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  • Webinar on Top Patent Law Stories of 2019

    MBHB Logo 2McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP will be offering a live webinar on the "Top Patent Law Stories of 2019" on January 22, 2020 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  Since 2007, the Patent Docs weblog has presented an annual, end-of-the-year review of the top stories in patent law.  In this presentation, Patent Docs co-authors Donald Zuhn, Kevin Noonan, and Michael Borella will take a look back at the top patent stories of 2019, many of which will likely impact patent applicants and practitioners in the coming year.

    While there is no fee to participate, attendees must register in advance.  Those wishing to register can do so here.  CLE credit is pending for the states of California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.

  • Fireside Chat with USPTO Director Iancu

    IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Corporate Committee will be hosting a fireside chat with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Director Andrei Iancu on January 16, 2020 from 12:00 to 1:00 pm (CT) at Google's offices Chicago, IL.  The fireside chat, which will focus on topics related to fostering innovation, diversity, and entrepreneurship, will be moderated by Sylvia Chen of Google.

    There is no cost to attend the event, but those interested in registering for the event should register by January 9, 2020 by contacting Billie Hinnen at bhinnen@sram.com.  Additional information regarding the event can be found here.

  • Top Stories of 2019: #6 to #10

    By Donald Zuhn –-

    FireworksAfter reflecting upon the events of the past twelve months, Patent Docs presents its 13th annual list of top patent stories.  For 2019, we identified fifteen stories that were covered on Patent Docs last year that we believe had (or are likely to have) a significant impact on patent practitioners and applicants.  Yesterday, we counted down stories #15 to #11, and today, we count down stories #10 to #6, as we will work our way towards the top five stories of 2019.  As with our other lists (2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007), links to our coverage of these stories (as well as a few links to articles on related topics) have been provided in case you missed the articles the first time around or wish to go back and have another look.  As always, we love to hear from Patent Docs readers, so if you think we left something off the list or disagree with anything we included, please let us know.  In addition, we will be offering a live webinar on the "Top Patent Law Stories of 2019" on January 22, 2020 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  Details regarding the webinar, which will focus on a handful of the most important stories on this year's list, can be found here.


    10.  Federal Circuit Applies Doctrine of Equivalents (And Not Only in "Exceptional" Cases)

    In May, the Federal Circuit dismissed Amgen's doctrine of equivalents argument in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., stating that "[t]he doctrine of equivalents applies only in exceptional cases and is not 'simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims,'" citing its pre-Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. precedent in London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  The Court based its decision on the reasoning that "Sandoz does not infringe claim 7 under the doctrine of equivalents because its one-step, one-solution purification process works in a substantially different way from the claimed three-step, three-solution process" recited in Amgen's claims.  Four months later, the Federal Circuit issued an order modifying its opinion to read:  "The doctrine of equivalents applies only in exceptional cases and is not 'simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims.'"  In between its May decision and September order in Amgen, the Federal Circuit issued at least five decisions applying the doctrine of equivalents (and issued a sixth decision applying the doctrine in November).

    The doctrine of equivalents is a Supreme Court-created patent doctrine that arose in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (an uncharacteristically pro-patent decision by the Court, the doctrine recognized that an "unscrupulous copyist" could practice a claimed invention without literal infringement in some circumstances, and as a consequence the patent right could be turned into a "hollow and useless thing").  The doctrine fell into disfavor at the Federal Circuit during the 1990's and arguably provided the first inkling to the Supreme Court that the Federal Circuit's patent jurisprudence would benefit from the Court's closer oversight.  In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. and Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, the Supreme Court reiterated the vibrancy of the doctrine; nevertheless, its successful assertion has continued to decline.  Thus, the Federal Circuit's decision in UCB, Inc. v. Watson Laboratories Inc. in June, affirming a District Court's determination in ANDA litigation that the generic challenger's product infringed under the doctrine, was a welcome surprise.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Pharma Tech Solutions, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," November 27, 2019
    • "Federal Circuit Issues Order Clarifying Status of Doctrine of Equivalents," September 5, 2019
    • "Ajinomoto Co. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Cir. 2019)," August 13, 2019
    • "Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," August 12, 2019
    • "Amgen Inc. v. Coherus BioSciences Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," August 11, 2019
    • "Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, S.A. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," July 24, 2019
    • "UCB, Inc. v. Watson Laboratories Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," July 16, 2019
    • "Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," May 12, 2019


    9.  Federal Circuit Finds More Method of Treatment Patents Eligible

    Following on the heels of its 2018 decision in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Int'l, the Federal Circuit issued two more decisions concerning the patent eligibility of method of treatment claims in 2019.  In Vanda, which made our Top Stories list last year (coming in at #12), the Federal Circuit affirmed a District Court decision finding that the claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,586,610, which are directed to methods of treating a patient suffering from schizophrenia with iloperidone, were not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  In April, the Federal Circuit decided Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., reversing a District Court decision holding the claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,808,737, which are directed to methods of using oxymorphone to treat pain in patients with impaired kidney function, to be ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  In reversing the District Court, the Federal Circuit determined that the asserted claims of the '737 patent were legally indistinguishable from the claims at issue in Vanda.  Only a few weeks earlier, the Federal Circuit decided Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, reversing and remanding a District Court decision granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings that the asserted claims of six patents, which relate to the use of beta-alanine in dietary supplements to increase the anaerobic working capacity of muscle and other tissue, were not patent eligible.  The United States closed 2019 by filing a brief in response to a Supreme Court order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States on the petition for certiorari filed by Petitioners Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. and Hikma Pharmaceuticals International Ltd. (previously West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.) in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc.  The Solicitor General concluded that Vanda "is not an optimal vehicle for bringing greater clarity because the court of appeals majority arrived at the correct result," noting that "[i]n cases involving medical-diagnostic methods, by contrast, the Federal Circuit's recent decisions suggest that the court might well have reached different outcomes if it were not bound by the Mayo framework."  The Solicitor General therefore recommended that "[t]he Court should await a case in which lower courts' confusion about the proper application of Section 101 and this Court's precedents makes a practical difference."  The Supreme Court is scheduled to discuss Hikma's petition at Conference on January 10, 2020.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Solicitor General Recommends That Supreme Court Deny Certiorari in Hikma Pharmaceuticals v. Vanda Pharmaceuticals," December 8, 2019
    • "Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," April 1, 2019
    • "Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019)," March 19, 2019


    8.  Supreme Court: Prevailing Applicants Not Liable for USPTO's Attorney's Fees

    Last month, in Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office could compel an aggrieved applicant to pay its attorney's fees in a § 145 review, regardless of who wins or loses.  The Court unanimously rejected the USPTO's arguments.  In doing so, the Court bolstered the "American Rule" on attorney's fees and preserved § 145 proceedings as a financially viable option for review of adverse Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) decisions.  The decision expressly considered only patent reviews, but it also applies to analogous reviews of trademark decisions.  Thus, it has impact on cases far more broadly than just § 145 proceedings.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. (2019)," December 11, 2019
    • "Peter v. NantKwest: PTO Faces Skeptical Justices over Assessment of Fees," October 7, 2019
    • "Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc.," March 4, 2019


    7.  Supreme Court: Federal Government Cannot Petition for Review in AIA Post-grant Proceedings

    In June, the Supreme Court determined in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service that federal government agencies cannot avail themselves of America Invents Act (AIA) post-grant proceedings.  This decision was based on the Court's determination that the government is not a "person" as that term is used in relation to inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered business method (CBM) proceedings.  To parties accusing the federal government of infringing their patents, the decision means that they will be free of AIA post-grant challenges from the accused agency.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service (2019)," June 10, 2019
    • "Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Return Mail v. U.S. Postal Service," February 19, 2019


    6.  Congressional Effort to Reform § 101 Slows

    In April, Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, and Senator Chris Coons (D-DE), Ranking Member, joined by Representative Doug Collins (R-GA-9), Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee, and Representatives Hank Johnson (D-GA-4), and Steve Stivers (R-OH-15), released a "bipartisan, bicameral framework on Section 101 patent reform."  A month later, the group released a draft bill proposing significant changes to 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the law of patent eligibility.  The draft bill would completely eliminate the notion of a judicial exception to patent eligibility as well as clarify that the § 101 inquiry is separate from those of §§ 102, 103, and 112.  In other words, patentable subject matter under the draft bill would likely be as broad or even broader than the "anything under the sun that is made by man" language of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.  In June, the Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property held hearings on its proposal to revise 35 U.S.C. § 101, and in particular the draft bill that was released in May.  Chairman Tillis and Ranking Member Coons (with an occasional third senator in the room) heard testimony from forty-five individuals representing a broad swathe of patent expertise including industry executives and groups, inventors, a former Federal Circuit judge, former U.S. Patent and Trademark Office officials, and law professors.  Following those hearings, Senators Tillis and Coons released a statement regarding their takeaway from the hearings.  If anything, their statement reflected an understanding that the law needs to change, the Senators are committed to doing so, and that they still need to work out the details.  Despite the whirlwind of activity in April, May, and June, legislative progress has slowed since Senators Tillis and Coons released their statement at the end of June, and the patent community awaits the Senators' next move.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Biotech Prospects for Patent Reform," June 26, 2019
    • "Senators Tillis and Coons Release Statement on Recent Patent Reform Hearings," June 26, 2019
    • "Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Holds Hearings on Proposed Revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 101," June 17, 2019
    • "ACLU (Predictably) Opposes Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Proposal," June 3, 2019
    • "Senate Proposal for Section 101 Reform: Effect on Biotech/Pharma Inventions," May 23, 2019
    • "Congress Proposes Draft Bill to Change 35 U.S.C. § 101," May 23, 2019
    • "Congress Releases Framework for Section 101 Reform," April 17, 2019
    • "Law Review Article Advocates Supreme Court's Patent Eligibility Law is Unconstitutional," February 20, 2019

  • Top Stories of 2019: #11 to #15

    By Donald Zuhn –-

    FireworksAfter reflecting upon the events of the past twelve months, Patent Docs presents its 13th annual list of top patent stories.  For 2019, we identified fifteen stories that were covered on Patent Docs last year that we believe had (or are likely to have) a significant impact on patent practitioners and applicants.  Today, we count down stories #15 to #11, and in the coming week, we will work our way towards the top stories of 2019.  As with our other lists (2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007), links to our coverage of these stories (as well as a few links to articles on related topics) have been provided in case you missed the articles the first time around or wish to go back and have another look.  As always, we love to hear from Patent Docs readers, so if you think we left something off the list or disagree with anything we included, please let us know.  In addition, we will be offering a live webinar on the "Top Patent Law Stories of 2019" on January 22, 2020 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  Details regarding the webinar, which will focus on a handful of the most important stories on this year's list, can be found here.


    15.  USPTO Declares Interference Between Broad Institute and UC Berkeley over CRISPR Technology

    In December 2015, the journal Science picked the CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) technology as its "Breakthrough of the Year," declaring that the technology had "matured into a molecular marvel."  Not surprisingly, CRISPR's status as breakthrough molecular marvel has resulted in a battle over who has the best patent position with respect to this technology.  In June, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office declared an interference between patents (and an application) assigned to the Broad Institute, Inc., the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College and applications assigned to the Regents of the University of California, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier.  If the new interference sounds to Patent Docs readers like deja vu all over again, it is and it isn't –– the strategy employed by UC Berkeley has induced the Office to address the issues of priority raised in the earlier interference between the parties.  The parties have filed a number of motions and responses to those motions, as evidenced by the links below, and Patent Docs will continue to cover the latest battle over the rights to this revolutionary genome engineering technology.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "CRISPR Interference Update," December 26, 2019
    • "Broad Files Reply Brief to Berkeley's Opposition to Substantive Motion No. 1," December 17, 2019
    • "Berkeley Files Responsive Motion to Broad's Substantive Motion No. 2 in Interference," December 12, 2019
    • "Berkeley Files Substantive Motion No. 2 to be Accorded Benefit to Earlier Priority Application in Interference," December 10, 2019
    • "CRISPR Housekeeping," November 25, 2019
    • "CRISPR Motions Day at the PTAB: Broad Files Its Substantive Motion No. 4," November 24, 2019
    • "CRISPR Motions Day at the PTAB: Broad Files Its Substantive Motion No. 3," November 20, 2019
    • "CRISPR Motions Day at the PTAB: Broad Files Its Substantive Motion No. 2," November 18, 2019
    • "Berkeley Files Opposition to Broad's Substantive Motion No. 1 in Interference," November 10, 2019
    • "Board Denies CVC Motion to Seal Priority Statement," November 4, 2019
    • "Sigma-Aldrich Tries Again," October 27, 2019
    • "University of California/Berkeley et al. Authorized to File Motion Opposed to Broad Substantive Motion No. 1," September 30, 2019
    • "Broad Institute Takes Its Turn in Interference Motion Practice," September 24, 2019
    • "CRISPR Interference: Motion Practice," September 11, 2019
    • "PTAB Redeclares CRISPR Interference and Grants Leave for Some (But Not All) of Parties' Proposed Motions," August 29, 2019
    • "University of California/Berkeley Granted Yet Another CRISPR Patent," August 25, 2019
    • "CRISPR Interference Parties Propose Motions," August 1, 2019
    • "Sigma-Aldrich Wants Its Piece of CRISPR Pie," July 21, 2019
    • "New CRISPR Interference: The Details," July 8, 2019
    • "CRISPR Battle Joined Again," July 1, 2019
    • "Another U.S. Patent Issued for CRISPR," April 28, 2019
    • "CRISPR Patent Watch," March 12, 2019


    14.  Solicitor General: Berkheimer Not Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Uncertainty Concerning § 101 Standards

    Berkheimer v. HP Inc. was decided by the Federal Circuit in February 2018 and stands for — in the words of Judge Moore — "the unremarkable proposition that whether a claim element or combination of elements would have been well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field at a particular point in time is a question of fact."  In September 2018, HP petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and earlier this year, the Court requested that the Solicitor General file a brief expressing the views of the United States in this matter.  That brief arrived in December, and the Solicitor General expressed the opinion that the overall lack of clarity regarding the fundamental issues surrounding patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 makes addressing the points of Berkheimer premature.  The Solicitor General began the brief by declaring that "this Court's recent decisions have fostered uncertainty concerning those substantive Section 101 standards," noting that the uncertainty lies mainly in the "the scope of the exceptions and the proper methodology for determining whether a particular patent implicates them."  Berkheimer being largely a procedural case, the Solicitor General suggests that it would not be the appropriate vehicle for addressing the more fundamental substantive questions, opining that HP's question "would be difficult to answer in any cogent manner while uncertainty about the substance of the Section 101 inquiry persists."  The Supreme Court is scheduled to discuss HP's petition at Conference on January 10, 2020.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Solicitor General Files Brief in Berkheimer v. HP," December 9, 2019


    13.  Federal Circuit Revisits Safe Harbor Provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)

    The Federal Circuit has grappled with, divisively in some instances, the extent to which the safe harbor provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) extend to activities that are not strictly for obtaining regulatory approval, such as post-approval quality testing and "stockpiling" product used for commercial purposes.  For example, in 2011, in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, then-Chief Judge Rader joined by Judge Newman held that "routine" post-approval submissions are outside the safe harbor (over a vigorous dissent by Judge Moore), whereas in 2012, in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the roles were reversed, with Judge Moore finding herself in the majority (with Judge Dyk), and then-Chief Judge Rader filing a dissent.  In December, the Federal Circuit revisited these issues in Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., in a decision authored by Judge Moore and joined by Judges Bryson and Chen.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury's decision that fourteen batches of Hospira's erythropoietin (EPO) were not protected under the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor, and that seven other batches were clearly made for purposes related to obtaining FDA approval and therefore were protected under the safe harbor.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," December 18, 2019


    12.  Supreme Court on Preemption of State Tort Liability by Compliance with Federal Law and Regulations

    In May, in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, the Supreme Court continued its explication of the balance between state law tort liability that can be imposed on drug makers and the extent to which this liability can be pre-empted by the drug maker's compliance with Federal laws and regulations, particularly those related to FDA approval.  In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court held that the pre-emption question is for a judge to decide, and not a jury.  The Court also found that pre-emption is limited to those circumstances where "it is 'impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.'"  The Court also explained that the meaning of "clear evidence" (in the context of the evidence that the FDA would not have approved a manufacturer requested change to the label) to be "evidence that shows the court that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve a change to the drug's label to include that warning."

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht (2019)," May 27, 2019


    11.  Federal Circuit: When "No Identifiable Efforts" Could Have Been Undertaken, Applicant Has Not Failed to Engage in Reasonable Efforts to Conclude Prosecution

    In January, the Federal Circuit determined in Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Iancu that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office had erred in calculating the Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) for Supernus' U.S. Patent No. 8,747,897.  In particular, the Court found that because there were "no identifiable efforts" that Supernus could have undertaken in the time period between the filing of an RCE during prosecution of the application that issued as the '897 patent and the mailing of an EPO notification of opposition for a European counterpart patent (which resulted in Supernus filing a supplemental Information Disclosure Statement), Supernus had not failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution (pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(C)(i)) during that time period.  In October, the USPTO published a notice of proposed rulemaking in which the Office proposed certain revisions to the rules of practice concerning PTA in view of the Federal Circuit's Supernus decision.  In particular, the Office proposed revising the period of reduction of PTA for several provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.704, in which the period of reduction will correspond to "the period from the beginning to the end of the applicant's failure to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution" as opposed to the consequences to the Office of applicant's failure to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "USPTO Proposes Revisions to PTA Rules in View of Supernus v. Iancu," October 6, 2019
    •     "Intra-Cellular Therapies, Inc. v. Iancu (Fed. Cir. 2019)," September 26, 2019
    •     "Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. Iancu (Fed. Cir. 2019)," September 17, 2019
    •     "USPTO Issues Notice on Impact of Federal Circuit's Supernus Decision on PTA Procedures," May 29, 2019
    •     "Supernus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Iancu (Fed. Cir. 2019)," January 27, 2019

  • USPTO Makes Ex Parte Hannun An Informative PTAB Decision

    By Michael Borella —

    USPTO SealOver five and a half years on from the Supreme Court's Alice vs. CLS Bank ruling, patentees, patent professionals, judges, and USPTO personnel are still wrestling with what it means for an invention to be eligible for patenting.  This is especially true for software-related innovations.  Despite the software-driven digital economy accounting for approximately 7% of the U.S. gross domestic product, software inventions can have a rough path to allowance and are likely to have their eligibility challenged post-issuance.  The disconnect between software being one of the main sources of innovation in the last decade and its least-favored-nation status in patent law is largely due to Alice and its progeny.

    In Alice, the Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand involves a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But elements or combinations of elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional will not lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.  While this inquiry is generally carried out as a matter of law, factual issues can come into play when determining whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional.

    How to apply this test in practice has been anything but clear.  In response to complaints from applicants, patentees, and numerous other parties, the USPTO published its 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance in January and an update thereto in October.

    Notably, the Guidance breaks the first part of the Alice test into two sub-steps.  In the former, one determines whether the claim recites a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea.  In the latter, one determines further "whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception."  To focus the analysis, the Guidance indicates that all abstract ideas should fall into one of three categories:  mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes.  Think of these as the "Three M's" — math, money, and mental steps.

    In order to put its version of the Alice test into practice, the USPTO has been publishing a series of informative PTAB § 101 decisions.  We discussed four of these as well as a fifth earlier in the year.  Recently, a sixth, Ex Parte Hannun, has been added to the list.

    The Claimed Invention

    The applicant's claimed invention is described as being directed to:

    [S]tate-of-the-art speech recognition systems developed using end-to-end deep learning.  In embodiments, the model architecture is significantly simpler than traditional speech systems, which rely on laboriously engineered processing pipelines; these traditional systems also tend to perform poorly when used in noisy environments.  In contrast, embodiments of the system do not need hand-designed components to model background noise, reverberation, or speaker variation, but instead directly learn a function that is robust to such effects.  A phoneme dictionary, nor even the concept of a "phoneme," is needed.  Embodiments include a well-optimized recurrent neural network (RNN) training system that can use multiple GPUs, as well as a set of novel data synthesis techniques that allows for a large amount of varied data for training to be efficiently obtained.  Embodiments of the system can also handle challenging noisy environments better than widely used, state-of-the-art commercial speech systems.

    The PTAB deemed claim 11 representative.  It recites:

    A computer-implemented method for transcribing speech comprising:
        receiving an input audio from a user;
        normalizing the input audio to make a total power of the input audio consistent with a set of training samples used to train a trained neural network model;
        generating a jitter set of audio files from the normalized input audio by translating the normalized input audio by one or more time values;
        for each audio file from the jitter set of audio files, which includes the normalized input audio:
            generating a set of spectrogram frames for each audio file;
            inputting the audio file along with a context of spectrogram frames into a trained neural network;
            obtaining predicted character probabilities outputs from the trained neural network; and
            decoding a transcription of the input audio using the predicted character probabilities outputs from the trained neural network constrained by a language model that interprets a string of characters from the predicted character probabilities outputs as a word or words.

    The Examiner's Rejection

    During prosecution, the Examiner rejected claim 11 and claims depending therefrom under § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.  Particularly, the Examiner viewed claim 11 as "using the predicted character probabilities (mathematical formula) to decode a transcription of the input audio into words or text data."  The Examiner found that this was "similar to the court case Gottschalk v. Benson because the predicted character probabilities (mathematical formula or relationship) is used to convert or transcribe audio data into text data (words)."  Thus, the Examiner concluded that the claim was directed to an invention falling into the mathematical concepts category.

    The Examiner also characterized the claim as merely "normalizing the input audio data (manipulating data)," and "generating spectrogram frames based on each audio file (generating information sets based on prior information sets)," "using a mathematical formula to convert audio data into text data (Decoding)."  The Examiner asserted that this implied that the claim was also abstract under the "certain methods of organizing human activity" and "mental process" categories because a "human can listen to an audio file and transcribe the audio data into text data which can all be done mentally."

    Moreover, the Examiner found that the claim also fails under the second step of Alice.  To that point, the Examiner wrote that the claimed invention "[d]oes not amount to significantly more since it is just decoding a transcription using a mathematical formula or relationship."

    The PTAB's Decision

    Applying the Revised Guidance, the PTAB began with the inquiry of whether the claim recites a judicial exception.  Notably, the PTAB disagreed with the Examiner's contention that the claims involve either a mental process or a method of organizing human activity.  The PTAB stated:

    While transcription generally can be performed by a human, the claims here are directed to a specific implementation including the steps of normalizing an input file, generating a jitter set of audio files, generating a set of spectrogram frames, obtaining predicted character probabilities from a trained neural network and decoding a transcription of the input audio using the predicted character probability outputs.  These are not steps that can practically be performed mentally.  Nor do we see how the claimed invention recites organizing human activity.

    The PTAB also concluded that the claims do not recite a mathematical concept, pointing out that while the specification discloses an algorithm, the claims do not recite the algorithm.  Thus, under the Revised Guidance, no mathematical concept is recited.  In particular, the PTAB referenced the USPTO's eligibility example 38, which explains that even if some claim limitations are based on mathematical concepts, the claim is not abstract unless at least one of those concepts are recited therein.

    The PTAB went on to note that even if the claims were considered to recite one of the aforementioned categories of abstract ideas, the claims still "are not directed to an abstract idea because the alleged judicial exception is integrated into a practical application."  Relying on statements made by the applicant, the PTAB observed that "the claims of the current application include specific features that were specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result" and "provide improvements to that technical field."  As evidence of this, the PTAB looked to the specification, which describes a trained neural network used with a language model that "achieves higher performance than traditional methods on hard speech recognition tasks while also being much simpler."

    Based on this analysis, the PTAB concluded that "the Examiner erred in determining that the claims are directed to an abstract idea."

    Turning to the second part of Alice, the PTAB took further issue with the Examiner's reasoning.  Particularly, the PTAB noted that "the Examiner concludes the claims do not include any additional elements that amounts to significantly more than a judicial exception but fails to provide sufficient factual support."  Under Berkheimer v. HP, such a conclusory rationale for contending that a claim does not amount to significantly more cannot stand.

    Thus, the PTAB reversed the Examiner's rejections of claim 11 and all of its dependent claims.

    Analysis

    This case is of note because it is one of the first in which the PTAB has confirmed that a machine learning invention can be non-abstract.  While the USPTO's example 39 has suggested that one can claim a machine learning procedure without reciting any of the underlying mathematics, a mental process, or a method of organizing human activity, this decision affirms that is the case.  The PTAB also seemed persuaded, based on statements made in the specification, that the claimed invention entails an improvement over previous techniques used to address the problem domain.

    Of course, a district court or the Federal Circuit might agree or disagree.  But, at the very least, the reasoning herein provides a roadmap for claim drafting and prosecution that may situate an invention to pass § 101 muster in the USPTO.

    Ex Parte Hannun (PTAB 2019)
    Panel: Administrative Patent Judges Kumar, McKeown, and Shiang
    Decision on Appeal by Administrative Patent Judge McKeown

  • Persion Pharmaceuticals LLC v.  Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd. (Fed. Cir. 2019)

    By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealLast week, the Federal Circuit affirmed a District Court decision (by Circuit Judge Bryson, sitting by designation) in an ANDA litigation, finding obvious claims asserted for treating patients having mild to moderate hepatic impairment with extended release opioid formulations, in Persion Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd.  In reaching this obviousness determination, Judge Bryson made recourse to the concept of inherent disclosure in questions of obviousness, which while limited in scope, the Federal Circuit found their colleague properly applied.

    The case involved infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) of Orange Book-listed U.S. Patent Nos. 9,265,760 and 9,339,499, which claimed extended release hydrocodone formulations for treating patients with hepatic impairment, who were known in the prior art to be at greater risk for opioid overdose; Persion's drug product was marketed as Zohydro ER.  Claims 1 and 12 of the '760 patent are representative:

    1.  A method of treating pain in a patient having mild or moderate hepatic impairment, the method comprising:
        administering to the patient having mild or moderate hepatic impairment a starting dose of an oral dosage unit having hydrocodone bitartrate as the only active ingredient, wherein the dosage unit comprises an extended release formulation of hydrocodone bitartrate, and wherein the starting dose is not adjusted relative to a patient without hepatic impairment.

    12.  A method of treating pain in a patient having mild or moderate hepatic impairment, the method comprising:
        administering to the patient having mild or moderate hepatic impairment an oral dos- age unit having hydrocodone bitartrate as the only active ingredient, wherein the dos- age unit comprises an extended release formulation of hydrocodone bitartrate,
        wherein the dosage unit provides a release profile of hydrocodone that:
            (1) does not increase average hydrocodone AUC0-inf in subjects suffering from mild hepatic impairment relative to subjects not suffering from renal or hepatic impairment in an amount of more than 14%;
            (2) does not increase average hydrocodone AUC0-inf in subjects suffering from moderate hepatic impairment relative to subjects not suffering from renal or hepatic impairment in an amount of more than 30%;
            (3) does not increase average hydrocodone Cmax subjects suffering from mild hepatic impairment relative to subjects not suffering from renal or hepatic impairment in an amount of more than 9%; and
            (4) does not increase average hydrocodone Cmax in subjects suffering from moderate hepatic impairment relative to subjects not suffering from renal or hepatic impairment in an amount of more than 14%.

    Defendant Alvogen asserted an obviousness defense over two prior art patent references:  U.S. Patent Publication No. 2006/0240105 (Devane), that disclosed the Zohydro ER formulation itself and an in vivo study in which the formulation is used to treat pain; and U.S. Patent Publication No. 2010/0010030 (Jain), which disclosed Vicodin CR, a mixture of hydrocodone and acetaminophen, and that pharmacokinetic parameters for hydrocodone "were similar in normal subjects and subjects with mild and moderate hepatic impairment."  The District Court also considered the contents of the Vicodin and Lortab labels (Lortab is a related hydrocodone prior art formulation).

    The District Court held that Alvogen's ANDA formulation would infringe Persion's asserted patent claims but that these claims were invalid as obvious over the combination of Devane and Jain and the Vicodin and Lortab labels; the Federal Circuit's opinion provided a succinct synopsis of the District Court's reasoning:

    Specifically, the district court found that in light of the teachings of Jain and the Vicodin and Lortab labels, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to administer the extended-release hydrocodone bitartrate formulation disclosed in Devane to patients with mild or moderate hepatic impairment at an unadjusted dose and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in so doing.  The district court further found that the pharmacokinetic limitations in the pharmacokinetic claims are "inherent in any obviousness combination that contains the Devane formulation" because the recited pharmacokinetic parameters were "necessarily present" in the Zohydro ER formulation described in both Devane and the asserted patents.  Finally, the district court found that the objective factors of unexpected results, long-felt but unmet need, and failure of others did not weigh in favor of finding nonobviousness.

    The District Court also held that Persion's asserted claims (which were broader in scope than the Zohydro ER formulation) did not satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), because the specification common to the two asserted patents only specifically described Zohydro ER.

    The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Reyna, joined by Judges O'Malley and Chen.  The opinion was based on the Federal Circuit finding no clear error in the District Court's factual bases for its obviousness determination, as required under Supreme Court precedent (the opinion specifically citing  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969), quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).

    On appeal, Persion raised four grounds of asserted error.  First, Persion argued that the District Court improperly relied on inherency to determine that Devane disclosure inherently disclosed the pharmacokinetic limitations recited in claim 12 and related asserted claims.  Persion also argued that it was improper for the District Court to rely on pharmacokinetic profiles from drugs that were not extended-release single-active-ingredient hydrocodone formulations, and from patients without hepatic impairment in reaching its obviousness conclusion.  Persion also contended that the District Court did not properly consider its evidence of the objective indicia factors of non-obviousness.  Finally, Persion contended that the District Court's holding of obviousness and inadequate written description was inconsistent with each other.

    (The opinion notes, in a footnote, that Persion argued many of these points as legal issues, but the panel believes that they are based on factual determinations by the District Court, which has the more deferential "clear error" standard of review.)

    With regard to inherency, the opinion cites Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that "[i]t is not invention to perceive that the product which others had discovered had qualities they failed to detect," specifically Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 249 (1945).  The panel further cited multiple instances of the Court's own (and CCPA) precedent, for the principle that merely discovering a new property of a prior art compound is not sufficient to defeat obviousness, including Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009); and In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1979).  On the other hand, the opinion notes that inherency is "carefully circumscribed" in the obviousness context, to require that an inherent property is consistently present and is not a matter of probabilities.  To Persion's generic challenge to the District Court's use of inherency to support its obviousness determination the panel stated:

    To the extent Persion contends that inherency can only satisfy a claim limitation when all other limitations are taught in a single reference, that position is contrary to our prior recognition that "inherency may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis" where the limitation at issue is "the natural result of the combination of prior art elements."  PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).

    Further, Persion argued that "Devane does not teach administering its hydrocodone-only formulation to patients with mild or moderate hepatic impairment" and that this deficiency negates inherency (an argument more fitting for rebutting invalidity for lack of novelty), and the opinion response was as follows:

    The district court found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated, with reasonable expectation of success, to administer an unadjusted dose of the Devane formulation to hepatically impaired patients.  There was also no dispute that the Devane formulation, which was identical to the Zohydro ER formulation described in the patents in suit, necessarily exhibited the claimed parameters under these conditions [italics added].

    The panel also rejected Persion's arguments directed to various aspects of the pharmacokinetic evidence and claims, which were what was inherent in the prior art Zohydro ER formulation.  The District Court's consideration of evidence for FDA requirements for combination products was also not error, according to the panel, because the FDA standard is more rigorous than the obviousness standard, and the art (Jain) supported the conclusion that single drug formulations (or at least not combinations with acetaminophen) were preferred for patients with hepatic injury.  Jain also provided evidence that the panel held the District Court properly considered in concluding that the reference suggested no difference in pharmacokinetics of hydrocodone between normal and hepatically impaired individuals.  Not surprisingly, the panel also found no clear error in the District Court relying on expert testimony regarding the relevance of pharmacokinetic comparisons between normal and hepatically impaired individuals.  And the panel found ample evidence related the existence of motivation to combine the teachings of these references by one of ordinary skill in the art.  The opinion states:

    In sum, after reviewing the entire evidentiary record, we are not left with any conviction that the district court has made a mistake.  See Zenith, 395 U.S. at 123.  We therefore reject Persion's challenge to the district court's factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous.

    Regarding the District Court's treatment of the objective indicia, the opinion stated:

    [T]he substance of the court's analysis makes clear that it properly considered the totality of the obviousness evidence in reaching its conclusion and did not treat the objective indicia as a mere "afterthought" relegated to "rebut[ting]" a prima facie case.  Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2013); In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation, 676 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

    The Federal Circuit did not reach the District Court's decision on the written description issue, but noted that the decisions were not inconsistent based on the differences in scope that the District Court considered in invalidating the asserted claims on § 103 and § 112 grounds.

    Application of inherency to obviousness determinations here was facilitated by the description in the prior art of Persion's extended release formulation, and the patentee's reliance on the pharmacokinetic properties of this formulation to distinguish their claimed method from how these drugs were administered (and to whom) in the prior art.  It was those very properties that were inherent and thus could not be used to distinguish the prior art on the obviousness question.  Also, the negative limitation, "and wherein the starting dose is not adjusted relative to a patient without hepatic impairment," was directly related to the absence of any in vivo difference between effectiveness or toxicity (i.e., risk of overdose) between patients with hepatic impairment and those with normal liver function.  Under these facts, and in view of the deferential standard of review the Court must give to a district court's factual determinations, Federal Circuit affirmance of the District Court's decision was not particularly remarkable.

    Persion Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Panel: Circuit Judges O'Malley, Reyna, and Chen
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Reyna

  • CG Technology Development, LLC v. Fanduel, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)

    Federal Circuit Upholds Invalidity of Video Game Patent Despite Board's Incorrect Claim Construction

    By Joseph Herndon —

    Federal Circuit SealCG Technology Development, LLC (CG Tech) appealed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's Final Written Decision holding that the claims of U.S. Patent RE39,818 would have been obvious.  The Federal Circuit found that even though the disputed limitations in the claims were improperly construed, the claims were nevertheless invalid under the proper construction.

    Initially, FanDuel, Inc., DraftKings, Inc., and bwin.party Digital Entertainment, PLC (collectively, Appellees) petitioned for inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. RE39,818.  The '818 patent describes a video game system with personalized wireless controllers that allow for custom operation of an interactive video system based on a user's personal data.  Although the specific language in each claim varies, each of the challenged claims recites a limitation authorizing or allowing a user to play a specific game based on the age of the user.  For example, claim 1 reads:

    1.  A video game system comprising:
        a processor unit for executing game instructions and displaying video images on a display screen, the processor includes a receiver for receiving wireless identification and control signal transmissions; and
        a personalized portable control comprising:
        a plurality of control switches for generating game control signals;
        a non-volatile memory for storing personalized identification information corresponding to a user of the controller, the personalized identification information comprises a user age, and historical game performance data; and
        a transmitter for wireless transmitting of the personalized identification and game control signals to the processor unit, wherein the processor unit authorizes game execution based on the user age, further the processor unit comprises a transmitting for transmitting the historical game performance data to the portable controller.

    Appellees petitioned for inter partes review on the basis that the challenged claims would have been obvious in view of several combinations of references, each of which relied in part on the disclosure in U.S. Patent No. 5,816,918 to Kelly.

    Kelly describes that a player can choose to play a non-tournament (i.e., prize credit) game or to participate in a tournament.  Players can also be required to meet certain conditions before participating in certain games or tournaments.  The operator may designate further characteristics of tournaments, such as participation based on predefined characteristics, age, or other characteristics.

    The Board construed the "authorize play based on age" limitations to mean "a control that either prohibits or adjusts operation of a video game based on the user's age" and found that Kelly discloses the "authorize play based on age" limitations.

    On appeal, what a reference teaches is a question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.

    CG Tech argued that the Board erred in including "or adjusts" in its construction of the claim term "authorize play based on age".  Rather than challenge CG Tech's position as to the propriety of the language "or adjusts" in the Board's claim construction, Appellees instead argued that the inclusion of "or adjusts" had no impact on the Board's analysis.  Appellees argued that the Board's finding that Kelly discloses the "authorize play based on age" limitations was based on the unchallenged part of the Board's construction because it found Kelly "prohibit[s] operation of a game" based on age.

    The Federal Circuit agreed with CG Tech that the Board erred in construing the "authorize play based on age" limitations.  The Board's construction was found to fail to distinguish the two embodiments described in the claims and the specification:  authorizing and adjusting.  "Authorize" indicates only prohibiting (or not prohibiting) the player from playing the game, a concept distinct from "adjusting" the game.  The claims also distinguish between "authorizing" game execution based on user age and "adjusting" the game.

    The specification similarly distinguishes between authorizing and adjusting game play.  The specification describes a controller that ensures "amusement games designed for a specific age group [are] not operated by an inappropriate user" such that a "video game can be prohibited based on the user age."  But it separately explains that "educational video 'games' can be adjusted to the age of the user."  The intrinsic record thus supports the conclusion that the "authorize play based on age" limitations do not include adjustment and therefore are properly construed as requiring "a control that prohibits operation of a video game based on the user's age."

    Although the Board incorrectly construed the "authorize play based on age" limitations, its findings regarding Kelly were limited to Kelly's disclosure of "prohibiting" game play based on age.  The incorrect claim construction was therefore found to be harmless error since substantial evidence supported the Board's finding.

    The Board found that Kelly discloses that meeting a predefined prerequisite is used in some embodiments to prohibit operation of a game for failure to meet the established prerequisite and further found it "discloses using the age of the game player as a prerequisite to playing a particular game."  The Board thus found Kelly discloses "a control that prohibits operation of a video game based on the user's age."

    Though the disclosures in Kelly are in separate portions of the specification, they nonetheless support the Board's finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Kelly discloses prohibiting credit game and tournament play based on age.  Thus, because substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Kelly teaches these limitations under the proper construction, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision.

    CG Technology Development, LLC v. Fanduel, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
    Nonprecedential disposition
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Clevenger and Moore
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Moore

  • CRISPR Interference Update

    By Kevin E. Noonan —

    USPTO SealAll interferences have filings that are either kept confidential or are entirely procedural in nature.  While there is little substantive to discuss, acknowledging them serves the purpose of keeping track of the proceedings; the following papers have been filed in Interference No 106,115 between Senior Party The Broad Institute, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Junior Party the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, "CVC") over patents and applications that disclose and claim eukaryotic cell-embodiments of CRISPR technology:

    CVC Protective Order Entered — December 9, 2019
    Broad Notice of Filing Priority Statement — December 12, 2019
    CVC Notice of Filing Priority Statement — December 12, 2019
    Deposition Notice Randall Peterson Ph.D. — December 12, 2019
    Broad Priority Statement Filing — December 12, 2019
    CVC Priority Statement Filing — December 12, 2019
    Broad Notice of Priority Statement Service — December 13, 2019
    CVC Notice of Priority Statement Service — December 13, 2019
    CVC Fourth Updated Notice of Related Proceedings — December 23, 2019

    Dr. Peterson's deposition was scheduled to take place on December 17th and 18th, pursuant to the schedule set forth by the Board's Order (see "CRISPR Housekeeping").

    Finally, for now, on December 23rd, CVC provided an updated Notice of Related Proceedings, informing the Board and the Broad of the following newly granted patents (as well as additional pending applications), none of which are involved in this interference:

    10,301,651 (USSN 14/685,504); 10,227,611 (USSN 14/042,782); 10,407,697 (USSN 15/435,233); 10,385,360 (USSN 15/925,544); 10,421,980 (USSN 16/033,002); 10,415,061 (USSN 16/033,005); 10,308,961 (USSN 16/033,016); 10,358,658 (USSN 16/201,836); 10,337,029 (USSN 16/201,848); 10,351,878 (USSN 16/201,855); 10,400,253 (USSN 16/276,343); 10,428,352 (USSN 16/276,348); 10,443,076 (USSN 16/276,356); 10,487,341 (USSN 16/277,090); 10,519,467 (USSN 15/803,424); 10,526,619 (USSN 16/380,758); and 10,513,712 (USSN 16/382,093); allowance of USSN 16/380,781; allowance of USSN 16/382,096; allowance of USSN 16/382,097; and allowance of USSN 16/382,100.

  • Season’s Greetings from Patent Docs

    Holiday StarsThe authors and contributors of Patent Docs wish their readers and families a Happy Holidays!  Publication of Patent Docs will resume on December 26th.

  • Representative Danny K. Davis Introduces ”Inventor Rights Act”

    By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Washington - Capitol #5Last year, Judge Illston gifted patentees with a proverbial lump of coal with her decision in Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. by invalidating on summary judgment claims directed to methods for isolating cell-free fetal DNA from maternal DNA on the grounds that they are not patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  On December 19, Rep. Danny K. Davis (IL-7), joined by Congressman Paul A. Gosar (AZ-04), introduced a bill that is more like a Christmas gift for inventors, entitled the Inventor Rights Act (H.R. 5478).

    After preliminary sections extolling the contribution of inventors to American innovation and economic advancement, and noting the negative effects on inventor rights by Supreme Court cases including eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, and PTAB proceedings under the provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), and calling out the practice of "efficient infringement," the bill proposes amending Section 100 of the Patent Act to include a new section (k):

    (k) The term 'inventor-owned patent' means a patent with respect to which the inventor of the invention claimed by the patent or an entity controlled by that inventor—
        (1) is the patentee; and
        (2) holds all substantial rights.

    For such "inventor-owned patents," the bill proposes a new Section 330, entitled Inventor protections, which include:

    (a) Not subjecting such patents to reexamination or review [presumably including post-grant review, inter partes review, or covered business method patent review], or [more broadly], to otherwise make a determination about the validity of an inventor-owned patent" without consent of the inventor-owner;
    (b) permitting venue either:
        (1) in accordance with section 1400(b) of title 28;
        (2) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued in the instant action;
        (3) where an inventor named on the patent in suit conducted research or development that led to the application for the patent in suit;
        (4) where a party has a regular and established physical facility that such party controls and operates, not primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and has—
            (A) engaged in management of significant research and development of an invention claimed in a patent in suit prior to the effective filing date of the patent;
            (B) manufactured a tangible good that is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; or
            (C) implemented a manufacturing process for a tangible good in which the process is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; or
        (5) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not meet the requirements of section 1400(b) of title 28, in accordance with section 1391(c)(3) of such title.

    Further, under proposed Section 330(c) the bill creates a presumption that after a finding of infringement the inventor-owner will suffer irreparable harm unless the court grants an injunction, and provides for rebutting the presumption only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the patentee would not be irreparably harmed.

    The bill further provides in Section 330(d) that an inventor-owner can elect, "at any time before final judgment is entered by the court," to obtain recovery under this Section, which will include: (1) profit disgorgement, which will include all infringer's revenues relating to the infringing article, with the infringer bearing the burden of showing any "elements of cost or production" claimed to reduce this amount; (2) interests and costs; (3) treble damages for willful infringement; and (4) attorneys fees in the amount that exceeds 10% of the amounts set forth in subparagraph (1)-(3).

    The University of Illinois/Chicago is in Rep. Davis's congressional district but he has not sponsored much patent-related legislation before.  One possible consequence of this bill should it pass (which is unlikely) is that patents will remain "owned" by (i.e., assigned) to the named inventors, even in corporate settings, with their corporate masters holding licenses (likely exclusive licenses) to get the benefit of the bill's provisions while retaining traditional control of the patented invention.  Care will need to be taken to avoid situations where the scope of the license is so restrictive to amount to an assignment, thus frustrating the purpose (see "St Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals").

    According to a press release posted on Rep. Davis's website, "[t]he Inventor Rights Act provides narrowly targeted relief only to inventors that own and control their own patents.  This bill does not apply to large corporations, drug companies, or typical non-practicing entities."  The bill will be taken up in due course by the House, presumably in the next session beginning in early 2020.