• By Kevin E. Noonan —

    GENGenetic Engineering News published the results of a study on Monday entitled "Top 50 NIH-Funded Institutions of 2019."  The report sets forth the context of these expenditures, with the Trump administration proposing large cuts in funding (12%, to a total outlay of $34.368 billion in Fiscal 2020) and Congress pushing back on any reductions (the House passed an appropriations bill allocating $41.084 billion, or a 5.12% increase and the Senate seems to be looking to follow suit).  And where does the money go?  The report states that 83% of that budget goes to fund extramural research, with FY2018 showing 47,000 grants awarded to 2,700 institutions in the amount of $26 billion.  This is in addition to supporting 6,000 scientists on the NIH campus.

    The remainder of the report shows the statistics for the 50 top "universities (including medical schools), research institutions, and teaching hospitals" for FY2019 through May 27th in dollars and number of grants awarded.  Not surprisingly, California has the most Federally granted institutions (7), with Massachusetts and New York ranking next with six apiece.  The report notes that these three states have 19 of the top 50 (38%) funded institutions.  Ohio is next with three institutions on the list, and seven states with two (Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington).  Twenty-six states have no university or other research institution on the list, but the report notes that these states also receive a significant amount NIH research money.

    Top 50 NIH-Funded Institutions of 2019

    Table 1-25 Table 26-50

  • By Donald Zuhn —

    District Court for the District of UtahIn April, in Xlear, Inc. v. STS Health, LLC, District Judge David Nuffer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant STS Health, LLC, finding that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,054,143 "do not point to an ineligible subject matter."  In denying STS's motion, the District Court also noted that "even if it were necessary to analyze the '143 patent under step two of the Alice Framework, STS has not carried its burden under that step."

    Plaintiff Xlear initiated the dispute between the parties when it filed suit against STS for infringement of the '143 patent.  In response, STS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the asserted claims were directed to the naturally occurring product xylitol, which was administered using well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.  The District Court denied the motion, finding that the '143 patent did not claim the naturally occurring product xylitol/xylose, but rather was directed to a method for delivery of the xylitol/xylose to clean out the nasopharynx in a human.  The Court also found that STS had not presented evidence of similar applications of xylitol prior to the '143 patent.  STS then filed its motion for summary judgment that the asserted claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for failing to recite patent eligible subject matter, citing seven issued patents as evidence that the nasal administration of xylitol/xylose was well-known, conventional, and routine when Xlear filed the application that issued as the '143 patent.

    In dismissing STS's motion for summary judgment, the District Court noted that when it denied STS's motion to dismiss, the Court had determined that under step one of the Alice framework the asserted claims were directed to a process or method that is not a law of nature or natural phenomenon.  In particular, the Court found that "the '143 patent does not claim the discovery of xylitol/xylose or the product itself," and "does not claim the exclusive right to every application of xylitol/xylose," but rather, the asserted claims "focus on the process of practically applying xylitol/xylose to clean the nasopharynx."  The Court therefore noted that:

    Because it was determined that the claims do not point to an ineligible subject matter, it was unnecessary to proceed to the second step and determine "whether additional elements 'transform[ed] the nature of the claims' into a patent-eligible application."  The analysis in the Previous Order should have stopped after concluding that the claims of the '143 patent do not point to patent ineligible subject matter.  The Previous Order should not have stated that additional evidence was needed to resolve the second step of the Alice Framework.

    However, the Court also noted that STS's motion for summary judgment would have failed even if it had been necessary to analyze the '143 patent under step two of the Alice framework.  In support, the District Court cited the Federal Circuit's decision in Berkheimer v. HP, Inc. for the proposition that whether "something is well-understood, routine, or conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination" that "goes beyond what was simply known in the prior art."  In particular, the Court noted that:

    STS has not shown how the seven cited patents teach the same invention as the '143 [patent].  The seven cited patents address the use of xylitol/xylose to aid in the absorption of other compounds through mucosal membranes, such as that found in the nose.  None of the cited patents address using xylitol/xylose to clean the nasopharynx.

    The Court also pointed out that notwithstanding the seven patents identified by STS, Xlear continued to argue that nasal administration of xylose/xylitol for cleaning the nasopharynx in a human was not conventional at the time of application, and the Court determined that "[t]he seven cited patents do not disprove that contention and STS has not demonstrated the absence of an underlying genuine issue of material fact that would permit deciding patent eligibility 'on summary judgment as a matter of law.'"

    The District Court concluded its opinion by noting that "[a]s the Previous Order determined under the first step of the Alice Framework, the claims of the '143 patent do not point to patent ineligible subject matter," and finding that "[t]he ‘143 Patent is therefore not invalid under § 101."  The Court therefore denied STS's motion for summary judgment.

    Xlear, Inc. v. STS Health, LLC (D. Utah 2019)
    Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment by District Judge Nuffer

  • By James Lovsin —

    Under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, States enjoy sovereign immunity from a wide variety of suits.  But there are exceptions, including congressional abrogation of immunity.  Twenty years ago, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), the Court struck down the Patent Remedy Act that abrogated state sovereign immunity from patent infringement:

    Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this title.

    35 U.S.C. § 296(a); see also id. § 271(h).

    The Court in Florida Prepaid held that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate immunity from patent infringement under various provisions in the Constitution, including the Patent Clause, Commerce Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; id. cl. 3; and § 5 of the 14th amend.

    Queen_Anne's_RevengeThis week, the Court granted to certiorari in Allen v. Cooper, No. 18-877 to consider the abrogation issue, again, in the context of copyright law.  In this case, Mr. Allen sued North Carolina for infringing his copyright in a documentary film related to the salvage of Blackbeard's ship, Queen Anne's Revenge.  The District Court denied the State's motion to dismiss for sovereign immunity, relying on the 1990 Copyright Remedy Act, which is substantially identical to the Patent Remedy Act:

    Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner provided by sections 106 through 122, for importing copies of phonorecords in violation of section 602, or for any other violation under this title.

    17 U.S.C. § 511(a).  In doing so, the District Court broke with the Fifth Circuit and several district courts throughout the country that have ruled the statute is invalid.

    The Fourth Circuit reversed.  The Fourth Circuit found that its "conclusion is required by Florida Prepaid."  895 F.3d 337, 351 (4th Cir. 2018).  As in Florida Prepaid, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate immunity from copyright infringement under the Copyright Clause, Commerce Clause, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    The Fourth Circuit rejected Allen's reliance on a 2006 Supreme Court case, Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, in which the Court upheld abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause.  According to the Fourth Circuit, Katz's holding "was made in a completely distinguishable context that was unique to the Bankruptcy Clause."  895 F.3d at 348.

    It is interesting that the Court decided to grant cert. in Allen v. Cooper.  Lower courts that have addressed copyright abrogation appear to have uniformly followed Florida Prepaid.  But the composition of the Court has significantly changed since Florida Prepaid was decided.  Florida Prepaid was decided by a 5-4 majority in 1999 and only one Justice from the majority, Justice Thomas, remains on the Court.  Similarly, only two of the dissenting Justices in Florida Prepaid remain on the Court, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.

    The Court's grant of cert. in Allen v. Cooper also stands in contrast to the Court's denial of cert. in April in the tribal immunity case Saint Regis Mohawk v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, No. 18-899.  There, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Tribe was not immune from inter partes review in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.

    Given the Copyright Remedy Act and Patent Remedy Act are substantively identical, the Court's decision in Allen v. Cooper could have an impact on patent law.  States frequently participate in the patent system and are often litigants in district courts as well as the PTAB.

    The Federal Circuit is currently deciding such a state sovereign immunity case.  In Regents of University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp., No. 18-1559, the PTAB majority ruled that the State waived immunity from IPR by filing an infringement suit in district court.  In concurrence, another judge explained that states do not have any immunity from IPR.  The Court heard oral argument in Regents in March.

    Patent Docs will monitor Allen v. Cooper and provide updates the case progresses.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    ACLUIt is perhaps not surprising that several medical groups, as well as other organizations with little regard for the patent system, and their legal accomplice, the American Civil Liberties Union, would oppose the recent efforts to amend the subject matter eligibility section of the statute (35 U.S.C. § 101) to correct the imbalances caused by recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter.  After all, one of the pillars of the current standard for (in)eligibility was the Court's decision in AMP v. Myriad Genetics, championed by the ACLU beginning with the District Court case challenging "gene patenting" (an effort, not inconsequentially, that has taken the place of Nazis marching through the predominantly Jewish suburb of Skokie, IL in the group's fundraising efforts).  This opposition has taken the form of a letter to Senators Coons (D-DE) and Tillis (R-NC) as well as Representatives Collins, Johnson, and Stivers setting forth these groups' views.

    Before getting into the substance of their allegations of the sky-falling effects of enactment of any revisions to the statutory status quo, two important realities need to be understood.  First, despite all the trumpeting and bally-hoo that ensued after the Supreme Court's Myriad decision was handed down, human genes remain patent-eligible.  Admittedly, the species of genes that can be patented has been limited, from genes isolated as they exist in the chromosome to a particular, processed form of the gene called "complementary DNA" or cDNA.  While this limitation can restrict the capacity for a small subset of human genes to be patented, the overwhelming majority of the ~30,000 genes present in the human genome remain patent eligible in the cDNA form.

    The second important (overlooked) fact is that most human genes are not patentable.  The reason for the distinction is that patent-eligibility is a categorical criterion, while patentability depends on the circumstances of the invention in light of the prior art.  The genomic sequence of the totality of human genes (as well as the ~80% of the genome that does not encode proteins) has been publicly available since the turn of the 21st Century, due in large part to such luminaries as Sir John Shulston who were motivated precisely to prevent (or forestall or at least retard) patenting of human genes.  And for those human genes for which patent applications were filed at that time, the statutory limit of patent term as 20 years from filing ensures that there are very few such patents that have not expired (or been abandoned); Myriad's BRCA gene patents, for example, are almost all expired or will be in short order.

    Thus, no matter what Congress may do, the historical fact is that the "gene age" is over and if there was ever a diminution of innovation, medical progress, or benefit to humanity occasioned by these patents, that time is truly past.

    This is not to say that the Supreme Court's precedent has not made mischief with regard to patenting "natural products" (see "Sherry Knowles Addresses Real World Impact of Myriad-Mayo Guidance at BIO Symposium"); how the Court's Myriad precedent has been interpreted, by both the Patent Office and the lower courts is a source of concern that is blithely ignored by the ACLU and their clients.

    Turning to the ACLU's letter, it is clear from the introductory sentence, stating that the signatories are "civil rights, medical, scientific, patient advocacy, and women's health organizations," that the ACLU turned its Rolodex to the groups it assembled for the Myriad case to once again raise an alarm over ephemeral consequences (and, sadly resulting in consequences these groups or at least their members would not have envisioned with approval; see "The ACLU, Working for the Man") that could result by enactment of the revisions suggested in the latest proposal.  The letter states that the proposed revisions to patent subject matter eligibility standards would "authorize patenting products and laws of nature, abstract ideas, and other general fields of knowledge" (they wouldn't, of course; they would just substitute per se, categorical standards to ones better suited to identifying that subject matter whose patenting would not "promote progress of the useful arts").

    But the ACLU and friends have expanded the litany of their worries from the Myriad days — the letter announces that they consider "[m]ost troubling[]" the prospect of "patenting of human genes and naturally-occurring associations between genes and diseases," which they claim "will prevent the discovery of novel treatments for diseases including cancer, muscular dystrophy, Alzheimer's disease, heart disease, and other rare and common diseases."  It would be understandable to think from this rhetoric that, before the Myriad decision no one ever discovered "novel treatments for diseases including cancer, muscular dystrophy, Alzheimer's disease, heart disease, and other rare and common diseases," when the truth of the matter is that, perhaps with the exception of Alzheimer's disease, the history of the past thirty years has been the discovery of treatments for such diseases, supported by the patent system to permit these treatments to come to market.  In addition, the letter claims, revising patent law as proposed would "create barriers to patients' access to potentially lifesaving genomic tests, eliminate access to confirmatory testing and dramatically increase the cost of tests that have benefited from innovation that led to reduced costs of DNA sequencing technology."  Sadly, of course, the true sequellae of the Myriad decision has been to permit corporate testing labs to expropriate the scientific advances which, as in Myriad, tend to come from academia and startup biotechnology companies; the even sadder reality is that access to medicine and diagnostic testing is thwarted by insufficient insurance coverage not patents.  Indeed, one of the reasons genetic diagnostic testing is (relatively) widely accepted (and reimbursed) is due to the success Myriad had in convincing skeptical insurance providers (public and private) in the late 1990's that something as frightening and serendipitous as cancer could be predicted with reliability at all (see "In Defense of Patenting").  And as for the letter's further allegation that the proposed revisions to statutory patent eligibility would "stymie competition for developing and improving diagnostic and medical tests, and increase the cost and hinder advancement of targeted therapeutics involving genomic markers" that would result in "higher costs for patients, payers, and the healthcare system overall," what will be stymied would be investment in such new technologies (except for those established businesses for whom innovation upsets their established channels of commerce and thus tend to avoid truly groundbreaking inventions).

    The letter goes on to provide an encomium for recent patent eligibility jurisprudence, highlighting the signal victory for the ACLU in Myriad and particularly noting the unanimity of the Supreme Court's decisions (which paradoxically does not necessarily demonstrate their correctness, erudition, or deep and penetrating thought concerning the patent issues at bar).  More troubling is the unsupported allegations that follow, that these decisions "have created a legal foundation that is promoting innovation across numerous sectors."  (It is worth noting that the only support for the assertion that human gene patent ineligibility should lead to lower cost diagnostic tests cited in the letter is an article by a journalist, written the day the Supreme Court handed down its Myriad decision.  One would think that the experience, putatively represented by the co-signers of the letter, six years after the Myriad decision, would yield ample, real-world evidence of this speculation but it's nowhere to be found in the letter.)

    In something of a factual (but not emotional or rhetorical) nonsequitur, the letter then recites the purported sins of Myriad, backed not by court findings but by allegations from an amicus brief from the American Medical Association and other medical groups.  (It is significant that plaintiffs and their ACLU counsel did not attempt to invalidate Myriad's patents for misuse or other misbehavior, but used allegations of misbehavior to drum up support for invalidating the patents on categorical grounds.)  Included in these allegations in the letter is the slander that "[t]he patents authorized Myriad to block all manner of scientific inquiry into the genes shutting down research at academic medical centers throughout the country," a statement belied by the more than 10,000 academic research papers that could be found in Medline and other databases having been published between 1997 (when the University of Utah or its licensee Myriad was granted the patents) and 2013 (when the Supreme Court invalidated a small subset of those patent claims).

    This false litany leads to a reiteration of the ACLU's Myriad rhetoric:  that there is a "fundamental truth" that "genes and other naturally occurring matter and relationships should never be granted to anyone as intellectual property."  But the consequence of taking that "truth" to its logical extreme is that nothing in the natural world, no matter how changed by human intervention, could be patented.  It is nothing less than hubris (and like much hubris, arising from ignorance) to think that only that which arises solely without reliance on the natural world deserves patent protection.  And the further roll call of intellectual luminaries and medical, religious, and interest groups recited as supporting the Myriad decision just shows that excellence and achievement in one field does not lead to wisdom is another (see William Shockley and Peter Duesberg as illustrative examples).

    As might have been expected, the ACLU's concern has been inflamed by language in the draft proposed legislation that the judicial exceptions (laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas) and case law supporting them would be abrogated.  This tactic raises many more concerns that importuning the ACLU and its friends and supporters, the most worrisome of which being that the Supreme Court would, at best, decide that such abrogation was unconstitutional for being beyond the patenting powers granted to Congress in Article I and, at worst, give rise to even more stringent limitations on patent eligibility (no doubt applauded by the ACLU and their co-signers of this letter).  The reality is, of course, more measured and reasoned than that:  what is proposed is replacing the poorly defined, inconsistently applied, subjective, per se judicial (instead of statutory) "exceptions" with legislation, vetted through the political process and (with luck) capable of consistent, predictable application in ways that do not turn patenting into a lottery dependent on the whims of district court or appellate judges or, indeed, the Supreme Court.  (It is ironic that the letter casts the consequences of this legislation as creating uncertainty, when even the casual observer will find plainly evident that it has been the Supreme Court's recent decisions, and its unwillingness to revisit them, that has caused the greatest uncertainty that the legislation proposes to correct.)  The ACLU's letter castigates the proposed legislation for wiping out "one hundred and fifty years of case law" but of course that's the point; said more properly the legislation will remove the uncertainties created by this case law.

    The letter ends with the disingenuous suggestion that "[t]o the extent that there are problems with the current application of the law that must be solved, narrower paths to addressing them are preferable to rewriting current 101 standards and overturning over a century of precedent." Not only does the letter contain no hint regarding what those "narrow paths" might be, it is unlikely that any such path would be acceptable to the ACLU and their supporters.

    One thing is certain:  there are competing memes involved in the patent subject matter eligibility debate, and for the pro-patent proponents to prevail this time it will take more political savvy than was exhibited during the Myriad case.

  • By Hanns-Juergen Grosse* —

    EPOThe approach of the European Patent Office (EPO) to prohibition of double patenting is well established and may, at a first glance, also seem well founded.

    Broadly speaking, the prohibition of double patenting is meant to mean that two patents cannot be granted to the same applicant for one invention (in the same jurisdiction).  At a closer look, there is a plurality of facets, layers and aspects, producing an exhilarating spectrum of double patenting.

    Thus, double patenting may arise in three situations where European patent applications are filed by the same applicant:

    • Europeans patent applications filed on the same day;

    • Divisional and parent patent applications; or

    • A European patent application claiming priority in respect of another European patent application (internal priority).

    However, commentators on European patent practice have never stopped to stress that the European Patent Convention (EPC) does not prohibit double patenting.

    After the Examining Division decided to refuse European patent application EP 10 718 590.2 in accordance with the applicable Guidelines for Examination at the EPO (Guidelines), G IV, 5.4 under Art. 97(2) EPC in conjunction with Art. 125 EPC, allowing subordinate application of principles of procedural law generally recognised in the contracting states of the EPC, the applicant appealed the decision and auxiliary requested, as occasionally done, that the responsible Board of Appeal (BoA) refers a pivotal question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBoA).

    The BoA did not, as usually done, discard the idea of referring the question to the EBoA, but also helped to develop the applicant's question into a two-tier question, and decided at the end of oral proceedings held on 07 February 2019 in appeal case T 318/14 to refer a detailed set of questions to the EBoA.

    What has happened?

    In earlier leading decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06, both relating to divisional patent applications, the EBoA said in passing that the principle of the prohibition on double patenting is based on the notion that an applicant has no legitimate interest in proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter if the applicant already possesses one granted patent for that subject-matter.  The Guidelines extrapolated therefrom that in case that two or more European applications from the same applicant designate the same state or states and the claims of those applications have the same filing date or priority date and relate to the same invention only one of the applications can be granted.

    However, for the present European patent application EP 10 718 590.2 claiming the internal priority of, and claiming the same subject matter as, an earlier European patent application, the applicant has a clear legitimate interest, as it is the filing date and not the priority date that is the relevant date for calculating the 20-year term of a patent.  Of course, it is common practise to file a European patent application establishing a priority date for a new invention, towards the end of one year after the priority date to file a PCT application claiming the priority in respect of the European patent application, and towards 31 months after the priority date to enter the regional phase of the PCT application before the EPO.

    The BoA agreed with the applicant that there is no uniform practice and even conflicting case law, and referred the following questions to the EBoA:

    1.  Can a European patent application be refused under Art. 97(2) EPC if it claims the same subject-matter as a European patent granted to the same applicant which does not form part of the state of the art pursuant to Art. 54(2) and (3) EPC?

    2.1  If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the conditions for such a refusal and are different conditions to be applied where the European patent application under examination was filed

    a) on the same date as, or

    b) as a European divisional application (Art. 76(1) EPC) in respect of, or

    c) claiming the priority (Art. 88 EPC) in respect of a European patent application on the basis of which a European patent was granted to the same applicant?

    2.2  In particular, in the latter case, does an applicant have a legitimate interest in the grant of the (subsequent) European patent application in view of the fact that the filing date and not the priority date is the relevant date for calculating the term of the European patent under Art. 63(1) EPC?

    For answers to the questions raised in T 318 /14, the EBoA may have to probe the real intentions of the legislators by going back to the archives and interpreting the Traveaux Préparatoires, the draft documents and minutes produced when the EPC was conceived back in the early 1970s.

    There will be plenty of fragments in need of attention, and plenty of leeway for interpretation.  However, it will be worth the efforts.

    * Dr. Grosse is a partner with D Young & Co

    This article was reprinted with permission from D Young & Co.

  • CalendarJune 3-6, 2019 – BIO International Convention (Biotechnology Innovation Organization) – Philadelphia, PA

    June 7, 2019 – Program on Ethics in the Practice of Intellectual Property Law (John Marshall Law School Center for Intellectual Property, Information & Privacy Law) – 12:40 to 5:00 pm, Chicago, IL

    June 12-14, 2019 – Patent Fundamentals Bootcamp 2019: An Introduction to Patent Drafting, Prosecution, and Litigation (Practising Law Institute) – Chicago, IL

    July 17-19, 2019 – Patent Fundamentals Bootcamp 2019: An Introduction to Patent Drafting, Prosecution, and Litigation (Practising Law Institute) – San Francisco, CA

  • JMLSThe John Marshall Law School Center for Intellectual Property, Information & Privacy Law will be holding its 10th Annual Program on Ethics in the Practice of Intellectual Property Law from 12:40 to 5:00 pm on June 7, 2019 in Chicago, IL.  The conference will consist of the following sessions:

    • What IP Lawyers Should Know About ARDC Proceedings and Client Complaints
    • Ethical Considerations for In-House Counsel
    • Ethical Issues in Patent Litigation
    • Developments in Malpractice for the IP Lawyer
    • Implicit Bias and the Legal Profession

    Additional information about the program can be found here.  Those interested in registering for the conference online can do so here; the registration fee is $195 (general registration); students, staff, and faculty can register for free.

  • By Donald Zuhn —

    District Court for the District of DelawareLast week, in Tangelo IP, LLC v. Tupperware Brands Corp., District Judge Richard G. Andrews of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied a motion for exceptional case filed by Defendant Tupperware Brands Corp., finding that Tupperware Brands had failed to establish that the case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285.  Plaintiff Tangelo IP, LLC had filed suit against Tupperware Brands, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,429,005.  Tupperware Brands responded by filing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the '005 patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The District Court granted the motion, and Tupperware Brands then moved for a finding of exceptional case and requested attorneys' fees under § 285.

    In determining that the case was not exceptional, the District Court noted that although it had found the '005 patent to be invalid under § 101, "that does not mean Plaintiff's contrary position was unreasonable."  In support, the Court cited SFA Sys., LLC v. Newegg Inc., 793 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015), for the proposition that "it is the substantive strength of the party's litigating position that is relevant to an exceptional case determination, not the correctness or eventual success of that position" (emphasis in opinion).

    In response to Tupperware Brands' argument that Tangelo had "ignored substantial precedent dismissing analogous claims directed to concepts long-practiced in society," the Court noted that Tupperware Brands had "identifie[d] no precedent addressing claims analogous to those in the '005 patent, at least beyond the broad category of claims directed to 'concepts long-practiced in society.'"  Judge Andrews also noted that he had not identified any cases in which analogous claims had been found to be patent ineligible.

    Judge Andrews concluded the opinion by distinguishing the instant case from his decision in Finnavations LLC v. Payoneer, Inc., 2019 WL 1236358 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2019).  In Finnavations, Judge Andrews had granted motions for exceptional case and attorneys' fees based on claims that were "plainly directed at a patent ineligible concept," where there was "no question" that the patent at issue was invalid because the claims were analogous to those struck down in Alice.  Judge Andrews found the instant case to be "clearly a different situation," explaining that while he ultimately agreed with Tupperware Brands regarding the validity of the '005 patent, "there is room for argument."  Judge Andrews also pointed out that he was not aware of any precedent that leaves "no question" as to the validity of the '005 patent, "particularly in view of the somewhat opaque nature of § 101."  The Court therefore denied Tupperware Brands' motion for a finding of exceptional case.

    Tangelo IP, LLC v. Tupperware Brands Corp. (D. Del. 2019)
    Memorandum Order by District Judge Andrews

  • By Donald Zuhn —

    USPTO SealIn January, the Federal Circuit determined in Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Iancu that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office had erred in calculating the Patent Term Adjustment for Supernus' U.S. Patent No. 8,747,897.  In particular, the Court found that because there were "no identifiable efforts" that Supernus could have undertaken in the time period between the filing of an RCE during prosecution of the application that issued as the '897 patent and the mailing of an EPO notification of opposition for a European counterpart patent (which resulted in Supernus filing a supplemental Information Disclosure Statement during prosecution of the '897 patent), Supernus had not failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution during that time period.

    In response to the Federal Circuit's decision in Supernus, the USPTO issued a Federal Register notice (84 Fed. Reg. 20343) earlier this month notifying stakeholders of the impact of the decision on its PTA determinations.  In the notice, entitled "Patent Term Adjustment Procedures in View of the Federal Circuit Decision in Supernus Pharm., Inc. v. Iancu," the Office indicates that it is "modifying its patent term adjustment procedures in view of the decision."  However, the notice states that "the USPTO will continue to make the patent term adjustment determinations indicated in patents under the existing regulations using information recorded in its PALM [Patent Application Locating and Monitoring] system," and that a patentee who believes there were no identifiable efforts it could have undertaken to conclude prosecution of an application (as Supernus argued with respect to the '897 patent) "may raise the issue in a timely request for reconsideration of the patent term adjustment, providing any relevant information that is not recorded in the USPTO's PALM system."

    The Office did note — in support of essentially maintaining the status quo on PTA determinations and challenges to those determinations — that "[t]he event from which the Federal Circuit measured the beginning of the patent term adjustment reduction in Supernus (the EPO's notice to Supernus of the opposition on August 21, 2012) is an event external to the USPTO and is thus not an event that is recorded in the USPTO's PALM system."  Therefore, until the Office is better able to track actions in foreign counterpart applications and patents (using, for example, the Citation List of its Global Dossier Initiative; see "USPTO News Briefs," October 25, 2017), it is hard to see what additional modifications the Office could make to its PTA procedures.

    The notice also points out that "the USPTO expects that the situation in Supernus should arise infrequently," explaining that:

    An extended delay between the filing of a request for continued examination and the subsequent Office action (932 days in Supernus) should be a rare occurrence now, as the average time between the filing of a request for continued examination and the subsequent Office action is currently only 79 days.

    In addition, the Office reminds stakeholders in a footnote that:

    The patent term adjustment reduction at issue in Supernus can be avoided by the prompt submission of the information disclosure statement.  Specifically, 37 CFR 1.704(d) provides a "safe harbor" in that a paper containing only an information disclosure statement in compliance with 37 CFR 1.97 and 1.98 will not be considered [a] failure to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution (processing or examination) of the application under 37 CFR 1.704(c)(6), (c)(8), (c)(9), or (c)(10) if the information disclosure statement is accompanied by one of the statements set forth in 37 CFR 1.704(d)(1)(i) or (d)(1)(ii).

    Noting that the Office has "adopted ad hoc procedures for seeking reconsideration of the patent term adjustment determination in the past when there have been changes to the interpretation of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 154(b) as a result of court decisions," the notice indicates that such ad hoc procedures were necessary because former provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4) "provided a time period for seeking judicial review that was not related to the filing of a request for reconsideration of the USPTO's patent term adjustment determination or the date of the USPTO's decision on any request for reconsideration of the USPTO’s patent term adjustment determination."  The Office therefore determined that no such ad hoc procedures were required in response to the Supernus decision because 37 C.F.R. § 1.705 allows patentees to file a request for reconsideration up to seven months after a patent is issued and to wait until after the Office reaches a final PTA determination before seeking judicial review of that determination.