• Moeller IPMoeller IP will be offering a webinar entitled "Patent Term Extensions in Emerging Markets: The Case of Mexico" on March 25, 2021 at 11:00 am (ET).  The webinar will address patent term extensions in Mexico, including a judicial case decided in October 2020 by the Supreme Court extending the term of a patent claiming a pharmaceutical product, which had been prosecuted for over 5 years.

    While there is no cost to participate in the program, those interested in attending the webinar can register here.

  • Mathys & SquireMathys & Squire will be offering a webinar entitled "Patent Drafting for Success in Europe" on March 25, 2021 at 2:00 pm (ET).  Martin MacLean and David Hobson of Mathys & Squire LLP will discuss tips and tricks to build into your drafting practice to safeguard against common pitfalls and maximise your probability of securing robust patent protection in Europe.

    While there is no cost to participate in the program, those interested in attending the webinar can register here.

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    When it comes to SARS-CoV-2 infection (and resulting COVID-19), it seems our Neanderthal ancestors giveth and taketh away.  Genetic material inherited from interbreeding between Neanderthals and early humans has been shown to increase the risk of serious COVID infection (see "Inherited Neanderthal Gene Encodes Genetic Risk for COVID-19").  Recently, further explication of correlations between Neanderthal remnants in genomic DNA of modern humans has shown that a sequence on chromosome 12 is associated with milder COVID disease.

    These results were reported by the same researchers who reported the earlier, more sinister connection between Neanderthal DNA and COVID-19, which included Svante Pääbo, who almost single-handedly created the science of detecting Neanderthal DNA in archeological samples (and living humans; see Neanderthal Man: In Search of Lost Genomes).  In this more recent study, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, and entitled "A genomic region associated with protection against severe COVID-19 is inherited from Neandertals," it is a region of chromosome 12 that contains the relevant, seemingly protective genetic locus.  Humans bearing this haplotype have a 22% reduction in risk of severe COVID infection.  It is present "at substantial frequencies in all regions of the world outside Africa," a hallmark of Neanderthal DNA which arose after humans migrated from the place of our initial evolutionary development.  Unlike the earlier, deleterious locus on chromosome 3, for which there is no known function, the region of chromosome 12 associated with milder COVID infection is known to encode proteins that are expressed "during infections with RNA viruses" according to these authors.  Another unique inheritance pattern is that this locus appears to have increased in frequency between 20,000 and 10,000 years ago and again approximately 1,000 years ago, which suggests selection that could have been very effective at times when effective medical intervention would have been practically non-existent.

    With regard to the function of this locus in Neanderthals themselves, the authors posit that these early humans would have needed to adapt to environments outside Africa which undoubtedly would have included new pathogens that cause infectious disease.  Such a pattern of genetic variants that affect genes involved in innate immunity have been shown to have been introduced into Homo sapiens sapiens ancestors from Neanderthal and Denisovan populations, including for example genes that reduce susceptibility to H. pylori infection.

    The current study involved genetic assessment of 2,244 terminally ill COVID 19 patients as part of the Genetic of Mortality in Critical Care (GenOMICC) consortium.  In addition to the two loci that have been discussed previously and herein, genetic loci relevant to COVID-19 infection have also been found on chromosomes 6, 19, and 21.  Specifically with regard to the chromosome 12 locus, these researchers reported association of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) with this relevant chromosomal loci; this locus satisfied the further criterion of being absent from the genomes of 108 Yoruba individuals (the loci on chromosome 6, 19, and 21 failed this characterization test).  The chromosome 12 SNPs were found to be in linkage disequilibrium (i.e., are separated at meiosis at lower than expected frequencies) and formed a ~75kb haplotype.  The researchers interpreted this inheritance pattern to be consistent with introduction of these sequences into the modern human gene pool by interbreeding with Neanderthals.  Further genetic analyses informed these researchers that this region was not a remnant of DNA inherited by both Neanderthals and modern humans from the time (~550,000 years ago) they diverged but rather were more consistent with mixing when the two populations co-habited beginning ~100,000 years ago.  This locus is also present in the three authentic Neanderthal genomes available in current databases.

    The geographic distribution of this locus in modern human populations is illustrated by this figure,

    2021-03-18 Imagewhich shows the veritable absence in Africa and variable frequencies (25-30%) around most of the rest of the world.

    The researchers found three genes (OAS1, OAS2, and OAS3) that encode oligoadenylate synthases present at this Neanderthal-derived locus.  These genes in modern humans are induced by interferon produced by RNA virus infection and which produce a product (short-chain polyadenylates) that activate a double-stranded RNA specific nuclease.  Other antiviral responses are induced as well as a consequence of this generic induction, suggesting a mechanism for resistance to RNA virus infection.  Finer scale genetic mapping of SNPs and COVID severity protection implicated OAS3 (although these authors state that this association is "tenuous").  Also of interest is a SNP in the OAS1 gene which alters splicing of the encoded mRNA transcript and produces several isoforms of the encoded protein in its modern human counterpart. Compared with these isoforms, the researchers reported that the ancestral Neanderthal protein has higher enzymatic activity.  This isoform is also present in African populations outside this locus, which these authors posit was an ancestral form lost in humans during the time they left Africa.  Functionally, this splice site variant has been associated in earlier studies with protection against West Nile Virus.  The Neanderthal-derived locus also has missense variants in the OAS1 and OAS2 genes, and two synonymous variants in the OAS3 gene, but these are a mixture of variants present in ancestral African DNA and later acquired in Neanderthal DNA.  The missense variant in the OAS1 gene has been previously associated with moderate-to-strong protection against SARS-CoV infection, although these researchers could not rule out the possibility that the responsible genetic factor was merely closely linked to this gene.  Finally, this Neanderthal locus on chromosome 12 also seems to provide increased resistance to Hepatitis C infection.

    The authors conclude by noting the suggestion that this Neanderthal-derived DNA, particularly the OAS loci contained therein, had undergone positive selection over the past 1,000 years and their hope that "[f]uture studies of human remains from historical times will clarify whether, and when, this occurred."

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    USPTO SealWhile those interested in the outcome await the April 9th filing of motions authorized by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in Interference Nos. 106,126 (between Senior Party Toolgen Inc. and Junior Party The Broad Institute, Harvard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, collectively termed "Broad") and 106,127 (between Senior Party Toolgen Inc. and Junior Party The University of California/Berkeley, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier, collectively termed "CVC"), some "housekeeping" types of activities have arisen in these interferences as well as in the earlier-declared Interference No. 106,115 between Broad as Senior Party and CVC as Junior Party.

    The Board issued a Memorandum on March 1st and an Order on March 9th.  In the Memorandum, the Board considered CVC's request for an order "sequestering" members of Broad's legal team in upcoming depositions of two Broad witnesses, Drs. Breaker and Ellington.  CVC's reasons in support of their request is that "Dr. Breaker adopted the entirety of Dr. Ellington's direct testimony as his own testimony in paragraphs 25 and 32 of his declaration," and thus the expectation is that "the cross examinations of Drs. Breaker and Ellington will significantly overlap and without sequester of Broad's counsel the second witness to be deposed may be prepared knowing what questions will be asked."  This would give the Broad an unfair advantage, according to CVC, and thus be prejudicial.  Also, CVC notes that in the earlier interference between these parties, No. 106,048, CVC had agreed to sequester their counsel.

    Not surprisingly Broad opposed, based in part on the distinction with the '048 Interference that that sequestration was part of a compromise involving Broad's objections to CVC's evidence.  Here, in contrast, CVC did not object to Broad's evidence and has agreed to the deposition schedule without sequestration.

    To CVC's detriment, the Board stated that the Junior Party did not assert any basis in the Standing Order for sequestration.  In addition, the Board stated that it was not clear why deposition of one witness who agrees with the testimony of another witness to be deposed, and adopts portions of that witnesses testimony, should be sufficiently prejudicial to CVC to warrant sequestration.  This sentiment is supported by the fact that the witnesses will be testifying under oath, according to the Board, and that testimony is required to be "based on their own knowledge and experience."  Moreover, the agreement between the parties in the '048 Interference is not binding on the Board, according to the Memorandum, which notes that "[t]he parties are free to reach an agreement in this proceeding and to agree to any deposition scheduling that complies with the time constraints of the interference schedule and other rules or orders."  Finally, the Memorandum states that CVC will be able to argue that the Board should give no weight to any witnesses' testimony or should be excluded.  As a result, the Board declined to issue CVC's requested offer, "[b]ecause CVC has failed to persuasively explain why counsel should be sequestrated for the depositions of Drs. Breaker and Ellington."

    In its March 9th Order, the Board ordered that, pursuant to the parties' request in an e-mail dated March 5th, the page limits for oppositions to each party's priority motion be extended from 10 pages to 60 pages.

    The news from the '126 and '127 Interferences is even less momentous, being merely Notice from Toolgen to the Board in each interference that it had, pursuant to Standing Order ¶126, had settlement discussions and, after a "good faith effort" by the parties in each interference had not agreed to settle either interference.

  • By Michael Borella —

    A computer does just three things:  receives information in the form of bits, transforms this information, and provides output based on the information as transformed.  The receiving may take place by way of various types of input modalities, such as keyboards, touchscreens, mice, audio microphones, video cameras, network interfaces, sensors, and so on.  The transforming may involve a literally infinite number of possibilities in the form of algorithms.  The output may also take on various modalities, including images displayed on a screen, audio, storage to volatile or non-volatile memory, and transmission by way of network interfaces, just to name a few.

    Given the fundamental nature of information processing in computing technology, it would be natural to assume that such endeavors would be protected by patent law — after all, the stated constitutional goal of such law is to "promote the progress of science and useful arts."  But due to how the Federal Circuit has interpreted recent Supreme Court decisions, a ground-breaking information processing invention can be unpatentable even if it is novel and non-obvious.  More than a philosophical or legal concern, the Federal Circuit's narrow (and many would agree, inconsistent) view on what subject matter can be patented causes business and economic uncertainty across the many industries in which computers have become ubiquitous.

    Differentiating between which types of information processing are eligible and which are not is fraught with danger, and even the most experienced patent attorneys (not to mention judges) can find this area of the law perplexing.  As a consequence, many entities are struggling to obtain patents on inventions that involve information processing.

    This article dips into these waters by exploring the origins of this current bias against information processing, and attempts to stake out a few areas in which claims to information processing may find more or less success.  Such an understanding, in turn, provides practical considerations for patenting decisions as well as prosecution and litigation strategies.  Nonetheless, more clarity is ultimately needed from the courts.

    At the outset, it is undisputed that information itself is not patentable.  Information per se, in bits, writing, or some other form, is not a process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, the four statutory categories set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101.  See Digitech Image Techs. v. Electronics for Imaging (Fed. Cir 2014).  Further, attempts to make the mere storage of data on a tangible medium statutory will fail due to printed matter doctrine.  See C R Bard Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2020).  Thus, trying to obtain a patent on a CDROM containing a performance of Beethoven's 5th Symphony will come to naught no matter how you claim the representation of the information encoding the performance.

    Information processing is different.  It involves steps taken by a computer (or other devices or maybe even humans) to obtain, transform, and provide information.  Information processing inventions are not directed to static information — they are drawn to using and changing information.

    Nonetheless, ever since Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, it has become increasingly difficult to patent information processing claims, no matter how innovative or useful.  In that case, the Supreme Court brought the ill-defined notion of abstract ideas to the fore, which has been used extensively by the Federal Circuit, district courts, and the USPTO to find information processing claims ineligible, even if those claims are otherwise statutory.

    A case that typifies the current difficulties information processing inventions can face is Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A. (Fed. Cir. 2016).  The claims therein recited, albeit in a rather broad fashion, (i) gathering streams of data related to sensor measurements of a power grid, (ii) from this data, determining events occurring in the power grid, and (iii) displaying visualizations of the events.  Here, the events could be faults in the power grid that could cause the power grid to fail.  Despite this sort of invention seemingly being of the "science and useful arts", the Federal Circuit knocked down the claims under § 101.  The Court wrote "[t]he focus of the asserted claims . . . is on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis."  This, according to the Court, directly leads to the conclusion that the claims are focused on an abstract idea.

    The justification for this conclusion was broken down to mirror the three functional parts of the claim.  Regarding the gathering steps, the Court cited to precedent in Digitech, as well as the pre-Alice case CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2011), for the notion that gathering information is an abstract idea.  Particularly, this gathering was deemed to be an abstract mental process even when carried out by computer.  CyberSource cites to a line of cases reaching back to Gottschalk v. Benson for the notion that gathering data for mathematical calculations has little — if any — patentable weight under § 101.  Regarding the data analysis steps, the Court once again viewed these as abstract mental processes, and cited to support for such a conclusion going back to Benson.  Finally, regarding the displaying steps, the Court cited to Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2014), where displaying an advertisement was considered to be an abstract idea.  The Court wrote:  "we have recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis."  What you are hearing is an echo of the so-called post-solution activity from Parker v. Flook.

    The Court also took issue with the claims' lack of specificity, noting that "rather than claiming some specific way of enabling a computer to monitor data from multiple sources across an electric power grid, [the claims] purport to monopolize every potential solution to the problem—any way of effectively monitoring multiple sources on a power grid."  In other words, the claims recited an outcome rather than specific steps to achieve that outcome.

    So the issue seems to be not only the information processing nature of the claims, but also that the processing allegedly could be carried out mentally, included mathematical calculations, and lacked specificity.  We also know from related cases that the type of information can matter.  For example, processing of financial, business, or social information can be viewed as abstract.  See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (Fed. Cir. 2015); Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2015); Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Systems & Software, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2018).

    But information processing inventions are not doomed to fall under the § 101 inquiry.  Notably, the claims of McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016), involved obtaining rules and phoneme timing, generating morph weights based on the rules and phoneme timing, and then producing lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters from the morph weights.  Like Electric Power Group, these claims involve gathering, transforming, and displaying information.  Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit found the claims to not be abstract.

    Why the different outcome?  Several reasons, including the claims being more specific and not directed to a mental, financial, or business process.  The Court looked to the specification for the understanding that a goal of this invention was to eliminate the subjectivity associated with human-rendered animations.  Thus, the invention was more closely tied to a computer than that of Electric Power Group.

    The dichotomy of these two cases represents how patent eligibility can be twisted like the proverbial nose of wax.  In Electric Power Group, the Court viewed the claims in a deconstructionist manner — looking at the invention as a series of discrete pieces and finding each of them abstract.  In McRO, the focus was on what the claim as a whole provided — the problem that it solved.  The reasoning of Electric Power Group certainly could have been used to justify the opposite outcome in McRO.  But the latter's claims were just different enough to be found eligible.

    Sometimes information processing inventions can be made patent-eligible by having their output control another device or physical process.  The classic case of this is Diamond v. Diehr, the claims of which, at their core, involve a computer receiving temperature readings, the computer performing calculations based on these readings, and the computer causing a rubber press to change state when the calculations take on a certain value.  But not all technologies lend themselves to being claimed similarly to Diehr.

    Indeed, there are many computerized inventions that are similar to McRO, in that they solve a specific problem in a specific manner without affecting another device — i.e., the processing is all "in the box".  And yet, they are still vulnerable to subject matter eligibility challenges in the USPTO and the courts.  As one example, a virus scanning application may involve no more than gathering data (network traffic and/or files), analyzing that data (determining if it matches a virus signature), and providing output (an indication of a detected virus or the lack thereof).  As another example, a machine learning application may involve no more than gathering data (training sets), analyzing that data (training the model), and providing output (the trained model).  As a further example, a computer-aided design application may involve no more than gathering data (parameters of the design), analyzing that data (formulating the design), and providing output (the final design).

    In each of these cases, it may not be viable to claim the invention in a way that is directly analogous to Diehr, because doing so would lead to a problem with divided infringement.  For instance, the entity that makes the computer-aided design application is unlikely to also use the designs to create physical products.

    For at least these reasons, there is a need for the Federal Circuit to elucidate and define what factors are more or less likely to make an information processing inventions patent-eligible.[1]  The current take on § 101 puts too much flexibility in the hands of judges and examiners; particularly, at what level they consider the claims, how much emphasis they put on the specification, and the role that prior art plays.  Patentees, especially small- and medium-sized companies with limited budgets, need to make smart decisions with respect to their investments in patents.  Without clarity, the risks and rewards associated with such investments will remain difficult to quantify.

    [1] One approach that we have outlined before is to, when possible, draft claims that are specific, solve a technical problem in a technical fashion, and recite features not in the prior art. 

  • By Kevin E. Noonan —

    Federal Circuit SealThe Federal Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) rejecting claims for failure to satisfy the subject matter eligibility standard under 35 U.S.C. § 101, in ex parte examination of claims to methods and related computing systems for genetic haplotyping in In re Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.

    The claimed method is recited in representative claim 1:

    1.  A method for resolving haplotype phase, comprising:
        receiving allele data describing allele information regarding genotypes for a family comprising at least a mother, a father, and at least two children of the mother and the father, where the genotypes for the family contain single nucleotide variants and storing the allele data on a computer system comprising a processor and a memory;
        receiving pedigree data for the family describing information regarding a pedigree for the family and storing the pedigree data on a computer system comprising a processor and a memory;
        determining an inheritance state for the allele information described in the allele data based on identity between single nucleotide variants contained in the genotypes for the family using a Hidden Markov Model having hidden states implemented on a computer system comprising a processor and a memory,
            wherein the hidden states comprise inheritance states, a compression fixed error state, and a[ Mendelian inheritance error]- rich fixed error state,
            wherein the inheritance states are maternal identical, paternal identical, identical, and non-identical;
        receiving transition probability data describing transition probabilities for inheritance states and storing the transition probability data on a computer system comprising a processor and a memory;
        receiving population linkage disequilibrium data and storing the population disequilibrium data on a computer system comprising a processor and a memory;
        determining a haplotype phase for at least one member of the family based on the pedigree data for the family, the inheritance state for the information described in the allele data, the transition probability data, and the population linkage disequilibrium data using a computer system comprising a processor and a memory;
        storing the haplotype phase for at least one member of the family using a computer system comprising a processor and a memory; and
        providing the stored haplotype phase for at least one member of the family in response to a request using a computer system comprising a processor and a memory.

    As explained in the opinion, the claimed method involves determining haplotype phase, i.e., "a process for determining the parent from whom alleles—i.e., versions of a gene—are inherited."  The specification describes using genotype data and pedigree data and applying a known prior art method as disclosed in Roach et al., Analysis of Genetic Inheritance in a Family Quartet by Whole Genome Sequencing, 328 SCIENCE 636 (2010).  This method uses a statistical tool termed a hidden Markov model for these predictions.  The specification discloses that prior art methods were inadequate and that the disclosed methods cure such shortcomings, increasing the number of possible prediction to 97.9% by "factoring additional data into the analysis."  These additional data include linkage disequilibrium data (a measure of reduction of expected crossing over frequency events during meiosis produced, inter alia, by marker genes being adjacent to one another on a chromosome) obtained from an art-available database of single nucleotide polymorphisms, as well as "transition probability date," wherein "transition probabilities are set depending on 'the expected number of state transitions and the total number of allele assortments in the pedigree.'"

    The Examiner, affirmed by the PTAB, rejected the claims based on their being directed to "abstract mathematical algorithms and mental processes."  According to the Federal Circuit's opinion, the Examiner and the Board applied the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), in making this determination.  With regard to step 1 of the test, the Examiner and Board determined that all steps recited in claim 1 were "directed to" either "mental steps of receiving, storing, or providing information[ or ]mathematical concepts"; the rationale is that the steps recited receiving or analyzing information, "which humans could process in their minds," or mathematical algorithms.  (It would be doctrinally beneficial for both the USPTO and the Federal Circuit to abandon the charade that the types of processes recited in claims related to computer implementation could be performed in the human mind; surely there must be a better rationale for the question-begging conclusion than this!)  Further, the Board also held that these mathematical algorithms, steps, and processes were not "integrated into a practical application" (which might be a surprise to patentees and patients who benefit from the application of the claimed methods).  The distinction drawn by the Board was that the method does not improve computer technology, citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), but rather provides an improved mathematical analysis (which results in a seemingly unappreciated practical application in genetic analysis).

    Completing its Alice analysis, the Board concluded that the claims did not satisfy the requirements of step 2 either, insofar as they did not "include additional limitations that, when taken individually or as a whole, provide an inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea into patent eligible subject matter" (an analysis that illustrates one again the wisdom Congress demonstrated generations ago in substituting obviousness for "inventive concept").  The recited steps "did not go beyond the well-known, routine, and conventional" according to the Board.  And in the philosophical coup de grace stemming from dicta in Justice Thomas's opinion in AMP v Myriad Genetics, the Board stated that the claimed invention was patent-ineligible "although the claims may provide a valuable contribution to science."

    Certain other claims, which recited as an affirmative step "providing the drug for treatment" did not transform the genetic analysis claims to patent-eligible ones for failing to satisfy the "five specificities" recited by Judge Lourie in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), because "they are not directed to a specific method of treatment, do not identify specific patients, do not recite a specific compound, do not prescribe particular doses, and do not identify the resulting outcome."

    The Federal Circuit affirmed (not surprisingly, under the circumstances) in an opinion by Judge Reyna joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Lourie.  The opinion recited the Court's familiar litany of purported obeisance to the Supreme Court's subject matter eligibility jurisprudence, down to Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), with regard to claims relying on mathematical algorithms.  After parsing claim 1 according to the context of its analytical steps, the Federal Circuit held that the Board was correct in finding this claim patent-ineligible because "Claim 1 recites no concrete application for the haplotype phase beyond storing it and providing it upon request."  The Court's response to Stanford's argument that "the specific application of the steps is novel and enables scientists to ascertain more haplotype information than was previously possible" was that "we are not persuaded" even if they were to accept Stanford's argument, nor was this panel convinced even if the invention provides the claimed advance in genetic analysis that the process is "an improved technological process" (which raises the question of the wisdom of denying patent eligibility to an invention that provides an improvement in genetic analysis that does not require a concommittant improvement in the technological process).

    Having found no legal (not logical) fault in the Board's determinations regarding step 1 of the Alice test, the Court turned to step 2, finding no error in the Board's determination regarding this step, because "Claim 1 recites no steps that practically apply the claimed mathematical algorithm; instead, claim 1 ends at storing the haplotype phase and 'providing' it 'in response to a request.'"  This rhetorical formulation evokes Justice Breyer's objection to the claims Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012), which curiously was not cited in the opinion.  This is perhaps because the clear distinction with the case before the Court is that everything except the correlation recited in the Mayo case was known in the prior art.  And the failure to recite "a specialized computer or a computer with a specialized memory or processor" in claim 1 here was enough to confirm patent ineligibility, analogous to the use of known detection methods that the Court used to sustain invalidation of claims directed to detecting cell-free fetal DNA in maternal blood in Ariosa v. Sequenom.  The opinion states:

    The written description makes clear that the mathematical steps performed, and the types of data received, as claimed, are conventional and well understood in the prior art.  . . .  Thus, taken individually, the limitations of claim 1 fail to transform the claims into a patent eligible application [emphasis added].

    Illustrating that a willingness to apply Alice seems to include a similar willingness to ignore Diamond v. Diehr (1981).  To Stanford's argument that the claim recites an ordered combination of elements, it is enough for this panel to conclude that because "[t]he alleged innovation accomplished in claim 1 is in the mathematical analysis itself, namely, in the receipt of data, executing mathematical calculations, and storing the resulting data, [t]he alleged innovation therefore subsists in 'the basic tools of scientific and technological work.'"

    And none of the limitations recited in any of the dependent claims in the application, including those directed towards drug treatment, rise (in this panel's view) above the characterization of the claims "do[ing] nothing more than recite the haplotype phase algorithm and instruct, 'apply it,' as the Supreme Court has prohibited," citing Alice instead of Mayo.

    Nothing about this decision is surprising; fortunately it is also non-precedential.  But that very fact should be enough to illustrate the importance of the Supreme Court granting certiorari in American Axle & Mfg. v. Neapco Holdings to perhaps straighten out the illogical morass that is subject matter eligibility at the Federal Circuit.

    In re Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (Fed. Cir. 2021)
    Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Lourie and Reyna
    Opinion by Circuit Judge Reyna

  • CalendarMarch 16, 2021 – "Patent Strategies for Personalised Medicine and Medical Devices" (HGF Limited) – 7:00 am (ET)

    March 16, 2021 – "Implementing and Enforcing Standard Essential Patents — Practical Perspectives from the U.S. and Europe" (Foley & Lardner and Linklaters) – 8:00 am to 9:00 am (GMT)

    March 16, 2021 – "Patent and IP Law in the Age of COVID" (McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP) – 10:00 am to 11:15 am (CT)

    March 17, 2021 – "Resources for Protecting Your Intellectual Property" (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 12:00 pm to 1:30 pm (ET)

    March 18, 2021 – "The Power of Bioinformatics: A Focus on Capturing Bioinformatics Innovation as Part of an IP Strategy" (HGF Limited) – 7:00 am (ET)

    March 18, 2021 – "China IP Basics, Part 2: Enforcing Your Intellectual Property Rights" (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) – 9:00 to 11:00 am (ET)

    March 18, 2021 – "Implementing and Enforcing Standard Essential Patents — Practical Perspectives from the U.S. and Europe" (Foley & Lardner and Linklaters) – 11:00 am to 12:00 pm (EST)

    March 18, 2021 – "Trade Secrets Summit – Part I" (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition Committee) – 12:00 pm to 2:30 pm (CST).

    March 18, 2021 – "An Overview of Global Issues Based on IPO's Special 301 Comments" (Intellectual Property Owners Association) – 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm (ET)

    March 18, 2021 – Virtual Panel Discussion on Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession (Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Committee) – 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm (CST)

    March 24-25, 2021 – FDA Boot Camp (American Conference Institute)

    April 26-27, 2021 – Paragraph IV Disputes Conference (American Conference Institute)

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Committee will be presenting Virtual Panel Discussion on Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession on March 18, 2021 from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm (CST).  The panel will feature Antonette N. Smith of Just the Beginning (JTB) – A Pipeline Organization; Josie M. Gough, Assistant Dean, DE&I, School of Law, Loyola University Chicago; Sandra S. Yamate of The Institute for Inclusion in the Legal Profession; and Hon. Ann C. Williams (Ret.) of Jones Day, Just The Beginning Beginning – A Pipeline Organization, and the Black Women Lawyers' Association of Chicago; and Hon. Virginia M. Kendall, U.S. District Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

    The panel discussion is free for IPLAC members.  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • IPLACThe Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition Committee will be presenting Part I of a "Trade Secrets Summit" on March 18, 2021 from 12:00 pm to 2:30 pm (CST).  R. Mark Halligan of Fisher Broyles LLP; Sean Driscoll, Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. Attorneys' Office; and Jennifer French, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation will review trade secrets case law developments in 2020 and early 2021, and what civil practitioners should know about investigations and prosecutions of trade secret misappropriation under the Economic Espionage Act.

    The registration fee for the presentation is $25 (non-members), $10 (students and seniors), and free for IPLAC members.  Those interested in registering for event can do so here.

  • IPO #2The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) will offer a one-hour webinar entitled "An Overview of Global Issues Based on IPO's Special 301 Comments" on March 18, 2021 from 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm (ET).  Stephen Bauer, retired, Medtronic Inc.; Dean Harts of 3M Enterprise Operations; and Sharon Reiche of Pfizer will provide an overview of significant IP policy concerns across different countries and regions based on IPO's comments made during the U.S. Trade Representative's Special 301 review, note issues that IP practitioners need to be aware of, and point out global trends in IP law and policy.

    The registration fee for the webinar is $150 for non-members or free for IPO members (government and academic rates are available upon request).  Those interested in registering for the webinar can do so here.