• By Kevin E. Noonan

    Supreme Court Building #2The Supreme Court today entered orders denying certiorari in all five cases having petitions on subject matter eligibility, including Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC; Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Berkheimer v. HP Inc.

    It can only be concluded that the Court is comfortable with the state of diagnostic method patenting (i.e., it does not exist in the U.S.).  There are members of the Court who have expressed skepticism or outright hostility to such claims, fearing that they will inhibit the practice of medicine, as well as statements (some of dubious provenance) that diagnostic methods are unlike pharmaceuticals and don't need patents (mostly from legal academics and economists).  Although Bilski was a business method patent case, some of the Justices there seemed unimpressed with method claims more generally, and this prejudice may be affecting their certiorari behavior.  And there is the animus many of the Justices have voiced about the Federal Circuit over the past 15-20 years, which may have made the Court less inclined to come to their rescue.

    Or maybe the Court believes that this decision (not to decide) will motivate Congress to change the law; after all, in Mayo, Justice Breyer said something along the lines of "if you disagree with us, go to Congress."  And genuinely, the Court may be facing up to the reality that, even if its concerns are real, the Justices don't have a solution to the problem, in which case Congress is the only answer.

    What needs to be done (although it won't be) is for the PTO and courts to distinguish in individual cases the application of the Mayo/Alice cases to come to a determination of patent eligibility.  The Court can speak in generalities all it wants, but if pressed by advocates who point out the economic consequences of the recent jurisprudence there is a chance the Court will moderate its views.  After all, the Court certainly does not want the business section of the Wall Street Journal to run the headline "Supreme Court Destroys U.S. Industry, Public at Risk, Healthcare Costs Sure to Rise."

    On the bright side, by denying cert. in Vanda, the Court kept alive the glimmer of hope that there is a way to draft enforceable claims related to diagnostics leading to real world therapeutic interventions, as well as in Berkheimer, which increases the burden on patent challengers and may inhibit plenary dismissal on eligibility grounds.

    And in view of the Court's denial of certiorari in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp., maybe the Court believes that the other petitioners have more compelling interests in the Court's disposition of their cases than patentees have.  This sentiment would not be inconsistent with the Court's views on patent law enunciated in many cases over the past decade.

  • By Donald Zuhn –-

    District Court for the Eastern District of PennsylvaniaLast month, in Becon Medical, Ltd. v. Bartlett, Senior District Judge Jan E. Dubois of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to stay filed by Defendants Scott P. Bartlett, M.D. and TalexMedical, LLC ("TalexMedical").  In denying TalexMedical's motion, the District Court concluded that all three factors for determining whether to stay an action pending inter partes review weighed against granting a stay.

    Plaintiffs Becon Medical, Ltd. and Henry Stephenson Byrd, M.D. ("Becon") initiated the dispute between the parties by filing suit against TalexMedical for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,167,942 and 8,852,277, contending that TalexMedical infringed the patents by making and selling its non-surgical infant ear correction device, InfantEar (Becon makes and sells the EarWell device).  TalexMedical was served with Becon's complaint on October 10, 2018, and filed its motion to stay approximately three weeks before it requested IPR on October 9, 2019.  By the time TalexMedical requested IPR, the parties had completed fact discovery, the Court had conducted a Markman hearing, and the Court had construed the disputed claim terms.

    The District Court noted that in determining whether to stay an action pending an IPR, courts consider three factors:  (1) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set.  With respect to the first factor, the District Court noted that courts look to four sub-factors:  (1) the timing of the request for IPR; (2) the timing of the request for stay; (3) the status of the IPR proceedings; and (4) the relationship of the parties.

    In assessing the sub-factors to be considered with respect to the first factor, the District Court indicated that TalexMedical waited until "the last possible day before the statutory deadline" to request IPR, and that "[d]efendants offer no reason for filing their IPR petitions just before the deadline."  The Court also noted that Becon filed its Initial Infringement Contentions approximately seven months before TalexMedical filed for IPR, and that "defendants do not explain the near seven-month delay in filing for IPR after they learned of plaintiffs' infringement contentions."  In view of the above, the Court found "that the timing of defendants' request for IPR suggests that defendants are seeking an inappropriate tactical advantage," and determined that this sub-factor (the timing of the request for IPR) weighed against granting a stay.

    With respect to the second sub-factor (the timing of the request for stay), the District Court determined that because TalexMedical filed its motion to stay approximately three weeks before it filed for IPR, this sub-factor weighed in favor of granting a stay.  However, because the PTAB had not yet instituted review, and the IPR proceedings could extend into early 2021 if review was instituted, the Court determined that the third sub-factor (the status of the IPR proceedings) weighed against granting a stay.

    Moving to the fourth and final sub-factor (the relationship of the parties), the District Court began by noting that courts are reluctant to stay proceedings where parties are direct competitors because "[w]here parties are direct competitors, a patent infringer can take market share and build brand loyalty while the case is pending, and these injuries may not be recoverable in damages or later injunctive relief" (citing Zillow, Inc. v. Trulia, Inc., No. C12-1549JLR, 2013 WL 5530573, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2013)).  In this case, the Court indicated that the parties are direct competitors since they both make non-surgical infant ear correction devices that are marketed and sold to physicians, and therefore, that Becon would likely be unduly prejudiced by a stay.  The Court also noted that Becon had presented strong evidence of willful infringement, and while acknowledging that willful infringement is not traditionally considered by courts in determining whether to grant a stay (and despite noting that Becon did not move for a preliminary injunction), the Court found that the evidence of willful infringement "is relevant to the exercise of its discretion."  The Court therefore concluded that the fourth sub-factor weighed against a stay, and because three of the four sub-factors weighed against granting a stay, determined that the first factor weighed against granting a stay.

    Turning to the second factor (whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case), the District Court noted that courts in the Third Circuit have generally held that this factor weighs against a stay when the PTAB has not yet decided whether to institute IPR proceedings.  Because the PTAB had not yet decided whether to institute IPR proceedings, the Court concluded that the second factor weighed against granting a stay.

    Finally, with respect to the third factor (whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set), the District Court pointed out that while expert discovery had not yet been completed and a trial date had not yet been set, fact discovery had been completed, the Court had conducted a Markman hearing, and the Court had construed the disputed claim terms.  Thus, the District Court determined that both the Court and the parties had already expended significant resources, which weighed against granting a stay.

    Having concluded that all three factors weighed against granting a stay, the District Court therefore denied Defendants' Motion to Stay the litigation pending IPR.

    Becon Medical, Ltd. v. Bartlett (E.D. Pa. 2019)
    Memorandum by Senior District Judge Dubois

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Young Members' Committee will be presenting a program entitled "Pot Topic: IP Issues for the New Recreational Weed Industry in Illinois" on January 22, 2020 from 5:30 to 9:00 pm (CT) at the Chicago-Kent College of Law Auditorium and Lobby in Chicago, IL.  Nicole Cosby of Fyllo, Nicole Grimm of McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff, Emily Tupy of Cresco Labs, and Adam Wolek of Taft Stettinius & Hollister will discuss the evolving recreational cannabis industry in Illinois and IP issues that involved companies will face going forward.

    The registration fee for the presentation is $50 (non-members), $25 (IPLAC members or seniors), or $15 (students).  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • Federal Circuit Bar Association_2The Federal Circuit Bar Association (FCBA) will be offering a webcast entitled "Patent Law Year in Review 2019" on January 16, 2020 from 12:00 pm to 1:00 pm (EST).  A panel consisting of Susan Tull of Finnegan, Henderson, Farbow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP; Jill Schmidt of Genentech, Inc.; Sharonmoyee Goswami of Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; and Andrew R. Sommer of Greenberg Traurig, LLP will cover developments in patent law with a focus on patent law decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, including developments in the law of patentability, infringement, damages, design patents, and various issues that come up in PTAB trial proceedings.

    The webinar is complimentary for FCBA members, $50 for government, educator, or retired practitioners, or $175 for private practitioners.  Those interested in registering for the webcast, can do so here.

  • Foley & LardnerFoley & Lardner will be offering a webinar entitled "PTAB Year in Review" on January 23, 2020 from 1:00 to 2:00 pm (CT).  Jeanne Gillis, Stephen Maebius, and George Quillin of Foley & Lardner LLP will discuss the year's major developments and how they may impact practice before the PTAB going forward, and address the following specific topics:

    • 2019 Trends and Statistics
    • Recalibrating IPR Strategy Post-SAS
    Constitutionality of PTAB Judges
    • Motion to Amend Pilot Program (started March 15, 2019) and Interim Decisions on Motion to Amend
    • State Sovereign Immunity
    • Appeal of Institution Decision
    • Retroactively Invalidating Patents
    • Patent Eligibility for Life Science Companies – PTAB Trial Practice Guide (Updated July 2019)
    • Real Party in Interest (RPI): What's Next?

    While there is no cost to participate in the program, advance registration is required.  Those interested in attending the webinar can register here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Washington - Capitol #3On January 6, 2020, a bi-partisan coalition of Senators, including Senator Collins (R-ME), Doug Jones (D-AL), Martha McSally (R-AZ), and Bob Menendez (D-NJ), introduced the "Ending the Diagnostic Odyssey Act of 2019" to permit states to use Medicaid funding for whole genome sequencing (WGS) analysis in children having certain rate diseases.  The bill is a counterpart of H.R. 4144, introduced by Rep. Scott Peters (CA-52), joined by Rep. Shimkus and Mr. Vargas, on August 2, 2019.

    The stated purpose of the bill is "[t]o enable States to better provide access to whole genome sequencing clinical services for certain undiagnosed children under the Medicaid program" and, of course, "for other purposes."  The bill purports to effectuate this legislative purpose by providing the States with an option to expressly achieve the stated objective.  This is to be done by amending Title XIX of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. ch.7, by inserting new section 1947, which states in pertinent part:

    [A] State, at its option as a State plan amendment, may provide for medical assistance under this title to an eligible individual for purposes of providing the individual with whole genome sequencing clinical services.  Sec. 1947 (a)

    Section (b) provides authorization for the state to pay a "health care provider" for WGS to an "eligible individual" (defined later in the bill as individuals who are "eligible for medical assistance under the State plan (or a waiver of such plan)" and are under 21 (or 20, 19, or 18 "as the state may choose" and has been "referred or admitted to an intensive care unit, or has been seen by at least 1 medical specialist, for a suspected genetic or undiagnosed disease; or is suspected by at least 1 medical specialist to have a neonatal- or pediatric- onset genetic disease") (Section 1947(f(1)).  During the first 12 fiscal year quarters (i.e., the first three fiscal years), the Federal percentage applicable to these payments would only provide 75% of the costs.  Part of the Federal support for this program includes planning grants (which shall also require a percentage of State matching funds as determined under section 1905(b) of the statute), and the State plan must establish procedures for referring any eligible individual to a health care provider qualified to provide WGS services (Sec. 1947(c)).

    The bill also contains requirements for the States (Section 1947(d)) to provide within three years of initiation a program under these provisions of the Act reports to the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and the Administrator of the Health Resources and Services Administration on the extent to which these service "reduce health disparities" (presumably disparities existing between those who can and those who cannot afford WGS services under existing law) and the converse, "the extent to which coverage under the State plan (or a waiver of such plan) impedes the use of genetic and genomic testing that may improve clinical outcomes for eligible individuals enrolled in the State plan (or under a waiver of such plan).  Health care providers (Section 1947(e)) must report to the State "on all applicable measures for determining the quality of such service."  Finally, "whole genome sequencing" is expressly defined as:

    [T]he unbiased sequencing of all deoxyribonucleic acid bases in the genome of such individual and, if for the sole benefit of the individual, a biological parent of such individual for the purpose of determining whether one or more potentially disease-causing genetic variants are present in the genome of such individual or such biological parent; and . . . includes any analysis, interpretation, and data report derived from such sequencing.''  (Section 1947(f)(2)).

    Senator Collins's Homepage defines the "genetic odyssey" in the bill's title as the delay children with rare genetic diseases endure, which the Senator says last 5-7 years on average.  The tragedy of this odyssey is that many of these children do not live more than 5 years, making the provisions of the bill a life-and-death proposition for them.  According to the website, "[t]here are approximately 7,000 rare diseases known today; approximately 80 percent of rare diseases are genetic, and about one-half of all rare diseases affect children."  The Senator asserts that her bill is supported by over 100 patient advocacy groups, including "the Genetic Alliance, the Parent Project Muscular Dystrophy, Tuberous Sclerosis Alliance, Alström Syndrome International, Epilepsy Foundation, and the Asthma and Allergy Foundation of America."

    The bill is expected to be taken up in due course; H.R. 4144 has been referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce but the committee has taken no further action since August.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan

    Federal Circuit SealTransitional terms in patent law (conventionally, "comprising," "consisting of," and the more arcane "consisting essentially of") have their own provenance and meaning, denoting limitations that are "open" (comprising) or "closed" (consisting).  But how should a court construe instances where these terms seem to be at odds with one another?  The Federal Circuit provided an answer, at least with regard to the interplay between "comprising" and Markush group language ("selected from the group consisting of") in one of its first opinions of the New Year, Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC.

    The case arose in ANDA litigation over generic versions of Amgen's Sensipar® formulation for treating "secondary hyperparathyroidism in adult patients with chronic kidney disease who are on dialysis and to treat hypercalcemia in patients with parathyroid cancer and primary and secondary hyperparathyroidism."  Amneal (and its affiliated companies), Piramal Healthcare UK Ltd., and Zydus Pharmaceuticals (and its affiliated companies) each filed an ANDA to market a generic version of the drug, and Amgen brought suit, asserting various claims of U.S. Patent No. 9,375,405 against the three defendants (claims 1, 2-4, 6, 8-12, and 14-18 against Amneal, claim 1-6 and 8-20 against Piramal, and claims 1-4, 6, 8-9, 15-17, and 19 against Zydus).  The parties agreed (for the purposes of the appeal) that claim 1 was representative:

    A pharmaceutical composition comprising:
        (a) from about 10% to about 40% by weight of cinacalcet HCl in an amount of from about 20 mg to about 100 mg;
        (b) from about 45% to about 85% by weight of a diluent selected from the group consisting of microcrystalline cellulose, starch, dicalcium phosphate, lactose, sorbitol, mannitol, sucrose, methyl dextrins, and mixtures thereof,
        (c) from about 1% to about 5% by weight of at least one binder selected from the group consisting of povidone, hydroxypropyl methylcellulose, hydroxypropyl cellulose, sodium carboxymethylcellulose, and mixtures thereof; and
        (d) from about 1% to 10% by weight of at least one disintegrant selected from the group consisting of crospovid[o]ne, sodium starch glycolate, croscarmellose sodium, and mixtures thereof,
        wherein the percentage by weight is relative to the total weight of the composition, and wherein the composition is for the treatment of at least one of hyperparathyroidism, hyperphosphonia, hypercalcemia, and elevated calcium phosphorus product.

    The District Court bifurcated proceedings and determined infringement first.  The panel opinion states that "[t]he prosecution history is particularly relevant to [this] appeal."  The relevant portions of this history involved introduction of the Markush groups in subparts (b), (c), and (d), which were not recited in the claim as filed.  The applicant introduced this language into subpart (b) and the Examiner (by Examiner's amendment) introduced the language into subparts (c) and (d) as a condition for allowance to overcome rejections over the prior art (to which the applicant acquiesced).  The significance of this history before the District Court related to whether or not the claim elements should be open to the presence of other components in formulations that would be infringing; Amgen contended such infringing formulations could comprise these unrecited components and the District Court disagreed.  According to the opinion, the District Court held that "Amgen ha[d] not overcome the very strong presumption that the Markush groups for the binder and disintegrant elements are closed to unrecited binders and disintegrants," relying on Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  Under this construction, the District Court found that Amneal did not infringe because its accused formulation contained as a binder Opadry Clear YS-1-7006, a product that contains hydroxypropyl methylcellulose ("HPMC"), polyethylene glycol 400, and polyethylene glycol 8000, which was not recited in subpart (c) (which recited HPMC).

    Similarly, the District Court found that Piramal's accused formulation used pregeletinized starch as a binder which the District Court held was not equivalent to povidone, a compound recited in the Markush language recited in subpart (c) of the claim.  That Amgen accepted the Examiner's amendment to obtain allowance of the claim raised prosecution history estoppel that precluded the District Court from considering any purported equivalents to the compounds expressly recited in the claim according to the District Court.

    On the other hand, the District Court found that Zydus's accused formulation was infringing under § 271(e)(2) because the function of pregelatinized starch in its formulation was as a diluent, and starch was recited as a diluent in the claim.  Thus, the District Court found Zydus literally infringed the claim.

    The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded as to the District Court's decision that Amneal did not infringe based on incorrect claim construction, but affirmed with regard to Piramal's non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and Zydus's literal infringement.  The opinion notes that, "as a preliminary matter," the panel needed to consider its jurisdiction over Zydus, because Zydus had pending defenses and counterclaims of invalidity against Amgen and thus the District Court's judgment was not final.  The opinion further noted, however, that Zydus's counsel at oral argument agreed to abandon these defenses should the Federal Circuit affirm the District Court's infringement decision, resolving any jurisdictional concerns.

    Regarding the District Court's claim construction, that the presence of the phrase "consisting of" in the Markush language introduced during prosecution prevented Amgen from extending its claim to formulations containing other elements, the Federal Circuit held that the District Court had "read more into Multilayer and Shire [Dev., LLC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 848 F.3d 981, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2017)] than is properly found there."  Further the opinion states that:

    Multilayer and Shire did not hold broadly that, whenever "consisting of" Markush group language is present in a particular claim limitation, even when the limitation follows a general claim transition phrase of "comprising," all components of an accused product that perform the general function of the particular limitation must meet the requirements of that limitation, thus precluding components outside the Markush group.  No such issue was presented in those cases.  Rather, each decision held only that the terms of a particular claim limitation that used "consisting of" Markush group language were restricted to members of the Markush group.

    Here, the question before the panel was whether the "binder" and "disintegrant" limitations, written in Markush format, precluded other binders or disintegrants from being in the claimed composition (or an accused infringing embodiment thereof), and the Federal Circuit held that they did not.  The Court's explication of both Multilayer and Shire supported this conclusion (because if not, this panel could not overturn the earlier panels' decision to the contrary).  The panel finds as a "critical[] differen[ce]" here that "[t]here is no language in Amgen's claim indicating that every binder or disintegrant in the claimed formulation must be within the Markush group" because the claim also recites "at least one" of a binder or disintegrant.  Moreover, the opinion states that the remaining limitations in the claims with regard to these components "merely require that those particular binders or disintegrants meet the specified weight-percentage requirements," which the panel asserted "is not inconsistent with the overall composition containing other binders or disintegrants."  Relying on the plain meaning of the claim language (and finding that the specification and prosecution history do not mandate a different conclusion), the Federal Circuit held that the Markush language is not sufficient to support the District Court's construction that the claims do not encompass formulations containing other disintegrants or binders.

    The opinion also found it significant that the claims recite "comprising " with regard to the components contained in the claimed formulations.  Having found nothing in the expressly recited limitations that would be "inconsistent with the presence of binders and disintegrants beyond those identified in those limitations" recited in Markush language, the panel further relied on Amgen's use of the term "comprising" to "reinforce[] the conclusion that the language of those limitations is best construed not to foreclose such additional binders and disintegrants."

    Accordingly, the panel held that the claims properly construed do not preclude infringement if the accused formulation included an "additional component [that is] functionally similar to the component identified in the Markush group limitation," unless there was another basis, not found here, for such a finding.  The panel found that the District Court's claim construction was incorrect and vacated the determination that Amneal's ANDA formulation did not infringe, remanding to the District Court for further proceedings based on the panel's construction.

    The Federal Circuit also vacated the District Court's finding that Amneal's formulation, comprising Opadry, did not satisfy the claim limitation that an infringing formula comprise HPMC, holding that on remand the District Court should determine whether the amount of Opadry in Amneal's formulation comprises 1% to 5% by weight of HPMC.

    Regarding Piramal's product, the question before the Court was whether Amgen was precluded by prosecution history estoppel from a finding that this formulation infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.  The District Court found, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that Amgen had narrowed the claims for "reasons related to patentability" by accepting the Examiner's amendment that inserted Markush language regarding the binder and disintegrant limitations.  Thus, Amgen was estopped from asserting that the Piramal formulation's pregelatinized starch was an equivalent to the expressly recited povidone in its claims (despite a paper submitted on the record during prosecution after the Examiner issued a Notice of Allowance that "[t]hese amendments have not been made in response to a prior art rejection but rather to place the claims in proper format and to better define the claimed subject matter, including equivalents").  And the panel also found unavailing Amgen's argument that these amendments were tangential to patentability because they were made to avoid the prior art.

    Finally, with regard to Zydus's product, the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that its product would infringe Amgen's claims.  In this case, Zydus's product comprised starch as a diluent, a component expressly recited amongst the Markush group of diluents in Amgen's claims.  The panel did not find credible Amgen's expert testimony (proffered with regard to Piramal's product and asserted by Zydus against Amgen's infringement contentions) that starch was a binder and not a diluent (on the ground that the expert proffered inconsistent testimony, changing it somewhat three times).  The panel held that the District Court did not err in it infringement finding and affirmed that Zydus's ANDA formulation literally infringed Amgen's asserted claims.

    Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC (Fed. Cir. 2020)
    Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Lourie, and Taranto
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Lourie

  • By Michael Borella

    USPTO SealIn August, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced that it planned on raising various fees.  One of those involved an additional $400 fee for non-provisional utility application filings with a PDF specification.  This fee would be avoidable if the specification was filed in DOCX format.  The USPTO's electronic filing system (EFS) has supported DOCX specification filings for over two years.

    As of the time of this writing, the USPTO has not made a final decision on this issue.  In anticipation of the fee increase, patent attorneys, agents, and paralegals have been trialing DOCX uploads.  So far, the EFS DOCX parser has proven to work well with many files, but it is rather fragile in some cases, and outright buggy in others.

    DOCX is an open standard for word processing files.  Since Microsoft Word 2007, it has been the default choice for the save format of that application.  Unlike the proprietary DOC files that Microsoft Word used to produce, DOCX files are structured in XML.  This makes them more portable between word processing applications and easier to parse.

    The USPTO justified its encouragement of DOCX adoption based on the format's ability to facilitate instant feedback in EFS regarding common document errors, improved searchability, metadata removal, and general compatibility.  Behind the scenes, it is likely that the USPTO intends to automate some of its application intake processes, such as automatically detecting the number and type of claims and classifying applications into art units.

    We have been testing the USPTO's DOCX upload options in EFS.  What we found was not particularly encouraging.  Most notable was that EFS will often reject a DOCX specification upload, stating that it found one or more particular types of errors in the application file.  But upon inspection, we found that the indicated errors frequently did not exist.  Instead, the parser flags false positives when it encounters legitimate formatting or content that it cannot properly handle.

    One such issue relates to font support.  For one particular application, we received dozens of error messages alleging that the file contained text in the unsupported Century font.  We thoroughly reviewed the application and determined that there was no Century characters present.  After some trial and error, we ultimately determined that this error was actually being caused by our custom Microsoft Word styles.  These styles allow the drafter to rapidly format applications so that they are consistent with one another and pleasing to the eye.  But some of our styles had been based on other styles.  Apparently this was problematic, because the errors went away once we changed these styles to be based on "no style".

    Even worse, one of our applications kept getting rejected because it allegedly contained two or more of the specification, claims, and abstract (EFS DOCX support requires these three sections of the application be uploaded in three separate DOCX files).  Yet, the file clearly contained only the specification.  After manually removing sections of the application in a systematic fashion, we found the culprit — the USPTO's DOCX parser apparently will not accept the word "conclusion" on a line by itself.  When placed in a sentence, no problem.  But on its own, "conclusion" consistently resulted in a rejected upload.  Again, the error provided had nothing to do with the purported problem with the DOCX file.  Only after hours of manual debugging were we able to satisfy EFS.

    Needless to say, DOCX support is not ready for prime time.  Practically speaking, an attorney or agent up against a bar date may find that he or she cannot upload a reasonably-formatted DOCX file, and may be unable to address the issue in the necessary time frame due to the DOCX parser's obtuse and misleading error messages.  Instead, he or she may have to just eat the $400 fee and file a PDF.

    But that's not all.  When you can successfully upload a DOCX file, the USPTO converts it into a PDF.  Afterward, EFS provides a link to the PDF and displays the message, "The PDF(s) have been generated from the docx file(s).  Please review the PDF(s) for accuracy.  By clicking the continue button, you agree to accept any changes made by the conversion and that it will become the final submission."  This effectively puts the onus on the attorney or agent to manually check, line by line, that the USPTO's conversion from DOCX to PDF is correct.  Doing so is especially important if your application contains complex mathematical expressions or chemical formulas.

    We are not to the first to point out some of these issues.  I highly recommend an article by Carl Oppedahl criticizing the USPTO's implementation of DOCX.

    While the USPTO may have legitimate reasons for transitioning to DOCX, the fundamental defects in the DOCX parser reflect a lack of adequate software quality assurance.  Thus, it needs to address these problems before imposing the $400 fee on non-DOCX specification filings.  If anything, the USPTO's attempt to reduce its application intake burden currently transfers much of that burden to individuals preparing the applications.

  • By Donald Zuhn –-

    FireworksAfter reflecting upon the events of the past twelve months, Patent Docs presents its 13th annual list of top patent stories.  For 2019, we identified fifteen stories that were covered on Patent Docs last year that we believe had (or are likely to have) a significant impact on patent practitioners and applicants.  In previous posts, we counted down stories #15 to #11 and stories #10 to #6, and today we count down the top five stories of 2019.  As with our other lists (2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007), links to our coverage of these stories (as well as a few links to articles on related topics) have been provided in case you missed the articles the first time around or wish to go back and have another look.  As always, we love to hear from Patent Docs readers, so if you think we left something off the list or disagree with anything we included, please let us know.  In addition, we will be offering a live webinar on the "Top Patent Law Stories of 2019" on January 22, 2020 from 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT).  Details regarding the webinar, which will focus on a handful of the most important stories on this year's list, can be found here.


    5.  USPTO Updates Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (Not Once, But Twice)

    In January, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office published updated examination guidance regarding the subject matter eligibility of inventions involving abstract ideas.  At first blush, the updated guidance does not appear to be a radical departure from substantive USPTO examination practice despite raising a few additional procedural hurdles that examiners are to overcome before rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  In October, the USPTO released an update to its January 2019 Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, in which the Office sought to clarify issues brought up in public comments on the January Guidance.  The patent community will have to wait and see how the new guidance plays out in practice.  If anything, the additional procedural requirements introduced and the limiting of abstract ideas to only three categories is likely to favor applicants for at least some types of inventions.  It is unlikely, however, that any claims that could be found patent-eligible under previous examination procedures are suddenly going to be viewed as ineligible under the new guidance.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility October Update: Example 46," November 17, 2019
    • "USPTO Publishes Update to Its Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance," October 17, 2019
    • "The PTAB Goes to Europe: Four Recent Section 101 Decisions Designated as Informative," July 28, 2019
    • "USPTO Presentation on Evaluating Computer-Implemented Functional Claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112," June 18, 2019
    • "USPTO on Patent Eligibility — Examples 41 and 42," January 24, 2019
    • "USPTO on Patent Eligibility — Example 40," January 20, 2019
    • "USPTO on Patent Eligibility — Examples 38 & 39," January 15, 2019
    • "USPTO on Patent Eligibility — Example 37," January 14, 2019
    • "USPTO Issues Updated Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance," January 7, 2019


    4.  Post-grant Review of Pre-AIA Patents Constitutional — USPTO Appointment of APJs at PTAB Unconstitutional

    In July, the Federal Circuit in Celgene Corp. v. Peter affirmed a determination by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that two patents owned by Celgene Corp. were invalid.  In rendering that decision, however, the Federal Circuit also addressed on the merits Celgene's argument that retroactive invalidation of its patents under the inter partes review (IPR) procedures introduced into U.S. patent law by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) is unconstitutional because its patents were granted before enactment of these IPR procedures and thus amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment.  The Federal Circuit based its decision that IPRs are not unconstitutional on the history, beginning in 1980, of Patent Office review of previously granted patents, which at least put patentees on notice that the Office could reconsider the validity of the patent grant.  This history made that grant contingent on there not being a successful post-grant challenge, and thus an IPR is nothing more than the latest iteration of such proceedings.

    And then in October, the Federal Circuit in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. determined that the way in which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has appointed administrative patent judges at the PTAB violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2).  According to the opinion, because administrative patent judges are principal officers they must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Federal Circuit Holds APJs Are Principal Officers," October 31, 2019
    • "OSI Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Apotex Inc. (Fed Cir. 2019)," October 8, 2019
    • "Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," August 21, 2019
    • "Celgene Corp. v. Peter (Fed. Cir. 2019)," August 5, 2019


    3.  Courts Continue to Address Question of Sovereign Immunity in Patent Cases

    In April, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari by the St. Regis Mohawk Indian Tribe on the question (answered in the negative by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit) of whether tribal sovereign immunity could protect the tribe from being named as a party in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding after Allergan assigned to the tribe its patents in IPR.  Then in June, in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp., the Federal Circuit determined that State sovereign immunity does not preclude institution of IPR proceedings before the PTAB.  In September, the State of Minnesota filed a petition for certiorari, contending that the Federal Circuit erred in deciding that the University of Minnesota, as an "arm of the state," could not assert sovereign immunity against LSI Corp., which sought to have the PTAB institute an IPR against University-owned patents.  And last fall, the Federal Circuit in Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Boston Scientific Corp. refused to recognize the immunity as advanced by the State, in this case asserted over the question of proper venue.  Given the number of cases in which the issue of sovereign immunity in patent cases has been raised, this issue is likely to be selected again for our top stories list in 2020.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. Boston Scientific Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," September 19, 2019
    • "State of Minnesota Petitions for Certiorari in Regents of University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp.," September 15, 2019
    • "Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," June 16, 2019
    • "Supreme Court to Revisit Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity From IP Infringement," June 4, 2019
    • "Supreme Court Denied Certiorari Writ by St. Regis Mohawk Indian Tribe in Restatis® IPR," April 15, 2019


    2. 
    Federal Circuit Strikes Down Diagnostic Patent in Athena v. Mayo, But Cannot Find Consensus on Subject Matter Eligibility Solution

    In February, in Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC, the Federal Circuit affirmed a District Court decision holding claims 6-9 of U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The '820 patent is directed to methods for diagnosing neurological disorders by detecting antibodies to a protein called muscle-specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK).  In July, the Federal Circuit issued a per curiam Order, denying a petition for rehearing en banc filed by Athena.  The per curiam Order was accompanied by eight opinions, four concurring in the denial of the petition and four dissenting in the denial of the petition.  The four concurring opinions were authored by Circuit Judges Lourie, Hughes, Dyk, and Chen, with Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Reyna, Taranto, and Hughes joining in one of the concurrences and Circuit Judge Chen joining in one concurrence and several parts of another.  The four dissenting opinions were authored by Circuit Judges Moore, Newman, Stoll, and O'Malley, with Circuit Judges O'Malley and Stoll joining in one of the dissents and Circuit Judge Wallach joining in three of the dissents.  Thus, a total of seven members of the Court (Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, Taranto, Chen, and Hughes) authored or joined opinions concurring in the denial, and a total of five members (Circuit Judges Newman, Moore, O'Malley, Wallach, and Stoll) authored or joined opinions dissenting in the denial.  The Federal Circuit had difficulty reaching a consensus on the solution to the problem of subject matter eligibility.  Some judges felt the Federal Circuit was bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Mayo, some hinted that the problem could only be solved by the Supreme Court or that the Federal Circuit would at least benefit from the Supreme Court's guidance, some thought the Federal Circuit could solve the problem by better distinguishing Mayo, and some thought Congress should step in to solve the problem.  Last fall, Athena filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case, requesting that the Supreme Court "provide much-needed guidance on the important question of the patent eligibility of medical diagnostic tests."  (In his brief in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc., the Solicitor General suggested that the Supreme Court "should provide additional guidance in a case where the current confusion has a material effect on the outcome of the Section 101 analysis," offering as one example a case involving the patent eligibility of medical-diagnostic methods, and pointing in particular to Athena v. Mayo.)  The Supreme Court is scheduled to discuss Athena's petition at Conference on January 10, 2020.

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Athena Diagnostics Seeks Supreme Court Review of Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services," December 16, 2019
    • "iNO Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair Distribution Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)," September 3, 2019
    • "Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. LABOKLIN GmbH (Fed. Cir. 2019)," August 22, 2019
    • "Australia Reigns Supreme over U.S. in Patenting Diagnostic Methods," August 6, 2019
    • "The Proper Role of the Federal Circuit," July 25, 2019
    • "Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services — The Dissents," July 17, 2019
    • "Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services — The Concurrences," July 14, 2019
    • "Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019)," July 9, 2019
    • "Invitation to Join Amicus Brief in Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo," April 11, 2019
    • "Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019)," April 7, 2019
    • "Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019)," February 12, 2019


    1.  Supreme Court: Secret Sales Trigger On-sale Bar under AIA

    In January, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether Congress intended to change the status of "secret" sales so as not to trigger the on-sale bar of revised 35 U.S.C. § 102 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) by adding the phrase "or otherwise known to the public."  The Federal Circuit had held that Congress had not done so, and the Supreme Court agreed.  The Court's decision, authored by Justice Thomas, was short (9 pages), unanimous (9-0), and issued quickly (handed down less than seven weeks after oral argument).  The Court recognized that it had "never addressed the precise question presented in this case," but voiced its opinion that "our precedents suggest that a sale or offer of sale need not make an invention available to the public."  The Court based its decision on the well-established principle that, under prior versions of § 102, "secret sales" could trigger the on-sale bar.  These cases were as recent as Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998), and as ancient as a trio of 19th Century cases (Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 (1877); Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1878)).  The opinion credits the Federal Circuit with making "explicit what was implicit in our precedent" with regard to the on-sale bar, citing Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F. 3d 1353 (2001), and Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F. 3d 1368 (1998), in support of its conclusion.  Based on this various precedent, the Court was able to reach the conclusion that Congress did not change what activities raised the on-sale bar, which includes secret sales, because there was insufficient evident of that intent.  The Court relied expressly on the Solicitor General's argument that "if 'on sale' had a settled meaning before the AIA was adopted, then adding the phrase 'or otherwise available to the public' to the statute 'would be a fairly oblique way of attempting to overturn' that 'settled body of law.'"  The Court pointed out that the catch-all phrase "otherwise available to the public" is better interpreted to capture "material that does not fit neatly into the statute's enumerated categories but is nevertheless meant to be covered."

    For information regarding this and other related topics, please see:

    • "Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (2019)," January 22, 2019

  • CalendarJanuary 16, 2020 – Fireside chat with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Director Andrei Iancu (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago Corporate Committee) – 12:00 to 1:00 pm (CT), Chicago, IL

    January 22, 2020 – "Top Patent Law Stories of 2019" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)