• By Joshua Rich —

    Supreme Court Building #2The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") is a Federal criminal statute intended to protect government and other "protected computers" from hacking.  Among other things, the CFAA serves as the basis for punishing anyone who "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer."[1]  But the provision on exceeding authorized access has been extremely controversial, in part because it allows private companies to shape the contours of criminal law through their terms of service.  That controversy has led to a split between the Federal circuit courts on the breadth of the provision, one that the Supreme Court has now agreed to decide through Van Buren v. United States, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, __ U.S. __ (2020).

    In enacting the CFAA in 1986, Congress sought to address the scourge of hackers who had become able to "trespass into" public and private computer systems.  The Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030, included provisions that would protect against "outside" hackers (those who access a computer without authorization) and "inside" hackers (those who exceed authorized access).  The CFAA prohibits hackers from accessing government computers, computers used by banking institutions, and "protected computers."  Under § 1030(e)(2)(B), however, the term "protected computer" includes any computer "which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States" — today, any computer linked to the internet.  And the term "exceeds authorized access" means "to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."[2]

    The U.S. Courts of Appeals have split on whether a person "exceeds authorized access" if he or she is entitled to access under certain conditions (for example, within their scope of employment), but instead accesses that information for an improper purpose.  In the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, obtaining the information for an improper use would not constitute a violation of the CFAA.[3]  In the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, however, there are circumstances under which it may be.[4]  Thus, in some states, accessing information for an improper purpose is a crime; in others, it isn't.  The Supreme Court's decision will remedy that split.

    The "exceeds authorized access" provision is notorious as well because of its part in the death of Aaron Swartz.  Mr. Swartz, a coding savant who was one of the founders of Reddit, was a long-time believer in open access to information on the internet.  He first downloaded and made public for free 2.7 million documents from PACER, the Federal court filing system that normally charges per page.  The Administrative Office of the United States Courts expressed concern that his actions exceed his authorized access.  Emboldened by an FBI investigation that led to no criminal charges, Mr. Swartz went to MIT — which prided itself on its open campus — and used the school's network to access JSTOR (a digital repository to which he had access as a research fellow at Harvard University) and download hundreds of thousands of academic journal articles with the intent to make them freely available.  This time, JSTOR complained that his actions exceeded his authorization under its terms of service and Mr. Swartz was criminally charged.  Mr. Swartz was indicted on thirteen counts (including ten under the CFAA) and threatened with 50 years imprisonment in what was later seen as "overcharging" and overzealous prosecution.  After the U.S. Attorney refused to budge from a requirement that Mr. Swartz serve time in prison, he died by suicide.

    The Van Buren case that the Supreme Court chose to review involves a clear violation of the "exceeds authorized access" provision, if that provision covers situations in which the accesser is entitled to access the information but does so for an improper purpose, and a sordid situation to boot.  Nathan Van Buren was a sergeant on the police force of Cumming, Georgia, a small town in the exurbs of Atlanta.  Van Buren met Andrew Albo, a widower in his sixties who took an unseemly interest in young women — including underage girls and prostitutes — when he was arresting Albo for providing alcohol to a minor.  Van Buren was in financial distress and saw an opportunity to shake Albo down.  Van Buren asked Albo for a "loan" of over $15,000 for fictitious medical expenses; Albo recorded the request and went to the Forsyth County Sheriff's Office, who involved the FBI.  The FBI set up a sting:  Albo would tell Van Buren that he had met a woman at a strip club and wanted to make sure she was not a police officer, and would provide Van Buren with money in exchange.  Ultimately, Van Buren "ran" the license plate numbers that Albo had gotten from the FBI in the Georgia Bureau of Investigation's Georgia Crime Information Center ("GCIC").  As a police officer, Van Buren was empowered to search the GCIC for official business, but not for personal reasons.

    After Van Buren ran the plate numbers in the GCIC, the FBI and GBI showed up at his home.  He admitted that he had made up the story about medical expenses, had received money from Albo, ran the license plate search in the GCIC, and knew that what he was doing was wrong.  He claimed the money from Albo was a "gift," but when asked if he received anything in exchange for the search, answered, "I mean he did give me $1,000."  Van Buren was then indicted, tried, and convicted on one count of honest-services wire fraud and one count of felony computer fraud under the CFAA.  Upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the honest-services conviction based on improper jury instructions and remanded that count for re-trial.  On the CFAA count, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction, even over a challenge that the CFAA did not encompass misuse of a computer by a person who had authority to access it for other reasons.

    In addressing Van Buren's appeal on the CFAA count, the Eleventh Circuit noted that while the appeal was styled as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, it was actually a request to overrule the Eleventh Circuit's precedent in United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).  In that case, the defendant had been an employee of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") who accessed the SSA database to find personal information (including the addresses) of his ex-wife, an ex-girlfriend, the ex-girlfriend's father, former co-workers and their family members, and numerous other acquaintances.  Rodriguez argued that he had not violated the CFAA because "he accessed only databases he was authorized to use," even if for improper purposes.  He argued that the Eleventh Circuit should follow the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with their interpretation of the language of the statute.  The Van Buren court noted that other courts had disagreed with the Rodriguez decision, but it was constrained by the prior-precedent rule to follow the prior Eleventh Circuit holding.  Thus, it applied the Rodriguez decision's holding and found that permitted access that was made for an impermissible purpose violated the CFAA.

    The question the Supreme Court has been asked to resolve is quite simple:  "Whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses the same information for an improper purpose."  The implications, however, are quite far-reaching.  The CFAA is both a civil and a criminal statute.  On one hand, there should be law — and preferably, a Federal law — that prohibits police officers from taking advantage of their positions to obtain information for corrupt purposes.  On the other hand, making any improper use of a computer a violation of the CFAA will encompass anyone using their work computer to check sports scores, shop online, or look for a new job.  It doesn't seem appropriate that such minor (and common) dalliances should be potentially subject to either criminal or civil liability.  But while such a charge would not arise under current DOJ Guidelines and is unlikely for an employer to raise, it is at least a potential outcome that has been raised by certain appellate courts and could result from the Court's consideration of the proper scope of the CFAA.

    [1] 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).

    [2] 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).

    [3] See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

    [4] See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1163 (2013); Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).  The CFAA questions in EF Cutural Travel and Citrin arose in civil cases, not in the criminal context.

  • By Michael Borella —

    USPTO SealIn a post-truth world, it is more tempting than ever to evaluate data based on gut instinct, intuition, and anecdotal evidence.  It is thus refreshing when results of a robust statistical analysis are published, even if the response to the ultimate outcome is, "Yeah, we knew that."

    Case in point, patent eligibility.  Most patent practitioners are likely to agree that the Supreme Court's Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank decision made it more likely to receive 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejections during prosecution before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  Many of these practitioners would also likely concede that Alice made it less predictable as to whether a given claimed invention would run into eligibility issues.  These same practitioners would probably concur that the Federal Circuit's Berkheimer v. HP case as well as the USPTO's 2019 patent eligibility guidance (PEG) made it less likely to receive such a rejection and resulted in the eligibility inquiry being more predictable.

    But most of this is anecdotal.  It is easy to find data supporting the premise that § 101 rejection rates went up after Alice and down after each of Berkheimer and the PEG.  But does this data withstand a rigorous examination?  Thanks to the USPTO's economists, the answer is yes.

    Last week the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office published a study of how the patent eligibility landscape has changed within its art units over the last six years, with emphasis on the inflection points of Alice, Berkheimer, and the PEG.

    Methodology

    The USPTO identified Alice-affected technologies by considering patents litigated in the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit for which eligibility was at issue.  The USPTO's U.S. Patent Classifications for the associated applications were used to identify the Alice-affected technologies, and all other U.S. Patent Classifications were used as the control group.

    Two main metrics were considered — percentage of first-action § 101 rejections and § 101 examination uncertainty.  The former is a simple quotient of first-action § 101 rejections over all first office actions in the Alice-affected technology areas within a defined time period.  The latter is a bit more complicated.  First, the rate of first-action § 101 rejections for each examiner is determined over the time period.  Then, the variance of these per-examiner rates was calculated.  The § 101 examination uncertainty metric was the average of these variances.[1]  Similar metrics were found for the control group.

    The Alice Decision

    In Alice, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.  One must first decide whether the claim at hand involves a judicially-excluded law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea.  If so, then one must further decide whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exclusion.  But, elements or combinations of elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional will not lift the claim over the § 101 hurdle.

    From the data, it is clear that Alice had a statistically significant impact on § 101 rejections.  In the Alice-affected technology areas, the likelihood of receiving a first-action § 101 rejection increased by 31% in the 18 months following the opinion's publication.  Also, Alice increased the § 101 examination uncertainty metric by 26% in these technology areas during the same period.

    The Berkheimer Decision

    While the Alice two-part inquiry is generally carried out as a matter of law, factual issues can come into play when determining whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional.  Berkheimer stands for the notion that when such factual issues are present, a patent application cannot be found ineligible without further review.

    Berkheimer resulted in the first-action § 101 rejection rate in the Alice-affected technology areas dropping from about 35% during March of 2018 to about 28% in early January of 2019.  Further, the uncertainty metric also fell from about 0.12 (its highest point since Alice) to about 0.9 in this time frame.  As a point of reference, in the months before Alice, the uncertainty metric was slightly below 0.9.

    The PEG

    In a nutshell, the PEG breaks the first part of the Alice test into two sub-steps.  In the former, one determines whether the claim recites a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea.  In the latter, one determines further "whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception."  To focus the analysis, the PEG indicates that all abstract ideas should fall into one of three categories:  mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes.  Think of these as the "Three M's" — math, money, and mental steps.

    Similar to Berkheimer, the PEG reduced both the first-action § 101 rejection rate and the uncertainty metric.  The first-action § 101 rejection rate fell steeply in the Alice-affected technology areas, from about 28% to about 18%.  The uncertainty metric dropped from about 0.9 to about 0.5, the latter its lowest point in the decade since Bilski v. Kappos.  Thus, the overall impact of the PEG was greater than that of Berkheimer.

    Analysis

    Given the lack of surprising results in this study, it is tempting to just yawn and say, "So what?"  To some extent, doing so would not be unwarranted — the PEG caused a huge reduction in § 101 rejections and uncertainty — but the Federal Circuit has explicitly stated that it is not bound by the USPTO's guidance.  The USPTO can pat itself on the back for its efforts in providing more consistent and predictable examination with the PEG, but that ultimately may not matter when the federal courts will apply a less patent-friendly test when determining whether to invalidate patents that the USPTO granted.

    But perhaps the most telling aspect of the study is not the data, but instead in the casual way that the authors describe the uncertainty surrounding § 101 and its potential impact on the economy.  Particularly, they take it as given that Alice "created uncertainty in the business and legal communities" and that "[a]mbiguity in the language . . . and in the scope of technologies involving abstract ideas made it difficult to predict how and where the standard would be applied."

    These statements reflect those of federal judges, former federal judges, certain members of Congress, the inventor community, patent professionals, and (of course) USPTO Director Iancu.  There is widespread consensus that Alice's unclear language is problematic and has made it riskier for small and medium-sized businesses to invest to protect their inventions.  Under Alice, patent applications can be rejected (and granted patents can be invalidated) based on subjective and conclusory reasoning.  But perhaps Alice is yet another cynical by-product of the post-truth narrative, where opinions and gut feelings trump objective facts.

    [1] It is not clear from the study whether this average was weighted by the number of first actions per examiner.  Arguably, it should have been so that more active examiners had more influence over the metric than less active examiners.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Latin American Patent Practice: An Overview and A Look at Recent Developments" on April 30, 2020, from 12:00 to 1:00 pm (ET).  Federico Aulmann of Obligado & Cia, Ricardo Nunes of Daniel Law, and Carlos Olarte of OlarteMoure will focus on three key Latin American jurisdictions:  Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, and cover characteristics of their patent systems, practice tips for patent prosecution and litigation, and recent developments that will impact patent practice.  The panel will address the following issues:

    • The patent prosecution systems in these three countries
    • Expediting examination, including through Patent Prosecution Highway options
    • Various aspects of litigation and damages
    • The availability of preliminary injunctions
    • Recent developments, such as implications of COVID-19 and compulsory licensing measures

    The registration fee for the webinar is $135 (IPO member) or $150 (non-member) (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "Remote IP Advocacy During COVID-19" on April 29, 2020, from 12:00 to 1:00 pm (ET).  Erika Arner of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP will moderate a panel consisting of Pam Crocker of That Vanguard Group, Inc.; Jon Fallon of High 5 Games; and Greg Gramenopolous of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP will provide tips and insights for effective remote advocacy and for IP during COVID-19.

    There is no registration fee for IPO members for this webcast (the fee for non-members is $150).  Additional information regarding the webcast can be found here.

  • Morningside IPMorningside IP and IPWatchdog will be offering a webinar on "COVID-19's Impact on IP in 2020 & Beyond" on April 30, 2020 starting at 12:00 pm (EDT).  Carlo Cotrone of Techtronic Industries North America (TTI), Kirk Goodwin of Whirlpool, and Gene Quinn of IPWatchdog will discuss the ramifications of COVID-19 on IP moving forward, what the immediate future looks like for law firms and corporations, and the ways in which patent filing strategies will be impacted.  Additional information regarding the webinar can be found here.

    There is no registration fee for this webinar.  However, those interested in registering for the webinar, should do so here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    University of California-BerkleyOn April 17th, CVC filed its Reply to Broad's Opposition (filed on April 9th) to CVC's Miscellaneous Motion No. 2 to Exclude Evidence filed (on April 2nd), in Interference No 106,115 between Senior Party The Broad Institute, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (collectively, "Broad") and Junior Party the University of California/Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively, "CVC").

    In its brief in support of its Miscellaneous Motion No. 2, CVC argued that four prior art references should not be considered by the Board because they were not cited in any of Broad's papers; declarations from several individuals, including some of Broad's inventors, are inadmissible as hearsay because these individuals had not been made available for deposition; and certain expert testimony fails the Supreme Court's Daubert test for expert testimony admissibility.

    Broad opposed, and its brief made two broad points.  First, Broad characterized the evidence objected to as hearsay was submitted merely as a "proffer" to the Board that set forth Broad's arguments to be submitted during the Priority Phase, and that Broad asserted that CVC made similar proffers relying on purported hearsay during the '048 Interference.  Broad asserted it proffer exception to the hearsay rule for the Sanjana, Lambowitz, and Zhang declarations, as well as the Cong 2013 reference and that CVC's hearsay objections "are, at best, premature."  Not surprisingly Broad defended the competence of its expert Dr. Mirkin, noting that his expertise is relevant to eukaryotic applications of CRISPR technology, specifically having to do with technology for introducing proteins and nucleic acids into eukaryotic cells.

    In its Reply, CVC argues that Broad had not rebutted CVC's hearsay arguments and challenges the authority Broad cited, Byrn v. Aronhime, Patent Inf. 105,384 (McK), Paper 64 at 12:17-20 (PTAB Sept. 20, 2006), as being directed to the narrow context of a motion to change a count.  While not acquiescing that its hearsay arguments might not be persuasive regarding Broad's Motion No. 2, CVC maintained that hearsay precluded the Board from considering this evidence for Broad's Motion No. 3 and Motion No. 4, or Broad's Oppositions to CVC's Motion No. 1 and Motion No. 2 (for the benefit of priority).  CVC supports its arguments with citations from Broad's Motions No. 3 and 4 and how Broad asserted the evidence CVC objected to in its Miscellaneous Motion No. 2 in support of its Substantive Motions and Oppositions to CVC's Substantive Motions.  CVC argues that "[n]othing in the statutes, rules, or case law authorizes a movant to rely on inadmissible evidence to support Motions and Oppositions related to priority benefit or de-designating claims.  To the contrary, motions must be supported by evidence, and the admissibility of that evidence may be challenged in a motion to exclude," citing SO ¶¶ 121.4.1; 152.2.1; 155.2.2.  Moreover, CVC argues that the evidence it objects to was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and thus inadmissible hearsay and not, as Broad argues merely a proffer of the evidence Broad might prove.

    CVC also rebuts Broad's "tit-for-tat" argument that CVC itself had relied on similar evidence in the earlier Interference No. 106,048, by distinguishing that evidence as "a proffer of CVC's best proofs to support a motion to change the count," citing Univ. of S. Calif. v. DePuy Spine, Inc., Patent Interference 105,653, Paper 169 (PTAB 2013).  CVC also asserts that unlike its allegations against Broad in its brief in support of its Miscellaneous Motion to Exclude, its affiant was made available for deposition.

    With regard to Broad's expert, CVC characterizes Broad's statements in its Opposition brief as overstating Dr. Mirkin's expertise.  The brief reiterates the differences in Dr. Mirkin's area(s) of expertise ("Broad has failed to show that Dr. Mirkin's experience with gold and silver nanoparticles somehow makes him an expert on the technical issues relevant to CVC's priority benefit") and lack of specific expertise in CRISPR technology:

    Dr. Mirkin's CV and cross-examination testimony demonstrate he has no specialized expertise regarding CRISPR systems or gene editing.  Tellingly, he has never even published a single paper on CRISPR systems, or even used CRISPR himself.  At deposition, Dr. Mirkin could not answer basic questions about how CRISPR-Cas9 systems actually function in eukaryotic cells.

    For these reasons CVC reiterates its argument that Dr. Mirkin's testimony should be excluded.

  • Calendar

    April 28, 2020 – "Gender Diversity in Innovation Toolkit — Virtual Roadshow" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 to 3:00 pm (ET)

    April 28, 2020 – "Innovation Triage: Identifying What is Ripe to Pursue Today" (IP.com and IPWatchdog) – 12:00 pm (EDT)

    April 28, 2020 – "All You Need to Know About Functioning of Eurasian, Russian and Ukrainian Patent Offices and Judiciary Systems During Coronavirus Pandemic"(Gorodissky & Partners) – 09:00 to 09:30 (BST) (session 1) or 12:00 to 12:30 (EST) (session 2)

    April 28, 2020 – "Industry Ideas & Trends Roundtable Amidst COVID-19" (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago Trademark & Anti-Counterfeiting Committee) – 12:00 to 1:00 pm (CT)

    April 30, 2020 – "Using Patent Landscapes to Develop IP Rich Products and Valuable Patent Positions" (Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner) – 12:00 pm (CT)

  • IPcomIP.com and IPWatchdog will be offering a webinar on "Innovation Triage: Identifying What is Ripe to Pursue Today" on April 28, 2020 starting at 12:00 pm (EDT).  Arvin Patel of TiVo, Kirk Goodwin of Whirlpool, Gene Quinn of IPWatchdog, and Jim Durkin of IP.com will focus on identifying and pursuing innovations in a cost-effective manner.  Additional information regarding the webinar can be found here.

    There is no registration fee for this webinar.  However, those interested in registering for the webinar, should do so here.

  • GorodisskyGorodissky & Partners will be offering a webinar entitled "All You Need to Know About Functioning of Eurasian, Russian and Ukrainian Patent Offices and Judiciary Systems During Coronavirus Pandemic" on April 28, 2020 from 09:00 to 09:30 (BST) (session 1) or 12:00 to 12:30 (EST) (session 2).  Yury Kuznetsov and Maksym Bocharov of Gorodissky & Partners will provide an overview on the modes in which the Eurasian, Russian, and Ukrainian Patent Offices, as well as national judiciaries, continue to function despite the business shutdown due to the COVID-19 quarantine in Russia and Ukraine, including explaining the availabilities of term extensions and restoration, and providing practical advice to those seeking patent and trademark protection in these jurisdictions.

    While the webinar is free, attendees must register in advance.  Those wishing to register can do so here.

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Trademark & Anti-Counterfeiting Committee will be presenting an "Industry Ideas & Trends Roundtable Amidst COVID-19" on April 28, 2020 from 12:00 to 1:00 pm (CT).  Those interested in registering for the online Zoom meeting should e-mail Karen S. Hwang at khwang@kshlawgroup.com.

    Additional information regarding the online roundtable can be found here.