included in the list described in section 351(o)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(o)(1)), including any updates require under subparagraph (C) of that section, but was not timely included in such list, may not bring an action under this section for infringement of the patent.

    The Senators, in introducing this bill, seem to believe that implementation of the BPCIA has been inhibited by non-disclosure by reference product sponsors (RPS) of patents that can be asserted against biosimilar applicants to their detriment.

    This sentiment ignores some important facts.  First, the BPCIA already includes a provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)(C), that seriously disincentives a reference product sponsor from failing to notify a biosimilar applicant of relevant patents:

    The owner of a patent that should have been included in the list described in [paragraph 3(A), the patent disclosure of the "patent dance"], but was not timely included in such list, may not bring an action under this section for infringement of the patent with respect to the biological product [emphasis added].

    Second, if any party has been disadvantaged under the BPCIA, it has been the reference product sponsor, as the result of judicial imprimatur of a strategy first employed by Sandoz to not disclose its aBLA or relevant manufacturing information to the RPS.  Enactment of S.659 will not address these issues, which include judicial interpretation of a Congressional mandate ("A biosimilar applicant shall [disclose its aBLA and relevant manufacturing information]"; emphasis added) to be optional.

    Another justification for these changes in the law involves the potential difficulty in a potential biosimilar applicant identifying before the fact (i.e., before a RPS competitor committed to pursuing a biosimilar) multiple patents that might be asserted against the biosimilar applicant.  But these concerns fly in the face of available outlets (for example, www.drugpatentwatch.com) that has this information readily available.

    On the other hand S.659 contains provisions that could increase transparency in useful ways, by establishing "a single, easily searchable, list that includes:

    (i) the official and proprietary name of each biological product licensed under subsection (a) or (k), and of each biological product application approved under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and deemed to be a license for the biological product under this section on March 23, 2020;

    (ii) with respect to each biological product described in clause (i), each patent submitted in accordance with paragraph (1);

    (iii) the date of licensure and application number for each such biological product;

    (iv) the marketing status, dosage form, route of administration, strength, and, if applicable, reference product, for each such biological product;

    (v) the licensure status for each such biological product, including whether the license at the time of listing is approved, withdrawn, or revoked;

    (vi) any period of any exclusivity under subsection (k)(7)(A) or subsection (k)(7)(B) of this section or section 527 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and any extension of such period in accordance with subsection (m) of this section with respect to each such biological product, and the date on which such exclusivity expires;

    (vii) information regarding any determination related to biosimilarity or interchangeability for each such biological product; and

    (viii) information regarding approved indications for each such biological product, in such manner as the Secretary determines appropriate.

    Political posturing is in vogue and particularly posturing regarding prescription drug prices.  'Twould be pretty if 'twere so that patents are the problem; bills like this one promote that narrative but at the cost of addressing systemic issues with drug pricing that will be unaffected by any changes or diminution of patent protection that protects biologic drug innovation.